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ABSTRACT 
 
Slaying the Leviathan: 




This dissertation argues that Catholic social scientists were the key theorists and designers of 
the post-1945 Western European order. Between 1920 and 1950, Catholics transformed from 
reactionary monarchists into Christian Democrats—a transition that has yet to be convincingly 
explained. The answer, I argue, should be sought at the level of social thought: following a number 
of anthropologists and political scientists, I suggest that modern governance is related far more 
closely to social theory, and social science, than it is to political theory, narrowly understood. 
Catholics lacked a genuine political theory, but they did not lack a sociology—and it is the latter that 
is required to govern a modern state. Following this insight, my research uncovered the forgotten 
universe of Catholic social science, showing how it was produced in the interwar years and put into 
practice after 1945.  
I trace three figures as exemplars of three different regional traditions: Jacques Maritain 
(France), Waldemar Gurian (Germany), and Eugen Kogon (Austria). Their stories of exile, 
incarceration, and furious intellectual production are paradigmatic of Europe’s tragic century. Each 
of them began on the authoritarian right wing, suffered at the hands of Nazism, and emerged after 
1945 as leading lights of the Christian Democratic culture that remade Western Europe. The 
dissertation traces their stories in deep context as a way to reconstruct the social-scientific, 
transnational imagination of interwar Catholicism. This methodology allows us to see how European 
Catholics, faced with interwar crisis, developed theories of economic growth and political order that 
were just as sophisticated as anything on offer from socialists or liberals. In the end, it was more 
influential as well—the European welfare state, after all, was born under Catholic auspices.   
The fundamental insight of Catholic social thought was that the state must devolve its 
authority to a complex of subsidiary and super-national institutions: families, Churches, professions, 
and charity organizations were to be charged with social welfare, while international institutions 
guarded international peace from power-hungry nation-states. In the interwar period, marked by 
étatiste projects of social-economic modernization, Catholics were left in the cold. World War II, 
however, changed everything. It did not simply alter political borders: crucially, it affected the very 
norms of international political and economic governance. While the state retained a great deal of 
political and economic power, its monopoly on sovereignty was chastened by a constellation of new 
institutions: the Marshall Plan, the UN, NATO, and European federalism appeared above the state, 
while the states themselves abjured mass nationalizations and supported subsidiary institutions 
(churches, families, regions) as delivers of welfare.  
Taking advantage of this new configuration of power, Christian Democratic parties rose to 
power across the continent and ensured that European reconstruction rehabilitated the nuclear 
family, empowered international and subsidiary institutions, and avoided large-scale nationalization 
of industry. In other words, the geopolitical arrangement of the late 1940s allowed Catholics, in 
alliance with American political-economic might, to come to power and put their social-scientific 
principles into practice through the creation of new social market economies. European Catholics 
had spent the interwar years calling for a new Christendom, organized according to social Catholic 
principles. My dissertation suggests that, after 1945, they found one.  
The research contained in this dissertation draws on research from over a dozen archives 
and more than seventy periodicals and newspapers. This capacious source base allows for a 
reconstruction of the transnational network of Catholic knowledge production across, primarily, 
France, Germany, and Austria, but also into Switzerland, Italy, Iberia, and the Atlantic World more 
broadly. This is the broadest source base in any study of modern European Catholicism, and this 
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It is customary to begin the acknowledgments by pointing out that, despite the writer’s belief 
that the dissertation would be a long and lonely process, it was in fact a deeply communal 
experience. This is true, but only to a point: writing a dissertation, as anyone would attest outside the 
confines of the “acknowledgments” genre, is a solitary experience, characterized more by lonely 
nights tapping away than convivial bull sessions. I say this not in order to diminish the assistance of 
others, but to point out its true significance. The aid I’ve received has been like bright stars of 
compassion in the dark night of dissertating. For all of it I am truly grateful. 
 I’ll begin with the teachers that led me to history and to my topic in the first place. First and 
foremost I must thank Linda Gerstein, my undergraduate mentor, who brilliantly showed me that 
history was the royal road to the life of the mind. It could be, that is, everything that I was casting 
about for as an undergraduate: insight into meaning, into social practice, into human relationships, 
into ideas. She showed me that the past is another world, and one that is not even past. I should 
thank my students at Shanghai High School, who suffered through my early attempts at history 
lecturing as I came to the conclusion that I had a genuine love for teaching history—it was this 
experience that led me to graduate school. At Columbia, I have had the privilege of working in an 
extraordinarily dynamic and exciting place to study European history. Volker Berghahn introduced 
me to European historiography; Mark Mazower taught me what it is to read like a historian. Carol 
Gluck nursed me through the emotional crisis that is perhaps the only mandatory feature of 
graduate education (surely one can get out of orals somehow?). Pierre Force introduced me to 
political economy, and, along with Fred Neuhouser, taught me to read as a philosopher; Harry 
Harootunian rekindled my waning faith that history can have a political conscience (or was that a 
political unconscious?). Paul Hanebrink was incredibly generous with his time and expertise—this 




 I have been blessed with two superb advisers: my debt to Samuel Moyn and Susan Pedersen 
is incalculable. Intellectually, they molded my occasionally unyielding clay into a shape resembling a 
genuine historian. Professor Moyn is the most perceptive reader, of my own work as well as that of 
others, that I have encountered, and he has shown me, through his pedagogy and his own scholarly 
example, how to bring intellectual history into dialogue with other forms of history and other 
disciplines. Professor Pedersen, through her own example and through her near-horror at my utter 
ignorance of so many topics, has lit a fire under me that, I hope, never goes out. Her indelible 
example has shown me the frisson, however unfashionable, of dense archival work and institutional 
awareness (how does the electoral system of the Third Republic work?). The intellectual side is only 
half of the adviser’s task, and Moyn and Pedersen shined at the administrative sides as well. This 
may sound minor, but any graduate student will attest that it is not. 
 Despite the popular misconception, a dissertation is not primarily an intellectual project, but 
an institutional and financial one: a thick network of institutions and funders is necessary to keep the 
dissertator in the archive. Columbia University has been a constant supporter, of course, providing 
enough summer funding and teaching stipends to keep me float. The German Academic Exchange 
Service [DAAD] sent me to Dresden for some much-needed language training, while the American 
Theological Librarianship Society supported my early efforts to chart the landscape of religious 
publishing. The Council for European Studies, through its pre-dissertation grant and its conference 
invitations, helped me in the fragile early stages of defining my project. The Social Science Research 
Council supported a year of research abroad, while the Consortium for Intellectual and Cultural 
History supported me for a summer as I tried to make sense of what I had found.  
 That said, a dissertation is also an intellectual project, and over the years innumerable people 
have helped me track down sources, corrected my errors, and suggested new avenues for 




conference at the University of Eichstätt, a warm audience at the European Social Science History 
Conference, and another at Cambridge University’s Political Theory and Intellectual History 
Workshop. Multiple commenters, particularly Udi Greenberg and Anson Rabinbach, provided some 
stellar insights at the German Studies Association, while another cluster of professors helped me at 
Columbia’s European History Workshop. In the key late stages of the writing, an interdisciplinary 
audience at the Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy helped me to think more 
broadly about my evidence and conclusions (William McCallister is specifically to be thanked here). 
Lastly, the Remarque Institute, again in the key last phases of writing, invited me to a Kandersteg 
Seminar on Religion—an unforgettable experience that helped my theoretical concerns snap into 
focus at just the right time (discussions here with Piotr Kosicki, amongst others, were extremely 
useful and enjoyable). 
 The raw material of a dissertation comes, again, not from one’s head but from arcane 
institutions known as libraries. I am grateful to the many librarians, too many to list here, who have 
supplied me with a steady stream of books, journals, inter-library loans, and more. I am particularly 
grateful to the archivists at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, the Landesarchiv Nordrhein-
Westfalen, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn, Erzbistum Köln, the Jacques Maritain Center at the 
University of Notre Dame, and the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, also in Munich. Special mention 
should be made of the Cercle d’études Jacques et Raïssa Maritain in Kolbsheim, where I was the 
recipient of extremely generous hospitality—and intellectual stimulation—from René Mougel.    
 Dissertations are a financial and intellectual struggle, yes, but also an emotional one: 
dissertating, to repeat, is a lonely experience, and a support network of friends, family, and pets is 
the only thing that keeps one from collapsing into a puddle of footnotes. I will err on the side of 
brevity here, but Adam Bronson and Simon Taylor, in particular, are worthy of thanks. During my 




Steve Milder stand out here. The debt I owe to family is such that it feels wrong to even mention it 
in a dissertation as shot through with flaws as this one surely is. They produced a person, not a 
dissertation (while the person is doubtless as flawed as the dissertation, responsibility for remaining 
errors must be my own). Suffice it to say that without Mom and Dad, Becky and Murray, Nana and 












We’ll be utilitarian, military, American and Catholic. Very Catholic! You’ll see! 
 







It is indeed possible that when everything has finally been destroyed, power will fall to the Catholics. 
However, that will probably not happen quickly. 
--Paul Adams, 19261  
 
A good Christian is, unbeknownst to himself, a liberal. 
--Wilhelm Röpke, 19442 
 
 When the dust settled on Europe after World War II, the Europe that remained bore little 
resemblance to its predecessor. The culture and social order of pre-1939 Europe had been 
decimated just as much as its industrial and military resources. As breadlines lengthened and 
acrimonious trials continued, it seemed that the continent was headed towards decades of misery. 
This did not happen—at least not in the West. Surprisingly, Western Europe after 1945 experienced 
decades of runaway economic growth and political stability. Perhaps the devastation was not as total 
as once thought: the seemingly crushed economies righted themselves with stunning speed, and 
Europe as we know it was born.  
 But what of culture, and specifically political culture? If the economic recovery required the 
survival of resources, organizations, and expertise from the prewar era, was this not also true of 
ideology? Most historians have thought not: the robust belief in parliamentary supremacy and 
legitimacy has most often been explained as a novel feature of the post-1945 landscape, a product of 
the prestige of wartime democracy and the power of American arms. Europeans, the familiar story 
goes, were simply tired of ideology and retreated from the trumpet blasts of violent belief to the 
familiar environs of familial and village life. The family and the local were celebrated ad nauseam, 
while the “totalitarian state” of left and right was criticized as a Leviathan of bureaucratic despotism, 
                                                
1 Paul Adams to Erik Peterson, 14 October 1926, quoted in Barbara Nichtweiß, “Apokalyptische Verfassungslehren: 
Carl Schmitt im Horizon der Theologie Erik Peterson”, in Bernd Wacker, ed., Die eigentlich katholische 
Verschärfung (München 1994), 37-88, here 85.  




denying the eternal dignity of the human person. As a continent, Europe retreated from Hitler and 
Mussolini to Pushkin: “My greatest wish, a quiet life/And a big bowl of cabbage soup.”  
 This does seem, at first glance, like a reasonable response to the horrors of war. As millions 
of soldiers scrambled back to their homes, unaware if their family was alive or what they would eat if 
they were, the fate of their race and class was not foremost in their mind. But just as matériel and 
expertise survived from prewar decades, one cultural-political institution, above all, emerged from 
the wreckage to take a surprising leadership role: the Catholic Church. The Church was everywhere 
after 1945, enjoying renewed prestige and authority. Charles de Gaulle, Robert Schuman, Konrad 
Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard, Alcide de Gasperi, Leopold Figl (chancellor of Austria, 1945-53), and 
many other founders of the new Europe were unabashedly Catholic. Their religion entered the 
public sphere in a way that would have been inconceivable in the 1920s. The most obvious example 
of this is the new hegemony of a political movement that dominated the post-1945 decades in 
Western Europe more than any other: Christian Democracy. 
 Christian Democracy is the greatest political success story of twentieth-century Europe. 
Even in Germany and Italy, Christian Democrats ruled for far longer than their more familiar 
predecessors, while the support of the Catholic masses for democratic parties and governments is 
among the most salient social-political phenomena of the century. The trajectory and origins of the 
movement, however, remain little understood. Christian Democrats, who preached a fundamentally 
conservative and localist ideology, are simply seen as the political exponents of the new anti-
ideological tenor of the times. 3 Those historians who have sought its origins implicitly legitimate this 
narrative by looking exclusively at those predecessors that resemble Christian Democracy most 
                                                
3 This is the basic story we get from the most influential synoptic accounts of modern European history: Tony Judt, 




superficially: those Catholics, vanishingly small in number, who actively supported parliamentary 
government in the 1920s and before.4  
It is, to be sure, widely recognized that Western Europe was reconstructed in a peculiarly 
conservative key. The Resistance had nourished utopian dreams of a new and socialist Europe that 
would arise from the ashes of war. In the cold light of day, geopolitical realities kept this from 
happening, as anti-Bolshevik fervor, stoked by American armies and Marshall funds, kept 
Communists from power and broke the back of the left. As Charles Maier, Philip Nord, Susan 
Pedersen, Richard Vinen, and others have shown, the post-1945 welfare state was primarily a 
creation of bourgeois conservatism and traditional elites. Especially on the continent, its roots lie in 
anti-Bolshevism and the technocratic circles of the 1930s, not in the fiery rhetoric of the trade 
unions or the Resistance. As Maier in particular has argued over the decades, there was a 
fundamental similarity between the economic stabilizations of the post-WWI and post-WWII 
periods: both times, socialist demands were defused through a neo-corporatist gambit of collective-
bargaining and interest-group politics, mediated by the state.5  
The shocking transformation of Catholic political culture, though, remains unexplained. 
Catholics had been, for decades, rabid opponents of modern European parliamentary democracy—
opponents, that is, of the very Europe that they were soon to celebrate and, to a large degree, create. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, most Catholics had supported authoritarian political solutions. Indeed, just 
as Christian Democracy was the default political option for post-1945 Europe, Catholic 
authoritarianism was, for much of Europe, the default political option in the interwar period. In 
                                                
4 See, for instance, Jean-Dominique Durand, L’Europe de la Démocratie chrétienne (Paris, 1995); Wolfram Kaiser, Christian 
Democracy and the Origins of European Union (New York, 2007).  
5 For a summation, see Charles S. Maier, “The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century 




Spain, Portugal, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia, and France (Vichy), authoritarian 
Catholic leaders came to power with the enthusiastic support of the Vatican. 
How are we to explain this transition between an authoritarian and a democratic 
Catholicism? Of those historians who have waded into these waters, most of them posit a rupture 
between the authoritarian Catholicism of the 1930s and the Christian Democracy of the 1940s. The 
only green shoots of Christian Democracy they find in the interwar period are those Catholics, 
vanishingly small in number, who actively supported parliamentary government in the 1930s and 
before. World War II, according to this hypothesis, took the familiar, reactionary options off the 
table, which allowed the previously-marginalized Christian Democrats to rush into power, leaving 
disappointed reactionaries with nowhere else to turn.  
This is largely unconvincing, given the deep continuities that clearly existed between the 
interwar and postwar periods. As many scholars have shown, there were broad continuities in social 
policy, bureaucracy, and economic structure between the 1930s and 1940s: it beggars belief that 
political culture would undergo a dramatic transformation across the same period. Before 
continuing, I should make it clear that this is not a story of iron continuity: there was significant 
change in political culture, just as there was in social policy. I am merely suggesting that, just as 
historians are trained now to find connections between Vichy and the Fourth Republic at the level 
of policy, we look also for connections at the level of political culture.  
Pope Leo XIII, in many ways the founder of modern Catholicism, points us towards a 
solution. He was the pope of Ralliement, a policy goading French Catholics to acclimate themselves 
to the Republic. He was also, however, the pope of Rerum Novarum (1891), an encyclical that laid out 
the social teachings of the Church. Leo made clear, that is, that while the Catholic Church is 
officially agnostic when it comes to questions of political form, there is official dogma when it 




previous historians have wondered, did Catholics become acclimated to democracy as a political form? 
They have been guided by an interpretation of European History as a sort of medieval morality play, 
in which the character called “Democracy” fends off a number of contenders before emerging 
victorious, due to a number of inherent virtues. If we are interested above all in democracy’s passion 
play, then we have no choice but to posit a rupture between interwar and postwar Catholicism—or, 
more broadly, between interwar and postwar European political culture. But, as Leo XIII makes 
clear, Catholics were doctrinally obligated to remain indifferent to political form. Catholics simply 
did not understand the social order in terms of “politics”, or “democracy.” This explains the near-
total lack of “Catholic political theory” in the years since 1890: there simply is no such thing. Leo 
XIII, to reiterate, had made it clear that Catholics have no political theory, while emphasizing 
simultaneously that they did have a social theory: that is, a sociology. This was quite a common 
refrain, in fact. “Catholicism is powerful because it is, above all, a sociology,” declared Ferdinand 
Brunetière, editor of the Revue des deux mondes, in 1905.6 Ernst Karl Winter, an Austrian Catholic who 
would go on to serve as vice-mayor of Vienna under Dollfuss’s authoritarian regime, argued 
similarly. “In order to solve the problem of sovereignty in a Catholic sense,” he writes, “the theme 
must be understood as sociological, and not legal.”7 
This might seem like a political disadvantage, but, as Carl Schmitt points out in his Roman 
Catholicism and Political Form, this political agnosticism is in fact the very source of Catholicism’s 
enormous power. To understand how, we must remain alive to the specific form that modern power 
takes. As Timothy Mitchell and James C. Scott and Mark Bevir have shown from the perspective of 
political science, and as Philip Nord and Adam Tooze have shown from the perspective of history, 
                                                
6 Quoted Albéric Belliot, Manuel de sociologie catholique (Paris, 1911), 590.  




and as Giorgio Agamben has shown from the perspective of philosophy, we need to look far 
beyond the vagaries of political leadership if we are to understand the exercise of modern power.8  
Nord refers to the post-1945 states as “technocorporatist” states, and describes the French Fourth 
Republic in terms that strongly recall Mitchell’s portrayal of Egypt at the same time: these are states 
that are governed by a particular conjunction of social-scientific knowledge and bureaucratic 
planning.9 The slippery concept of “democracy,” in other words, is not an especially helpful rubric if 
we want to understand how European states rebuilt themselves after 1945.  
In a phrase: Catholicism is a sociology—modern power requires, above all, a sociology. This 
should not sound especially radical. I am merely interested in placing Catholicism on the same 
playing field as its competitors. Liberalism and socialism, Catholicism’s two great opponents, were 
not political theories in any simple sense. They were both engaged in complex rethinking of modern 
economic and social order. As Howard Brick has detailed in Transcending Capitalism, American 
theorists at this time were united in the idea that “capitalism” as theory and practice was outdated 
and needed to give way to more organized and socially-beneficial forms of economic organization. 
Catholics were doing the same thing, and learning at the feet of the same masters. As we will see, 
                                                
8 Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings (Cambridge, MA, 1998); Philip Nord, France’s New Deal (Princeton, 2010); J. Adam 
Tooze. Statistics and the German State, 1900–1945 (New York, 2001); Mark Bevir, Democratic Governance (Princeton, 2010); 
Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts (Berkeley, 2002); Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa 
(Stanford, 2011). For a critical perspective on this era’s discovery of society, see Bruno Latour, “Gabriel Tarde and the 
End of the Social,” in The Social in Question, ed. Patrick Joyce (London, 2002), 117-50. These figures are all operating, it is 
probably clear, from a broadly Foucauldian perspective (as Foucault makes clear, it does not matter who sits in the 
center of the Panopticon, or how they got there).  
9 This might explain the collapse of political-theory proper between the 1940s and 1960s, famously decried by Peter 
Laslett in 1956. Characteristic figures from across the Cold War West—Isaiah Berlin, Michael Oakeshott, Ernst-
Wolfgang Böckenförde, Raymond Aron, Ronald Dahl—are more properly anti-political thinkers, committed as they 
were to forms of “pluralism” that would deprive the field of the political of as much autonomy as possible. For 
traditions of pluralism in American political thought and its critique by the New Left, see, among others, Darryl Baskin, 
“American Pluralism: Theory, Practice, and Ideology,” Journal of Politics 32 (1970), 71-95; Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the 
Future (Baltimore, 2003); Ira Katznelson, Desolation and Enlightenment (New York, 2003); Edward Purcell, The Crisis of 




Catholics took the same sociological, post-capitalist turn as social theorists in non-Catholic 
traditions.10 
Once we think of Catholicism as a means of comprehending and managing social reality – in 
other words, as a social science in an age of competing social sciences – its contribution to political 
culture between 1920 and 1950 snaps into focus. Catholics did not support the post-1945 states 
because they had become enamored with “democracy” in the abstract. Instead, they legitimated 
certain forms of democracy, which incarnated a social order that was, in many ways, representative 
of Catholic social thought as it had developed for decades. While there were all sorts of changes in 
Catholic political-social thought in the interwar period, which will be traced in the chapters to come, 
the fundamental argument here is that Catholics supported the post-1945 order not because they 
were weary or because their favored fascist solutions were off the table, but because the new order is 
what they had wanted all along. The postwar moment, therefore, had just as many continuities in 
politics and culture as it did in society and economics. In this sense, and at least until the firestorm 
of the 1960s, Western Europe remained God’s continent. 
Bishop von Ketteler and the Catholic Turn to Sociology  
 In the late nineteenth century, European intellectuals turned to the problem of “society.” 
Alongside older accounts of the birth of “sociology” in the work of H. Stuart Hughes and others, a 
cluster of more historical studies by the likes of Stefan Collini, James Kloppenberg, and Daniel 
Rodgers have shown how this new framework was ratified in actual political practice: the birth of 
sociology, that is to say, was conditioned by the advent of new, activist states that were interested in 
administering this newly-discovered entity through a variety of means.11 This literature has focused 
                                                
10 Howard Brick, Transcending Capitalism (Ithaca, 2006).  
11 H. Stuart Hughes, Consciouness and Society (New York, 1958); Stefan Collini, Liberalism and Sociology (Cambridge, 1979); 




on socialists, new Liberals, and liberal Protestants—and for good reason, as these were the standard-
bearers of the new sociological imagination and politics. Catholics, however, took the sociological 
turn, too, and in ways that would bear historical fruit after 1945. They have, however, been almost 
entirely ignored, giving a historical imprimatur to the Catholic belief, here voiced by Romano 
Guardini, that  “das Katholische is kein Typus neben anderen.”12 
This is a surprising omission, insofar as the welfare state that is the presumed telos of these 
studies, at least in Europe, truly came into being under Catholic auspices. Once the dust had settled, 
and Western Europe embarked on its Wirtschaftswunder, the Catholic tradition reigned supreme, as 
Christian Democratic parties came to power across the continent. Old-style nationalism had been 
discredited (or outlawed), while the gentlemanly liberalism of the French Radicals or German DDP 
had followed the vanguard English Liberals into irrelevance. Even the socialists were forced to take 
a backseat; where they had a hand in governing at all, as in Austria or the Netherlands, it was in 
coalition with the Christian Democrats. And while the socialists were forced to back away from 
Marx and the language of class warfare in the 1950s, Catholics never gave up on their own gurus of 
social theory. 
 Catholic sociology decidedly was not a rearguard action, undertaken unwillingly and with 
noses held so as to keep the godless working classes from slipping into socialism. Catholics put 
together a dynamic and complex social theory, and Catholic institutions gathered immense quantities 
of data to buttress it. In many cases, they learned a great deal from their competitors. To take just 
one example: Dan Rodgers has demonstrated that the Kathedersozialisten, notably Adolph Wagner and 
Gustav Schmoller, played a major role in turning Euro-American social theorists away from 
liberalism and towards sociology. Amidst the American progressives and European socialists filling 
their lecture halls, at least one Jesuit could be found. This was Heinrich Pesch, who emerged from 
                                                




his study with Wagner and Schmoller to become the most influential Catholic sociologist in 
Wilhelmine Germany (this will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3).13  
And while Pesch differed in some ways from his teacher, he shared with them a desire to 
exorcize the specter of “atomization,” widely held to be haunting Europe in the late nineteenth 
century. It is an open, because unanswerable, question whether or not such a phenomena is 
produced by modern capitalist societies (the question presumes, anyway, a peculiarly atavistic, 
Democritean notion of the “atom”). They do, however, produces discourses of atomization as surely 
as they produce any other commodity. The old bugbear of Manchestertum, if it had ever lived at all, 
was more or less dead by the 1880s: very few believed, any more, that the free market could be left 
to its own devices, and very many believed that modernity was headed directly, as Tocqueville had 
taught, towards frightening forms of “individualism.” English conservatives turned to Randolph 
Churchill, and the Liberals to T.H. Green. In France, Frédéric Le Play, the Catholic sociologist, 
joined hands at least thus far with the sociological imagination of the Third Republic, represented 
most prominently by Emile Durkheim. In Germany, where laissez-faire policies had never made 
much headway, the Kathedersozialisten oversaw a sociological turn in German policy and thought, just 
as Bishop von Ketteler laid out the most brilliant and influential Catholic sociology of the nineteenth 
century. Meanwhile, in Austria the liberalism of Ringstrasse Vienna gave way to Austro-Marxism and 
Karl Lueger’s Christian Socials. 
 Why, if Catholics took the turn to sociology in the late nineteenth century, and criticized 
“individualism” and unrestrained capitalism as much as anyone else, were they such destabilizing and 
critical denizens of the political landscape? In France and Germany, Catholics were among the 
strongest opponents of the emerging political and social order, while in Austria, Lueger ensured that 
Catholics fulminated against socialism and modernity as strongly as their coreligionists to the West. 
                                                




There are a few easy answers to this question: Catholics were opposed to modernity in some sense, 
or they longed for a vanished and bucolic order, or they were xenophobic, or in thrall to a 
reactionary Vatican. These answers are comforting in their simplicity, and fully in line with the 
reigning interpretation of the Catholic trajectory, but, as the chapters to come will argue, they fly in 
the face of the evidence. 
 For a better reading of what made Catholics different—what made them out of step with 
their times—we can turn to Bishop von Ketteler (1811-77). It is he, and not Pius X and certainly not 
Christ, who stands at the origin of our story, and I’ll discuss him here as an introduction to Catholic 
social theory in the interwar period. His work represents the first genuine confrontation between 
Catholicism and the new social-economic world of the nineteenth century, and his response shaped 
all of those that came after. As a bishop in the Rhineland, he was well-positioned to lead the way. 
There were not many places where a longstanding university culture coincided, geographically, with 
rapid industrialization in the 1840s: the university towns of Berlin, Paris, and Oxbridge were 
preindustrial, both economically and theoretically. The Rhineland, though, was different. Ancient 
universities here coincided with breakneck industrialization in one of the only regions to fully 
develop so early in the century. Two major figures observed the social and economic changes of the 
1840s Rhineland, and were appalled at the injustices that they saw and the “atomism” it created. 
They created two sets of theories that would battle one another for the next century. One of these 
two was Kettler. The other was his almost-exact contemporary, who wrote his dissertation on 
Epicurean theories of the atom and its ties to abstract individualism: Karl Marx.  
 Like Marx, Ketteler was fantastically influential, despite the fact that his legacy was, again like 
Marx’s, carried in numerous, sometimes contradictory, directions. For reasons to be explained 
below, my discussion will begin with the three major milieux that structured Catholic political life in 




political culture of each milieu, although taking his legacy in quite different directions, can be traced 
biographically back to Ketteler. French social Catholicism is rooted in a chance encounter between 
French aristocrats, in German prison during the Franco-Prussian war, and Ketteler’s works. German 
Catholicism, too, is unthinkable without Ketteler: his disciples were the founders and theorists of the 
German Zentrum. Franz von Hitze, another disciple, served in the Reichstag and founded the 
Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland, the central organization for Catholic thought and action in 
Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany. Karl von Vogelsang, a student of Ketteler’s, brought his insights 
to Vienna, where he became the grand doyen of Austrian Catholic thought.  
 Ketteler did much more than simply condemn all modern developments, crying like Lear for 
a return to a vanished order. Although he spent his life combating the errors of socialism, he shared 
all of the moral outrage, and much of the social-scientific analysis, of his enemies (indeed, a bizarre 
rumor circulated according to which Ketteler had actually baptized Lasalle!14). “O yes,” he declared 
in 1848, “I believe in the truth of all those sublime ideas that are stirring the world to its depths 
today.”15 As a member of the Frankfurt Parliament of that fateful year, Ketteler cast his lot with the 
liberals (keeping in mind, as James Sheehan has shown, that “liberalism” was quite a fractious and 
confused phenomenon at the time16). He was a close, and not altogether unsympathetic, reader of 
both Marx and Lasalle, while he applauded some of the étatiste social reforms initiated by Bismarck, 
such as the state takeover of the railways. He wanted a more just social order, in which industry 
would play a major role and in which workers could augment their wages through cooperative 
ownership of the means of production. He defended the right of labor to organize, and lauded the 
curtailment of the workday. More broadly, he wanted to overturn the abstract individualism thought 
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to be embedded in modern economic formations, while simultaneously protecting the increased 
production and technological innovation they produced.  
 Ketteler believed, however, that “those sublime ideas” cherished by liberals and socialists 
could not be realized through liberal or socialist methods, and he stridently opposed both Marx and 
Bismarck, both of whom explicitly disavowed him (Marx in a letter, Bismarck in the Reichstag). The 
competing solutions for social order, deprived of Christian teaching, would lead to tyranny. Even 
socialism, he predicted, would yield the “slavery of the Labor state.” Likewise, he thundered 
throughout Bismarck’s reign that the state was encroaching on territory that was not its own: the 
Church, most notably, but also the economy. The end result of all of these developments was 
“unbridled competition amongst the people dissolved into isolated individuals under the sole 
Control of an absolute monarch or an equally absolute National Assembly.”17 
 The antidote, and the only one, was a “return to corporative forms,” by which he meant 
subsidiary institutions, legitimated by natural law, that would mediate between the individual and the 
state. This is Ketteler’s grand and simple idea, which would be passed down to generations of 
Catholics after him. His system, like those to come, was based throughout on the divinely-instituted 
right to private property, threatened with “unjustifiable encroachment” by socialist reform. Private 
property was defended as both the most charitable and the most efficient way to husband God’s 
resources. While Ketteler did not doubt that these rights were being abused, these abuses were the 
direct result of atheism and the corollary replacement of charity, defined as the Christian form of 
taxation, with the taxes that modern States were levying by force. Economic transformation could 
never come from above, by fiat, but from below, leavened by moral regeneration and the principle 
of charity, mediated by natural social forms.  
                                                




 Ketteler was not so naïve as to think that private charity, as traditionally understood, could 
alone reform the social order. A legal framework was surely necessary to protect the rights of the 
worker and set the parameters for a socially just economy, without itself dominating that economy: 
the state, for Ketteler, was not simply to vanish, as in Marx, but to structure the economy and protect 
its natural, corporate order without dominating it. Practically, this would take the form of 
cooperative production, as virtuous employers, without delegating their property rights to a 
crusading and atheist state, would sell off much of the enterprise to the workers themselves, who 
would then, at least partially, own their own workplaces and share in the fruits of their own labor. 
The economy would be organized by cooperative guilds, as in medieval Christendom, instead of by 
competing classes.18  
Although Ketteler was a modern figure in many ways, he also drew upon much older 
traditions of Catholic metaphysics. Catholicism is a religion of mediation: this is the key to all of 
these new political ideals, tying them both backwards to Catholic theology and forwards to 
contemporary political thought. The Catholic does not stand, like Job, shivering before a thundering 
God. Instead, he is enmeshed in a web of authority figures—parents, priests, bishops—each of 
which partake of Paul’s dictum that all true authority is rooted in God. In earth as it is in heaven: the 
space separating man and God, however large it might be, is not empty. It is full of life: demons on 
the one hand, but also the panoply of saints and, above all, the Virgin Mother herself. “God the 
Father,” as one recent memoirist has it, “was rarely addressed directly. There were intermediaries to 
carry one’s petition to him.”19 
 Although often seen as a forerunner of “Christian Democracy,” Ketteler was uninterested in 
questions of political form (personally, he advocated a Greater Germany centered in Catholic 
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Austria, although this was far from the centerpiece of his work). He was for more interested in a  
management of modern economic forces and capital through putatively ancient Christian principles 
of social harmony and charity. The state would have a role to play, but a circumscribed one within a 
larger hierarchy of workers’ cooperatives, families, and Churches. The right to private property 
would be paramount, and the state would not take over or manage industries, for reasons of both 
morality and efficiency. Worker’s rights were to be protected, while avoiding the rhetoric of class 
conflict, admitting the impossibility of perfect income equality, and protecting the productive 
capacities of the nation as a whole.  
 It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Ketteler would have looked with pleasure on the 
economic reconstruction of Europe after 1945, regardless of the Christian nature of the parties 
involved. Postwar states trumpeted decentralization, social justice, and productivity, while avoiding 
large-scale nationalizations or class conflict. Under the guise of “anti-totalitarianism,” which was, as 
we’ll see, a Catholic invention, Ketteler’s fear of sovereignty was universalized across the political 
spectrum, as socialists and liberals united behind the formerly Catholic criticism of the nation-state 
project. Political actors of all stripes were in favor of a wide-ranging “federalism,” that would parcel 
the monopolized sovereignty of the state to sub-national institutions, like families and villages and 
churches, and super-national institutions, like the ECSC and the U.N. The purpose of the 
dissertation is to show that this is no accident—that Ketteler’s successors played a major role in 
constructing and imagining the post-1945 settlement in Western Europe and Austria. 
The Twin Aims of the Dissertation 
 This is certainly a tall order, so in this section I would like to clarify the precise goals of the 
work. While a great deal of primary-source and archival research has gone into this dissertation, the 
aim was not to deepen the understanding of a particular figure, movement or party, laudable as such 




primarily, in making two interventions, pursuant to my broader goal of writing a history of 
Catholicism that would not be about Catholicism, but about Europe. In this section, these goals will 
be clarified through a brief review of the extant literature.  
 First, I have investigated Catholicism as a transnational political culture. Previous historians 
have, of course, recognized the importance of Catholic political and social teaching. The big picture, 
though, has been missed by focusing overmuch on the same nation-state context that Catholics 
worked so hard, and so successfully, to undermine. Catholicism is tailor-made, it would seem, as a 
subject for the recent turn towards transnational history, and yet it has seldom been studied in that 
way. The best recent works on European Catholicism have all taken the nation-state as their 
privileged object of inquiry. The standard sources on modern Catholicism are a series of edited 
collections, in which each nation is granted an essay or a series of essays.20  
 When it comes to post-1914 Catholicism, only three figures have been attempting to think 
seriously about Catholicism as a transnational phenomenon: Martin Conway, Wolfram Kaiser, and 
Elke Seefried. While Conway and Kaiser have worked together, editing one of the volumes referred 
to above, their approaches differ. They both reject, quite rightly, the notion that masses of Catholic 
voters suddenly discovered the merits of democracy in 1945, and attempt to explain the triumph of 
Christian Democracy in light of broad continuities in Catholic culture and the Catholic milieu. In 
Kaiser’s case, the success of Christian Democracy can be chalked up to two factors. First, the 
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changed circumstances of the post-1945 period and the delegitimization of the traditional Catholic 
right. Second, the ready availability of a network of political elites and intellectuals who had been 
theorizing and supporting Christian democracy in the interwar period. Conway basically agrees with 
this story, but he grants interwar preparation even less significance than does Kaiser: “Christian 
Democracy,” he chides in a statement that invalidates much other work on the topic, “did not 
suddenly become the most successful political force in western Europe because various largely 
minority currents of European Catholics had long been seeking to construct a pluralist form of 
Catholic politics which engaged with modern society.”21  
 What both of them ignore is Catholic political culture: one searches in vain throughout their 
work for any real description of what Catholics were actually saying about politics in periodicals or 
monographs. Kaiser focuses on elite, minority currents, while Conway polemically states that 
ideology mattered less than taxation policies and sugar beet prices. One move they both make is 
worth discussing, as their example will be followed here: neither of them grant much significance to 
the Vatican. Of course, the Church’s encyclicals had influence across Europe, and indeed the globe, 
but that will not be my focus here. The telegenic pope, personally guiding his flock, is a product of 
the Cold War. This does not mean, of course, that the Vatican hierarchy should be ignored, but it 
does mean that it cannot be equated in any simple way with Catholic politics across Europe.22  
 I will not follow them, however, in their studied disinterest in Catholic political culture as it 
existed on the ground: here, Elke Seefried, the third historian of transnational interwar Catholicism, 
has done a remarkable, if circumscribed, service by charting the role of German emigrés in 
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theorizing the Austrian Ständestaat.23 By referring to “political culture,” I mean to register that I, like 
Seefried, will not be focusing on elite discourse, or the history of theology. The main players in the 
dissertation, with the possible exception of Jacques Maritain and the indubitable exception of Carl 
Schmitt, were not brilliant or original thinkers in their own right. They mattered, and will be 
discussed here, because they structured what Catholicism qua political-social discourse: what was it 
possible to say within the confines of a Catholic political movement or Catholic journal? Brilliant 
and idiosyncratic figures like Teilhard de Chardin will be ignored, as they did not influence political 
culture in any serious way, while uninteresting thinkers like Jean de Fabrègues will be discussed in 
detail, insofar as they were able to exercise intellectual power through the periodical (of which 
Fabrègues edited many). Intellectual power and influence was mediated across these years primarily 
by the periodical. In Régis Debray’s account of “intellectual power,” the 1920-60 period is theorized 
as a period in which editors, more than professors (or priests), held sway.24 The efflorescence of lay 
Catholic periodicals (or Dominican ones that functioned as such) will provide the dissertation’s 
major source base, supplemented by pamphlets, monographs, and archival material.  
 The transnational approach truly pays dividends here, and the dissertation will not follow the 
traditional country-by-country approach to Catholic history. At least, not for the majority of the 
dissertation. It is true that in the 1910s and early 1920s, still stung by the retrenchment of the war, 
there was little in the way of international Catholic life: as we’ll see in Chapters 1-3, most Catholics 
hunkered into their respective milieux. But, beginning in the late 1920s, a truly transnational 
Catholicism did begin to emerge, as will be traced in Chapters 4-5. There were two causes: first, the 
general internationalist spirit that swept across Europe in the era of Locarno; second, the waves of 
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refugees that accompanied that era’s collapse. The Germany of 1933, the Austria of 1938, and the 
France of 1940 threatened the freedom, and sometimes the lives, of at least certain brands of 
Catholic intellectuals. They fled everywhere they could, including such far-flung destinations as Rio 
de Janeiro (Dietrich von Hildebrand) or Istanbul (Friedrich Dessauer). As they fled, sometimes 
multiple times, they encountered and enlivened new political cultures, and genuine international 
influence and cooperation began to occur. This would bear fruit primarily after 1945, when the 
international Catholicism we know today, studded by international conferences and journals, was 
consolidated. But that post-1945 Catholicism, which I’ll call Cold War Catholicism, cannot be 
understood without understanding its transnational preconditions.  
 While there is no doubt that the story is transnational, my decision to tell a particular 
transnational story must be defended. Despite the pretensions of the dissertation’s subtitle, I cannot 
pretend to tell the story of European Catholicism as a whole. I will focus primarily on France, 
Germany, and Austria. These three nations provide a relatively coherent narrative: as we’ll see, 
patterns of exile and linguistic competence brought these three nations together, time and again. 
French Catholics were interested in Austrian affairs far more than in Dutch ones, and vice versa. In 
each case, Catholics played an uncertain and fractious role in national politics, leading to voluminous 
lay speculation about the shape and prospects of Catholic politics—speculation that lay the 
groundwork for Cold War Catholicism. Similar phenomena could be traced in Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and even Britain, but at the cost of narrative economy and even 
coherence, as each of those regions had unique trajectories, conditioned in most cases by more 
direct clerical influence than was the case in my chosen areas.25 
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 Eastern European Catholicism, in particular, is left out of the story, aside from the 
surprisingly strong Silesian voice in German Catholicism and the occasional presence of Bohemian 
refugees in Austria. This story is a fascinating one, but it is quite simply a different one than the one 
I’m telling here: Eastern Europeans developed their own Catholicism, with stronger ties to 
nationalism than was the case in Western Europe or Austria. Moreover, the dissertation is 
unabashedly focused on the post-1945 settlement, which Eastern Europeans, for obvious reasons, 
inhabited in quite a different way.26  
 That, then, is my first intervention: the study of Catholicism as a transnational political 
culture. My second intervention flows organically from the first: Catholic historiography has been 
split into those who study “Catholicism and the state” (political parties, intellectuals, etc.) and those 
who study “Catholicism and society” (Catholic civil-society institutions, the press, unions, youth 
movements, popular piety, pilgrimage movements, etc.). I am not intervening directly into either of 
these literatures. Readers looking for new insights about the Zentrum’s response to Hitler, or the 
ideology of the youth movements, will be disappointed. I am, instead, trying to unite these two 
literatures in pursuit of a more complete picture of Catholicism, which was not a denizen of “State” 
or “Society,” but rather a set of institutions that straddled the two. Catholicism did not sit 
comfortably within a settled “State/society” division, but rather came to the table with a particular 
vision of how that division should be made.   
 This sounds hopelessly abstract and theoretical, I’m aware. Terms like “state” and “society” 
often indicate a lack of analytical precision. This, though, is precisely the point. As political theorists 
like Timothy Mitchell and Jacques Rancière have argued, the fulcrum of democratic politics is the 
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decision regarding which sectors should be “political” (governed democratically, through the state) 
and which should be “social” (removed from direct democratic oversight). Here’s Mitchell:  
The line between state and society is not the perimeter of an intrinsic entity, which 
can be thought of as a freestanding object or actor. It is a line drawn internally, within 
the network of institional mechanisms through which a certain social and political 
order is maintained.27 
 
The line between state and society is always a blurry one, as even the most laissez-faire state 
exercises major influence on the putatively free economy operating under its purview. But it is a line 
that needs always to be drawn, and a line whose location is always contested. To what extent are 
phenomena like the family, the firm, the union, and so on to be folded into the “State,” and to what 
extent are they to operate oustide of democratic channels?   
 More than socialists or even (until the 1940s) liberals, Catholics were interested in enlarging 
“society” as much as possible: i.e., they wanted the state to shrink dramatically in size, allowing the 
“natural” order of “society” to govern economic life as much as possible. The democracies of the 
1920s, as we will see, crusaded in favor of an activist state that would democratically control wide 
swathes of society (education, economy, etc.). Catholics saw this as inexcusable trespass on the 
grounds of the “social” and its natural ordering, and their social thought was “social” in the deepest 
sense: the state, they believed, should retreat from society and allow the latter to develop in its own, 
natural way. The state should not wither away—Catholics were not liberals, nor were they 
Marxists—but should itself assume a limited, natural, but nonetheless robust place in the political-
social order.  
 To summarize: I make, here, two major interventions. 1) I tell a story that is deeply 
transnational. 2) I understand Catholicism as a response to a fundamental question of modern social 
life: where should the state/society line be drawn? Neither of these approaches have been explored 
                                                




in the extant historiography, which I will survey here. First of all, of course, there is the mountain of 
research from what Oded Heilbronner calls “the ghetto of the Catholic establishment.” Produced by 
Catholic scholars and published by Catholic presses, this work, sometimes excellent and useful, 
avoids critical perspectives and fails to engage with broader debates (this is only the flipside of the 
disinterest in Catholicism, itself a result of long-term institutional trends, evinced in the non-Catholic 
historical profession). In Germany, this work is often linked with the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in 
Bonn, or published by Ferdinand Schoningh; in France, leading scholars of Catholicism like Philippe 
Chenaux, Jacques Prévotat, and René Rémond are linked with the similar Centre catholique des 
intellectuels français.28 
 In the last few decades, a plethora of scholars have begun researching Catholicism from a 
more, shall we say, catholic perspective. Early works, like those by Eugen Weber, assumed that 
Catholicism had declined in significance as modern states consolidated themselves in the late 
nineteenth century. But now, after a generation of work by scholars like Margaret Anderson, 
Marjorie Beale, Edward Berenson, David Blackbourn, Werner Blessing, Caroline Ford, Antonius 
Liedhegener, Philip Nord, Susan Pedersen, and Jonathan Sperber, this argument is no longer 
tenable.29 It is now beyond question that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
marked by Catholic revival, in terms of associational culture, political activisim, and public piety. 
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Indeed, Catholicism as we know it was really a product of the late nineteenth-century flurry of 
activity, and not the long tail of an ancient and declining Church.  
 There has been, however, no satisfactory attempt to connect this with the post-1945 period, 
especially on a transnational scale. The extant literature presents two basic and convincing ways of 
relating post-1945 Catholicism to its predecessors. The first has been most prominent in French 
history, where the failure of Catholic political parties has turned historians’ attention towards social 
movements and policies. Historians have focused a great deal on Catholic civil-society institutions 
and their influence on economic policy under various regimes, including Vichy. Marjorie Beale, 
Philip Nord, and Susan Pedersen have demonstrated beyond doubt that Catholic institutions and 
ideologies were central to French economic policies in the interwar and postwar period, in addition, 
obviously, to the Pétain regime.30 While the M.R.P. may have been short-lived, the welfare policies 
percolating in the youth movements and workers’ cooperatives of interwar Catholicism played a 
major role. 
While these historians have focused on Catholicism as a social phenomenon, a number of 
historians of Germany, which had successful Catholic or Christian parties throughout the twentieth 
century, have focused more on Catholicism as a directly political phenomenon. The role of Catholics 
in the democratic system has been studied exhaustively in the work of, among others, Margaret 
Anderson, David Blackbourn, Werner Blessing, John Boyer, Noel Cary, Wilfried Loth, Jonathan 
Sperber, Helmut Walser Smith, and Rudolf Uertz. Following on the heels of Ronald Ross’s Beleagured 
Tower (1976), these scholars have attempted to bring Catholicism, and particularly the Center Party, 
into the center of the raging debate on the Kaiserreich and, to a lesser extent, the Weimar and Bonn 
Republics. Unlike in France, the influence of Catholic thought on the social market economy has 
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been almost entirely ignored (despite the fact that it was enacted by a Catholic administration, with 
the support of Catholic economists!).31  
From our perspective, the most important work comes from Margaret Anderson, Noel Cary, 
Karl-Egon Lönne, and Winfried Becker, who have been arguing in favor of what Cary calls a 
“Catholic Sonderweg.” For these scholars, post-1945 West German political culture was foreshadowed 
above all in the Center party. The Catholic party in the Bismarckean, Wilhelmine, and Weimar 
regimes, even though it had been skeptical of democracy qua system of governance, nonetheless 
sought to protect civil liberties, and were the strongest voices in favor of fair parliamentary elections 
and balanced government. Unlike contemporary parties, and like the postwar CDU, the Zentrum 
brought together a broad spectrum of German society: Catholics from different classes and regions 
voted for the party, which was forced to accommodate their interests and become a sort of catch-all 
party. There were even a fair number of activists within the Zentrum who wanted to “leave the 
tower” and become an interconfessional party. 
French historians, then, have constructed a Catholicism of “society,” while German 
historians have construced a Catholicism of the “state.” Both of these approaches are correct, and a 
dissertation of this scope cannot hope to add much detail to these specialized studies. The problem 
is that neither approach adds up to a balanced appraisal of the fate of Catholicism across the period 
1920-1950. The German/Austrian approach to “Christian Democracy” as a political phenomenon 
has no obvious bearing on the French case, while the attention paid to French “Social Catholicism” 
seems irrelevant to the German case. Clearly, though, a single story can and should be told: French 
and German Catholics were, by the 1940s, tied together in myriad ways and were clearly involved in 
                                                
31 I cannot hope to provide more than an overview of the voluminous literature on the German Catholic milieu, which 
has ballooned to such proportions that at least three major attempts to survey it have been undertaken in recent years.  
See Margaret Anderson, “Piety and Politics: Recent Work on German Catholicism,” Journal of Modern History 63 (1991), 
681-716; Karl-Egon Lönne, “Katholizismus-Forschung,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 6 (2000), 128-170; Oded Heilbronner, 




the same political-social project: one defined neither by “State” or “Society,” but by the peculiarly 
Catholic means of finding the division between the two. By tying their analyses directly to the 
nation-state, scholars have missed a broad, transnational shift in Catholic political culture, which 
unites the various phenomena traced in the French and German literatures. Briefly, what we find in 
each case is that Catholics, responding to a new international context, were willing to grant 
legitimacy to the new post-1945 nation states, precisely because their own social-political ideals were 
inscribed in the new regimes, whether or not a Catholic or Christian-Democratic party was actually 
at the helm.  
And, to return finally to our beginning point: Catholics across Western Europe were willing 
to grant legitimacy to the new regimes because they drew the line between state and society in an 
acceptable place. For reasons that will be explored in the chapters to come, Catholics had become 
convinced that the great tragedy of modernity was that this line had been drawn improperly: that the 
state had been granted too much control over the modern social order. After World War II, liberals 
and socialists—the former bêtes noires of the Catholics—suddenly agreed with them. Totalitarianism 
theory, invented by Catholics as a modern restatement of Ketteler’s position, was accepted across 
the political spectrum, and conditioned a broad agreement, now rejected by scholars, that Nazism 
and Communism were both fundamentally similar, and marked by a common hypertrophy of the 
state, which ran roughshod over “society.”   
The Structure of the Dissertation  
The dissertation is organized into three parts. Part I, which covers the early 1920s, is 
composed of three short chapters, each devoted to one of the three major milieux that structured 
Catholic culture and politics across the region in question. These chapters introduce the reader to 
the various institutions, schools of thought, and political cultures at work in the wake of World War 




will use “Mitteleuropa” to refer to Southern Germany and Austria.32 At this time, there was very 
little in the way of international circulation of ideas or texts outside of circumscribed and marginal 
phenomena.33 These chapters introduce the reader to three individuals, one from each milieu, who 
will be followed throughout the dissertation, both as a narrative device and because these three 
figures were especially important. For France (Chapter 1), I will follow Jacques Maritain, who was 
then a leading Catholic intellectual in the orbit of the Action française. For Mitteleuropa (Chapter 2), 
I will follow Eugen Kogon, a Southern German who was living in Vienna and serving as co-editor 
of Schönere Zukunft, the region’s pre-eminent Catholic political journal. For the Rhineland (Chapter 
3), the focus will be on Waldemar Gurian, a polymath student of Max Scheler’s and Carl Schmitt’s 
who was involved in many of the region’s most significant Catholic institutions, newspapers, and 
periodicals. 
In Part II, which focuses on the mid-1930s, I will show how Catholicism became 
transnational – and, moreover, that Catholicism was one of the three major transnational 
constellations of the period, alongside Fascism and Popular-Front Communism. Catholicism is not 
usually seen in that light, which leads us to misinterpret both the 1930s and the 1940s: once we 
reconstruct Catholicism as a major political and intellectual player, the post-1945 period can be 
construed as the victory of one of the warring parties of the 1930s, and not the mutual exhaustion of 
all of them.  
Like socialism, though, transnational Catholicism was divided into warring factions, each of 
which had its own intellectual figureheads and political counterparts. Chapter 4, which focuses on 
                                                
32 I am aware that “Mitteleuropa” is a controversial term with a great many meanings (see, for instance, Jürgen Elvert, 
Mitteleuropa (Stuttgart, 1999)). I am adopting it here as the least bad solution to the problem of referring to this region, 
and I certainly don’t intend to legitimate the claims of the intellectuals themselves that there was any mystical unity in the 
lands of central Europe.  
33 For which see Jean-Claude Delbreil, Les catholiques française et les tentatives de rapprochement franco-allemand (1920-1933) 




the continuing career of Jacques Maritain and Waldemar Gurian, covers what I’m calling “civil-
society Catholicism.” By this point, Maritain and Gurian were friends and allies, linked to a massive 
set of Catholic movements that went by the name of “Catholic Action.” For the first time, journals 
and manifestoes were truly international in character. Maritain was beginning to cultivate ties with 
Americans and Germans, while Gurian, from exile in Switzerland, published an anti-Nazi journal 
that was read across Europe. They were both arguing that Catholicism did not mandate a specific 
form of political or social organization at all—with the one major exception that Catholicism could 
not survive in “totalitarian” societies, which featured the only form of politics manifestly outlawed 
by Catholic teaching. These Catholics opposed authoritarian regimes like Mussolini’s and Franco’s 
precisely because their “politics” were totalitarian and denied the freedom within civil society that 
was necessary for Catholicism to flourish. These were, incidentally, the first Catholics to seriously 
imply, even if they did not say so, that Catholicism was compatible with industrial capitalism as it 
existed in America and Europe. Although their insights were essentially in line with Ketteler’s, they 
were less interested in corporatist institutions and the failures of capitalism than with civil freedoms 
and the liberty of the Church. While these Catholics were probably in the minority in the 1930s, they 
were aligned with a powerful set of social movements, most notably Catholic Action and certain 
strands of the right-wing French ligues. As always with apolitical movements, however, a strong 
politics was certainly implied, and performed. 
Also unlike Ketteler, these Catholics spent as much of their energy fighting against other 
Catholics as they did against secularists. Their enemies, discussed in Chapter 5, were the 
“corporatists,” and one of their champions was Eugen Kogon. Kogon and the other corporatists 
argued, contra the civil-society Catholics, that Catholicism did enjoin a particular socio-political order. 
Drawing on Quadragesimo Anno and remaining more true to Ketteler’s original insights, they argued 




through violence. Like their opponents, the corporatists were transnational: Kogon’s work was read 
in France, for instance, while Dollfuss’s experiments were applauded by right-wing French 
Catholics, some of whom went to Austria to study the new Catholic utopia in the making. These 
Catholics, too, were opposed to “totalitarianism,” and saw their authoritarian corporatism as the 
only true defense against the totalitarian politics of Nazis and Bolsheviks. 
The last three chapters will chart the overcoming of this divide in the crucible of World War 
II and its aftermath, as the Catholics’ common opposition to totalitarianism, alongside new 
geopolitical circumstances, allowed them to present a united front in the early years of the Cold War 
(I am calling this “Cold War Catholicism”). This period did not see the “victory” of one of these 
brands of Catholicism, but rather their cooperation and merging in a new geopolitical context. 
Chapter 6 covers the years of the war itself, and shows the surprising rapprochement between both 
forms of Catholicism and neoliberalism during these years, prefiguring the ideological cleavages of the 
Cold War. Jacques Maritain and Waldemar Gurian, both in exile in America, played a major role 
here. In addition, this chapter demonstrates the collapse of authoritarian corporatism as a viable 
option, after the Anschluss and the widespread Catholic disaffection with Vichy beginning in 1942-
3; Kogon, who was imprisoned in Dachau after the Anschluss, is paradigmatic here.  
In Chapter 7, the immediate post-war period is discussed. The war had changed everything, 
of course, but Catholic ideas and transnational networks from the interwar period survived and were 
integral to the anti-Communist turn taken by Catholic states in 1946-7. Chapter 8 discusses the final 
consolidation of “Cold War Catholicism,” as old barriers melted away and Catholics joined hands in 
support of the new European order. They did so not because the new regimes were “democratic,” 
but because they were anti-totalitarian. These were regimes that deployed weak forms of state 





All three of our central figures were involved in Cold War Catholicism. Jacques Maritain 
emerged from the war as Catholic Europe’s most famous intellectual. He served as French 
ambassador to the Vatican, and was involved with both the United Nations and UNESCO. Gurian 
founded and edited a journal, The Review of Politics, which was one of the key incubators of Cold War 
liberalism. He became a consummate Cold Warrior, playing an important role in the American 
understanding of Germany and vice-versa (he traveled, thanks to the Rockefeller Foundation, to the 
“America Houses” to lecture on the virtues of America and the evils of totalitarianism in the late 
40s). Kogon worked for the U.S. Army in Germany and published Der SS-Staat, which sold 
hundreds of thousands of copies and was one of the most important books on Nazism in late 1940s 
Germany; he was also editor of Frankfurter Hefte, one of a handful of postwar Germany’s most 
significant journals.  
These three figures, then, mirror the fate of European Catholicism as a whole. They began, 
like most Catholics in the 1920s, as strict interpreters of Ketteler’s legacy. Modern politics and 
modern economics, they all believed, were a complete disaster, and needed to be overturned in the 
name of a properly Catholic social order. In the 1930s, like most European Catholics, their lives 
were turned upside-down by events. Gurian and Maritain were forced into American exile, while 
Kogon was placed in a concentration camp. Their interpretation of Catholicism and its place in 
modern society began to change, as did that of their liberal and socialist opponents. After the war, 
they emerged into a Europe that was, surprisingly, congenial to the political-social insights they had 
been circulating for decades. However much they may have fulminated against the liberal-
democratic capitalism of the 1920s, it was in this way that they became, unwittingly and 




Part One: The Rhenish Question: Sovereignty and European 
Catholicism, 1920-1925 
 
All those who have profoundly studied Europe know that the German problem lies, morally and 
geographically, at the center of all the problems and sufferings of that continent. 
--Jacques Maritain, 19401 
 
The decision about Germany, over the question whether it should be unified and, if need be, 
neutralized, can fundamentally alter the collective politics of Western Europe. 
--Eugen Kogon, 19512 
 
Will it be necessary in the interest of lasting peace to dismember Germany politically? Or, will it be 
possible to maintain German unity and accept—sooner or later—a re-educated and reformed 
Germany as an equal partner in a forthcoming international organization? […] [A]ny settlement with 
Germany is related to universal problems. 
--Waldemar Gurian, 19453 
                                                
1 Maritain, “Europe and the Federal Idea,” Commonweal 26 April 1940, 8-12, here 10.  
2 Kogon to Paul-Henri Spaak, 1 March 1951, ME 613, Historical Archives of the European Union, European Institute, 
Florence. 




Introduction to Part One 
 
Insofar as the father is the archetype of authority, because the original experience of all authority, 
democracy is, according to its idea, a fatherless society. 
--Hans Kelsen1 
 
World War I and its aftermath, while devastating for Europe as a whole, were stimulating for 
Catholicism, Europe’s ancient faith. Like many of their peers, Catholics across the continent had 
positively welcomed the war as an opportunity to burst free from fin de siècle decadence. “To be 
honest,” admitted one Austrian Catholic in 1926, “we all wanted the war in 1914.”2 Although 
Catholics on the ground and in the Vatican were, like everyone else, horrified at the destruction it 
eventually unleashed, the chaos and ruin left in the war’s wake created opportunities. “The chaos is 
an anxious chaos,” one British Jesuit wrote in 1920. “Men are beginning to ask, not so much what 
the war has achieved, as what it revealed.”3 For many, and not only for Catholics, it revealed the 
bankruptcy of the liberal pieties that had legitimated the prewar European settlement. As empires 
collapsed, leaving massive economic problems and political crises in their wake, Catholicism found 
its moment. “True anarchy,” as Novalis had claimed long before, “is the breeding ground of 
religion.”4 
Catholics were faced with what Hubert Lyautey, a Catholic French general, called the 
“universal collapse of thrones and of all that they symbolize.”5 Even in places like Belgium, where 
the throne remained, Catholics found themselves forced to participate for the first time in 
                                                
1 Hans Kelsen, “Foundations of Democracy,” Ethics 66, 1 (1955), 1-101, here 31.  
2 Ernst Karl Winter, “Das konservative und liberale Österreich: Würdigung und Kritik seiner Kultur,” in Die 
Österreichische Aktion (Wien, 1927), 113-26, here 121. 
3 C.C. Martindale, “After-War Religion,” Dublin Review 166, 333 (April 1920), 161-71, here 161. 
4 Quoted Paul-Ludwig Landsberg, Die Welt des Mittelalter und Wir (Bonn, 1923), 115. 





parliamentary elections against Liberals and Socialists. Catholics across the continent responded 
creatively and forged one of the most penetrating, and eventually most successful, analyses of the 
new situation. “One is not born traditional,” Bruno Latour reminds us. On the contrary, “one 
chooses to become traditional by constant innovation.”6 While there were, of course, millions who 
attended Church for reasons of family or regional tradition, Catholicism was a vibrant discourse that 
attracted some of the best minds of the era, and Catholic rhetoric was not defined by the bucolic 
parish priest. We are all familiar with the period’s intellectuals who flocked to the Church, or at least 
to its aura, as a gesture of discontent: Graham Greene and Evelyn Waugh in Britain; Hugo Ball and 
Edith Stein in Germany; Jean Cocteau and Gabriel Marcel in France (to give only the most obvious 
names). This is not especially important in itself—as contemporary Catholics were wont to point 
out, these aesthetic conversions were often temporary and opportunistic. What they register, though, 
is a sense that Catholicism was out of step with the times, and that it provided a refuge from those 
times. Hugo Ball’s reconstruction of his path to the Church was called, after all, Flight Out of Time.  
In what sense, though, was Catholicism a refuge from the times? It was not writ in stone that 
Catholicism would emerge in this way: Catholicism did not serve as such a dissenting ideology du jour 
in, say, the 1840s, or the 1950s, or the 2010s. The fact that it did so in the 1920s requires 
explanations that move beyond clichéd notions of the post-WWI “return of the sacred” or “collapse 
of the Enlightenment project.” While this may have mattered to an intellectual elite, it hardly 
underpinned Catholic political culture writ large. In fact, we might expect Catholicism to ratify the 
postwar moment: the war had finally demonstrated beyond doubt that French and German 
Catholics were loyal to their respective nations, while the reconstituted states were, in general, quite 
friendly to religion, constitutionally speaking. Diplomatic ties were renewed between France and the 
                                                




Vatican, while the Weimar Constitution protected Church schools and property as well as could be 
expected.  
Perhaps, we might think, a Europe was being born that was peculiarly repugnant to the 
Catholic imagination? This was, however, not the case, at least not in any simple way. To a 
surprising extent, and with the exception of educational policy, Catholics had little quarrel with the 
actual social and economic policies that were being enacted in the 1920s, and their outrage over 
cultural decadence was shared by almost all governing parties. Pius XI admitted as much in 
Quadragesimo Anno (1931), pointing out that post-WWI social legislation had a great deal in common 
with Catholic social teaching.7 The bourgeois recasting of Europe, as famously described by Charles 
Maier, embodied many Catholic ideals.8 This is quite schematic and will be developed in more local 
detail later, but generally we can say the following: negatively, both Catholics and the regimes of the 
1920s were opposed to revolutionary socialism and Bolshevism, freezing them out in the name of 
private property. Positively, they were each dedicated to a corporatist restructuring of the State in 
which centralizing parliaments would, at least in terms of economic policy, give a greater voice to 
professions, employers’ federations, and labor unions. Catholics and the reigning political powers 
were both dedicated to steering a path between collectivism and atomized individualism: the putative 
hegemony of Manchestertum was fictitious, as actors of nearly all political stripes argued for increased 
organization of the economy and increased socialization of the individual into his or her community. 
Not only Catholics, but socialists and liberals were convinced of the importance of the family and its 
protection.9 
                                                
7 Pius XII, Quadragesimo Anno, paragraphs 22 and 28. 
8 Charles Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe (Princeton, 1975).  
9 For a general account of the rise of the social sciences in this period, albeit one that misconstrues them as a peculiarly 
liberal project, see Dorothy Ross, “Changing Contours of the Social Science Disciplines,” in The Modern Social Sciences, 




So the question remains: what was the Catholic objection to the Europe of the 1920s? An 
answer requires an investigation of “the political,” in the broadest sense of that word. The Catholic 
conception of the political—of what the sphere of politics can and should mean, of where its 
legitimacy was to be found—was categorically opposed to that of their liberal and socialist 
colleagues. This is not so simple as saying that Catholics wanted a Catholic state, just as socialists 
wanted a socialist state. The banal observation that Catholic politics differed from socialist politics 
explains very little. More interesting and important is the divergent conception of the political 
itself—of the very nature of the state and the society it constructs. To take one especially trenchant 
example: Catholics were, to varying degrees, opposed to parliamentary democracy. This was not 
because they were opposed to “modernity” or to “secularity” or even to “democracy.” Catholics 
were opposed to a very specific idea of democracy: that held by liberals and socialists at the time. 
Indeed, blanket opposition to democracy had been outlawed by Leo XIII, and, as we’ll see below, 
even the most strident legitimists were clear that certain forms of democracy would be acceptable—
just not the forms that were on offer in the 1920s.  
The fundamental Catholic objection to the democracies of the 1920s was their abolition of 
what were variously called corporations, estates, or “natural political communities.” Catholics 
charged, not without reason, that the new states used the authority of the “people” writ large to 
reconstruct the political-social order, without reference to the pre-statist communities of the 
profession, church, and family. Catholics, on the contrary, were committed to political theories of 
what we might call deep subsidiarity, in which the state would take its place among a hierarchy of 
legitimate and divinely-ordained corporations. It was not even to be the most important of these: the 
family, G.K. Chesterton wrote in 1910, “is older than law and stands outside the state.” In the 20s, 




and 40s, as forthcoming chapters will detail, these same political ideals came to seem much less out 
of touch.  
It is worth noting here that the Catholic position shared a great deal with, and freely learned 
from, the “pluralist” tradition of political thought, exemplified most famously in the work of Figgis, 
Cole, and Laski. Their “guild socialist” ideas were highly in vogue in the 1910s; even Bertrand 
Russell advocated a version of their ideas in his 1918 Roads to Freedom. On the continent, “legal 
pluralist” ideas found their champion in Léon Duguit. Like the Catholics, these figures sought to 
replace the abstractions of sovereign law: Figgis, for instance, wrote in 1907 of the need to replace 
“an abstract and unreal theory of State omnipotence” with a theory that incorporated “the facts of 
the world with its innumerable bonds of association and the naturalness of social authority.” These 
words would be repeated, nearly verbatim, by hundreds of Catholics in the interwar years. The 
basically secular tradition of pluralism, however, collapsed in the 1920s, as David Runciman has 
shown.10 Catholics were left bearing the torch of “anti-étatisme” and “natural political 
communities.” 
This was for good, and properly political, reasons. While we can remain agnostic about the 
Church’s claims to eternality, its interventions on earth forced it into the same nitty-gritty politics as 
everyone else. In Part I, I will investigate Catholic anti-étatisme as it developed in response to 
domestic crises in the early 1920s. The “transnational Catholicism” that we know from the present 
had yet to develop, and Catholics operated in three more-or-less independent milieux (one of the few 
articles on German Catholic life to appear in the French press, characteristically, was rife with 
misspellings and made the absurd claim that most Catholic students were xenophobic pan-
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Germanists)11. These will be covered in the three chapters that make up Part I: one on France, one 
on the Rhineland, and one on Central Europe/Mitteleuropa. In each case, the Catholic contribution to 
the regional political-social discourse will be placed in the context of the liberal and socialist 
responses at work in those same regions. The Catholic contribution is only legible when read 
alongside its competitors—a general principle that will be followed throughout the dissertation.  
By pointing out the continuities in Catholic social and political thought between the 1920s 
and 1950s, I do not seek to downplay the extent of the transformation: Catholics themselves were, 
as always, wont to point out the long heritage of their own beliefs, and we must not take them at 
face value. The Catholics of the 1920s were desperately opposed to parliamentary democracy, and 
they built an imposing political-cultural edifice devoted to its dismantling. The ecclesiastical 
hierarchy remained enthralled by visions of a bucolic, pre-revolutionary order in which women, 
Jews, and others would return to their putatively traditional roles: one need only look to the 
hierarchy’s dismal record in the 1930s and 1940s to see how deeply opposed to parliamentary 
democracy they truly were. This atmosphere of reaction survived into civil-society groups, too: as 
we’ll see, employer’s federations and scouting movements were infused with anti-democratic values 
and practices. 
None of this is news, however: we all know that interwar Catholics were a reactionary 
bunch, and there is no need to add another dissertation chronicling Catholic contributions to 
Nazism in Germany, “Austro-fascism” in Austria, or Vichyite policies in France. This ground has 
been well-plowed, and rightly so. What historians understand far less well is the linkage between 
                                                
11 P. Waline, “Quelques aspects du catholicisme allemand,” Revue des Jeunes 11 (1921), 534-49. These milieux generally 
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politics often sent intellectuals from one region to another, while there were always outré figures at work (we might think 
of Johannes Messner, a solidarist in Vienna, or Franz Xaver Landmesser, a universalist in the heart of the Rhineland). I 
should note, also, that Catholicism had been more transnational in the past, too: in the pre-1914 period, social Catholics 
in particular had maintained a robust interest in one another’s work, as a glance through the leading French social 





these forms of Catholicism and the Christian Democracy à venir. This dissertation will focus on this 
longer trajectory, which will lead me to emphasize different institutions and individuals than if I 
were to be fundamentally interested in the Catholic contribution to far-right politics in the interwar 
period. This does not at all mean, though, that I will be focusing on the handful of left-wing, pro-
democratic Catholics: on the contrary, there were continuities between the “vital center” of interwar 
Catholicism and its postwar successor. The shape that this postwar successor took is marked 
indelibly the experience of war and reconstruction, as well as the new geopolitical alignments of the 
late 1940s. But this, too, we already know. It was also—and this is my contribution—indelibly 
marked by the Catholic experience of the 1920s and 1930s. 
In these chapters, I will be focusing on domestic politics: these were the crucible of Catholic 
political culture. I will be looking at Catholicism, that is, as a “bottom-up” phenomenon, generated 
from local conditions and local intelligentsia instead of by the Vatican. Of course, the Vatican was 
relevant, but it is important to recall that the popes of the interwar periods were not the mediatized 
popes of the post-Vatican II era: the Pope was not yet a media icon, and local political cultures were 
shaped more by local concerns than by the Vatican. It is worthwhile here, though, to describe the 
Vatican’s ambiguous place in the Versailles order. Take the League, for instance, which more than 
any other institution symbolized that order. In stark contrast to Pius XII’s relations to the United 
Nations, Popes Benedict XV and Pius XI essentially ignored the League. Although there were a few 
overtures in 1921-22, Geneva did not welcome Rome’s intervention, and the Vatican did not 
attempt to join the League after acceding to statehood in 1929.12  Pius XII, in his major encylical on 
foreign relations, Ubi arcano Dei (1922), evinced great skepticism of the League (reversing the 
cautious optimism of Benedict XV in Pacem, Dei munus (1919)). The encyclical was, it should be said, 
dismissive of everything that was going on in Europe and the world; it reads somewhat like The 
                                                




Waste-Land if Eliot had been more interested in educational policy. But the sections on international 
affairs leave no doubt that the League’s bankruptcy had already, in Pius’s mind, been demonstrated:  
Since the close of the Great War individuals, the different classes of society, the 
nations of the earth have not as yet found true peace. […] Nor has this illusory 
peace, written only on paper, served as yet to reawaken similar noble sentiments in 
the souls of men. […] No merely human institution of today can be as successful in 
devising a set of international laws which will be in harmony with world conditions 
as the Middle Ages were in the possession of that true League of Nations, 
Christianity. 
 
Catholics throughout the continent followed the Vatican’s lead. “The League is a miscarriage, which 
wants to be loved despite its origins,” declared Friedrich Schreyvogl, editor of Abendland, one of 
Catholic Europe’s most distinguished and widely-read journals.13 Yves Simon recalled that one had 
to “jeer at the League of Nations” in order to be taken seriously in 1920s French Catholic circles, 
while a characteristic article in Revue des Jeunes, a central journal of the Catholic youth movement, 
worried that France would end up dissolving its identity and becoming merely the “20th republic of 
the League of Nations.”14  
There was certainly some Catholic support for the League, primarily from conservatives who 
believed that Geneva could be turned towards Catholic visions of Western Christendom.15 Some in 
the hieararchy, notably the bishops of Geneva and Arras, attempted to corral their coreligionists into 
support for the League. The Union catholique d’études internationales was formed to secure Catholic 
influence on the League, under the presidency of the Swiss Catholic, Gonzague de Reynold. His 
career, though, indicates how far removed from the Geneva mainstream even these Catholics were: 
                                                
13 Friedrich Schreyvogl, “Genf und der abendländische Gedanke,” Abendland 1, 7 (April 1926), 210-11, here 211. 
14 Yves Simon quoted Eugen Weber, Action Française (Stanford, 1962), 224; José Vincent, “La France divisée en régions,” 
Revue des jeunes 9 (1919), 41-53, here 50. 
15 No study exists of Catholicism and the League of Nations. There are studies, from Wolfram Kaiser and Guido Müller, 
of the “Secrétariat International des Parties Démocratiques d’Inspiration Chrétienne,” a small, pro-League, Christian-
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Reynold was a reactionary aristocrat, who would go on to support Mussolini, Maurras, and Salazar. 
He believed in a new transnational Europe to come that would return to the roots of Romanitas and 
eschew liberal democracy. Maurice Barrès is another example here: no friend of the League, and a 
staple of the right-wing, he nonetheless wrote in praise of Geneva in 1920—precisely as the means 
through which the Rhineland could be returned to France! So, in the absence of any real work on 
Catholic relationships to the League, I want to suggest here that true support for Geneva was 
marginal, and much of it was, as in the case of Reynold and Barrès, contingent and strategic.16  
Catholic suspicion of the League of Nations was of a piece with the continent-wide allergy to 
the new democratic republics. The problem was not formal: in principle, Catholics supported the idea 
of international federalism. The issue with Geneva, as Catholics from across the continent argued, 
was that it remained wedded to the same nation-state principles that it claimed to overthrow. “The 
sovereign state,” a leading scholar of international relations has judged, “was the only source of the 
League’s power. There could be no authority above that of the state.”17 The solution to the Rhenish 
crisis, which dominated European statecraft in the early 1920s, was complex and contested, but 
participants then and later historians agree that the nation-state remained the horizon of political 
expectations. The Rhineland was destined, according to Versailles, to return to a sovereign nation-
state, be it France or Germany (the Saar region would decide this via plebiscite). There were no 
serious plans to solve the fundamentally economic issue via supranational economic planning, or any 
other form of drastic upending of nation-state sovereignty. 
                                                
16 Even Yves de la Brière, probably the most important French Catholic League-supporter, hedges his bets: if only, he 
cried, Catholics could be as active at the League as secularists and masons! Yves de la Brière, “La Cinquieme Assemblée 
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Democrats, marginal as they were, tended to support the League, too: Luigi Sturzo and Marc Sangnier championed it, as 
did Paul Archambault and the ill-starred Matthias Erzberger. 




Catholics were deeply interested in the Rhenish question. The region had already assumed a 
prominent place in Catholic life and thought before 1919: it had, for instance, served as a 
synecdoche of German nationhood for many since the Napleonic Wars and the burst of enthusiasm 
known as Rheinromantik.18 Conveniently overlooking the Rhine’s contribution to the events of 1848, 
Catholics were wont to wax poetic about the Rhineland as the ancient heart of Abendland, where 
Charlemagne had ruled a continent not yet divided by the all-too-human borders of the nation-
state.19 “The Rhenish problem long ago ceased being a French-German problem, or even a 
European one,” declared one Catholic resident in 1922. “It is, rather, a question for the world.”20  
Catholics, who were opposed to the national projects enshrined in both the French and 
German republics, robustly opposed this solution, and the chapters that follow will each begin with 
the solution particular to that chapter’s milieu. As we’ll see, all Catholic milieux were opposed to the 
League’s handling of the crisis, in general insofar as it ratified the nation-state principle, and in 
particular insofar as the final settlement was a boon for Weimar Germany, the national project that 
more than any other aroused Catholic ire. They each had different solutions, however, which are 
indicative of the different approaches to political order that were at work in each region. “The 
problem of the Rhineland and the problem of Europe,” declared a German Catholic political 
pamphlet in 1924, “are tightly bound up with one another.”21 In the next three chapters, we will see 
how. 
                                                
18 Thomas Lekan, “A ‘Noble Prospect’: Tourism, Heimat, and Conservation on the Rhine, 1880-1914,” Journal of Modern 
History 81, 4 (2009), 824-58, esp. 832-4. 
19 For a particularly lyrical version, see Hermann Platz, Deutschland-Frankreich und die Idee des Abendlandes (Köln, 1924) 
20 Heinrich Staab, “Das Programm des guten Rheinländers,” Allgemeine Rundschau 19, 23 (10 June 1922), 266-7, here 266.  




Chapter 1: France: Jacques Maritain and the Despotism of the Social 
 
Without a doubt, Catholicism, and Catholicism alone, resists.  
--Charles Maurras, 19051 
 
We are faced with the question of statistics. 
--M. Rigaux (social Catholic), 19122 
 
Jacques Maritain, the most brilliant and prominent Catholic intellectual of interwar France, 
tended to avoid specific policy recommendations. He was, he claimed, only interested in politics 
from the standpoint of redemption. He made an exception for Germany, though. Throughout his 
career he gave multiple thoughts about the shape of the Germany à venir. The German issue was not 
a political one, strictly speaking, but a metaphysical or theological one. Charles Maurras, the neo-
royalist who headed the French right during these years, theorized “the constant historical disorder of 
Germany”: for him, the nation defined disorder. “Disorder,” he claimed, was “the intellectual and 
moral characteristic of Germany.”3 Maritain, for his part, delivered a widely noted lecture series 
during the war devoted to demolishing German thought. Like Maurras, Germany was not seen 
simply an unpleasant neighbor, but as a metonym for everything troubling about modernity itself. 
“Modernism,” Maritain held, “is of Germanic origin.”4 Politically, this meant that the German 
project had to be abolished. “The nature of things,” Maritain declared, “seems to demand that 
Germany be divided into multiple states.”5 
Maritain here gave voice to a more widespread French horror at a resurgent Germany. With 
their fellows on the right of the political spectrum, Catholics tended to think that a European peace 
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3 Maurras, “Gaulois, Germains, Latins,” Revue Universelle 27 (Oct-Dec 1926), 385-419, 407 passim.  
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would not be possible until the German pips had squeaked. Politically, this meant a total 
dismembering of the Second Reich.6 With the exception of Maurice Barrès—who had a somewhat 
mystical attachment to the region, and fervently believed that it should return to French hands7—
they were primarily concerned about the danger to world peace posed by a united Germany. Their 
political goal was a total dismemberment of the nation, which would turn the Prusso-centric Reich 
back into a cluster of harmless city-states. So when it came to the Rhineland, the most prominent 
Catholic position—as announced in L’Action Française and in Revue Universelle—was Rhenish 
independence. The Action Française newspaper publicized the Rhenish independence movement, 
regretting that the drafters of the Versailles treaty had neglected to understand that a unitary 
German state could only exist under the jackboots of Prussia.8 Meanwhile, a stream of articles in 
Revue Universelle, the Action française’s cultural journal, defended Rhenish independence as the only 
way to guarantee a stable European peace.9  
To understand the French Catholic rejection of the German nation-state, we must examine 
their principled rejection of the nation-state principle, as such, and their belief that authority should 
be delegated as far from the unitary nation-state as possible. Of course, this was conditioned by their 
precarious position in the France of the anti-clerical Third Republic.10 The Dreyfus Affair and the 
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policies of the Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes administrations, culminating in the Briand-
shepherded Law of Separation (1905), forced Catholics into the public sphere in a new way. This 
had deep roots: the Catholic Counter-Revolution had retained a strong voice throughout much of 
the nineteenth century, while Catholicism was a major, if largely overlooked, player in socialist 
movements, too.11 France remained a largely rural country, and the peasantry remained ensconced in 
their Catholic milieu. Meanwhile, especially after 1848 and 1870, increasing numbers of the 
bourgeoisie turned to the Church as a bastion of order.12 The French nation-building project of the 
fin de siècle, as Caroline Ford has shown in her case study of Brittany, was not a secularizing, Parisian 
project as Eugen Weber and others had imagined—on the contrary, Catholicism and French 
nationhood interacted in all sorts of ways.13  
Two pre-1914 phenomena in particular deserve our attention as precursors of the interwar 
efflorescence of Catholic thought and political action (I will only register their presence in this 
moment, and then dwell on their political theories as they were manifested in the 1920s). First, social 
Catholicism, which was based primarily in the provinces (notably in Lille and Lyon).14 While it might 
not be surprising that peasants and employers clung to Catholicism throughout the long nineteenth 
century, recent research has indicated that many workers, too, remained close to the Church. Even 
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in Paris, the heart of secular, proletarian France, seventy percent of the population insisted on a 
Catholic burial in 1905 (keeping in mind that French socialism provided its own burial rituals).15  
French social Catholicism is rooted in the work of Count René de la Tour du Pin and Count 
Albert du Mun, two aristocratic military officers who, after France’s 1870 defeat, dedicated 
themselves to renewing the Church and reviving France. They founded a network of Catholic 
Workmen’s Clubs in 1871, which had grown to include sixty thousand members by 1900. Through 
strategic alliances with Catholic industrialists, social Catholicism became enormously successful: a 
moderately-successful political party (Action Libérale Populaire) existed alongside a number of 
important journals, a staggeringly prolific propaganda and information bureau (the Action populaire), 
and a whole complex of trade unions, industrial federations, youth leagues, and consumer leagues. 
Intellectually, the Semaines Sociales, a yearly study meeting founded in 1904, was the most important 
institution of social Catholicism: it regularly brought together, with the papal blessing, a bevy of 
Catholic social scientists, who would speak to hundreds of Catholic priests, union organizers, 
officials in mutual aid societies, and other lay activists. As we’ll see in more detail below, social 
Catholics were at the forefront of social-scientific investigation: their Guide social published inquiries 
into living conditions amongst Catholic workers, and the responses they got indicated that they were 
not only wagging questionnaires in people’s faces, but introducing them to the new social 
imagination of the early twentieth century.16 They insisted, though, that man does not live by bread 
alone and that their work was as much moral as scientific. “The Church,” declared one social 
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Catholic writer in 1912, “has descended to the social terrain […] in order to win it for true 
civilization.”17 
Second, the pre-1914 years demonstrated the new salience of Catholicism for France’s 
intellectual class, headquartered as always in Paris. A famous generational survey cum manifesto, Les 
jeunes gens d’aujourd’hui, sounded the alarm: the old republican pieties were succuming to a “Catholic 
renaissance” among the youth.18 The Dreyfusard spirit that had inflamed, and even created, the 
Parisian intelligentsia began to crumble in the face of the scandals of the rigorously anti-clerical 
administrations of Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes. Georges Sorel and Charles Péguy, strident 
Dreyfusards, moved to the right and begin flirting with more reactionary solutions. Léon Daudet, 
the son of the great republican novelist Alphonse Daudet, disowned his heritage and joined Charles 
Maurras, France’s most notorious and influential royalist: “the Catholic religion and the philosophy 
of Saint Thomas Aquinas,” he wrote of these years, was used by him and others to “slake the thirst 
for the Infinite which assails the human being between the ages of twenty and thirty.”19 Other 
prominent Parisian intellectuals, including the popular historian Jacques Bainville and the art 
historian Louis Dimier, flocked to Maurras’s side, as well. The Action française emerged in these years 
as the right’s most important voice: French reaction was no longer identified with doddering 
provincial aristocrats, but with the proto-fascist dynamism of the Camelots du roi, stalking the streets 
of Paris and hawking the party newspaper. 
Daudet was not the only blue-blooded republican to join the ranks of reaction in these years. 
Jacques Maritain was born into a Protestant family in 1882, and in his early years showed every 
indication of becoming a leading republican intellectual. He was the grandson of Jules Favre, one of 
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the Third Republic’s leading statesmen, and began his career studying botany at German universities, 
then at the height of their intellectual dominance. During the Dreyfus Affair, he strongly supported 
Zola and Péguy, becoming closely associated with the latter. “It will be necessary,” he exclaimed in 
1899, “to raze the churches and wound the heart of the old believing woman.”20 But in 1906, he 
succumed to Daudet’s “thirst for the Infinite” and converted to Catholicism along with his wife 
Raïssa, a Russian Jew. He quickly entered the mainstream of Catholic reaction, associating himself 
with the Action française from 1911 onwards. “We thank you,” he wrote to Père Delatte, his spiritual 
director, “for having pointed out so clearly to us the venom of liberalism and for having provided an 
irrefutable historical justification for the disdain that every Catholic should feel instinctively, it seems 
to me, for all the diminutions, concessions, and vilenesses of modern times.”21  
During the war, Catholics became even more involved in public life, as the union sacrée 
brought them squarely into the national fold: in the real and symbolic trenches of World War I, 
religious differences were cast aside in the name of eternal France.22 Catholics came out of the war 
with a new prestige, just as they would in 1945: in addition to the continuation of the Semaines sociales 
and the other pre-war social movements, they founded a bevy of Christian trade unions, Équipes 
sociales, scouting movements, and more. “The religious idea has returned to civic life,” one 
prominent social Catholic announced in 1922.23 These new groups tended to bask in the reflected 
glory of the many military heroes, notably Edouard de Castelnau, that took part. They also tended to 
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be apolitical. Following a trend set by the Vatican, most Catholic organizations satisfied themselves 
with protecting the rights and traditions of Catholicism without engaging in high-profile counter-
revolutionary activity. The Catholic Scouts, for instance, emphasized their political agnosticism, and 
their official manual outlawed any political discussion at scout camps or meetings.24  
That said, however, these movements certainly did not celebrate the republic, and, given the 
tenor of the times, were implicitly conservative or even antirepublican (the same scouting manual 
featured a medieval knight on its cover). Simone de Beauvoir recalled of her Catholic education in 
the 1920s that she had been taught the glory of Marie Antoinette and the profound evil of the sans-
culottes and tricoteuses.25 Castelnau himself founded the Fédération Nationale Catholique in response to the 
victory of Edouard Herriot’s militantly anti-clerical Cartel des gauches in 1924. The F.N.C. was a 
Catholic organization that, while technically apolitical, served as the primary national organization of 
a Catholic culture that remained, as Philip Nord has written, “in critical opposition to the wider civic 
order, more intent on a reconquest of the public realm […] than on any form of power-sharing.”26 
And while Castelnau himself favored the extreme right of the republican possibilities, many of the 
F.N.C.’s top brass, not to mention many of its hundreds of thousands of members, were associated 
with the Action française.27  
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The political face of Catholicism belonged, above all, to Maurras’s royalist movement.28 
There were miniscule Christian Democratic parties, but their influence and popularity paled in 
comparison to Maurras’s. Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli judge that the movement 
constituted one of the two basic poles of 1920s intellectual life, comparing its influence to that of 
the P.C.F. after 1945.29 Nothing of the sort could plausibly be claimed for Christian Democracy, 
which enjoyed no prominent intellectual support and never surpassed three per cent of the national 
vote. Maurras’s  organization enjoyed the support of many in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, including 
Pope Pius X and prominent theologians like Louis Billot and Thomas Pègues.30 Yves Simon claimed 
in 1922 that Catholic intellectuals were doomed to irrelevance if they did not associate themselves 
with Maurras: “An admission of democracy in such a climate exposed one to ironical and disdainful 
pity […] One had to speak of liberal errors with a superior air, scoff at liberty, equality, or 
fraternity.”31  
This is somewhat puzzling, especially as the Catholic-friendly Bloc national was in power until 
1924. As Susan Pedersen has pointed out, Catholic social policies, premised on a corporatist critique 
of atomized individualism, were well-nigh indistinguishable from those of mainstream republican 
social ideals. Kristin Stromberg Childers, for instance, has shown that Catholic invocations of the 
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père de famille were strikingly similar to those of non-Catholics.32 As Venita Datta has pointed out, 
both Radicals and Catholics were speaking the language of the “organic”: no simplistic 
determination of “individualistic” republicanism vs. “organic” Catholicism will do.33 Solidarisme, the 
reigning social ideology of the radicals, emphasized local administrative control and—an abiding 
Catholic concern—the protection of private property. It rejected class conflict, and emphasized the 
devoirs that we all owe to the collective: like Catholics, radicals were interested in steering a path 
between individualism and collectivism. Social Catholics and solidarist Radicals had rubbed 
shoulders at the Musée Social, a center of reformist thinking with close ties to the government, and 
Catholic law professors like Raoul Jay were among France’s leading proponents of worker’s 
insurance (modeled on Bismarck’s Germany).34 There were, moreover, plenty of resources for 
Catholic republicanism, notably including the papal injunction to Ralliement in the 1890s and, more 
recently, the warm memories from the union sacrée. Albéric Belliot’s authoritative Manuel de sociologie 
catholique, while of course not supporting socialism, at least claimed that it was superior to 
liberalism!35 Even in the 1920s, there were reasons to hope: the French state, for instance, reopened 
diplomatic relations with the Vatican and sent official representatives to the canonization of Joan of 
Arc. 
To explain the widespread Catholic opposition to the republic, we must examine the precise 
shape that the republic was taking at the time by examining the ethical socialism of the Radical Party, 
judged by Ory and Sirinelli to be the other pole of 1920s French intellectual life. As Sanford Elwitt 
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and Judth F. Stone have shown, Radicals were the dominant voices of the Third Republic, and they 
worked hard, both intellectually and politically, to stabilize bourgeois society through a program of 
social legislation.36 Radicals conceived of the state, and its relationship to the new idea of “society,” 
in terms that were unacceptable to Catholics. These precise Radical theories and policies conditioned 
the Catholic opposition, and not any abstract opposition to modernity or republican regimes. 
Charles Maurras, it bears repeating, was not even a Catholic: he was an outspoken agnostic whose 
master was not Christ or Aquinas, but Auguste Comte, the founder of French sociology. The debate 
between Radicals and Catholics was carried out in the language of society, and not that of politics. 
As Judith Surkis has pointed out, the concept of the “social” arose in republican circles to 
provide a ballast of value for the Republic—a way to reject the bankrupt individualist tradition 
without ceding ground to socialism or royalism.37 Emile Durkheim, of course, was the principal poet 
of the social. As a leading Dreyfusard, he had attempted to theorize a notion of “society” that would 
thread a particularly difficult needle. He, and his confrères, needed a way to counter anti-Dreyfusard 
accusations of bankrupt, liberal atomism, while also protecting the Kantian cosmopolitanism he saw 
as integral to the French national project. It is important to recall that the debate was taking pace 
from within the tradition of sociology, and was not staged between republican sociology and 
Catholic atavism. The two central players—Durkheim and Maurras—were self-declared disciples of 
Comte, and shared some central premises, most importantly the idea that religion was necessary to 
public cohesion.38 The debatable issue was whether or not individualism itself could serve as this 
new religion. While Maurras saw republican individualism as anathema to properly sociological 
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religiosity, Durkheim disagreed. Catholicism, he claimed in the midst of the Dreyfus Affair, was 
“yesterday’s religion” and in dire need of replacement by the “religion of humanity whose rational 
expression is the individualist morality.”39  
Durkheim’s “individualism,” he emphasized, was quite different from the desiccated 
Benthamite version. “In reality,” he writes, “the religion of the individual is a social institution like all 
known religions.”40 In 1900, he delivered an address at the Exposition Universelle, as part of a series 
of lectures on the concept of solidarité, which Durkheim supported and which came to be known as 
the official social philosophy of the Third Republic.41 He spoke alongside his friend and disciple, 
Léon Bourgeois. Bourgeois was probably the most significant Radical ideologue and politician of the 
Third Republic (excepting possibly the heroes of the 1870s). He was closely identified with the 
politics of Geneva, serving as president of the League Council and winning the 1920 Nobel Peace 
Prize for his efforts. And as the expositor of solidarisme, widely recognized as the Radicals’ guiding, if 
loosely-defined, political ideology, his shadow loomed large over debates in the 20s.  
Bourgeois brought Durkheimean ideas of the social into the heart of Radical political 
thinking. Like Durkheim, he was critical of both socialism and liberalism, believing that a socialized 
individualism could provide a just and efficient path between the two. The utility of solidarisme, as 
Bourgeois constantly emphasized, was that it allowed for a more equitable social order from within 
the framework of “individualism” and the principles of 1789. The basic idea was that man, as 
Durkheim taught, is social all the way down, tied from birth by a thousand strands to his 
community. This is true regardless of social policy. “There is a natural solidarity,” Bourgeois 
believed, “which has nothing in common with justice.” What solidarism tried to do was bend this 
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pre-existing solidarity towards just social relations. For this, conscious management and science are 
needed, as nature is not enough. Like Durkheim, Bourgeois was explicit that this new system would 
replace the religions of old. We need not wait for the endtimes for justice, Bourgeois writes: with the 
help of science and fair contracts, justice can appear on earth.42 
This same elevation of the social can be found in the lengthy electoral manifesto prepared by 
the Cartel des Gauches in preparation for the fateful election of 1924. Like Bourgeois, the Cartel tried 
to claim the mantle of the French Revolution, praising Gambetta and Combes as anti-clerical 
forerunners. The Church was lumped together with high finance and high industry as a counter-
revolutionary agent behind the nefarious Bloc National, while Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, a leading 
Durkheimean, contributed an essay on the “republican ideal.”43 Like Bourgeois and Durkheim, 
Lévy-Bruhl argued that the project of 1789 must become social: the people must be sovereign, but 
must also guarantee rights through social policies. The most interesting article in this regard came 
from Charles Rist, who argued for a form of economic corporatism that would be based on 
individualism—as mediated through the state and a proposed National Economic Council (which 
became a reality in 1925).44 
The agents in each of these cases were the familiar republican agents: the male voter, the 
sovereign people, the republican state.45 For all of the republican interest in corporate management, 
this was always on the national stage. Bourgeois’s most controversial policy, for instance, was 
support of a sizable income tax to fund his programs. What is studiously missing from Durkheim, 
Bourgeois, and the Cartel des Gauches was a principled appreciation of subsidiary communities: the 
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family, most notably, or the region. Natalism is not the same as principled defense of the family qua 
moral entity, as Radicals rejected conservative demands for family-based voting, and even female 
suffrage (on the grounds that women were too religious). Durkheim, for instance, was convinced 
that local or regional loyalties were atavistic and needed to be effaced in the name of a national 
community. “The patriotism of the parish,” he wrote, “has become an archaism that cannot be 
revived at will.”46 “[T]he men of the Revolution,” he instructed, “made France one, indivisible, 
centralized, and perhaps one should even see the revoutionary achievement as being above all a 
great movement of national concentration.”47 Elsewhere, he delivered a paean to the state as the 
“prime mover”:  
It is the State that has rescued the child from patriarchal domination and from family 
tyranny; it is the State that has freed the citizen from feudal groups and later from 
communal groups; it is the State that has liberated the craftsman and his master from 
guild tyranny.48 
 
From the Catholic perspective, these “liberations” were in fact enslavements, and it was the 
undermining of these traditional communities that most worried Catholics about the Republic. 
While French republicans were just as convinced as Catholics in the centrality of the social, their 
theories advocated a rational, scientific reconstruction of society to the detriment of natural or pre-
existing communities (in this, of course, they were following a long revolutionary tradition). In the 
bellwether 1910 survey cited above, the authors declared, “The idea of national sovereignty, as it was 
conceived by the Revolution, is in crisis.”49 Philippe Ariès (an outspoken Catholic, then as later), 
recalling his youthful affiliation with the Action française, wrote that he “opposed the limited 
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traditional community, the sense of solidary of a small group, to democratic individualism.”50 La 
Tour du Pin praised Maurras’s movement for the same reason: 
You hold high the flag on which you have inscribed not only the restoration of the 
throne, that is to say, the liberty of the state, but all the other public liberties which 
have disappeared since the proclamation of individual liberty; liberty of the Church, 
of the province, of the commune, of the profession, of the family.51 
 
From their perspective, these organic communities are both enjoined by nature and just in 
themselves. Catholics, both those in the Action française and those associated with social Catholicism, 
believed that the State should do no more than crown a natural and organic order, taking its place 
amongst a series of legitimate, natural, and ancient communities. As Maurras pointed out, there were 
differences between the Semaines Sociales and the Action Française, but they could rally behind a 
certain understanding of “the state and its functions.”52 And neither group sought to return to pre-
scientific understandings of the social order. “If it is the sociologists who do not give morality its 
proper place,” chided one social Catholic, “there are others who do not pay sufficient attention to 
the economic aspects of socio-economic problems.”53 Catholics sought to remain Catholic while 
also remaining scientific, and their writings, especially in the social-Catholic tradition, retained all of 
the social-scientific rigor they had developed in the fin de siècle.  
But, as all agreed, science was not enough without morality, and the particular source of 
Catholic morality at this time was Thomism, which swept Catholic France—both social and royalist 
Catholics—in the 1920s. Leo XIII had called for a return to Thomas in 1879, and his call was met 
inside the seminaries. But after World War I, Thomism enjoyed an astonishing vogue in the public 
sphere, as lay intellectuals like Étienne Gilson, Auguste Valensin, and, above all, Maritain blew the 
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cobwebs off of the medieval doctor and brought him into dialogue with modern culture and society. 
“This is the first time,” Raïssa Maritain wrote in her journal, “that Thomist philosophy has had such 
a large entry into the world of culture.”54 Even, in one case, to the theater: Henri Ghéon, who wrote 
a well-received play with the inauspicious title, The Triumph of St. Thomas, explained, “We can take it 
for granted, following the urgent advice of Rome after sufficient examination, that the principles of 
Thomism are just, while those of Descartes and Kant are false.”55 Thanks to Ghéon, Maritain, new 
mass-audience courses at the Institut Catholique, a bevy of Thomist study circles, a mass of 
publications from the Thomist stronghold at Louvain, and so on, a generation of Catholics was 
raised in Thomas’s shadow.56 
 It is no coincidence that Jacques Maritain was both one of the chief Action Française 
intellectuals and France’s most famous Thomist: Aquinas and Maurras were closely allied in the 
1920s. Maurras, in addition to publicizing Thomism in his newspaper and discussing the Church 
Doctor in his own monographs, enjoyed the support of Thomism’s greatest luminaries.57 Maritain 
edited the philosophy section of the Revue Universelle, the chief Catholic organ of the Action française, 
and he lent a Thomist flavor to the enterprise. Maritain was also one of the guiding spirits of La 
Gazette française, another Catholic journal in the orbit of Action Française, founded in 1924 (not 
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coincidentally, the year of the Cartel des Gauches).58 “We cannot imagine,” Etienne Borne later 
recalled, “how Maurras was able to entrance and fascinate a large part of the Catholic intelligentsia, 
including cardinals and bishops.”59 Later historians have been unable to solve Borne’s conundrum, 
and the links between Thomist philosophy and the Action Française remain understudied.60  
 When put into the propert context of Third Republic radicalism, Thomism’s appeal as a 
discourse of anti-republicanism becomes apparent. Thomism’s account of natural law allowed a way 
to reinstate the traditional communities and hierarchies that had always been fundamental to the 
counter-revolutionary imagination. As Maritain explained it, Thomism allowed Catholic to reassert 
the objective reality, and hierarchical ordering, of the natural and social world. This was homologous 
with Maurras’s attempt to theorize a “realist politics, either Catholic or positivist.”61 Like Maurras 
and others, Maritain was convinced that Republicans were in thrall to a bankrupt, Kantian 
philosophy that denied the objective reality of the world in favor of the newly-minted “social.” Kant 
was, of course, one of Durkheim’s philosophical patron saints, as well as Maritain’s primary bête noir. 
“Saint Thomas against Kant!” was the call to arms with which Maritain ended his wartime series of 
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lectures at the Institut Catholique, while Maurras declared Kantian idealism to be the “religion of the 
Third Republic. […] Intellectually, morally, ethically, [Kant] is the enemy.”62  
The issue was that Thomas theorized an ontology of order: the enormous centrality of 
“order” as a keyword in social thinking can be traced back to the Thomist revival (and would bear 
fruit later in neoliberalism, whose key early journal was called Ordo, in honor of Thomas). 
Philosophy, Maritain averred in 1920, is about attaining knowledge of being, “thanks to what is 
called the natural light of human intelligence.”63 This light allows us to see and be dominated by 
objects, whose “natural order” it is our duty as philosophers to uncover.64 “Human intelligence,” 
Maritain concluded, is “naturally made for being in general and without restriction.”65 Like Garrigou-
Lagrange, the most prominent Thomist within the hierarchy itself, and one who profoundly 
influenced Maritain, Maritain held that the natural light of reason afforded us a sens commun—a 
“dowry of nature,” as Maritain put it—that afforded all of us with “certitudes, which gush 
spontaneously in our spirit.”66 For both Maurras and Maritain, there is no such thing as Being without a 
hierarchy. In a world populated by objects, some order must prevail to avoid the anarchy of the 
Kantian world. This was a Thomist commonplace. As one Thomist wrote in Revue Universelle in 
1924, “the world is a hierarchy of beings, intimately linked and ordered in such a way that reason can 
discover the connections.”67 Maurras was obsessed with what he called “the immense question of 
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order.”68 In a 1922 article for Revue Universelle, Maritain approvingly cited Maurras’s praise for the 
Church, and went on: “It is only in the Church, herald of supernatural order and safeguard of 
natural order among men, that order appears in plenitude, in its splendor and metaphysical purity.” 
And, more darkly: “All order—including that among demons—is divine.” 69 Maurras put it this way: 
“As soon as Being begins to distance itself from its opposite, as soon as Being exists, it has its force 
and its order.”70  
 For both Maritain and Maurras, the problem with the Third Republic was that it denied this 
natural order in the name of the “social,” which, as we have seen, structured Radical discourse and 
denied the existence of a natural social order. It was this specific context Maritain had in mind when, 
in a scathing discussion of Durkheim, he denounced the “despotism of the social.”71 The Republic, 
Maritain taught, wrenched “the human person”, understood as the person embedded in a web of 
communities, from his natural habitat, transforming him into an “individual”: “isolated, naked, with 
no social framework to support and protect it.” This individual, excised from the warm embrace of 
fathers and patrons, “will be completely annexed to the social whole.”72 Maurras spoke in similar 
terms in his critique of “social individualism” (a perfectly just way to characterize the solidarist 
system): true liberty appears when “companies, corps and distinct groups […] remain master of their 
own regulations”, while the false liberty of the republicans consists in abstract liberty, given to all 
“without taking into account their different functions.”73 For Maurras and Maritain, this “despotism 
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of the social” was behind the paradoxical equation of individualism and tyranny. In a characteristic 
1921 article, Maritain criticized European modernity because it deifies the individual, but also 
because it deifies the state; years earlier, he had vilified Rousseau for turning man into a “slave of the 
state.”74 Maurras felt the same way: “the republic is simultaneously individualist and étatiste.”75 
The Catholic critique of the “social” extended across the intellectual spectrum. Augustin 
Cochin, an Orléanist conservative with loose ties to the Action Française, was a favored historian of 
the Catholic right: both Maritain and Maurras were enamored of his work.76 He made his name 
through his histories of the French Revolution, which, like Maritain and Maurras, he saw as a denial 
of reality in this special Thomist sense. “[I]t is necessary,” he taught, “to distinguish between the 
artificial union founded on theories and the real union founded on facts.”77 We are naturally tied to 
one another, and to God, by innumerable and invisible strands, and once these are cut, as they were 
in 1789, the “people” will fill this space, assume Godlike powers, and institute a Reign of Terror. 
While this historical thesis has had a long afterlife, at the time it was employed as part of a wider 
Catholic critique of the Republic and the new legitimating language of the social. Durkheim, Cochin 
taught, simply reversed the polarity of Rousseau: “Rousseau divinized the people; Durkheim 
socialized God: God, pure symbol of the only reality, the social.”78 To take another example: Simon 
Deploige, a Thomist professor at Louvain, devoted an entire volume to criticizing Durkheim’s 
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sociology (Maritain wrote the preface to a new edition of the book, published by the Action 
Française’s publishing house in 1923). Deploige sought to unravel the sociological notion that 
something called “society” could replace God as the source of moral value and political order: 
Deploige saw this merely as “social mysticism.”79 Society, as the “Grand Être” that both produces 
and watches over us, ends up enslaving us more fully than any feudal order.  
 The Social Catholics of the 1920s participated in the same discourse. Although they tended 
to support the Republic, they were as critical as Maurras and Maritain of the étatiste tendency to 
steamroll intermediary communities. Social Catholics and Maurrasean royalists were not at all 
warring factions, although they differed in emphasis: the Church, after all, blessed them both, while 
La Tour du Pin, one of social Catholicism’s founding fathers, was a firm devotee of Maurras (while 
Maurras would call him “my direct master, master, I repeat it, of our social politics”80). Augustin 
Cochin was celebrated in both the social Catholic and the royalist press.81 Deploige associated with 
the Action française while speaking at the Semaines sociales at the same time. More importantly, 
though, there were homologies between the political thought of the royalists and that of the social 
Catholics: each were rooted in the Thomist revival and its celebration of intermediary communities. 
Paul Archambault, a giant of progressive Catholicism in the 1920s, sought “our liberation from 
subjective individualism, without delivering us into fashionable sociologisme.”82 The 1922 Semaines 
Sociales, specifically on the economic role of the state, was peppered with references to Thomism, 
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and its theory of intermediary bodies, as a critique of the centralizing, revolutionary state. “Sociology 
and economics,” declared one Catholic writer, “are related to theology.”83 
The most important political thinkers of social Catholicism were the so-called 
“institutionalists”: J.T. Delos, Maurice Hauriou, and George Renard. All three were concerned to 
devolve power away from the state and towards a series of intermediary “institutions.” The State 
was tasked not with directing economic life, but with organizing and protecting an organic 
institutional milieu. Both Delos and Renard were staples of the Semaines Sociales, while Hauriou was 
the central inspiration behind the political thought of Eugène Duthoit, the president of the Semaines. 
Hauriou had developed a notion of law that could, as he himself argued, overcome the 
Durkheimean idea of the social.84 Duthoit argued that the contemporary French state was seriously 
overstepping its bounds, and needed to withdraw in the face of subsidiary communities. “It is a […] 
fact,” Duthoit announced, “that the state is not adapting to its economic functions as it should.” As 
Tocqueville had foreseen, war had caused the state to balloon and encroach on territory that is not 
its own, intervening into local realities with its clumsy, visible hand. All of these difficulties collapse 
into one: Duthoit’s diagnosis, shared with Maritain, is that the state “is fundamentally unaware of its 
true nature.” The State should not abolish all other communities, or even conceive of itself as an 
independent force at all. It is no more than the “superstructure” that organizes and protects the 
infrastructure: provinces, départements, communes, corporations, families, and so on. The State is 
“a power of envelopment, and not one of absorption.” 85  
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It is worth dwelling on a particular manifestation of this idea that would have tremendous, 
and surprising, staying power: the “human person,” or la personne humaine, as opposed to the 
“individual.” Like Catholic social thought more broadly, Catholic personalism only makes sense 
when placed in the context of Third Republic republicanism. For while Catholics were keen to cite 
the term’s Thomist heritage, the more proximate source was the Republic itself. In his work on 
suicide, Durkheim announced that “the human person is and must be considered something 
sacred,” while in his 1898 intervention into the Dreyfus Affair he had used the “human person” to 
name the social individual he was theorizing. “In the modern world, in the world of the Revolution,” 
Jean Jaurès announced in 1903, “law begins with the human person” (this was met with cheers from 
the left wing of the Chamber of Deputies). The following year, he defended “the right of the human 
person to unlimited liberty of thought and belief.”86 In the 1920s, too: Lévy-Bruhl, in his essay for 
the Cartel des Gauches manifesto, proclaimed that the Republic was charged with protecting the 
development of the “human person.”87  
So while republicans were arguing that the socialized “human person” was a mere 
development from individualism, Catholics responded that individualism, as defended by Durkheim, 
in fact represented the denial of the socialized “human person.” This argument was made from 
across the Catholic spectrum, although Social Catholics writing around the time of the Law of 
Separation seem to have been the first to make this move. Royalists were quick to follow suit: 
Augustin Cochin used the “human person” as a stick with which to beat modern political ideas in 
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1909, while Maritain did so in 1914.88 In the 1920s, the concept became firmly embedded in Catholic 
discourse, from which point it would, as we’ll see in following chapters, take on a life of its own.89 
Maritain did more than anyone else to make the concept famous. The notion of the person 
is, Maritain proudly claims, a legitimately Thomist one. Essentially it adds nothing to the ontological 
status of man as described above: the possession of rationality and the ability to consciously and 
morally dwell in the hierarchy of being stretching from man to God. The individual, by contrast, is 
like a plant or animal, motivated by unconscious instinct and ignorant of the spark of divine 
rationality in his soul. “As individuals,” Maritain rhapsodizes, “we are subject to the stars. As 
persons, we rule them.”90 In other words, a true person is not subject to the whims of brute matter, 
but soars above it—at least in spirit—through the possession of reason. 
Both historically and conceptually, the notion is rooted in a realist, federalist critique of the 
modern state: the “person” was not a hoary Thomist idea that Maritain dusted off in the name of 
federalist politics, but was created in that context, and for that (political) reason. Here’s Maritain in 
1923: 
In the social order, the modern city sacrifices the person to the individual; it gives 
universal suffrage, equal rights, liberty of opinion, to the individual, and delivers the 
person, isolated, naked, with no social framework to support and protect it, to all the 
devouring powers which threaten the soul’s life.91 
 
The resonance with the federalist politics described above should be obvious: the person, as a 
denizen of an acephalous reality (“social framework”), has been transformed into an atomized mass 
man who can be dominated by the “devouring powers” of the state. The only solution, as Maritain 
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pointed out elsewhere, is a return to a more local, federalist and customary notion of legitimacy and 
law.92 
What, though, does this all have to do with “democracy”? Recall my basic hypothesis that 
Catholics were not greatly exercised by the question of democracy in the abstract—a contention that 
is, I believe, borne out by my analysis above, which looks at French Catholicism as a whole and 
finds a coherent set of social guidelines without dwelling on the “democracy vs. monarchy” 
question. Many French Catholics were monarchists, of course, but very few of them were willing to 
theorize a natural connection between monarchism and Catholicism (there were exceptions: 
Garrigou-Lagrange, for one). This simply was not the tenor of Catholic thinking. Christian 
Democrats like Archambault, who believed in full-throated Catholic participation in the republic, 
were in the minority. Charles Maurras, whose cry of “Politique, d’abord!” seems to fly in the face of 
this thesis, was of course not Catholic, nor were many of his central intellectual backers (Léon 
Daudet, Pierre Lasserre, et al.). The disagreement beween Maurras and Archambault was not about 
democracy in the abstract—it was about the capacity of democracy to instantiate the social form that 
Catholics truly desired. Maurras and Archambault shared the desire for a decentralized, regionalist 
social and economic order: they differed in the belief of the former that democracy was incapable of 
creating it.  
In closing, let’s look at Jacques Maritain, the key Catholic intellectual of the Action Française, 
and Revue Universelle, the central Catholic organ of Action Française activism. The Revue was very 
Catholic but it was not, in any way, a royalist journal. Indeed, in the 1920s it published no articles in 
support of the monarchy. This is a remarkable fact, and a very difficult one to explain away if one 
believes that 1920s French Catholics were dyed-in-the-wool monarchists: the central organ for 
French Catholic intellectuals, one allied with the right-wing of French politics, did not support 
                                                




monarchism in any way. It published a great many articles about social Catholicism, the dangers of 
centralization, the dangers of “sociology” and Radicalism, the menace of a united Germany, and 
more of the Catholic concerns that I’ve outlined above. But the Revue did not dabble in questions of 
political form.93 Maritain, likewise, emphasized the difference between démocratie, a legitimate political 
form found in the works of Thomas and Aristotle, and démocratisme, a bankrupt, centralizing form of 
democratic politics at work in Prussia and in French Radicalism.94 Catholics were more interested in 
the reform of society. Belliot, the Catholic sociologist, in 1927 listed seven institutions that would be 
“the most useful for the integral reform of society.” The state did not appear on this list.95 
Does this mean that French Catholicism was primed for parliamentary democracy? Of 
course not: French Catholics, for the most part, were anti-republican to their marrow, and many 
would turn to explicitly anti-democratic solutions in the 1930s and early 1940s. Belliot, again, is 
paradigmatic here: he was scathing towards “parliamentarism” and linked it directly with the 
bureaucratization and centralization that had dissolved the proper corporate order. Simultaneously, 
though, he was careful to admit that in certain times and places, democracy might be the proper 
political order.96 There was a long and winding road between the reactionary Catholicism of the 
1920s and the Cold War Catholicism of the 1940s. What I’ve done in this chapter, though, is revise 
the traditional understanding of 1920s Catholicism: it was as opposed to the Republic as we always 
believed, but for different reasons. Catholics were less interested in questions of political form than 
of social form; less interested in political theory than in economics. Once we see this, the nature of 
the Catholic transition to democracy snaps into focus—we no longer see a picture of Catholics 
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waking up and smelling the roses of democracy, but a more nuanced one, in which Catholics, 
interested in reproducing a certain social form, were casting about for the best political means to 
arrive there. In the 1920s, monarchism seemed the natural answer to this problem. In the 1930s, as 
we’ll see in Part II, many turned towards authoritarian and non-monarchist Fascism. And, in the 




Chapter 2: Eugen Kogon and the Democracy of Tomorrow
 
The sovereign state, in the modern sense, tends towards the world-state, and it wishes to become the 
Church, the last unified source of value. Phrased apocalyptically: it bears the Antichrist in its womb! 
--Ernst Karl Winter, 19261 
 
French Catholics were not the only ones terrified of the crusading nation-state, and they 
were not the only ones to see Prussia as its most dangerous manifestation. They were joined by an 
active culture of Catholics in central Europe, primarily in Bavaria and Austria. Here, as in France, 
Catholics set up their own, putatively ancient, traditions as a bulwark against the Prussian machine, 
which represented “modernity” in all its most frightening guises. There was very little connection 
between the two milieux at the time—understandably, French and German-speaking Catholics had 
little to say to one another in the days immediately succeeding the Second World War. They relied, 
though, on a shared heritage of nineteenth-century social thinking, and a shared fear that the nation-
state, arrviste in Vienna but well-entrenched in France, was running roughshod over the Church’s 
ancient liberties. The traditions were somewhat different, however, and would therefore make 
different contributions to the transnational Catholicism that would emerge in the 1930s and, 
especially, in the 1940s. 
While French Catholics were skeptical of the state as such, Central European Catholics were 
more willing to countenance an authoritarian, Catholic state. There were multiple reasons for this: 
for one, Austrian Catholicism had developed as an ideology of state for decades, which French 
Catholicism had of course never done (also, as we’ll see in Chapter 5, Austrian Catholicism would 
become an ideology of state, once again, in the 1930s). Perhaps more importantly, central Europe 
was in utter chaos in the early twentieth century, and it seemed clear that organic social groupings, 
particularly nations, were not going to harmoniously coexist without the steady hand of the state. 
                                                




And while the most political strains of political Catholicism would collapse with Dollfuss and the 
Anschluss of 1938, a number of Catholics nourished in this tradition would become important to 
Cold War Catholicism as a transnational, and trans-Atlantic, project.  
This difference in emphasis is apparent in the Central Europeans’ preferred solution to the 
Rhineland question, which we’ve been using as a litmus test. The French, recall, wanted to dismantle 
“German-ness” in its entirety, seeing it and the nation-state it represented as heretical forms of 
modernity. They did not foresee a federalist solution to the Rhineland problem, if only because 
federalism seemed to them alien to the étatiste German genius. Central Europeans, however, drew 
on a different notion of the state, and a different notion of what it meant to be German. They 
wanted to reintegrate the Rhineland into a new German-speaking confederation, uniting it into a 
central European empire headquartered on Catholic Vienna (the Austrian Christian Socials, like 
many other Germans in Central Europe, claimed that Wilsonian principles of self-determination 
required Anschluss).2 “The German-speaking area of Mitteleuropa,” despaired one author in a 
Bavarian journal, “has ever since [Versailles] been divided into sixteen sovereign states.”3 This 
seemed like a tragedy to many central European Catholics, especially those in Bavaria and Austria 
(Czechs and Hungarians, for instance, were more enthused, as their nationalist dreams had finally 
come to fruition). “After the collapse of 1918,” judged Josef Eberle, a key arbiter of Viennese 
cultural life, “the question of an organic arrangement of Mitteleuropa […] burns brighter than 
ever.”4 
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Central Europeans were, of course, aware of the preferred French plan for the Rhineland. In 
one of Barrès’s rare pieces of positive press in Germany, Heinrich Staab, a correspondent for the 
Bavarian Allgemeine Rundschau, wrote that he was perfectly right to argue that the Rhineland had no 
spiritual roots in the Prussian Machtstaat of the Second Reich. But the solution was not to annex the 
Rhineland to France, as the Rhineland was not spiritually French, either. This explains the 
catastrophic failure of French propaganda activities there, which the writer judges to have been as 
successful as “an elephant in a porcelain store.” The Rhineland saga can only come to a close once 
the frame of reference is expanded: “We must not pose a question about the fate of the Rhineland 
itself. The Rhineland’s fate and its spirit can only be posed by returning it to the collective German 
fate[.]”5 The author’s solution was included in his title, “Der Großdeutsche Gedanke”: the journal’s 
editor explained elsewhere that, in regards to the Rhineland problem, “salvation is to be found only 
in großdeutschen ideas.”6 For Staab, the vexing question of the Rhineland could only be solved if the 
region were folded back into a reorganized Germany, oriented not towards Berlin, but towards the 
Catholic regions of the South and West.  
There was a strong commonality between central European and French Catholicism, 
geopolitically speaking: a tremendous hatred of Prussia and all that it stood for (this would become 
significant in the 1930s, as the equation of Prussia and Nazism allowed a baseline of cooperation for 
anti-Nazi Catholics in France and Austria). Großdeutsch Catholics rejected the Bismarckean solution 
to the puzzle of German organization. Richard von Kralik, the aged figurehead of Romantic, 
großdeutsch Catholicism, went so far as to equate this political faith with Catholicism: 
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“Großdeutsche thought is inextricably tied to Catholicism—indeed, they are the same thing.”7 Ignaz 
von Seipel gave it the imprimatur of a respected scholar, and politician on the make, in his Nation 
und Staat (1916). While the French blamed Bismarck’s state for repeated humiliation and constant 
threat, Catholics in Mitteleuropa saw Bismarck’s Prussia as directly responsible for the kleindeutsch 
(or, as they sometimes called it, großpreußische) Reich that had dissolved the more ancient unities of 
Catholic Germany. From his professorial post in Munich, Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster wrote at 
length about the total guilt of Germany, and particularly Prussia, for the war. Like others, Foerster 
argued that only a revived großdeutsch federalism could halt the Prussian menace.8 The leading 
Catholic political party in Foerster’s Bavaria made “Los von Berlin!” one of its electoral slogans.9 
Otto Kunze, a prominent Bavarian federalist, wrote a rare essay defending Bismarck: “as a 
Prussian,” Kunze argued, Bismarck “understood better how to dignify the character of the other 
German states than would an abstract German doctrinaire.” Even though the point of the essay was 
to show that Weimar was furiously centralizing even when compared to the Wilhelmine Reich—
which, after all, had let Bavaria keep its monarch—the reader of one copy crossed out the 
conciliatory, “as [als] a Prussian” and replaced it with a more commonplace expression of 
Prussophobia: “although [obwohl] a Prussian.”10 
                                                
7 Richard von Kralik, “Der großdeutsche Gedanke: Eine historische Übersicht”, Frankfurter Zeitgemäße Broschuren (Hamm-
Westfalen, 1921), 213-47, here 215. This series, incidentally, was edited by Hans Rost, one of the leading publicists at 
Allgemeine Rundschau. There are literally hundreds of articles from Das Neue Reich, Schönere Zukunft, or Allgemeine Rundschau 
that could be cited here; großdeutsch propaganda was central to their journalistic mission. For a solid overview, which 
unites all of the clichés, keywords, and paranoia of the movement, see Hans Pfeiffer, “Politische Fragen der 
reichsdeutschen Katholiken,” Schönere Zukunft 3, 18 (29 January 1928), 373-4. 
8 For more on Foerster, see Gregory Munro, Hitler’s Bavarian Antagonist (Lewiston, 2006).  
9 Allan Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 1918-19 (Princeton, 1965), 190.  
10 Otto Kunze, “Wofür kämpft Bayern?” Allgemeine Rundschau 20, 44/5 (6 November 1923), 521-3, here 522. This 
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This hatred of Prussia was linked, in Vienna no less than in Paris, to a hatred of the nation-
state project itself. While Central European Catholics were wont to envision an authoritarian, 
outwardly-Catholic state, they did not in any way desire a nation-state and its monopoly on 
sovereignty—the national principle had unraveled the glorious Austro-Hungarian empire, and could 
Großdeutsche thought was hampered not only by the selective application of Wilsonian principles, 
but by the nation-state form that continued to haunt the continent. This form as such would have to 
be reinvisioned if Catholics were to inhabit the “organic arrangement” they sought. The modern 
state, judged the Austrian Ernst Karl Winter, “is its own God, and is therefore estranged from all 
other Gods.” So there is, for Winter, a close link—even an identification—between the modern 
concept of sovereignty and the disappearance of God. This led Winter to the apocalyptic phrasing in 
the epigraph to this chapter: sovereignty is more than a form of state order, it is the Antichrist 
himself.11  
In this section, the Central European Catholic opposition to the Versailles order, and the 
nation-states that structured it, will be explored and contextualized. As in the previous section, we 
will begin by laying the scene, providing some background information about both Central 
European Catholicism and its political opponents, notably the Austrian Social Democrats [SPÖ] 
(those Catholics in Southern Germany were more concerned about the Weimar regime, which will 
be considered in the next section). We will then follow the career of Eugen Kogon, our second 
major protagonist, as a guide through the intellectual ferment of Central European Catholicism.  
Whereas French Catholics had become accustomed to their monarchy’s disappearance, 
Catholics here experienced it as a fresh blow, and one compounded by the political and economic 
turmoil of the early 1920s. Bavaria had, under Wilhelm, at least been allowed to keep its monarch, 
and as Werner Blessing has shown, nineteenth-century Bavarians had been socialized, through the 
                                                




press and the Church, to inhabit a mystical and pious Catholicism as their primary identity marker, 
looking to Rome instead of Berlin.12 But the dynasty, along with much else that Bavarian Catholics 
held dear, was swept away in 1918 by Kurt Eisner and the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic. 
Although Eisner soon fell, many Bavarians remained skeptical of the regime that followed. Cardinal 
Michael von Faulhaber notoriously referred to Weimar as cursed with the “mark of Cain” (which led 
to a clash with the young Konrad Adenauer at the 1922 Katholikentag where Faulhaber made that 
remark).13 The most powerful political movement in the region was the Bayerische Volkspartei [BVP], 
a spinoff from the renowned Catholic Center party (centered electorally and spiritually in the 
Rhineland). The BVP was founded as a rejection of the parliamentarist progressivism of Matthias 
Erzberger and other Zentrum leaders. While the national party was allied with Catholic labor unions, 
the Bavarian wing was dominated by Georg Heim’s populist, and quasi-separatist, farmers’ league. 
This was a Catholicism of the rural parish, and not of Munich, which inherited a bustling avant-
garde scene from the Wilhelmine period, and represented an SPD-holdout in a sea of BVP voters.  
Perhaps because Bavaria was the most Catholic Land in Germany, Catholics had not felt 
threatened in the Wilhelmine years and had spurned the tight organizational culture characteristic of 
Catholicism elsewhere in Germany.14 The central organization in the Rhineland, to be discussed 
below, was the massive Katholische Volksverein, which had very few members in Bavaria. A dismayed 
Catholic jurist reported in 1927 that “[t]here still exist, particularly in Bavaria, some who are alarmed 
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by the mere name, Volksverein.”15 Catholic trade unions, too, were far less important in Bavaria than 
in the Rhineland, due to a less industrialized economy and the blanket opposition of Catholic clergy 
and employers.16 Even the BVP was less popular in Bavaria than the Center was elsewhere: around 
half of Catholics in the archdiocese of Munich-Freising voted for the BVP, compared to the three 
quarters of Catholics in Münster who voted for the Zentrum. This fluidity rendered Bavarian 
Catholicism particularly open to innovative political movements, especially on the right (including 
the Catholic and federalist Bayern und Reich movement17). The most notable of these was, of course, 
National Socialism, which drew many of its early supporters from Bavarian Catholics.18 
The situation was similar in Austria, in some respects. Austrian Catholics, like those in 
Bavaria, had lost their beloved Catholic monarch and been thrust into an unwanted republic. They, 
too, looked askance at a socialist metropolis, bursting with American films and new fashions, 
situated in a bucolic and pious Catholic countryside. Although the Marxist menace in Bavaria had 
largely dissipated with Eisner, Austrian socialists maintained an iron grip on “Red Vienna,” tirelessly 
seeking to undermine clerical influence. The Christian Social party was similar in structure to the 
BVP. Although the party had its roots in Karl Lueger’s Viennese and ideologically vague 
organization, it had become more provincial and Catholic after Lueger’s 1911 death, finding its 
strength more in agrarian regions and farmers’ associations than in trade unions. Like its Bavarian 
counterpart, the Christian Socials found themselves participating in a Republic whose existence they, 
like most Austrians, deemed illegitimate; this led, as in Bavaria, to a Catholic political culture that 
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bristled against the new political reality.19 Austria was, however, more organized, as befitting a 
political Catholicism that was used to exercising power, and soon would again. Catholics in Austria 
were organized to the hilt, setting up an “unimaginably large number of clerical or Catholic 
organizations,” as a leading historian of the Austrian church has written.20 
Bavaria and Western Austria had longstanding economic and cultural ties and can, for our 
purposes at least, be explored jointly. This does not mean that I subscribe to a mythical notion of 
Mitteleuropa, or even to Karl Dietrich Erdmann’s problematic assertion that Austrian history should 
be folded into German history. In the complex ethno-national mélange of central Europe, these 
major categories are more obfuscating than enlightening, and the historian must turn his focus to the 
region. The German Catholic heartland I’m calling Mitteleuropa extended from Bavaria to the 
Upper Austrian provinces of Vorarlberg, Tyrol, and Salzburg—regions that Georg Heim, founder of 
the BVP, felt should fuse with Bavaria, leaving Vienna in the cold.21 Catholics here imagined 
themselves to be part of the same community, despite the fact that the Versailles Treaty, against the 
overwhelming wishes of the population, mandated against it. In the absence of political unity, these 
ties were organized in other ways, such as mountain clubs and shooting societies.22 As Ludger Rape 
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has demonstrated, there were also close ties, both financial and cultural, between the paramilitary 
movements that sprung up in each region (the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr and the Austrian Heimwehr).23 
The Alpine Catholicism of Central Europe was headquarted in Salzburg, the staunchly 
Christian-Social city directly bordering Bavaria (indeed, it had been part of Bavaria only 120 years 
earlier, and Bavaria’s deposed King Ludwig III fled to a castle in Salzburg in 1919). Franz Rehrl, 
Salzburg’s governor throughout the 1920s, despised Vienna and its socialists, claiming that his city 
had more in common with Bavaria. 24 This form of großdeutsch, cosmopolitan Catholicism was on 
display, most memorably, at the Salzburg Festival, founded in 1922 with Rehrl’s support. Bavarians 
made up a large contingent of the crowd in the early years, while the festival as a whole was 
dedicated to a renewed Catholic, German culture as an antidote to the secularizing tendencies of 
Berlin and Vienna.25 The archbishop of Salzburg gave voice to this common cause at a 1922 address 
in Munich. “We are brothers,” he declared to his Bavarian neighbors. “We share our ancestry, our 
language, our holy Catholic belief, even our emergency and our anguish. In truth and love, God be 
thanked, we are bound.”26  
There was a great deal of intellectual-cultural exchange, as well. Foerster, already mentioned, 
was symbolic here: although born in Berlin, he found his true home shuttling between Munich and 
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Vienna, penning scathing critiques of Prussia alongside soaring hymns to the genius of Austria.27 
The leading Catholic journal in the whole region was Schönere Zukunft, headquartered in Vienna: one 
memoir of the period recalls that it was a common sight in monasteries, and in the hands of priests 
and bishops.28 A prominent Rhenish Catholic, looking on in horror, claimed that this “Romanticism 
of a Christian universal culture, following the medieval model, is represented above all in Austria by 
the journal Schönere Zukunft.”29 Although published in Vienna, it advocated and performed a wider 
German identity. Its founder and editor, Josef Eberle, hailed from Southern Germany, as did many 
of his contributors, and his previous journal, Das Neue Reich, had been published in Tyrol. Eberle’s 
journal was widely read throughout the former Habsburg empire and in Germany, where it actually 
had more readers than it did in Austria. The journal was interested in Bavarian issues: Eberle wrote a 
characteristic article called simply, “The Struggle between Bavaria and the Reich: For Munich, 
against Berlin.”30 The journal had a great deal in common, intellectualy and in terms of personnel, 
with Bavarian Catholicism’s central journal: Allgemeine Rundschau (in fact, the two nearly merged in 
1927). Many contributed from Austria, including Alfred Missong and Richard von Schaukal, two of 
Austria’s premier conservatives (the former could be tracked through the dissertation: he eventually 
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edited the major organ of the triumphant Austrian Christian Democrats).31 Dietrich von Hildebrand, 
who would go on to become one of Dollfuss’s most prominent defenders in the 1930s, was 
associated with Bavarian legitimist movements in the 1920s and began his career writing for 
Allgemeine Rundschau.32  
Eugen Kogon, the second major protagonist of the dissertation, was, like Hildebrand, a 
German who began his career writing for Allgemeine Rundschau before making a name for himself in 
Austria. Born in Munich in 1903, Kogon was educated by Dominicans, as his parents had died when 
he was young. After the war, he remained in the turbulent center of Munich, involving himself with 
Catholic youth groups and clashing with National Socialists in the Hofbräuhaus. He studied political 
economy there, working a second job to pay his way through school, before traveling to Florence in 
1925 to study at the university and study the Fascist state firsthand. He then met his wife in South 
Tyrol and moved with her to Vienna, where he began his study with Othmar Spann and started 
writing journalistic articles on politics and economics.33 Following the well-trodden path between 
these journals, he became an assistant editor of Schönere Zukunft in 1927 and a central figure in 
Austrian Catholic intellectual life. His mission, though, was German in the widest sense: “In the 
German Ostmark, in Austria,” he reported in 1930, “we are experiencing the pangs of the rebirth of 
German political thought.”34 
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He remained a constant visitor to his birth country, and he wrote a clutch of articles for 
Hochland, the most prestigious cultural organ of German-speaking Catholicism as such. We have a 
contemporary account of him from Friedrich Fuchs, one of Hochland’s editors. “He is certainly a 
well-instructed man,” Fuchs wrote to a friend in 1928. “He earns his bread with Eberle, to whom he 
claims to be very important. […] He speaks often and charmingly of Eberle (an amusing farmer, 
which is both his strength and his weakness).”35  It seems that Kogon was not simply boasting about 
his importance: a French Catholic observer in 1933 described Kogon as “Eberle’s right arm,” and 
Kogon contributed an enormous amount to Schönere Zukunft.36 
This, then, was the shape of Catholic political culture in Mitteleuropa, and the background 
of Eugen Kogon, our exemplary figure; we can now turn to its contents. The same question poses 
itself as in France, and it must be answered in the same contextual way. Why, precisely, were 
Catholics so opposed to the new order? There was, we’ll see, no blanket “opposition to modernity.” 
There was also very little principled monarchism, let alone invocations of divine right. Central 
European Catholicism, even moreso than French, was indifferent to royalism. Although there 
certainly were pockets of it, the restoration of the Wittelsbach or Habsburg dynasties was so 
unlikely, and they had anyway been so tarred by defeat, that few Catholics seriously supported it.37 
Nor were they, in any simple way, wed to authoritarian politics as a matter of course. To take one 
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example: in his lengthy series of articles on Italian Fascism, which he had after all studied firsthand, 
Kogon criticized it for its étatisme and centralization.38 
As in France, politics in Mitteleuropa were divided between Catholics and Socialists of one 
stripe or another (post-Eisner, revolutionary Bolshevism was off the table in Bavaria, and had always 
been far from the concerns of the Austro-Marxists). They had much in common with one another, 
and it was not writ in stone that they would become bitter enemies: indeed, in Austria in 1919 the 
Christian Socialists and Social Democrats in Austria entered a coalition. Both groups had taken the 
“social turn” in preceding decades, and wanted to replace the dessicated liberalism of the prewar 
period with a more robust and organized economy. Ignaz Seipel in 1919 drew upon this shared 
heritage, arguing that the Catholic tradition, too, provided the resources for socialization. As Seipel 
claimed and John Boyer has shown in more detail, Karl Lueger’s party provided a model of 
municipal socialism and efficient government: “Red Vienna,” in fact, in many ways drew upon its 
“black” predecessor.39  
Intellectually, socialists and Catholics both sought to overturn the putative “atomism” of 
Ringstrasse liberalism and discover more communal forms of social-economic existence. Kogon and 
other Catholic sociologists shared, for instance, the Marxist worry over “Hochkapitalismus” and its 
individuating tendencies.40 Catholics, no less than Marxists, refused to see the “individual” as the 
component part of society, and thought this category error was at the heart of capitalist decadence. 
“Without being in another,” wrote a leading Austrian Catholic intellectual, “the human spirit cannot 
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become a self any more […] than one can sail without wind.”41 Ignaz von Seipel, in fact, was 
teaching courses on Catholic sociology and economics at the University of Salzburg in the 
immediate prewar years.42 As Klemens von Klemperer has pointed out, Catholics and Marxists were 
not even very far apart on the “nationalities question” that so dominated Central European politics 
at the time.43 The Austro-Marxists and their Socialist party had more nuanced views than Bolsheviks 
or Spartacists on this question (raising Lenin’s ire against them). Otto Bauer, most famously, 
believed that Marxists could not ignore questions of national character, and that nationalities should 
be allowed to develop fully in an international federation not unlike the Austro-Hungarian empire 
(the Soviet Union would come to embrace similar positions in its own multi-national empire).  
These similarities, however, mask a more fundamental ideological disagreement. Similar 
political positions, in other words, can be built upon radically different premises. To take one 
poignant example: in Austria, both Marxists and Catholics were opposed to abortion. They both had 
natalist policies that undercut the individualism implicit in pro-abortion politics. But whereas a 
Catholic would argue that the fetus belongs to God, Julius Tandler, the socalists’ leading expert on 
family issues, declared that the fetus belonged to that recently-discovered entity called “society.”44 
 This language of the “social” united French Radicalism with Austro-Marxism: “Everyone 
speaks of socialization,” observed Schumpeter in 1920.45 Both were, after all, part of the broader, 
European attempt to square the circle between the new social sciences and older norms of scientific 
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rationality. They were both, that is, caught up in the epochal shift between liberalism and sociology, 
and were trying to salvage the Enlightenment project after liberalism’s collapse.46 More specifically, 
they were both participants in the international revival of Kantianism in the early decades of the 
twentieth century: Max Adler sounds much like Durkheim in his invocation of the “social a priori.”47 
In both places this Kantianism gave a strong role to the state as the purveyor and manager of 
scientific rationality against the entrenched superstitious of subsidiary groupings, like the family and 
the Stand.  
“Municipal policy,” Anson Rabinbach has judged, “was dedicated to the transformation of 
consciousness.”48 Sozialisierung was the SPÖ’s name for its policy towards key industries. As Otto 
Bauer explained it, industry would be socialized, and not expropriated: labor, capital, consumers, and 
the state would jointly manage the newly-socialized industries.49 And while the party had to scale 
back its ambitions after losing control of national governance, its policies within Vienna made it 
clear that they were on a crusade against the Church. The famous Linz Program of 1926 was quite 
clear that the party was dedicated to overcoming clerical influence via class struggle. Whereas the 
party was dedicated to socializing everything from childcare to swimming pools, religion had to 
remain a “private phenomenon” in order to combat the “condition of misery, ignorance, and 
servility” that marked the “religious intuitions of the masses.”50 Vienna became a laboratory for 
municipal socialism, in which the city government attempted to create a new working-class culture 
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to replace the atavistic Habsburg culture of prewar Vienna.51 The workers were to be housed in 
municipal housing and socialized through SPÖ organizations. Directly upon winning the elections of 
1919, the SPÖ attempted to reform marriage laws and abolish confessional schools, while the 
Arbeiter-Zeitung thundered that priests were the “electoral protection force [Wahlschutztruppen] of 
capital.” In 1923, just as the Cartel des gauches was sharpening its claws in France, the Austrian 
socialists called on their followers to leave the Church—which 23,000 did in the next year alone.52 
Socialists were not merely crusading against religion in general, but against the peculiarly 
political and Romantic forms that Catholicism had taken in central Europe. “Religion,” declared 
Seipel in 1923, “must always be an object of political struggle for religious men.”53 Romantic 
Catholicism, so typical of the region, was more political in nature than French Thomism, obsessed 
as it was with the idea that the spirit of Christ should pervade every level of society, up to and 
including the state.54 Thomism had made very few inroads in Mitteleuropa, while there was, a 
Viennese newspaper reported in 1923, a “resurrection of Romantic political thought.”55 French 
Catholics despised Romanticism—after all, French Romanticism had been dominated by republicans 
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like Hugo and Michelet.56 “We must,” Eberle implored in 1920, “create the spiritual atmosphere of 
Catholic Romanticism, as Bonald, Schlegel, de Maistre, Haller, Görres, and Adam Müller did one 
hundred years ago.”57 This was the task Eberle set for himself, and he succeeded admirably—to the 
extent that a German cardinal referred to Eberle as the “second Görres.”58  
The intellectual leader of neo-Romantic Catholicism was Kogon’s mentor and academic 
adviser: Othmar Spann. Spann marshalled the insights of a generation of Austrian Catholic 
sociologists—Karl von Vogelsang, one of Lueger’s tutors, foremost among them—and turned 
Catholic sociology into an intellectual and institutional force to be reckoned with. Although largely 
forgotten today on account of his eventual Naziphilia, Spann was one of the leading intellects of 
Central Europe. He was vastly prolific and influential in both the Heimwehr and in the academic 
politics of the First Republic, in addition to the Kamaradenschaftsbund of Sudeten Germans.59 He was 
also a leader in sociology as such, insofar as Max Weber’s methodological innovations, like his 
gentlemanly liberalism, were widely ignored at the time.60 As Georg von Below, perhaps the fledgling 
discipline’s most trenchant critic, argued in 1921, sociology had sundered any ties it once had to 
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Comtean positivism, and had entered a period in which older, idealist forms of Romanticism were in 
the ascendant.61  
Spann’s project was to translate the Romantic social theory of his forebears into the 
combustible political context of postwar Central Europe.62 He oversaw a public renaissance of 
Romantic icons, most notably his personal hero, Adam Müller, whose forgotten work Spann had 
stumbled upon in an antiquarian book shop. Jakob Baxa, another of his students, edited and 
commented upon Müller’s work for a series of monographs Spann edited (Ernst Karl Winter judged 
“the Viennese school Othmar Spann—Jakob Baxa” to be “in the first line […] of research on 
political Romanticism”63). This caused a certain amount of desparation from Germans elwhere: both 
Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt despaired over the Müller renaissance. “Almost forgotten for a full 
century,” Baxa happily declared in 1923, “[Adam Müller’s] Elemente der Staatskunst can now celebrate 
its resurrection.”64 
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Although the anti-étatiste emphasis of French Catholic thought was present in Central 
Europe, too, for a variety of contemporary and historical reasons the Austrians were more invested 
in authoritarian political solutions than the French. Unlike in France, Central European Catholicism 
had developed as an ideology-of-state: from the era of Metternich to that of Lueger, and onwards to 
Seipel and Dollfuss, Austrian Catholics were never far from the levers of power, which is reflected 
in their political Catholicism. Müller and Vogelsang theorized authoritarian state forms in the 
nineteenth century. “Christ did not die merely for men,” Müller had famously written, “but also for 
states.”65 Spann, too, desired a powerful and authoritarian state, responding both to his intellectual 
forebears and to the utter collapse of public order and legitimacy in central Europe.  
The state envisioned by Vogelsang, Spann, and the Christian Socials they inspired was 
powerful, but it was not a Leviathan, and it was not charged with administering the society or the 
economy. Spann referred to his state as a Totalität, but it certainly was not totalitär. Following the 
general trend of Catholic social thought, these Catholics sought to deprive the sphere of politics of 
its monopoly of violence and its abstraction from the living forces of the country. Legitimate and 
sovereign power was to be placed back in the hands of organic groupings like the family and the 
vocation (responding perhaps to the familial economy of power performed by the Habsburgs66). 
These communities were to have legitimate authority within their own sphere, which would serve as 
a limitation of the centralized state: Spann referred to this principle as Sachsouveränität, which is 
difficult to translate. Jan-Werner Müller has suggested “rational administration,” while I would 
suggest something like “sovereignty of the object” to emphasize that the peculiar rationality of 
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Sachsouveränität comes from its location in the great chain of being.67 “Sachsouveränität,” Spann 
emphasized, “takes the place of Volkssouveränität,” which was the sin of the republic (in Austria as in 
France).68  
Although Spann was its intellectual progenitor, neo-Romanticism can best be traced in the 
work of Kogon, who was its ambassador to Germany, writing a blockbuster essay on Spann’s 
thought in Hochland. Like Winter, who praised Kogon’s work in Allgemeine Rundschau, Kogon felt that 
social breakdown was linked to the Leviathan of the nation-state. “The more atomized the society,” 
Kogon writes, “the more powerful the central government.”69 Following the path blazed by Müller 
and Spann, both of whom were supremely interested in questions of finance, Kogon thought that 
money, and not democracy, was the solvent of the proper social order.70 Like others in his milieu, he 
was convinced that the European crisis had more to do with economics than with politics, narrowly 
construed. “The ‘Century of Technology’,” Kogon suggests, “could also be called the ‘Century of 
the Achievement of Market Domination’ or the ‘Century of Speculation.’”71 These issues had 
particular resonance in Germany and Austria in these years, of course, and recent scholarship has 
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shown the cultural and political consequences of currency fluctuations.72 Capitalism for Kogon is 
defined by the new prominence of money as the measure of all value: “an economy of universalized 
money, market, and wages.” He tells a parable in which the devil tempts man to build himself a 
“prison of freedom,” filled with ceaseless treadmills on which we run, soothed by the theologians 
and poets declaiming the justice of the system, “in order to manufacture money: money, money, 
again and again money.”73 No less than Bauer and the social democrats, Kogon sought a complete 
revolution in the economic and social structures of capitalist society, so that production could be 
oriented by social needs instead of profit.74  
In this, Romantic Catholics were perfectly in the mainstream of the epochal shift from 
liberalism to sociology: in fact, insofar as Spann-style sociology dominated Weberean sociology in 
the 1920s, they were at the vanguard of this phenomenon. But, as in France, Catholics differed as to 
the identity of the social groups that should be relevant to modern societies. While French Radicals 
had emphasized “society” as the new organism, Austrian Social Democrats emphasized “society” 
and “class”—equally abhorrent to the Catholics. Spann, Kogon, and the other Romantics 
completely rejected this designation, and it was here that they parted ways with their fellow 
sociologists in Red Vienna.   
For Kogon, the terms of socialist argumentation—class conflict—were already wrongly 
posed, because the notion of a “class” presumes a social order constructed in terms of “money” 
instead of nature. The very idea of a class violates what Kogon refers to as “the law of mediation 
and of small societies.”75 “What is often called a workers’ estate,” Vogelsang had argued, “is not an 
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estate at all, but a proletarian precipitate which is the result of the decomposition of all the other 
estates.”76  
Instead, the solution can only be a reconceptualization of the nature of society and the 
economic subject, who cannot face the “market” as a “consumer,” but must be imbricated in a 
dense network of relations—what Kogon calls an “organic totality of intelligent creatures 
[Lebwesen].” And in order to do this, the agent of the economic process has to be reconceptualized, 
from the class to the family, vocation, and corporation. There is a parallel here with the incipient 
personalism of Cochin and Maritain: as the French were seeking to save the individual from the 
monstrous state by socializing him into the person, the Romantics were attempting to save this same 
individual from the pitiless jaws of the market, by securing him in the safety of his natural 
communities. In his 1928 Hochland essay, Kogon defines society as “Organism—this means: a 
hierarchical order of living, proportionately self-acting, unequal members towards the fulfillment of 
a specific goal. Without classification and domination an organism is unthinkable.”77   
  The most important of these groupings were the family and the corporation [Stand], a 
word/concept that was important for all of the Romantic Catholics, and would become only moreso 
under Dolffuß’s Ständestaat regime.78 The Stand was an attempt to make the turn to sociology while 
simultaneously avoiding the language of class and holding the Antichrist of state sovereignty at bay. 
Everyone at the time believed that individuals were conditioned by their place in the economic 
structure; Catholics simply did not define this positioning in terms of class. There are two callings 
that are fundamental to every society, Kogon held: that of the priest, and that of the father. 
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Interestingly, Kogon immediately dismisses the priest as a model for the social organism, insofar as 
his role is not to mediate between individuals, but between mankind and God. The role of the 
father, on the other hand, is to introduce the child into the hierarchy of communities that makes up 
a healthy society. There are many of these, of which the corporation is the first (the others are tribe, 
nation [Volk], state, race, and mankind). Kogon defines it this way: “A Corporation is the 
community of co-workers that is intrinsically connected to the Gesamtgesellschaft of other 
connections.” It is thus one of many chains linking “the family and the state.”79 Note here that 
Kogon does not see the corporation as mediating between the individual and the state: the individual 
as such does not even figure into his analysis, as the individual lacks reality outside of, and only 
enters the purview of economist from within, the family.80 
These theories were central to the region’s Catholic political culture. “Society rests on three 
fundamental pillars: family, profession, settlement [Siedlung],” declared the 1923 Linzer Program of 
Austrian Catholic workers. The family is the strongest of these, while “[t]he corporations 
[Berufsstände] form the next higher community. Within their sphere, they should be granted an 
appropriate legislative, administrative, and judicial authority.”81 The program called for social 
insurance against sickness, unemployment, age, accidents, and more, but demanded that it be run by 
the Berufstände, while the State was charged merely with oversight. Likewise, the Heimwehr’s 
Korneuburg Oath supported “the self-administration of the estates and a strong leadership of the 
state.”82  
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These ideas were prominent in Bavaria, too. The BVP politician and Bavarian president, 
Gustav Ritter von Kahr, announced his desire to reinvigorate Bavaria’s traditional Stände.83 “True 
federalism does not know the concept of the sovereign state,” wrote Otto Kunze, editor of 
Allgemeine Rundschau, in 1924. What federalism “knows, above all, is law,” which is “independent of 
the state” and made from natural communities, stretched in a chain from the family to the state. 
“None of them are sovereign,” Kunze concludes, “or all of them.” He provides a particularly 
apposite example: “The family of a pair of Polish peasants without their papers, founded before a 
fearless priest, is just as legal and complete of a corporate body [Körperschaft] as the Republic of 
Prussia.”84  
Kunze’s article brings us full circle: Kunze’s analogy assures us that the Republic of Prussia 
is a legitimate body. Kunze explicitly does not, though, say that the Weimar Republic, or the 
Austrian one, was. Like other Catholics in Mitteleuropa, Kunze was a strict federalist, and believed 
that both of these republics usurped the legitimacy of the Länder and all of the subsidiary 
communities that made it up. All of this explains, in a roundabout way, why Central European 
Catholics believed that the “solution to the difficult problem [of the Rhineland] can only be found 
on großdeutschem and federalist grounds.”85 It was held throughout the region’s Catholic political 
culture that the sovereign Machtstaat was itself at fault for Europe’s decadence, and it was only by 
overcoming the very principle of national sovereignty, which the League was manifestly failing to 
do, that a just social order could be founded.  
Again, though, what does this have to do with democracy? As for France, I have tried to tell 
the story of central European political Catholicism without using “democracy” as a unit of analysis. 
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In this, I am following the evidence, as the Catholics themselves were not thinking in these terms. 
Neither, for that matter, were the Socialists: in both cases, ideological traditions existed that allowed 
the vexed issue of democracy to be solved by equating “true democracy” with some form of 
authoritarian government, whether it be a dictatorship of the proletariat or the prelate. Seipel himself 
declared in 1929 that “there can and will be no better way of life in which man may conduct and 
administer public affairs than democracy, the true, properly understood, democracy.”86 And while 
Spann, Eberle, and others on the far-right were reasonably clear that parliamentary democracy was 
unacceptable, they normally refrained from saying so explicitly, and anyhow the Christian Socials at 
the time were committed, in some sense, to the Austrian Republic.  
The dispute between Socialists and Catholics in Central Europe was not about democracy, to 
which they both had ambiguous relationships. As in France, even the most reactionary Catholics 
followed the Leonine injunction to remain indifferent to political form, while explicitly holding out 
the possibility of an acceptable democracy. The Austrian hierarchy, by no means a bastion of 
progressivism, reiterated this Catholic commitment in January 1919. Even Josef Eberle and the 
Allgemeine Rundschau circle emphasized consistently that certain forms of democracy could be 
acceptable to the Catholic conscience.87 Ignaz Seipel led the way here, serving for most of the 1920s 
as head of the Austrian state, while simultaneously criticizing that state for being a merely “formal 
democracy” instead of a “true democracy,” which would recognize that the demos is naturally 
organized into groups and headed by elites (this sensibility survived into the 1930 Korneuburg oath 
of the Heimwehr). Kogon adopted the same language in an article entitled “Democracy of Today 
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and Tomorrow”: the “formal democracy” of today must and would, he wagered, give way to the 
“corporatist [ständische] democracy” to come, which would not be based on the abstract and 
godless principles of 1789. “The democracy of tomorrow is no figment of our imagination,” Kogon 
proclaimed. “It lives, and needs only further development and maintenance.”88 While this does not 
mean, in any way, that Catholics were great fans of parliamentary democracy, it does mean that the 
Christian Democracy of the 1940s, which almost all of the figures discussed here would support, 
could develop organically from the reactionary Catholicism of the 1920s. 
                                                




Chapter 3: Rhineland: Waldemar Gurian and the Democratic 
Centuries to Come 
 
In interwar Cologne, the contradictions and tensions of Germany were laid bare. 
--Karl Anton Prinz Rohan, 19541 
 
 In France and Austria, we have explored Catholic political cultures that were firmly opposed 
to democracy as it existed in the 1920s, for very similar reasons: in both cases, Catholics sought to 
revamp traditional corps intermédiares or Stände that would mediate between families, professions, 
regions, states, and beyond to Christendom itself. In both cases, Catholics drew on a similar 
nineteenth-century heritage of Catholic social thought, and similar negative experiences with 
unwanted and anti-clerical republics. These two milieux were, in many obvious ways, quite similar. 
But what of the third major Catholic milieu of the interwar period: the Rhineland itself? At first 
blush, it seems like the political culture here was quite different, insofar as the Catholic Rhineland 
was at the heart of Catholic democratic politics (the Zentrum) and of Catholic labor unions. And the 
Rhineland was, in many ways, unique. We should not forget, though, that Rhenish social thought 
was at the heart of Catholicism across Europe, just as it was (via Marx) at the heart of European 
socialism. The Rhineland, while abjuring the violence or political reaction of French and Central 
European Catholics, shared a basic sensibility with them: indifference to abstract questions of 
“democracy” coupled with intense interest in devolving sovereignty away from the nation-state and 
towards the Stände. At the same time, though, it pointed more clearly than any other form of 
Catholicism to the Christian Democracy of the future.  
 The point here is not to collapse the differences between these milieux, which after all did 
operate quite independently of one another and, sometimes, with mutual suspicion (this was 
particularly the case, as we’ll see, between the Rhenish and Central European Catholics). Instead, we 
                                                




are trying to show that there were certain basic commonalities across Europe, while different regions 
had specific emphases that they would bring to the table when Catholicism became more 
transnational in the 1930s. Major differences remained about the nature of the proper political order: 
as events in the 1930s would show, French Catholics were deeply divided about the proper relation 
between politics and religion, while Central European Catholics largely believed in the necessity of a 
powerful, and Catholic, state. Catholics in Central Europe did not even understand the “individual” 
as a coherent unit of analysis, while the French provided an updated form of individualism through 
the new theory of “personalism.” The French remained nationalist in the sense that their federalism 
would only take place within the French state, while the Central Europeans were already imagining 
forms of international federation to take the place of the Habsburg empire. And so on: this would 
all play out in the 1930s and 1940s, interacting with geopolitical events and crises to create a 
transnational formation of Cold War Catholicism after World War II. 
 Rhenish Catholics played an important role, too, especially insofar as they were forced to 
think harder about how, precisely, Catholics could live in an industrial, democratic, and religiously 
diverse world. “In Austria, Catholics can be conservative,” observed Ernst Karl Winter in 1926. “In 
Germany, they must be, as it were, modern.”2 This is apparent in their own privileged solution to the 
status of their own Land, which we’ve been using as a litmus test: more than Catholics in France or 
Central Europe, Rhenish Catholics generally accepted the Versailles solution, and did not seek to 
radically dismantle the European order. There was very little support for Rhenish separatists among 
the population; most of it that existed had been drummed up by Poincaré, attempting to export his 
countrymen’s enthusiasm for the scheme. Likewise, Rhenish Catholics, who lived in one of Europe’s 
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most industrial and prosperous regions, were loath to yoke their fate to the catastrophic economic 
and political situation of Bavaria and Austria.  
While they, like other Germans, sought to revise the Versailles settlement, they did not want 
to demolish the Weimar experiment, as both French and Central European Catholics did. Most 
Catholics in the Rhineland, and certainly their political party, the Zentrum, wanted to remain 
integrated in the Second Reich—“Reich and Rhine, eternally united!” declared the anonymous 
foreword to a Rhenish essay on the subject, while the region’s most prolific Catholic champion, 
Hermann Platz, was clear in 1919 that the region was a full player “within Germany’s common 
destiny.” Carl Schmitt’s 1925 lecture on the Rhineland, too, assumed that it should be 
reincorporated into the kleindeutsch Reich.3 Julius Bachem, the powerful editor of Kölnische 
Volkszeitung, went so far as to prepare a volume of historical essays on the fruitful ties between 
Prussia and the Rhineland.4 
Rhenish Catholics were still wary of Prussia, but in a somewhat different key: they did not 
seek to disaggregate Prussia and the Rhineland, but rather to shift the Reich’s center of gravity away 
from the jackboots of the East and towards the pacific traditions of the Catholic West. “The post-
1870 German Empire,” Scheler claimed, “has been far too strongly and one-sidedly centred in the 
Prussian spirit and still clings far too fondly to the old outlook of the absolute monarchy, provoking 
the inevitable reaction of hyperdemocratic opposition.”5 The saber-rattling Prussophobia of other 
European Catholics was, however, out of place here, and even Scheler sought only to correct the 
balance: the Rhineland was, of course, technically a part of Prussia. Their Land was only about 30% 
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Catholic, while the Rhineland itself (not including the Saar) was almost 70% Catholic.6 Hermann 
Platz, Ernst Michel, Max Scheler, and many other Rhenish Catholics constantly argued for a more 
Catholic Reich, which could simultaneously preserve the German genius without succumbing to 
Protestant materialism or the windy and atavistic Catholicism of Central Europe. The central organ 
for this kind of work was a new journal called Reich- und Heimatblätter, the journal of the Cologne-
based Reichs- und Heimatbund Deutsche Katholiken, an organization founded for the sole purpose of 
diminishing Prussia’s influence in the Reich.7 “‘Let us get rid of this Berlin’,” a Zentrum politician 
recalled of this period, “was widely heard in the Rhineland.”8 
Rhenish Catholics were also generally appreciative of the League, perhaps because they were 
in the global crosshairs. Ernst Michel, a Catholic socialist in Frankfurt, rhapsodized that the 
Rhineland was a sacrificial victim in the service of a new, peaceful, and cosmopolitan European 
order.9 This is most apparent in the careers of the region’s two most characteristic politicians: 
Matthias Erzberger and Konrad Adenauer. Erzberger, who relied on the Rhineland and its laboring 
population for his power base within the party, was German Catholicism’s most prominent 
champion of Geneva.10 He was outspokenly left-leaning and democratic, which made him anathema 
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in the South (and to much of Germany, leading to his assassination). Erzberger passed the torch to 
Adenauer, who, as mayor of Cologne at the time, threw himself into international politics, hoping to 
make his beloved Heimat a bridge to European peace. “I am, as you know, a Rhinelander,” Adenauer 
told an interviewer at Die Zeit in 1949, “and I have always felt my home province, the Rhineland, to 
be a bridge between France and Germany.”11 Both of them sought a solution to the Rhineland 
problem that would avoid revanchiste nationalism, be it French or German. Erzberger decried 
France’s age-old desire to occupy the Rhineland, while Adenauer worked tirelessly, behind the 
scenes, to keep the region from falling into the hands of either Paris or Berlin.12 
The specificities of Rhenish political culture were not lost on the Rhinelanders themselves, 
who were proud of their Heimat. With Hermann Platz leading the charge, Rhenish Catholics were 
obsessed with the special identity of their Land (as Celia Applegate has shown, there was no 
contradiction between longing for the Heimat and support for the Weimar Republic13). Carl Schmitt, 
for instance, embraced his identity as a Rhinelander in the 1920s, claiming that he felt a special 
connection to others who shared his heritage.14 Rhenish pride was conditioned by a sense that 
Rhenish Catholicism provided answers to modern problems in ways that more reactionary German-
speaking Catholicisms did not. The region’s two leading social Catholics, Gustav Gundlach and 
Oswald von Nell-Breuning, “did not get along” with Josef Eberle and spurned his whole system of 
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thought.15 Friedrich Dessauer, editor of Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung, wrote a scathing letter to the 
editor of Hochland in 1921, complaining about Eberle’s whole circle in Vienna, who ignored the 
social message of Christ in favor of anti-Semitism and kneejerk conservatism.16 Schmitt refused to 
collaborate on a joint volume once he found that the despised Othmar Spann would be writing 
there, too.17 Herbert Dankworth, probably the region’s leading international affairs correspondent, 
warned that the Habsburg-style atavism of Mitteleuropa was pulling Europe back into chaos.18 Anton 
Hilckman, another central Rhenish Catholic journalist, theorized a clear distinction between 
Westeuropa and Mitteleuropa. The former celebrated freedom, while the latter was tied to an atavistic 
“combination of ‘Throne and Altar’ (it is no coincidence that ‘Throne’ comes first!)”.19  
Rhenish Catholics had been at the forefront of Catholic innovation for decades, and had 
little sympathy for the reactionary impulses of their Southern neighbors (or their French ones, for 
that matter).20 As Antonius Liedhegener has shown in his study of Münster and Bochum, this 
restless innovation continued in the Weimar years, as both cities registered church attendance rates 
around sixty percent.21 The progenitor of all of this was Ketteler himself, who had been a bishop in 
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West Germany. His desire for a Catholicism that could make peace with the Reich, without 
submitting to it, lived on in the region. If anything, it became even more meliorative and capitalist in 
the decades after Ketteler’s death. While he had drafted a plank of the Zentrum’s platform calling 
for corporate representation, this was scotched by the 1890s, due largely to the opposition of the 
unions. By the era of Franz Hitze and Georg von Hertling, the Zentrum had, both theoretically and 
practically, signed onto a fundamentally status quo-form of welfarist capitalism.22 This was 
conditioned by economic realities: while Catholic politics elsewhere were dominated by aristocrats, 
agrarian interests, and paramilitary organizations, the Rhineland was a region of workers, large-scale 
businessmen, and industry. Their political party was more progressive, as well. Rhenish 
Catholicism’s relative openness to Protestantism and to parliamentarism was preconditioned by their 
unique political position, which made them one of Europe’s few violators of the Westphalian 
principle, cuius regio, eius religio [whose realm, his religion]. Perhaps for this reason, the Center Party, a 
bastion of the Weimar Coalition, was primarily a Rhenish phenomenon. Most of the party’s 
politicians hailed from the region, as did its leading newspaper (the Kölnische Volkszeitung). Wilhelm 
Marx, the Zentrum politician and two-time chancellor, was from Cologne and celebrated his 
Rhenish heritage. Adam Stegerwald, who led the Christian unions, came from Bavaria but had to 
move to the Rhineland to become politically effective.  
The Zentrum was only one Catholic institution among many in the region: unlike in Bavaria, 
Rhenish Catholics were nestled from birth in a dizzying area of Catholic civil-society institutions. 
The most important of these was the Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland, Catholic Germany’s 
most prominent civil society organization. It was founded in Mönchengladbach, just outside of 
Cologne, and remained headquartered there throughout the Wilhelmine and Weimar years. Rhenish 
                                                




Catholics were about six times more likely to join than Bavarian Catholics, while Anton Orel, a 
leading Viennese Catholic sociologist, declared that the Volksverein was no better than liberalism.23 
He had a point, insofar as the Volksverein was largely dedicated to accommodating Catholics to the 
political and economic realities of Bismarck’s Germany: “Mönchengladbach,” Alfred Diamant has 
written, “became synonymous with the Catholic accomodation to capitalism and the modern 
state.”24 
Catholic labor unions, too, were more succesful in the Rhineland than elsewhere, if only 
because the region was far more industrially developed than Bavaria or Western Austria. Walter 
Dirks, one of the Catholic Rhineland’s premier intellectuals, later recalled an upbringing surrounded 
by workers and labor activism, which would have been extremely unlikely anywhere else in Catholic 
Europe.25 The first Catholic union in Germany, the Gewerkverein christlicher Bergarbeiter Deutschlands, 
was founded in the Ruhr in 1894, while the major umbrella group of Catholic unions, the 
Gesamtverband der christlichen Gewerkschaften Deutschlands, was headquartered in the Rhineland, along 
with most of its adherents. In the 1920s, these movements were joined by another set of Catholic lay 
institutions: the youth movements, made up of dynamic youths who sought to overcome the 
decadence of Weimar life through comradery and nature. These institutions swept German youth 
culture as a whole; within Catholicism, they seem to have made their biggest mark in Prussia (both 
Silesia and the Rhineland). The major organizations were Quickborn, which had been founded as a 
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temperance movement before becoming a full-fledged Catholic youth movement after the war, and 
Neudeutschland, founded in Cologne in 1919.26   
Research into Rhenish Catholicism has become something of a cottage industry. The main 
reason is that it provides the most plausible predecessor of Christian Democracy, as the Zentrum 
was the only Catholic parliamentary party anywhere in Europe to have any significant success before 
1945. Indeed, a powerful body of scholarship, represented primarily by Margaret Anderson and 
Noel Cary, has argued that a “Catholic Sonderweg” can be discerned here: Rhenish Catholics, these 
scholars argue, were more democratic, more accepting of difference, and more devoted to civil 
liberties than any other German milieu. Their attempts to carve a space for themselves within 
Prussia—a Land they could never hope to dominate—had made them “the era’s true liberals.”27  
As in Italy, though, Rhenish Catholic political culture was riven by struggle and 
contradiction, which led many in the Zentrum, like their counterparts in the PPI and unlike their 
successors in the CDU, to support authoritarian solutions to parliamentary deadlock.28 In actuality, 
the Zentrum was much less of a democratic party than the PPI. David Blackbourn refers to the 
party as “a characteristic political creature of imperial Germany.” It was created as a pressure group 
for Catholic rights in the Bismarckean Reich, and never changed in character. As Helmut Walser 
Smith has conclusively shown, it was dedicated to its own unique version of Germany’s future, 
retaining a combative stance towards Protestants and liberals: it was, that is, a Weltanschauungspartei 
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amongst others. The party was unable to successfully, or even coherently, transition from empire to 
republic, as Karsten Ruppert has recently argued. Jürgen Elvert, too, has written that the party 
“never understood itself to be a decidedly republican party,” while Thomas Knapp memorably 
depicted a party that was “in the republic but not of it.”29  
Cary focuses almost all of his attention on the early 1920s, when there was serious debate 
within the party as to the shape that it would eventually take. His hero is Adam Stegerwald, a 
Catholic unionist who made various attempts to forge an interdemoninational labor party. Cary’s 
Stegerwald, though, bears little resemblance to the Stegerwald of other historians less interested in 
showing a democratic Zentrum: the Stegerwald of William Patch, for instance, groomed Heinrich 
Brüning, sought alliances with the DNVP, and sought an inchoate “German” democracy that would 
avoid the “formal democracy of French centralism.”30 Anyhow, Cary focuses too squarely on 
Stegerwald: the true leader of the party, almost entirely ignored by Cary, was Wilhelm Marx, who 
longed for the Wilhelmine empire and who looms, significantly, much larger in Ruppert’s less 
sanguine view of the Weimar Zentrum. We could also look at the outcome of all of the intraparty 
debate: not Stegerwald, but Ludwig Kaas, an arch-reactionary priest, guided the party from the late 
1920s until its dissolution under Hitler: a dissolution for which it was in part responsible, as it was 
the parliamentary force behind the Enabling Act. Even Joseph Wirth, erstwhile chancellor and left-
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Catholic, oversaw a shift away from cooperation and towards belligerent revanchisme in his 
tumultuous tenure.31  
The biggest problem with Cary’s account, as with many other accounts of the Weimar 
Zentrum, is that it ignores the region’s political culture in favor of political elites and their makeshift 
responses to the avalanche of crises that rocked Germany in the mid-1920s. This makes the 
rightward shift seem like a contingent reaction to political events, such as the failure of the Reichstag 
to pass a school bill in 1927. While these surely mattered, they can also be overemphasized: it is 
inconceivable that the party could have veered, under different circumstances, towards Communism. 
In this section, I will turn the focus on the Rhineland itself, and not on its ministers in Berlin. What 
we will find is that, while there certainly were “progressive” forms of Catholicism at work there, it is 
far too simple to claim that Rhenish Catholics were democratic or republican. Like Catholics 
elsewhere, they were trying to imagine a “social Catholicism” as a response to socialism proper, 
dominant in Prussia; following the lead of the Vatican, and the example of Bishop von Ketteler, the 
founding saint of Rhenish Catholicism, they cared more about social form than political form. And, 
again like Catholics elsewhere although in a different key, they sought a social order that would leave 
room for traditional structures and Stände outside the purview of the nation-state.  
As in the previous few chapters, and perhaps even moreso, it is necessary to dive into the 
region’s specific, non-Catholic intellectual traditions to see how this worked. The major intellectual 
context for the development of Rhenish theories in the Wilhelmine period was the attack on laissez-
faire, and the support for statist economic and social policies, current in Prussia. The 
Kathedersozialisten, notably Gustav Schmoller and Adolph Wagner, were important influences on the 
field of sociology as such, counting both Weber and Durkheim among their intellectual offspring; 
                                                




moreover, as Dan Rodgers has shown, their particular brand of scientifically-astute social activism 
enjoyed influence across the Atlantic world.32 They were among the first and most influential to 
reject laissez-faire economics by linking it to an outdated picture of man as abstract “atom.” Their 
vision of progressive reform, like those of French Radicals and Austrian Socialists, was centered on 
the state and required the abolition or restructuring of traditional affective communities, notably the 
Church. Although most closely associated with the National Liberals, then in the process of 
tremendous innovations in public welfare and social insurance, their ideas were influential among 
Social Democrats, too, through the intermediary of the Verein für Sozialpolitik and younger figures 
like Werner Sombart (himself a socialist).   
Catholics were not inexorably opposed to all of this. Indeed, as elsewhere, Rhenish Catholics 
shared many of the assumptions and influences of others who were taking the “social turn.” 
Catholics, for instance, celebrated the refounding of the ancient University of Cologne in 1919, 
which had been spearheaded by Adenauer. And while the university certainly nourished a great deal 
of Catholic talent, its refounding had been supported by the SPD, as well, and it featured such non-
Catholic luminaries as Paul Honigsheim, a founding father of German sociology.33 This openness is 
inscribed in the very name of their reigning social theory: following Heinrich Pesch, Rhenish 
Catholics as disparate as Erzberger and Scheler supported “solidarism,” which had been adapted 
from the Third Republic radicalism discussed in chapter 1.34 Pesch, a Jesuit and the most influential 
Catholic sociologist in the region, had actually forged his ideas in the seminars of Schmoller and 
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Wagner: just as French Catholic social ideas came from Comte, Rhenish Catholic ones came, at least 
partially, from the Kathedersozialisten themselves. Pesch’s followers, too, opened their minds to the 
non-Catholic world in ways that would have been anathema in Paris or Vienna. Heinrich Brauns, 
former head of the Volksvereine and disciple of Pesch, brought solidarism into the state during his 
eight-year tenure as Minister of Labor. Matthias Erzberger, too, was a close student of Pesch’s 
theories.35  
Max Scheler, a Catholic philosopher who held the chair in Sociology at the newly-founded 
University of Cologne, was at the epicenter of this attempted rapprochement. He had come to fame 
across Germany with his patriotic work during the war, which sold in immense numbers and made 
him a household name, even among Protestants. He was, moreover, a close friend and intellectual 
sparring partner of Werner Sombart and other non-Catholic icons. In a widely-discussed series of 
essays in Hochland, Scheler implored the rest of Catholic Germany to follow his example, as the 
noble German dream would fail if the Prussian version of Germanness were allowed to dominate 
the Reich to the detriment of the more noble and charitable traditions of the Catholic South and 
West. This would in no wise take the form of a return: like Pesch, whose economic theories Scheler 
adopted, he held that Catholicism must revitalize itself and make peace with the industrial, 
consumerist world of Weimar. Here, he argues that Maritain was correct to see “modernity” as a 
German invention, but wrong to think that there was any turning back:  
It is a tragedy to be forced to expel almost the whole world from paradise, even 
though we [Germans] didn’t want it and were only following the law and fate of its 
own essence. And perhaps the heart of the mythical angel sobbed behind his iron 
visage when he showed Adam with his sword the new path of world history. But he 
obeyed his Lord and God, just as we obeyed the idea and the condition of the 
present world, the commandments of its hour and its necessity. 
 
                                                




It would be nice, Scheler admits, to re-enter the lost Eden of spiritual plenitude, but that is not 
possible. We have been, fully and finally, expelled, and in order to fulfill our mission we must, like 
Adam himself, charge into the new world of labor and suffering, braving the evils of Cain in the 
knowledge that a Moses, too, could emerge from the crucible. Scheler referred elsewhere to the 
“democratic centuries to come”: there could be, he reminded his reader, no other, as “aristocratic 
ages and monarchic forms of government,” for good or ill, were gone and would not return.36 
The question that has haunted these chapters emerges here, therefore, with special clarity: 
why did these Catholics, opposed like everyone to Manchestertum and atomization, reject full 
participation in the Weimar Republic? Why did Scheler become a political radical, while even more 
mainstream Catholics were loathe to shore up the republic’s ruins (Wilhelm Marx and Ludwig Kaas 
are, again, the prime examples)? This was the Catholicism of Erzberger, yes, but it was also the 
Catholicism of Carl Schmitt, who was after all a full and characteristic player in Rhenish Catholicism 
in the early 1920s, publishing in Kölnische Volkszeitung. Why, finally, did the Rhineland’s premier 
political party lack a serious commitment to the Republic, predisposing it to drive its coffin’s final 
nail in 1933?  
Scheler, who wanted above all for Catholics to re-enter Germany’s national life, is in a way 
evidence of its failure to do so. In 1917, he wrote a revealing letter to Ernst Troeltsch, begging for 
help finding a post at a non-Catholic university. He wanted, he implored, to reach “the ear of all 
German youth, as I reject the rule of Catholica non leguntur et audiuntur.” This rule—“one does not 
read or listen to Catholics”—had become a truism in non-Catholic Germany, and largely remained 
so in the 1920s, despite Scheler’s best efforts.37 Although celebrated throughout Germany following 
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his 1928 death—Martin Heidegger referred to him as Weimar Germany’s “greatest philosophical 
force”—he never quite extended his reach beyond the Catholic milieu. He finally achieved an 
appointment at the more ecumenical University of Frankfurt in 1928, but died before he could take 
it.  
For an answer, we must turn, as always, to the political culture of Catholicism’s opponents—
to those who did follow and uphold the rule, Catholica non leguntur— and the hegemony here, as 
elsewhere, of the new and contested language of the “social.” I will focus on the SPD, and not on 
the National Liberals: they were a party forged in Kulturkampf, and it was quite obvious that the 
Catholics would not find solace there.38 The general secretary of the Zentrum’s commercial and 
industrial advisory board directs us here when he declares that a major service of the Zentrum had 
been the “complete extirpation” of “the postwar phantom of socialization.”39 Although there was 
wide agreement about the need for organized responses to capitalist dislocation, the various parties 
of Weimar Germany disagreed radically about the shape that this response should take, and the 
extent to which the state should be involved. Catholics vigorously defended the sphere of charity, 
organized through the Caritasverband, and sought to place the family at the basis of any public welfare 
scheme. The SPD, like the SPÖ and the French Radials, sought to democratize public welfare by 
placing it in the hands of the state. This came to a head over the National Youth Welfare Law: 
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originally designed to “create a public youth education and socialization system,” the mobilization of 
confessional religious organizations, both Catholic and Protestant, assured that it turned into “a law 
which protected voluntary welfare against the expansive ambitions of public youth welfare 
officials.”40 
The Prussian social democrats of the 1920s, as a number of scholars have shown, were just 
as interested in creating a new Wohnkultur, and thrusting religion into the private sphere, as were 
their Austrian counterparts (the SPD program, at least until 1925, contained the same clause about 
religion as a Privatsache that could be found in the manifestoes of the SPÖ and French Radicals). 
After much Sturm und Drang, Weimar social democrats found themselves supporting the nation-state 
and seeing it as the vehicle towards a socialist future: “we are witnessing,” declared one of them in 
1921, “the gradual coming into being of the welfare state, of the ‘social state.’”41 The state, thanks to 
the 1922 Youth Welfare Law, the 1924 National Welfare Decree, and a raft of initiatives on the 
municipal level, found itself more involved in welfare—especially children’s welfare—than ever 
before. The SPD was not afraid to take this reforming zeal into the Catholic Rhineland. In 
Frankfurt, for instance, the social democrat municipality brought in Ernst May to apply the 
principles of the new Atlantic progressivism; like city planners in Austria, May attempted to 
transform Frankfurt into a bastion of Neue Sachlichkeit and a modern, socialist culture. In Düsseldorf, 
Robert Lehr (DNVP) was obsessed with the municipal exhibitions that served as showcases for 
Weimar’s social politics.42 On the level of the Land, the new Minister of Culture in Prussia, a socialist 
named Adolf Hoffmann, embarked on an anticlerical campaign in the early days of Weimar. He 
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sought to end state subsidies to churches, abolish prayer in schools, and even ban Christmas 
celebrations: in short, he sought to create by fiat a socialist Kultur in a religious Land. Even though 
his more cautious successor reversed his policies, he created a firestorm of controversy and left 
Catholics wary of socialists, and of the Republic.43  
To unpack the intellectual response to socialist provocation, we can turn to Waldemar 
Gurian, the dissertation’s third and final protagonist, and trace his intellectual itinerary through the 
Weimar years. Gurian encapsulated the Rhineland so perfectly that this tour will, simultaneously, lay 
bare the intellectual landscape of the region itself. “It is a sign of a land’s cultural power that it 
indelibly marks those, even guests, that grow up there,” a friend wrote about Gurian in 1945. If 
Gurian “were asked to name the piece of the earth to which he owed the most, he could only 
answer: the Rhineland.”44 Note the grammar of this sentence: Gurian was shaped by the Rhineland 
like a piece of soft wax. Like Kogon, he was less an intellectual than a journalist and provocateur, 
with a gift for networking and for sniffing out the keenest intellects of the religion. He is useful 
because he gave voice to the “commonsense” understandings of his milieu’s Catholicism; Schmitt 
was right when he judged Gurian to wield primarily “journalistic intelligence.”45 This might make 
him useless to the theologian, but it makes him supremely useful to the historian.  
A Russian Jew born in 1902, Gurian’s family had fled the Russian pogroms to Germany, 
where he was baptized in 1914.46 He first became engaged with Rhenish Catholic culture through 
enthusiastic involvement with Quickborn, Catholic Germany’s most dynamic Jugendbewegung. He 
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attended the Universities of Bonn and Cologne in the early 1920s, where he became involved with 
the youth movements and, through them, with the world of Rhenish Catholic journalism, in which 
he would live until forced into exile, yet again, in 1934. He wrote for nearly every significant Catholic 
organ in the region, notably including the aforementioned Kölnische Volkszeitung, where he served as 
an editor. He was an excitable young man with a knack for wrestling his way into the acquaintance 
of leading intellectuals: he was probably the only student to be shared by Max Scheler and Carl 
Schmitt, the two leading intellectuals of the region, and he was also the first German Catholic to 
befriend and popularize Jacques Maritain.  
Intellectually, Gurian was formed by the specific variant of social Catholicism at work in the 
Rhineland, and Gurian’s narrative follows that of social Catholicism in the Rhineland more broadly: 
a brief period of enchantment with socialism in the early 1920s, followed by furious anti-Marxism 
and traditionalist-corporatist Catholicism in the later 1920s. To see this, we will look primarily at 
Max Scheler, his teacher and mentor, and Theodor Brauer, a Catholic union leader that Gurian 
greatly admired as an expert on socialism Gurian’s articles are studded with references to Brauer, 
Franz Müller, and other figures from the Königswinterer Kreis, a group of social Catholic 
intellectuals who provided the inspiration for Quadragesimo Anno, while Gurian’s involvement with 
Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung assured that he was in the mainstream of Rhenish social Catholicism.47  
Both Scheler and Brauer referred to their social theory as Solidarismus, drawing on the work 
of the aforementioned Heinrich Pesch, whose shadow loomed large over the whole period. Born in 
Cologne in 1854, Pesch studied in Bonn before becoming a Jesuit and living abroad, where he 
confronted firsthand the ravages of industrialization in Lancashire. As a disciple of Ketteler and a 
student of Schmoller and Wagner, Pesch was able, more than any pre-war Catholic social theorist, to 
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grapple with both modern industry and modern sociology: the first volume of his magisterial 
Lehrbuch became common currency in German-Catholic institutions of higher learning, taking the 
place of prominence that Spann held in Austria.48 Catholic philosophers (Max Scheler), social 
scientists (Goetz Briefs), union leaders (Theodor Brauer), and politicians (Matthias Erzberger) used 
his language and his theories. He was the major inspiration behind the Königswinterer Kreis, which 
included the giants of twentieth-century Catholic social thought, including Oswald von Nell-
Breuning, a student of Pesch’s and the major author of Quadragesimo Anno (to be considered in the 
next chapter). Königswinter is just south of Bonn, and Pesch’s influence, at least in the 1920s, was 
restricted to the Rhineland, whose premier university in Cologne gave him an honorary degree soon 
before his 1926 death. The Königswinterer Kreis was, moreover, closely linked to the largely 
Rhenish Volksverein, and in 1932 formally associated itself with it.49  
 I won’t dwell on Pesch’s theories here, but will focus instead on their more proximate 
manifestations in the work of Scheler and his successor at the sociological chair in Cologne, the 
union leader Theodor Brauer. The central point, though, is that Pesch’s solidarism, while sharing 
much with the anti-individualist corporatism of both Central Europe and France, gave more 
credence to the rights and value of the individual. While Pesch’s creed that “all social functions can 
be found in the family, as buds and blooms can be found in the seed” sounds like Spann, he 
constanty emphasized that Solidarism did not abolish the individual, but rather put him or her into 
proper balance with the community. Indeed, Othmar Spann rejected Pesch and solidarism for 
precisely this reason, correctly pointing out that the principle of Solidarität could be found among 
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liberals and socialists, and rejected proper Catholic universalism.50 And there is no doubt that Pesch 
was, like his followers, more sanguine about market capitalism than the Romantics. He accepted 
economic competition as a fait accompli, and was, in certain moods, more interested in rejecting 
unregulated and rapacious competition than he was in overturning capitalism altogether. His goal, he 
claimed, was to give “a solidaristic foundation to Smith’s industrial system,” while the sympathetic 
bishop of Köln, in the Kölner Richtlinien that he oversaw, distinguished between “technical 
capitalism,” which was acceptable, and the spirit of destructive and rapacious competition, which 
was not.51  
In the early 1920s, though, Pesch’s rigorously scholastic and traditionalist solidarism took a 
radical turn, as many Catholic intellectuals and journals turned towards a more full-blooded 
Christian socialism. Pesch led the way, writing a widely-remarked 1918 pamphlet called “Not 
Communist socialism, but Christian socialism!” Theodor Steinbüchel, a professor in Bonn, 
published his massive study, Socialism as Ethical Ideal, in 1921, in which he tried to salvage a properly 
Christian, ethical moment in Marxist socialism. One of his students was Walter Dirks, the Catholic 
who probably did more than any other to engage with Marx (studying Lukács and the young Marx). 
Dirks was, like Gurian, an editor at Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung, the newspaper that represented the 
Zentrum’s left wing throughout the 1920s. Its founder, Friedrich Dessauer, was a wealthy industrialist 
who plowed his resources into supporting the Catholic left.52 Dessauer made his views known when 
he founded the journal in 1923, claiming that he aspired towards the “creation of a great German 
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magazine business without dependence on capitalism.”53 He nourished a whole circle of left-
Catholics, including Ernst Michel and Heinrich Mertens. Before his excommunication in 1926, Josef 
Wittig was the most prominent progressive priest in the movement. By the mid-1920s, Gurian held 
Wittig, who presided over his 1924 wedding, in even higher esteem than Scheler.54 In a remarkable 
1921 essay in Hochland, Wittig had made the case that the true Christian could be nothing less than a 
social revolutionary. “If Jesus can be brought together with the social question,” Wittig asked, “why 
not also with the revolution?”55 
Scheler, one of the most important of these Christian Socialists, was probably the most 
formative influence on Gurian during these years, as he was on Rhenish Catholicism more generally. 
Although he became gently critical later in the 1920s, as Scheler drifted away from the Church, 
Gurian’s work throughout the Weimar era remains shot through with Scheler’s themes. As late as 
1928, a close friend referred to Gurian’s “piety towards Scheler,” while Gurian told an American 
interviewer after World War II that Scheler had been one of the most formative and lasting 
influences on his own thought. Gurian had encountered Scheler during his time with the Catholic 
youth movements, and his first book, based on a dissertation advised by Scheler, provides an 
interpretation of these movements from Scheler’s perspective. It was, after all, through the youth 
movements that Gurian had encountered Scheler’s work: “It must be well known to you,” Gurian 
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wrote to his future mentor in 1921, “that your ideas find great favor among the members of the 
German youth movement.”56  
Born in 1872, Scheler was, like Gurian, Jewish. He was baptized in 1899, and spent the later 
Wilhelmine years studying in Berlin and Jena, where he became interested in Edmund Husserl and 
the new philosophical school of phenomenology. He rocketed to prominence during the war, on 
account of both his major work on ethics, printed in Husserl’s Jahrbuch für Philosophie und 
phänomenologische Forschung, and his fire-breathing forays into the crowded field of nationalist 
propaganda. His Der Genius des Krieges und der deutsche Krieg, a sophisticated version of the standard 
Kultur/Zivilisation dichotomy, became a runaway success. He was, at the time, a believing Catholic 
and was hired, as we’ve seen, to the University of Cologne. Around 1923, in response to both 
intellectual unrest and a series of outrageous personal scandals, Scheler soured on the Church, but 
not before publishing a series of extremely influential works of Catholic sociology (a few years later, 
a young Polish priest named Karol Wojtyla would write his Habilitationsschrift on Scheler). “The 
development of German Catholicism after the war is, without Scheler, simply unthinkable,” judged 
an obituary in a prominent German Catholic journal. “The name Scheler,” the historian Thomas 
Keller has written more recently, “stands before all others for the modernization of German 
Catholicism.”57  
Writing at the peak of his influence and in Catholic Germany’s premier journal, Scheler 
praised Pesch and added his voice to the chorus of Rhenish Christian socialists. Scheler called for a 
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“prophetic socialism” that would avoid the materialism of Marxist socialism. In contrast to the 
universalism of Central Europe, Scheler’s “Christian socialism” would protect the individual; he 
rejected the common, if paradoxical, Catholic equation of “socialism” with “individualism.” The 
individual—in Scheler’s parlance, the “person”—does have moral value on his own, and not only in 
community, as Spann believed.  But of course, Scheler was not an “individualist” either. He believed, 
as did many Catholics in the Rhineland, that there was a space between, or above, the futile 
dichotomy of atheist socialism and “Romantic, reactionary-feudal socialism” (which he also 
castigated as “utopia in reverse”: as good a name for Kogon’s system as any). This third way was the 
“classic Christian theory of the corporation, as it was first formulated by the Fathers.” Like Catholics 
elsewhere, Scheler wanted to “transform the working class into an estate [Stand].” This would take 
place in the context of a federalized and de-Prussified German state: “It is,” he wrote, “in the 
constitution of the federal State that the Christian idea of community is most present today.” Unlike 
both Marx and the reactionary corporatists of central Europe, Scheler ended by reminding the 
reader that the freedom of the individual remained paramount: Christian socialism was not a 
rejection of individualism, but its fulfillment58 (like Maritain, Scheler referred to this fulfilled 
individual as the “Person”). 
The Zentrum did not, of course, adopt “Christian socialism”; as the 1920s wore on, it became 
clear that no such thing was in the political cards, and the socialist-Catholic rapprochement that 
Stegerwald and others desired succumbed to the stresses of 1920s politics. Here we can turn to 
Theodor Brauer, Scheler’s successor in the Chair of Sociology at the University of Cologne and 
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another major influence on Waldemar Gurian. Brauer was, in the 1920s, among the most prominent 
of Catholic economists—when Martin Spahn wanted to publish a volume on “Catholic Germans 
and Their Fatherland” during the war, he suggested that Brauer write the section on the economy.59 
Born in Cleve, near the Dutch border, in 1880, Brauer found his way into social Catholicism from 
within the town’s grain industry. He quickly moved up the ranks, becoming assistant director of the 
Volksverein in 1907 and editor of Deutsche Arbeit, the trade unionist journal, from 1912. He later 
served as Adam Stegerwald’s private secretary during his tenure as Minister of Public Welfare in 
Prussia before becoming a professor of economics in Karlsruhe in 1923. Five years later, he 
accepted Scheler’s old chair at the University of Cologne, becoming co-director of the Municipal 
Institute for Research in the Social Sciences simultaneously. Historians agree that he was the premier 
theorist of the Catholic labor unions in Weimar Germany.60 For our purposes, he is significant 
because, more than any other figure in the Rhineland, he theorized the Catholic rejection of 
socialism. He gave a speech about this in 1920 that, in Noel Cary’s eyes, shut down the burgeoning 
Catholic-socialist rapprochement, while his 1928 volume on German socialism was the first major 
account of the tradition from a Catholic—and it was not a positive one. Gurian claimed that 
Brauer’s was the first decent book on the subject to come out of German Catholicism, and pleaded 
for the Zentrum to adopt Brauer’s economic policies.61 
 The key move that Brauer makes, which both Scheler and Pesch had avoided, was the 
equation of socialism with Marxism: for Brauer, as for many in the Zentrum and in the hierarchy, no 
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compromise, even rhetorical, could be broached between the two traditions. And while Gurian may 
have been skeptical about this in the early 1920s, by the end of the decade he had come firmly to 
Brauer’s side. Like his master, Pesch, Brauer tended to avoid the language of “capitalism vs. 
socialism” altogether, holding instead that a reformed industrial capitalism, cleansed of the language 
of class consciousness, could secure economic justice. Indeed, what is most striking in Brauer’s work 
is how close he sounds to hegemonic traditions of Volkswirtschaft, debating figures like Werner 
Sombart and the Kathedersozialisten on their own turf. In his major work, The Unions and Political 
Economy (1912, new edition 1922), Brauer had attempted to theorize a space for unions using the 
language of political economy and national efficiency, deliberately downplaying class consciousness 
or electoral action to change the economic order. The unions, Brauer held, had a natural and 
important part to play in the national economy, and were essential to the pursuit of economic 
growth and efficiency. 
Brauer’s idea of the unions, though, was quite different from the socialists’, a fact he 
introduces by dismissing Sombart’s personal attempt, in 1906, to introduce class struggle into the 
vocabulary of the federated Christian unions. Like Pesch, and Kogon for that matter, Brauer 
believed that class-based organizations were bound to fail, running as they do against the grain of 
the natural economic order, which is organized around the Beruf. “The core of Berufsgedankens,” 
Brauer writes, “is the belief that man performs a function in the service of a community, however 
constituted.”62 The core of the union movement, in Brauer’s eyes, was the organization of workers 
by profession so that they could have a voice in wage negotiations, ensuring that national efficiency 
and growth would be compatible with economic justice. 
                                                




Sometimes, Brauer would come out rhetorically against capitalism, claiming in 1920 that 
Christians could overcome it through “the reconnection [Wiederknüpfung] of ties that capitalism 
has loosened, if not destroyed.”63 But this “reconnection” had, as in Pesch, more to do with the 
protection of private property and employers’ rights than through their undoing. To this end, the 
workers had to give up their class identity and become a workers’ estate [Arbeiterstand]. In a 1924 
volume on the crisis of the unions, he claimed that the unions had “been pushed away from their 
organic development” and in a socialist, “anti-ständisch” direction. The labor movement, Brauer 
proclaimed, is “no movement of class struggle.” Marxist socialism attements to “denude the worker 
of his fundamental unity, which is destined to every man, as Persönlichkeit, from his profession 
[Beruf].”64 
 Gurian, therefore, tracks the fundamental trend in Rhenish Catholic political culture: the 
shift from the revolutionary Catholic socialism of Scheler and the late Pesch, towards the corporatist 
capitalism of Theodor Brauer. More than his counterparts in France or Central Europe, Brauer 
theorized an industrial Catholicism, directed towards national efficiency and productivity. As 
elsewhere, though, we should ask ourselves what this has to do with democracy. The answer is more 
complex than elsewhere in Europe, as Scheler and Brauer were actively supporting forms of 
democratic politics. But in the end, we see a quite similar phenomenon: theoretical indifference to 
political form with an actual, empirical tendency to support authoritarianism. Indeed, just as 
Austrian Catholics were becoming increasingly drawn towards paramilitary politics in the late 1920s, 
and French Catholics towards the para-fascist Ligues in the 1930s, Rhenish Catholics oversaw a sharp 
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right turn in Zentrum politics in the late 1920s. Theodor Brauer is himself evidence of this: in 1933, 
like a number of other Rhenish Catholics, he threw himself behind National Socialism.65 
Thinkers in the Rhineland were more interested in political theory than their coreligionists 
elsewhere: interestingly, though, we do not find a principled defense of democracy as such, but 
rather a more insistent emphasis on the Leonine notion that Catholicism is compatible with all 
political forms. In any case, Rhenish Catholics, like those elsewhere, did not think that the state 
should matter very much at all. Many in the Rhineland agitated against what Ernst Michel called “the 
Leviathan-nature of the modern, omnipotent state.”66 Heinrich Scharp, the chief editor of Rhein-
Mainische Volkszeitung, declared, “The autonomous, national power-state [Machtstaat] […] has 
conclusively become untenable in Europe.”67 Hermann Platz provides the best example here, as he 
was the greatest proponent of the Rhineland’s special genius, and also the founding father of 
Abendland (the journal), in 1925. The Rhineland, for Platz, represents the heart of the Christian West, 
as it had existed in the Carolingian period. In the proper Christian order, states remain independent 
but also leavened by a shared, Roman-Christian culture; political borders become unimportant in a 
Christendom of shared spiritual values. Nationalism, and the rise of the Machiavellian state, caused 
this order to crumble; moreover, “[t]he Rhineland is at the heart of this distortion and tension.”68 
Only a chastening of the state, a necessary precursor to the return of religion, can solve the crisis: 
“Now is the time to move backwards and say to the state that alongside and above it are things that 
are not stamped by its own measures and laws, and which it must serve.”69 
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 There was a key difference between Rhenish figures and those in France and Central 
Europe: Platz, Michel, Scheler, Brauer, Gurian, and more believed, at least in the early 1920s, that 
this anti-étatiste, corporatist social order could quite conceivably take place within the parameters of 
parliamentary democracy. There was a general sensibility throughout the region that democracy 
could be salvaged if it could be federalized: Hermann Platz, a lifelong Francophile, was far more 
interested in the Christian Democracy of Marc Sangnier, marginal as it might have been, than in the 
Action française.70 The increasing and dangerous power of the central government, Heinrich Brauns 
reminded Zentrum voters in a 1924 pamphlet, is a contingent affair and “does not belong to the 
epitome of democracy.”71 Benedikt Schmittman, the standard-bearer for Rhenish anti-Prussianism, 
did not question the principle of parliamentary supremacy, either.  
Heinrich Pesch, as so often, led the way. In his influential Lehrbuch, Pesch approvingly 
quoted the Zentrum politician Georg von Hertling’s dictum that “Christian politics is neither 
monarchic nor democratic, because it can be both.”72  Scheler, as we have seen, took it for granted 
that “the centuries to come” would be democratic, while Karl Neundörfer, a Catholic jurist and 
leader of the Caritas movement, emphasized that the Church could not tie itself to any political form 
at all (in one article for Schildgenossen, he directed his ire squarely against Adam Müller and the 
Romantic Revival).73 “Men can choose any political form that they wish,” Oswald von Nell-
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Breuning pointed out a few years later, “even the democratic one.” (he was directly critiquing 
Othmar Spann in this 1932 essay)74  
An interesting figure in this regard is Peter Tischleder, another Rhenish Catholic and 
contributor to Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung. As Gurian wrote to Maritain in 1927, Tischleder’s works 
“are extraordinarily representative of the Zentrum’s political philosophy.”75 His basic project, as 
outlined in a number of works in the 1920s, was to defend the legitimacy of the Weimar Republic in 
scholastic terms. Catholics, Tischleder argued, are perfectly free to support any state-form that they 
please, and the notion that God enjoins a particular political form is both antiquated and false. In his 
1926 volume called, simply, Der Staat, Tischleder sketched a Catholic political philosophy organized 
around a “rejection of the centralized power-state, which chokes the free personality through 
political paternalism, as was the case with the absolute state of the ancien régime.”76 Here Tischleder 
blames the monarchist state of the past for precisely that centralized power that Catholic Romantics 
elsewhere were finding in democracy. As this suggests, Tischleder was resolutely opposed to 
monarchical, legitimist Romanticism, and engaged in a running series of polemics with Central 
European Romantics, including Eberle himself. While Tischleder primarily drew upon the authority 
of Aquinas, he drew upon another fellow Rhinelander in his war against Romanticism: Carl 
Schmitt.77 
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 Gurian, too, was interested in Schmitt: he was one of four students to take Schmitt’s 1924-5 
seminar on “mass democracy,” while Schmitt recalled, decades later, that Gurian had been an 
intimate member of his circle between 1924 and 1928. And even though Gurian and Schmitt broke 
off relations around 1929, Gurian continued to recommend his former mentor’s works as the most 
perceptive analyses of Weimar democracy.78 It might seem perverse to use Schmitt as a paradigmatic 
example of democratic Rhineland Catholicism. In some ways, it is: Schmitt is a subtle and 
inconsistent thinker, and the reading I will provide here does not mesh with every word he wrote in 
the early 1920s.79 The task is not an idealist reconstruction of Schmitt’s mentalité at the time, but an 
analysis of his work in the context in which it was produced and received. We are investigating, that 
is, the Schmitt that taught at the University of Bonn, published in Kölnische Volkszeitung, and gave 
speeches at Zentrum party congresses, and not the Schmitt who became a Nazi and whose hermetic 
pronouncements have been so inspirational for modern theorists. One of his students and disciples, 
a priest named Werner Becker, served as chief editor of the aforementioned Abendland. Catholic 
publications at the time ignored his suspiciously heretical Political Theology in favor of Roman 
Catholicism and Political Form (1923), the second edition of which (1925) was published in the august 
Katholische Gedanke series, alongside figures of impeccable Catholic credentials.80  
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Schmitt’s achievement was to show, more powerfully than any other Catholic of the 1920s, 
that the Catholic Church was profoundly uninterested in the question of political form. It could thus 
exist alongside democratic and parliamentary states without giving up one iota of its identity. The 
prerogative of the Church was to represent its own interests in the polity, and work in tandem with 
the state, but the state itself was secular and its form was immaterial. Schmitt begins by asking 
himself about “the incomprehensible political power of Roman Catholicism”: how can the 
institution embody the most precise political logic, while simultaneously accommodating itself with a 
variety of political arrangements? Opponents of the church have pointed this out as an instance of 
hypocrisy or dogmatic vagueness, but Schmitt argues that precisely the opposite is the case. In order 
to be truly universal, the Church must be able to contain all oppositions within itself. The church is 
best understood, Schmitt decides, as “a complex of opposites […] There appears to be no antithesis 
it does not embrace.”81 The Church is not an institution like any other, but rather the one and only 
vicar of Christ on earth: “The Pope is not the Prophet but the Vicar of Christ.” Vicar means, 
essentially, “deputy”: the Pope “represents” Christ insofar as he has been appointed as the deputy 
representative of Christ’s awesome power on earth. This form of power—absolute authority rooted 
in “the ethos of belief”—is called “representation.” Schmitt uses repräsentieren to describe the papal 
relationship with Christ. “Represent” does not mean, here, aesthetic representation, but a literal re-
presentation: in the person of the pope, Christ and his unquestioned authority are made, once again, 
present. The Pope’s role is to assume a place in “an unbroken chain linked with the personal 
mandate and concrete person of Christ.”82 
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  The book is not, however, a clarion call for theocracy: in Schmitt’s telling, there used to be a 
great many “political” institutions in this sense, such as the House of Lords. But they have all 
disappeared into the maw of modernity and the economistic thinking it entails. The political is not a 
phenomenon of matter or of calculation, but of belief and authority. In the modern age, economics 
and calculability have colonized every sphere of social life save one: the Church, which survives now 
as the sole representative of a bygone age when Europe knew about belief, and it knew about 
politics. Representation “is not a materialist concept,” and in a materialist age it has been forgotten. 
The Church, which is not charged with government, merely “wishes to live with the state in a special 
community in which two representations confront each other as partners”; it wants to “deliberate as 
an equal partner with the state, and thereby create new law.”83 The political form of this state is 
irrelevant from the Church’s perspective: what matters is its “ethos” and its willingness to 
collaborate with the Church and other “natural communities” as equals. While Schmitt was 
idiosyncratic in many regards, and would only become moreso after his 1926 excommunication, his 
political theory here is directly a product of the Catholic Rhineland and the Center Party. 
 So, to sum up: Catholic political culture in the Rhineland was, in many respects, quite similar 
to its counterparts elsewhere. It was anti-étatiste and generally supported corporatist attempts to 
take the social turn without landing in the heresy of nation-state sovereignty; meanwhile, it was 
tempted by authoritarianism while remaining in theory indifferent to political form. It differed in 
two major ways, which helped to make it the most representative forerunner of Christian 
Democracy (unsurprising, as the most significant Christian Democratic party would be born in the 
Rhineland). First: it was invested in modern forms of economic management and growth. Rhenish 
Catholic economics and social scientists seriously desired a robust, industrial economy, albeit one 
                                                




that would avoid class conflict and protect private property. Second: it was dedicated, in a more 
serious way than was the case elsewhere, to the proposition that Catholicism could flourish under 
any political form, including democracy. French and Austrian Catholics might say such a thing under 
their breath, or might define “democracy” in such an extraordinary way that their insincerity can be 
understood. Rhenish Catholics, however, had been developing civil-society institutions and a 
political party under both a Protestant empire and a Protestant-socialist Republic.  
 That said, though, the story from here on is not as simple as “Rhenish Catholicism marches 
to victory.” First of all, Rhenish Catholicism itself was quite a complex phenomenon. Authoritarian 
politics, and Nazism, were popular in the later 1920s, while there was, as we’ve seen, little genuine 
commitment to the Weimar Republic among Center politicians. The Center remained, that is to say, 
an organization for the defense of the Church and its values, and not a genuinely republican, 
democratic party. This was not possible until “democracy” itself changed in tenor, which would not 
happen until the 1940s. The story of how all of this happened can no longer be told in the milieux 
that I have set up in Part I: in the 1930s, as we’ll see in Part II, Catholicism became transnational, as 




Part II: Catholicism between Civil Society and the Corporate State: 
The Twin Birth of Personalism and Anti-Totalitarianism, 1934-7 
 
And so, with Leo's Encyclical pointing the way and furnishing the light, a true Catholic social science 
has arisen, which is daily fostered and enriched by the tireless efforts of those chosen men whom 
We have termed auxiliaries of the Church. 




Introduction to Part II 
 
As I have shown in Part I, Catholic intellectuals across Europe were critical of the nation-
state and its arrogation of total sovereignty and the monopoly on violence, even though their 
positive political (and philosophical) projects varied dramatically. These three milieux were operating 
quite separately, which was eminently possible in the 1920s, when states and intellectuals tended to 
be more narrowly focused on their own problems. But in the 1930s, European political culture took 
a transnational turn: Robert Brasillach, one of Maurras’s most disciples, declared “la fin de l’après-
guerre” in 1931. The Spanish Civil War, which dragged poets and funds from across Europe into a 
fundamentally local conflict, is the exemplar here. The milieux of Part One either collapsed or shifted 
dramatically in orientation. Francophone Catholicism was thrown into disarray by the 1926 papal 
condemnation of the Action française, which sent Catholics in France and Belgium looking for new, 
and more properly Catholic, orientations. The Catholicism of the Rhineland became a Catholicism 
of internal or genuine exile, as the Nazi Gleichschaltung shattered the previously robust civil-society 
traditions of the region. In Central Europe, the civil-war atmosphere of Austria led Catholicism 
down an increasingly paramilitary and authoritarian road; meanwhile, the looming threat of Anschluss 
forced Catholics into new transnational alliances (they, too, would join the Rhinelanders in exile 
from 1938 onwards).  
In response to an obviously continent-wide crisis, as the Geneva system collapsed, 
intellectuals, Catholics included, began to ponder continent-wide solutions, as Catholicism, Popular 
Front Marxism, and Nazism-Fascism became international phenomena. This is obviously true for 
the latter two: we all know about the international culture of the Popular Front, and the international 
vogue for Fascism, which intrigued intellectuals from London to Spain to Paris to Bucharest. 




Indeed, most accounts of Catholicism in the period, following the lead of Ze’ev Sternhell and John 
Hellman, have either understood Catholics as “Fascist” or “Democratic,” which misunderstands the 
axes of Catholic intellectual life.1  
Catholics shared much with their socialist and Fascist competitors, just as they had shared so 
much with the Radicalism, Austro-Marxism, or National Liberalism of the 1920s. They were full 
participants in the spirit of the 1930s, which sought to overcome the barren parliamentary politics of 
the past in favor of something new, muscular, authoritarian—and European in scope. In short, 
Catholicism embraced the politics of youth, along with everyone else. They began to respond less to 
Leo XIII’s Ralliement, or even the pieties of Windthorst, than to the crusading rhetoric of Quas 
Primas, the 1925 encyclical that called for a return to “Christ the King” in the earthly realm. The 
Belgian José Streel’s Les jeunes gens et la politique (1932) set the tone: Streel and his colleagues were 
tired of the old Catholic parties and their “complacent senility”, preferring instead a virile, muscular 
Catholicism that would rehape the world in its own image.2 Catholics tended to agree with Streel 
that the solutions of the past, whether those solutions were “monarchy” or “Catholic political 
parties,” were bankrupt. The Zentrum, the PPI, the Action française, the Catholic Party in Belgium, 
even the Austrian Christian Socials: these movements no longer exercised the hearts and minds of 
the Catholic youth, largely because so many of them had been condemned or outlawed. Catholics, 
like socialists and Fascists, moved beyond the logic of party.  
There is more than one way, though, to move beyond the old-style party politics that had 
become Catholics’ stock in trade since the “Culture Wars” of the late nineteenth century. The claim 
to be “above politics,” then as now, can be used to legitimate an enormous variety of political 
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positions. Catholics sought to inhabit this newly-vigorous public sphere in two major and relatively 
distinct ways; the two chapters in Part II will be dedicated to charting these two transnational forms 
of Catholicism (like socialism, transnational Catholicism was riven by conflict in the 1930s). Both of 
them, it should be noted, stream organically from the Catholic social thought charted in Part I, 
although they drew markedly different lessons from it. 
In Chapter 4, we will explore what I’m calling “civil-society Catholicism.” These Catholics, 
in keeping with the Church’s longstanding allergy to political participation as normally understood, 
held that religion was fundamentally a feature of civil society and had no business interfering in 
statecraft. Jacques Maritain and Waldemar Gurian were key intellectual exponents of this form of 
Catholicism, while they oversaw a constellation of movements and organizations, firmly controlled 
by the hierarchy, known as Catholic Action (youth organizations, workers’ organizations, farmer’s 
organizations, and so on). Pope Pius XI had been supporting these movements in earnest since the 
early 1920s, when it became clear that traditional Catholic politics would no longer work in the era 
of Mussolini. Catholic Action did not explode in significance throughout the rest of Catholic Europe 
until the rest of Europe followed Mussolini (from about 1930 onwards). Even in Austria, Catholic 
Action served as a counterweight to Dollfuss’s regime; tellingly, given the suspicion of the “party” 
that was everywhere in these years, the Austrian hierarchy disbanded the old Christian-Social Vereine 
in favor of more clerical Catholic Action movements.3 Maritain, Gurian, and Catholic Action-
ideologues sought to leaven political life from within, pervading all political parties and systems with 
the spirit of Christian charity. This would serve to bend the arc of history towards Christ, without 
actually tying Christ’s name or mission to a fallen, terrestrial movement.  
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Many Catholics, however, thought this smacked of wishy-washy opportunism: Catholics, 
they pointed out, were bound to a quite specific set of economic and social teachings, and were 
duty-bound to support them in whatever fashion they could. General de Castelnau and his Croix de 
Feu, for instance, were harshly critical of Catholic Action for its unwillingness to question the Third 
Republic and its legitimacy. Castelnau and the like, who will be covered in Chapter 5, believed that 
the Church should forthrightly ally itself with certain political regimes, as parliamentary democracy 
was manifestly incapable of inaugurating a Christian social order on earth (I will refer to this as 
“corporatist Catholicism”). This was not a Catholicism of party, though: it was a Catholicism that 
rejected parties altogether and was to incarnate itself in the partyless state. It must be said that history 
seemed to be on their side, once we think about Spain, Portugal, Austria, Croatia, and Hungary (and 
France, if we include Vichy). Indeed, authoritarian Catholicism was perhaps the default political 
option of the 1930s. It was also just as transnational in focus as socialism and Fascism: especially as 
mediated through the Vatican, corporatists in France, Austria, Germany, Spain, and beyond were in 
constant contact and were developing a common political and economic discourse. They drew on 
the social theories, particularly the economic ones, that were covered in Part I, as well as the anti-
democratic and anti-liberal sympathies nourished in 1920s Catholicism.  
The Vatican itself straddled these positions, in an impossible balancing-act that has led to 
mountains of controversy over the last seventy years. Pius was certainly glad to be rid of the old 
partisan Catholicism: he snuffed out the Italian PPI with pleasure, and had tumultuous relations with 
the German Center. Robert Pollard defines the policy of the Vatican in the 1920s and 1930s as 
about “Concordats and Catholic Action”—both of them strategies to pursue Catholic interests 
without unruly Catholic parties.4 These strategies were primarily followed in non-Catholic states like 
                                                





Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy: when state-capture, as normally understood, was off the table, Pius 
turned towards alternative, and not directly political, means to pursue Catholic interests. On the 
other hand, in many parts of Europe Catholic state-capture remained on the table, and here the 
Vatican showed a slightly different face. Pius XI is the Pope of Catholic Action, yes, but he is also 
the Pope of Quadragesimo Anno (1931), an encyclical providing quite precise social and economic 
guidelines. Meanwhile, the Church granted certain degrees of support to so-called “clerical” regimes 
in Hungary, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Croatia, Slovakia, and Vichy France. This will be investigated in 
Chapter 5. At this point, though, I do want to register that this “support” has often been over-
estimated: to take one example, the Vatican was not behind Franco’s rebellion, had developed 
passable relations with the Spanish Republic, and even rebuffed Franco’s first few efforts to claim 
official Vatican support for his movement. Meanwhile, the Vatican was never especially enthusiastic 
about Vichy—they did not conclude a Concordat with the state, for instance. It is doubtless true 
that many bishops, notably in Austria and France, were supporters of these regimes, but this does 
mean that we can say in any simple way that the Vatican robustly supported authoritarian politics.  
So while civil-society Catholicism and corporatist Catholicism were often at one another’s 
throats, especially over hot-button issues like the invasion of Abyssinia and the Spanish Civil War, 
they were fundamentally united in ways that would allow their rapprochement after World War II. It is 
worth pointing out, too, that these divisions were not air-tight, any more than the geographical milieu 
of the 1920s were hermetically sealed from one another. Some figures, including most notably 
Emmanuel Mounier, shuttled back and forth between these positions, which was bewildering both 
for his friends and for later historians. Léon Degrelle, to take another example, had his start in 





They were all drawing on the shared heritage of the 1920s, of course, but even more than 
this, Catholics in both of these transnational circles developed a new political concept that would 
have a great future: anti-totalitarianism. Catholics of all stripes despised both Nazism and 
Communism, as they were the two greatest threats to the integrity of the Church and her preferred 
social order (insofar as both were dedicated to étatiste political solutions). Catholics developed the 
concept of “totalitarianism” as a shorthand to register this joint disapproval. They could not know 
that “joint opposition to Nazism and Communism” would be the sine qua non of participation in the 
post-1945 order. And nobody had better anti-totalitarian credentials than the Catholics. They had, as 
we’ll see, invented the category. 
Knights of the Total: Carl Schmitt and Karl Eschweiler 
 
While the extant literature almost uniformly credits “totalitarianism theory” to secularists 
(either American political scientists or German socialists), historically speaking, Catholics were 
clearly the innovators.5 “Bolshevism and Fascism,” declared one Anglo-Catholic sociologist in 1935, 
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“are at one in theory of government.”6 The Vatican, too, arrived at totalitarianism theory in 1936, as 
seen in the Holy Office’s never-issued document, entitled “Propositions [to be Condemned] on 
Racism, Nationalism, Communism, Totalitarianism.”7This had become commonplace in Catholic 
social science by this time, as we’ll see, and was still extremely rare among non-Catholics.  
The beauty of totalitarianism theory, from the Catholic point of view, was that it lumped 
together Catholicism’s enemies in a single category, allowing the Church to portray itself as an 
institution locked in a single, titanic struggle, instead of as one competing political and social voice 
amongst others. In France, Catholics were responding to the rise of the hated Popular Front; any 
theory that could equate Bolshevism and Nazism delegitimized the very concept of a Moscow-
backed, anti-fascist Front Populaire. In Austria, Catholic supporters of Dollfuss’s Ständestaat were in a 
similar position: their two major enemies were the Austro-Marxists, just defeated in a civil war but 
still a threat, and the National Socialists, whose desire for Anschluss was finding worrying resonance 
within Austria itself. Totalitarianism theory allowed supporters of Dollfuss to undercut the National 
Socialists’ claim to represent a bulwark against Communism.  
The Catholic outrage over “totalitarianism”, in addition to being politically convenient, can 
also be traced back to the fact that many Catholics – those who supported National Socialism – 
actually supported the “total state” between 1932 and 1934. Indeed, one of German Catholicism’s 
erstwhile favored sons – Carl Schmitt – turned to the “total state” in 1931, which was the moment 
when totalitarianism turned from “local descriptor of Italian Fascism” into “novel concept of 
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political science.” Schmitt’s turn, indeed, created “totalitarianism” vs. “anti-totalitarianism” as a 
debate within Catholicism several years before it appeared elsewhere. By this point, Schmitt was 
something of a pariah in Catholic circles, although still treated with great respect. He had been 
excommunicated in 1926 and, perhaps an even greater sin, moved to hated Berlin, and made his 
legal name by supporting the rights of the national Reich over the regions.8 But after his turn to 
Nazism and the total state, Catholics turned on him en masse. With the exception of Jean de 
Fabrègues, all of the major figures to be discussed in Part II—Gaston Fessard, Waldemar Gurian, 
Dietrich von Hildebrand, Eugen Kogon, Paul Landsberg, Jacques Maritain, and François Perroux—
attacked Schmitt by name in the process of conceptualizing their own new, anti-totalitarian breed of 
Catholic politics. 
Schmitt is probably the most important source for the language of the “total state,” which 
would quickly become “anti-totalitarianism”; his two articles on the “total state [totaler Staat],” which 
appeared in Karl Prinz von Rohan’s Europäische Revue in 1931 and 1933, are ground zero of the 
tradition. The first volume with “total state” in the title, Heinz Ziegler’s Autoritärer oder Totaler Staat 
(1932), was written in direct response to Schmitt, while the second was written by Ernst Forsthoff, 
one of Schmitt’s pupils and disciples (Der Totale Staat (1933)).9 This judgment, I should add, is not 
mine alone: several articles that appeared between 1932 and 1935 credited Schmitt with introducing 
the notion of the total into the political vocabulary in his aforementioned articles for Europäische 
Revue, while more recent scholars have seconded this verdict.10  
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In the chapters that follow, it is important to keep in mind what “totalitarianism” meant in 
Catholic social thought. Schmitt and his interlocutors were writing before Orwell’s 1984, Arendt’s 
Origins of Totalitarianism, Freidrich and Brzezinski’s work on totalitarianism, and everything else that 
has created our own nightmarish associations. For them, totalitarianism was not the rejection of 
liberal democracy and capitalism, but its very essence. For Schmitt, in an analysis that clearly builds 
upon his earlier works, particularly Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy and The Concept of the Political, the 
total state is a product of the nineteenth-century liberal state. Moreover, his initial development of 
the concept was a gambit to save Weimar democracy, albeit in Brüning’s authoritarian form, and not 
to underwrite the National Socialist revolution (Schmitt was not yet involved with the Nazis). 
Schmitt’s invocation of the total state was meant to defend Brüning’s emergency economic decrees. 
He pointed out that the state/society distinction was already, as a matter of fact, collapsing: in 1928, 
53% of the German economy was implicated, in some way or another, with the German state. The 
failure to recognize the fact that political and civil society are already imbricated is leading to the 
misinformed outcries over Brüning’s economic decrees, which are rooted in a failure to understand 
the nature of the modern state.11 
Although the “total state” would soon become a watchword for “Nazism,” the fact that 
Schmitt meant it at the time as, precisely, a defense of the Republic tells us something important 
about the idea’s genealogy. The total state was meant to save democracy and update it for new 
conditions, beyond the liberal state of the nineteenth century. The debate about totalitarianism is not the 
same as the debate about democracy. As in the 1920s, “democracy” was not the language through which 
these debates were carried out: the debate was about the role of the state in the social order, and not 
                                                                                                                                                
Grenze,” Hochland 30, 1 (1932-3), 558-60; Karl Thieme, Deutsche evangelische Christen auf dem Wege zur katholischen Kirche 
(Züirch, 1934), 42; more recently, Abbot Gleason, Totalitarianism (New York, 1995), 18. 




the form of that state. Schmitt’s radically anti-pluralist contention was that, to stave off civil war, the 
state would have to understand the truth about itself and assert its dominance over subsidiary 
groups, as Brüning was in fact then doing. Without a strong political presence, the state would 
become no more than a battle ground: “Through pluralization, the turn to the total is not 
transcended [aufgehoben], but rather parceled, in that each organized social power-complex—from 
choirs and sport clubs to armed self-protection—seeks to actualize [verwirklichen] the totality in and 
for itself.”12 
Of course, the Weimar Republic did collapse, and Schmitt and many other Catholics used 
the language of the “total state” to signal their support for the new, National Socialist regime. In 
almost no case, though, were these writers truly Schmittean: instead, based on a misunderstanding of 
the nature of the National Socialist regime, they equated the Nazi “total state” with the authoritarian, 
corporatist state that many had been clamoring for in the 1920s. As this became clear, almost all 
Catholic intellectuals turned away from Nazism. For all of the Sturm und Drang about Catholic 
Nazism, it remains the case that almost no prominent Catholic intellectuals or theologians gave 
significant support to Nazism beyond about 1934. In the heady months of 1933, though, many 
praised the “total state.” Robert Grosche, another Rhenish Catholic, praised the coming of the total 
state in a widely reprinted 1933 lecture.13 A writer for Schönere Zukunft, also in 1933, praised the “total 
revolution” in Germany, warning that those who overlooked the fact that Nazism aimed for das 
Ganze were sorely mistaken.14 Eugen Kogon, who as we will see was initially a strong supporter of 
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the National Socialist experiment, praised its “totalitarian” qualities in 1934.15  Ground zero for pro-
totalitarian Catholics was the notorious 1933 conference at Maria Laach, “Idee und Aufbau der 
Reich,” held during what Klaus Scholder has called “the summer of political theology” and 
organized by Franz Xaver Landmesser, head of the Katholische Akademikerverband and one of the few 
acolytes of Othmar Spann in the Rhineland.16 In addition to Schmitt, participants included Grosche, 
Ildefons Herwegen, Damasus Winzen, Albert Mirgeler, Martin Spahn, Emil Ritter, Karl Eschweiler, 
and even Theodor Brauer—an honor roll of National Socialist Catholic intellectuals. In an essay a 
few months later in which Heinrich Getzeny discussed the unforgettable summer of political 
theology, every name he mentioned had been present at this conference, at which the total state had 
been a major topic of discussion.17  
Emil Ritter, one of the attendees and the editor of Germania (formerly a Zentrum organ), was 
also behind another fascinating document of Catholic totalitarianism: Katholisch-konservatives Erbgut, a 
collection of essays published in 1934 and designed to repackage the Catholic heritage as a long 
precursor to National Socialism. In his foreword, Ritter gives voice to Karamazov Catholicism. 
“Liberalism is the enemy for everyone [i.e. the Catholic heroes described in the book], from Schlegel 
to Hitze.” Liberalism is defined as the heretical separation of church, state, and Volk, which were 
being reunited in the “total state” of National Socialism, which would spring from “the living Volk, 
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which is a community created by God, and defined by blood and fate.”18 This is followed by essays 
by, among others, Jakob Baxa and Eugen Kogon—two of Spann’s most prominent students—who 
reformulate the Catholic social theories of Adam Müller and Karl von Vogelsang, respectively, as 
predecessors of the Nazi total state.19  
From our perspective, the most interesting Catholic defender of the “total state” was Karl 
Eschweiler, who came out of the same open-minded Rhenish milieu as Waldemar Gurian. Indeed, 
he baptized Gurian’s children, and he organized the first translations of Jacques Maritain into 
German. Maritain, for his part, believed that Eschweiler was the man to reproduce the Meudon-
model of Thomist study circles in Germany.20 In a 1926 letter to Gurian, Grosche referred to the 
three as something of a triumvirate, worrying that they all overestimated the potential of neo-
Thomism.21  Eschweiler was also close with Carl Schmitt from around 1925 until his premature 
death in 1936, and had been friendly with Scheler in the mid-1920s (he wrote a long obituary for 
Scheler in a French journal in 192822). What’s interesting, then, about Eschweiler is that his 
formation was, in many ways, so similar to Gurian’s: this explains the disappointment that Gurian 
felt—he told Maritain the revelation was “extremely painful”—when Eschweiler became one of the 
most prominent National Socialist Catholics in Germany.23 
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 What’s interesting about Eschweiler is that, unlike Schmitt, he came to the “total state” for 
perfectly orthodox reasons: he was speaking the language of Catholicism. He actually came to 
Nazism several years before Schmitt, writing an essay in Der Ring in 1931 in which he laid out his 
vision of a Hitler-friendly Catholicism. For Eschweiler, there are duties to God and duties to 
Caesar—these are fundamentally distinct, and there is no middle ground between them. “To the 
Caesar, or the State, belongs all that is of this world.”24 The sphere of law and politics is neatly 
separated from the sphere of religion, the Church can have no role to play in temporal affairs, and 
the Zentrum can only appear as unwarranted clericalism. The nation, the province of Caesar, thus 
deserves total control over the things of this earth, which it exercises by way of the authoritarian 
state. “The nation is a true and noble public domain [Gemeingut] […] The nation naturally fulfills 
itself in political [staatlichen] existence.”25 In a particularly revealing letter from 1932, Eschweiler 
defends Schmitt from Leo Strauss’s celebrated criticisms of Der Begriff des Politischen, arguing that 
Strauss, as a Jew, is incapable of truly political thought: their legalistic understanding of religious 
dogma keeps them from understanding either faith or politics, which are predicated on the strict 
division of labor outlined above.26 
Eschweiler used the theories of Catholic Action when he actually turned to the total state. In 
a May 1933 essay, entitled “Neun Sätze über das katholische Aktion,” he makes an exceptionally 
detailed version of the argument that he was making in newspapers and sermons across Germany at 
the time. Following Bellarmine, Eschweiler claimed that the church and state can be defined as the 
two “societates perfectas” to which we have access on earth. He here clearly tracks Schmitt’s second 
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article on the total state, also published in 1933 and relying on Bellarmine: “every true state, as a 
societas perfectas of the temporal world, is a total state.”27 While Eschweiler defends a strict separation 
of church and state—there are two societates perfectas, not one—he is clear that this bears no 
resemblance to the liberal settlement. As Eschweiler had explained earlier, “The differentiation of 
‘state and church’ was first made possible, and first established, in Christianity.”28 His point of view 
was closer to Gentile himself: “State and Church,” Gentile had written in 1930, “are two totalitarian 
regimes. Their agreement can only arise from a self-delimitation.” 29 The Catholic Church expressed 
itself via non-political Catholic Action (the ideology of the Concordat), while the Nazi state could 
fully embrace our political and national existence. 
Interestingly, the appeal of this settlement for Eschweiler, as for other totalitarian Catholics, 
is that the confusing and hateful category of “society” is abolished. The theological-political unity of 
the Middle Ages, Eschweiler complained, had not been split into two—church and state—but rather 
into three: church, state, and a new entity called “civil society [bürgerliche Gesellschaft].”30 In this 
sphere of public life, the citizen enjoys freedom from the two perfect societies, and it is in this 
Godless realm that the twin evils of international capitalism and international Marxism were allowed 
to flourish. Catholics, in their support for civil society and for the clerical, Zentrum politics with 
which it was associated, have been defending this bankrupt tri-partite division, but with the rise of 
National Socialism, the godless Ralliement can mercifully draw to a close. The state can become a 
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total state, as it should, and religious authority can, by withdrawing from the temporal realm, more 
truly reflect the glory of God through a spiritualization of papal authority.31 
Abyssinia: Introducing Two Forms of Anti-Totalitarianism 
Schmitt, Eschweiler, and all of the totalitarian Catholics reject the old political solutions: 
Catholic defense parties, traditionalist monarchism, and so on. Like others in the 1930s, they turned 
towards more radical solutions divorced from the logic of party politics. Their opponents—the vast 
majority of Catholics who identified as anti-totalitarian—followed them at least that far. There was 
more than one way, though, to be anti-totalitarian. To set up the next two chapters, I will here 
briefly canvas one of the major debates between civil-society and corporatist Catholicism. There 
was, we’ll see, a cleavage within Catholicism, but this was not between “democratic” or “liberal” 
Catholicism and “authoritarian” Catholicism, but rather between civil-society Catholics, who argued 
that religion should abandon the field of politics altogether, and corporatist Catholics, who argued 
that certain forms of political-economic order were specifically enjoined by the Catholic faith. The 
point here is not at all to retrospectively chastise Catholics for abandoning democracy in its hour of 
need: almost nobody in mid-1930s Europe believed in parliamentary democracy. The point, instead, 
is to more faithfully reconstruct the twin Catholic internationalisms of the 1930s by moving away 
from “democracy” as an analytical axis. 
The Abyssinian invasion was, for Catholics, the most divisive international event of the 
1930s. In a 1941 lecture bemoaning the divided state of his homeland, Gaston Fessard dated the 
split to March 1935 and the debate over Ethiopia; a few years later, in a touching reminiscence of his 
generation of Catholics, Daniel Villey identified that same event as the foundational controversy of 
                                                




the 1930s.32 Maurras and the Action Française made their most principled stand of the 1930s over 
the issue of sanctions, publishing a list of politicians to be assassinated (a stunt for which Maurras 
duly served jail time). But the nature of the confrontation was not what we would expect, just as the 
divisions in 1930s Catholic life were more complex than has previously been noted. The controversy 
did not at all pit “fascist” against “anti-fascist” Catholics: those supporting Mussolini against those 
opposing him. Instead, the struggle was between civil-society Catholics—who did not believe that 
Catholicism enjoined any political commitments at all—and corporatist Catholics, who believed that 
it did. 
Maritain and the group of “civil society Catholics” he led were not anti-fascist in any 
recognizable way. Instead, the position taken by Gurian, Maritain and the rest was studiously 
apolitical: the position of the Catholic intellectual, they held, was not to support or oppose fascism, 
but to act as witnesses of an eternal religious truth that only obliquely informs politics, and never in 
a partisan way. Their manifesto, “Pour le justice et la paix,” does not condemn fascism, war, or 
imperialism—that is, it does not take any of the routes that we would expect an anti-invasion 
manifesto to take, or the ones that were, in fact, taken in manifestoes on the left (such as the one 
that appeared in Le Populaire on 5 October).33 “The question in no way concerns the sympathies or 
antipathies that one might have in regard to the internal regime of Italy,” the manifesto states. “[I]t 
concerns justice and eternal values.”34 The manifesto does not discuss any of the concrete issues at 
stake—slavery in Ethiopia, the legitimacy of the League, or the advisability of sanctions—and 
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explicitly relegates such practical concerns to irrelevance, from the Catholic perspective.35 Instead, it 
stakes itself on abstract and universal appeals to peace and justice, arguing that the possible logistical 
need for Italian expansion is illegitimate, as empirical issues like this cannot impinge on the absolute 
immorality of wars of conquest. An editorialist at Sept, the journalistic home base for these 
Catholics, explained it best: “The issue is not fascism or anti-fascism, but international justice.“36  
In a sense, they had the Vatican on their side, insofar as Pius XI was loathe to take official 
positions on ongoing political events. But while the Vatican itself remained silent, the Pope could 
not strictly control the Italian hierarchy’s “orgy of enthusiasm” for the invasion.37 Many Catholics, in 
France especially, followed the lead of the Italian clergy and heralded Mussolini’s action. This was 
the position taken by Castelnau’s FNC, as well as the one taken by most French Catholic 
intellectuals, who remained reliant on Maurras, at least in spirit.38 And there is no doubt what 
position a Maurrasean Catholic should take: Maurras and his circle violently opposed sanctions, and 
celebrated the invasion as a glorious exemplar of the new, militarist spirit of the 1930s. The 
manifesto of this group—the one that occasioned Pour le justice et la paix—was Manifeste des intellectuels 
français pour la défense de l’Occident, which was published in Le Temps on 4 October 1935. In addition to 
Maurras, it was signed by the most important French Catholic right-wing intellectuals, some of 
whom we have met before: Henri Massis, Jean de Fabrègues, Pierre Maxence, and more. Whereas 
the civil-society manifesto essentially defended peace at any cost, relying upon eternal values of 
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justice and castigating those who were willing to cynically legitimize violence in the name of political 
reason, these Catholics were willing to do precisely that.  
In the manifesto, they make two basic sets of argumentation. First, they argue that Italian 
Fascism is a great representative of the Roman spirit and should thus be accorded the same rights as 
every other (imperialist) nation. The civil society Catholics did not respond to this; as we’ve seen, 
they thought that the particular merits of Fascism were irrelevant. It was the second issue that was 
more controversial. The corporatists argued according to Realpolitik: if we act against Mussolini in 
the name of foolish international laws, we are courting European catastrophe.  
They argue in terms of politics, not values: “At the hour when we menace Italy with 
sanctions sure to lead to an unprecedented war, we, French intellectuals, must declare, before world 
opinion, that we do not want these sanctions or this war. […] The just interests of the Western 
community would be injured.”39 This is, to be sure, a moral argument, but the premises are not 
eternal but temporal and diplomatic: the implication is that such considerations may be properly 
considered by the Catholic as he acts in the world. The political decision to allow Mussolini’s 
invasion is given religious significance: at stake, they argue, “is the notion of man himself.” For the 
civil society Catholics, “man” at his most basic is not a political animal, and must indeed be 
protected from the political. For those on the right, however, the dignity of man is inextricably 
wrapped up in politics.  
The primary organ for corporatist Catholicism in Austria was Christliche Ständestaat, a 
Dollfuß-supporting journal peopled with many figures discussed in Chapter 2. Both its primary 
editor and its foreign-affairs correspondent—Dietrich von Hildebrand and Klaus Dohrn—wrote 
articles defending the invasion. They argued in similar terms, employing an appreciation for 
                                                




Fascism’s Latin mission alongside steely power politics. “Italy is,” Hildebrand argued, “the germ of 
the Christian West. […] Can anyone seriously treat Italy and Abyssinia as equally great, merely 
because they are both members of the League of Nations?”40 Dohrn followed this with a political 
approach, arguing that the peace of Europe depended on the politics of Stresa and Locarno, not the 
politics of divisive, punitive fascism; the sanction debate threatens to plunge Europe back into 
war—“Therefore by all means, ‘Down with sanctions!’”41 
Although the competition between these two groups was sometimes vicious, there were 
nonetheless significant areas of doctrinal overlap. They agreed with one another, and with the 
Vatican, about the basic principles of social, economic, and international order: all were to follow 
the principles of subsidiarity that had been ingrained in all forms of Catholic thinking for decades. 
This would not become clear until these people found themselves on the same side in 1947-8. The 
most significant of these concerned, as we would expect, the critique of the state form, which 
survived in modified forms in the 1930s, even as the political realities which had originally created it 
had vanished. Both civil-society Catholics and corporatist Catholics, even while fighting tooth and 
nail against one another, developed sophisticated forms of personalism and anti-totalitarianism, 
setting up the disappearance of this final chasm in Catholic political thought in the post-1945 period. 
As we will see in Part III, it was under these banners—and not those of “humanism” or 
“democracy”—that Catholic intellectuals would legitimate their participation in Christian 
Democracy and the Cold War.  
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Chapter 4: Politics in the Higher Sense: Waldemar Gurian, Jacques 
Maritain, and Civil-Society Catholicism 
 
It has been demonstrated time and again that all political errors are based in religious ones. 
--Franziskus Stratfmann, 19281 
 
Day-to-day politics is not the task of Catholic Action, but politics in the higher sense. 
--Pope Pius XI, 19342 
 
Introduction 
In 1937, Gaston Fessard, S.J., received a kind letter from a M. François, the secretary of the 
French Communist Party in Paris’s seventh arrondissement. François was inviting Fessard to a 
lecture and discussion about the possibilities of anti-fascist collaboration between Catholics and 
Communists, “setting aside the religious question.” There was nothing new about this: in the Paris 
of the Popular Front, ecumenical cooperation against fascism was almost taken for granted. Fessard, 
though, was uninterested. He responded icily that he would certainly not be attending, as the sorts of 
collaboration François sought were impossible. Even in the name of anti-fascism, religion cannot be 
“set aside” in the name of politics. It is, on the contrary, everything.3 But was this not, François 
surely wondered, an unwarranted intrusion of religion into the sphere of politics? After all, had not 
Catholics since Leo XIII maintained that Christ’s transcendent Church could not identify itself with 
any particular political regime or party, leaving Catholics, qua citizens, to vote how they chose? Why, 
then, couldn’t Catholics ally with Communists in the political sphere to fight fascism, especially as 
fascist parties and leaders across Europe were becoming increasingly open about their hostility to 
the Church?  
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This chapter is dedicated to answering these questions and explaining Fessard’s response to 
François. The answer is not as simple as it might seem: although Catholic antipathy to Bolshevism 
was nothing new, Fessard’s negative response relied on a new conceptual vocabulary, designed to 
legitimate Catholic anti-Communism in a newly-polarized age in which the Church’s traditional 
conservative positions had either disappeared or become irrelevant. To see how this happened, this 
chapter will focus on one cluster of Catholic intellectuals, whom I’ll call the “civil society Catholics.” 
It is misleading to refer to them as “progressive” or “democratic,” as other historians have done. 
The characteristic stance of these Catholics was not principled political activity at all, much less 
theoretical defense of parliamentary democracy. Instead, they retreated from politics altogether, 
insofar as “politics” refers to specific, partisan commitments to governing institutions and social 
programs (i.e. specific policies, specific values, specific political forms). “Political plans do not, as 
such, interest M. Maritain,” wrote Joseph Desclausais in a critical Revue Universelle article. “He is only 
interested in spiritual ones.”4  
In addition to Fessard’s and Maritain’s circle of French Catholics, this chapter will focus on 
their allies among the German exile population, most prominently Waldemar Gurian and Paul-
Ludwig Landsberg. Both of them ended up in Switzerland, which provided a congenial home for 
exiled Catholic anti-fascists for at least a part of the 1930s (the more corporatist exiles tended 
towards Austria, and will be discussed in the next chapter).5 They were joined by, among others, 
Karl Thieme, a Catholic convert and close friend of Gurian’s. Joseph Wirth, the former Chancellor 
and leader of the Catholic Zentrum party, was an active presence in Swiss exile life—organizing an 
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anti-racist manifesto that Gurian and Thieme wrote together—before coming to Switzerland himself 
in 1939. They found a publishing home with Carl Doka, the editor of Schweizerische Rundschau, who 
had longstanding connections with Rhenish Catholicism.6 Switzerland was also home to Vita Nova 
Verlag, an anti-Nazi publisher that published Gurian, Maritain, and other Catholics in this tradition.  
The most famous position held by this cluster of Catholics was their opposition to the 
Spanish Civil War: all four of the Catholics to be discussed in this chapter—Maritain, Gurian, 
Landsberg, and Fessard—were opposed to it. Landsberg lived in Spain and saw the violence 
firsthand, while Gurian engaged in furious polemics with his new colleagues at Notre Dame about 
the issue. Maritain wrote a preface decrying the notion of the “holy war,” about which Fessard wrote 
in Études, the prestigious journal he edited (Maritain recognized the danger Fessard was courting, 
and wrote a letter of effusive thanks).7 This placed them firmly in the minority of Catholic Europe. 
Their “opposition” to the war, however, did not extend to a commitment to one side or the other. 
Most Catholics and the vast majority of the hierarchy supported Franco’s rebellions. Civil-society 
Catholics did not support the Republic, nor did their argumentative strategies involve a defense of 
its legitimacy. Instead, they were critical of both sides and simply wished the whole thing would 
draw to a close with as little bloodshed as possible. In their 1937 manifesto on this topic, Pour le 
peuple basque, they attacked the killing of noncombatants: “Under such conditions it is up to 
Catholics, without distinction of party, to be the first to raise their voices so that the world might be 
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spared the pitiless massacre of a Christian people […] We address an anguished appeal to all men of 
good will, to all countries, that the massacre of noncombatants cease immediately.”8 
Despite the historiographical consensus, this war was not an especially important moment in 
French Catholic intellectual life, let alone European Catholic intellectual life (emigrés in Austria and 
Switzerland had far graver concerns). In La Vie Intellectuelle, the most important organ for those 
Catholics to be discussed in this chapter, there were few articles on Spain—there were far more 
articles on Russia, for instance, and about as many articles on Mexico.9 The key moves had been 
already made in 1934 and 1935, in response to the Stavisky riots and the Abyssinian invasion: the 
two manifestoes Pour le bien commun (1934) and Manifeste pour le justice et le paix (1935), Gurian’s 
Bolschewismus als Weltgefahr (1935), Gaston Fessard’s Pax Nostra (1936), and Maritain’s Humanisme 
Intégral (1936) (based on lectures delivered in 1934). The Spanish Civil War was their most public 
moment, but not the one that formed them.  
The most significant years in the development of this Catholicism within the limits of civil 
society was 1934-6, and I will thus focus on those years (although not dogmatically). Our four 
guiding figures will be Waldemar Gurian, Paul-Ludwig Landsberg, Jacques Maritain, and Gaston 
Fessard. They all knew one another, with the exception, so far as I can tell, of Gurian and Fessard 
(although they were aware of one another’s work10). Fessard was close with Gurian’s friends, 
Maritain and Landsberg: indeed, before perishing at Oranienburg in 1944, Landsberg was planning 
                                                
8 “Pour le peuple basque,” in Maritain, Oeuvres Complètes VI, 1130. 
9 Significantly, in Bernard Doering’s article on the topic, he has to dance around the fact that Maritain wrote vanishingly 
little about the Spanish Civil War, and he quotes very few French right-wing articles on Spain, for the simple reason that 
there were not a great number of them. Doering, “Jacques Maritain, and the Spanish Civil War,” The Review of Politics 4, 4 
(1982), 489-522. Likewise, in Jay Corrin’s account of this in Chapter 13 of Catholic Intellectuals and the Challenge of Democracy, 
he discusses primarily English Catholic supporters of Franco.  
10 Fessard relies on Gurian’s work on Bolshevism in La main tendue? (Paris, 1937), 165, while Gurian wrote a 
praiseworthy review of “the well-known Jesuit, Father G. Fessard” and his own writings on Communism in 1947. 




to officially convert to Catholicism under Fessard’s guidance.11 Landsberg met Maritain and Fessard 
in the 1930s: he attended study sessions at Meudon in 1934, and took part in a group interview 
about Maritain’s Humanisme Intégral, along with Fessard, in 1937.12 
Although the Swiss exiles were important, the geographical center of this chapter will be 
France: Gurian and Landsberg primarily mattered in the mid-1930s because of their impact on 
French intellectual life. The most important source will be the series of journals edited by Father 
Vincent Bernadot: La Vie Intellectuelle (founded 1928), Sept (1934-7), and Temps Présent (1937-9). All 
four of our major figures published in these journals, participating in, as Maritain wrote in a letter 
about Temps Présent, “a generosity effectively superior to partisan frontiers.”13 This constituted the 
most important set of periodicals for those Catholics who, after 1926, abandoned their Maurrasean 
sympathies and sought a new path for the faith; Bernadot himself, it should be noted, was one of the 
co-authors, with Maritain, of French Catholicism’s most authoritative condemnation of Maurras 
from a doctrinal point of view, Clairvoyance de Rome (1929). I will also draw on Emmanuel Mounier’s 
Esprit, which was a rogue force in the 1930s and does not fit precisely into the “civil society” rubric 
I’ve set up (Mounier signed a truly anti-fascist manifesto, for instance, studiously ignored by Maritain 
and other civil-society Catholics). It did, however, provide a platform for the civil society writings of 
Maritain and Landsberg, and was an important defender of the new language of personalism even if, 
as I will argue below, its contribution in this regard has been overstated.14  
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I should note, also, a disciplinary shift in these writers: they did not identify as Catholic social 
scientists in the way that many of the figures from Part One had done. The reasons for this should 
be apparent: these authors asserted that Catholicism was primarily a spiritual affair and would only 
obliquely impact the fundamentally secular world of civil society. Civil-society Catholics did, 
however, further the critique of the secular sciences that we’ve seen developing in earlier decades. “In 
my view,” Maritain declared in an important 1935 interview, “the solution would consist in 
distinguishing here the spiritual and the ‘sociological’ order, purifying the former of the latter”15 
(significantly, Maritain drew precisely upon Scheler to make that point). Gurian similarly railed 
against the “sociologization [Soziologierung] of the world.”16 This will be a chapter on theologians 
and philosophers, not one of sociologists and economists. Catholic social scientists, properly 
speaking, tended towards the corporatist Catholicism to be covered in the next chapter.  
This chapter has four sections. The first will trace the contours of civil-society Catholicism 
as a transnational project, focusing on its constitution in the years around 1930. I will then turn to 
the mid-1930s, showing how “civil-society” Catholics interacted with the political crises of the time, 
following the lead of the Vatican and the “Catholic Action” movement. In the final two sections, I 
will focus on “personalism” and “anti-totalitarianism” in some philosophical detail, returning to my 
exemplary figures for some insight into the constellation of ideas that made up transnational, civil-
society Catholicism.  
Transnational Formation 
After remaining in splendid isolation in the early 1920s crisis, French and Rhenish circles 
began to intermingle in the late 1920s: “Vive l’Internationale,” as Fessard wryly commented upon 
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his own considerable ties to Germany.17 The backdrop for this was the new atmosphere of trust in 
international order that surged through Europe in the latter half of the 1920s. While the much-
ballyhooed Kellogg-Briand Pact was the most memorable expression of this new sensibility, there 
were also non-utopian reasons for optimism. This was the era of Briand, Stresemann, and Locarno, 
not Clemenceau, Eisner, and Versailles; the era of relative economic stability, and not the crushing 
burdens of the crisis-ridden early 1920s. Threats to the republican order—in the form of völkisch 
parties in Germany or the Action Française in France—were in abeyance until the economic crisis 
returned.18 
Other scholars have, of course, noticed the transnational bent of 1930s Catholicism as 
compared to its relatively blinkered, nationalist counterpart in the 1920s. These previous accounts, 
however, have been tied to the same improper understanding of 1930s Catholicism as most other 
scholarship (i.e. that Catholics were either “Democrats” or “Fascists”). On the one hand, Jean-
Claude Delbreil and Wolfram Kaiser represent those whare most interested in the the Christian-
Democratic Secrétariat International des Partis Démocratiques d’inspiration chrétienne [SIPDIC]. 
They see it as a predecessor to Christian-Democratic internationalism, even while Delbreil at least 
(and Guido Müller, in an essay appearing in a collection edited by Kaiser) admits that SIPDIC was a 
highly marginal phenomenon. 19 On the other hand, scholars like John Hellman are interested in 
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Catholics qua Fascists, and he ends up tracing equally insignificant phenomena like the personal 
travel itinerary of Emmanuel Mounier.20 
Both of these literatures are unsatisfactory, reducing a massive international organization to a 
few conferences and correspondents. In the next two chapters, I will try to trace more robust forms 
of transnational sensibility—ones that would more directly bleed into the incontrovertibly 
cosmopolitan sensibilities of Christian Democrats in the 1940s. Catholicism was deeply transnational 
at the time, and not merely because a handful of intellectuals hosted conferences: Catholic Action 
consisted of a global network of studiously apolitical organizations, linked in various ways to the 
clergy and thus to the Vatican. These groups provided the social-political backdrop to the “civil-
society Catholicism” to be discussed in this chapter: they have, I think, been widely ignored because 
they are so difficult to fit onto the “democratic vs. fascist” continuum. For example, Jacques 
Maritain enjoyed an international vogue in the 1930s. He is usually lumped as a “democrat,” but he 
wanted nothing to do with Christian Democratic parties and thus was alienated from SIPDIC (he 
was highly critical of the Zentrum). As he was clearly not a fascist, he disappears in the literature on 
transnational Catholicism (except for those works detailing his influence in Latin America). On the 
other hand, while there were relatively few genuine Catholic Fascists, Catholic corporatism, as social 
science and as political practice, exploded across Europe in the 1930s (this will be covered in the 
next chapter). The issue here is not that previous accounts are wrong: Kaiser, for instance, does 
provide important insight into the formation of the elite Nouvelles Equipes Internationales. I am 
interested, though, in the formation of political cultures more broadly, and for insight here we need 
to look at a broader source base, and think more seriously about the Church as a transnational 
institution serving millions of parishioners, than has been done in the literature thus far. 
                                                




One form of transnational activism that arose during the 1930s concerned the issue of anti-
Semitism. This issue cut across the corporatist/civil-society divide, bringing together figures as 
diverse as Maritain and Dietrich von Hildebrand. The center of this network was Johannes 
Oesterreicher, a Moravian priest living in Vienna, and his journal Die Erfüllung. Inspired by Joseph 
Wirth, Oesterreicher, Gurian, and Karl Thieme worked together on a manifesto that drew support 
from across the Catholic world: Austrian corporatists, Belgian social Catholics, French theologians, 
and more signed.21 I will not be focusing on this strand of transnational activisim: as with the 
Christian-Democratic transnationalism, it was important in its own way, but it does not seem to me 
the central narrative. It was, though, part of the ferment of international Catholic activity during 
these years. 
So, to return to our narrative: around 1930, a clutch of new Catholic journals appeared, 
giving voice to this new internationalist sensibility. In addition to Abendland (German, founded 
1925), discussed briefly in Chapter 3, we could think of La Vie Intellectuelle (French, founded 1928), 
Nova et Vetera (Swiss, founded 1925), or La Cité Chrétienne (Belgian, founded 1926). Abendland, like 
most of these new journals, was closely linked to the politics of Locarno, which it trumpeted in its 
pages.22 It was not, however, a liberal democratic journal: it believed that the new international 
cooperation should be in the spirit of medievalist Christian Abendland, not Anglo-Saxon 
jurisprudence (not for nothing was Ignaz Seipel on its board, or did the Austrian Friedrich 
Schreyvogl, who would become a Nazi sympathizer, serve as editor). “The name Abendland,” the 
Catholic historian Alois Dempf wrote to Carl Schmitt, “binds us to a rejection of humanitarian 
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liberalism and the ideology of the majority.”23 That said, the journal still participated in the new 
international spirit. Hermann Platz wrote reports of French Catholic congresses devoted to 
international peace, while Gurian covered the judgment of the Action Française and the new school of 
anti-Maurras Catholics growing around Maritain. 24An article by Josef Karl Mayr, which appeared 
there in 1927, gives the flavor of this new sensibility.  
When we compare the Europe of today with that of ten years ago, we find an 
astonishing, and surprisingly rapid, change from a state of the deepest division and 
bloodiest self-laceration to one of purposeful cooperation and common rebuilding.25  
 
Specifically, he believed that this turnaround, prefigured by the 1924 Dawes Plan, began in earnest in 
1925, with Locarno and the withdrawal of Franco-Belgian forces from the Ruhr: the “neutralization 
of the Rhineland” had been the catalyst for “the hour of change of Western politics.”26 Gurian 
would bring the spirit and sensibility of these 1920s journals into the 1930s, in exile. Alongside his 
friend, Karl Thieme, Gurian published Deutsche Briefe, a small but influential journal dedicated to 
exposing National Socialist attacks on the church. One of its subscribers was Robert d’Harcourt, a 
Catholic who wrote lengthily and often about the National Socialist menace and its anti-Christian 
principles.27 
 The French periodical world responded in kind: indeed, it had a longer hill to climb, as anti-
French sentiment had never been as fundamental to German Catholic identity as anti-German 
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animus had been to the French. The first issue of La Vie Intellectuelle (1928) marks the shift. It 
includes an article from Karl Eschweiler about Max Scheler, reprints the lecture Maritain had 
recently given at a Tagung of the Katholische Akademikerverband in Constance, and includes a laudatory 
account by Joseph Delos about that same international event. “More than ever,” Delos judged, “an 
international collaboration of intellectual Catholic forces is necessary.”28 And the version of 
Germany that they provided to the French was precisely the Rhenish one: in addition to Eschweiler, 
Bernadot’s journal published Landsberg, Gurian, Peter Wust, Erik Peterson and Franziskus 
Stratmann, the founder of the Friedensbund Deutscher Katholiken, while ignoring even the most 
famous exemplars of Romantic Mitteleuropa.29 In 1930, Robert d’Harcourt published account of a 
visit to Peter Wust, Fessard’s teacher and Scheler’s student, who was pointedly referred to in the title 
of the article as a “Rhenish philosopher.” Both Wust and his visitor understood themselves to be 
building bridges not between Germany and France, but rather between Cologne and Paris: “these 
two cities where Thomas Aquinas taught.”30 In a review of one of Landsberg’s books, André George 
claimed it was no surprise that Landsberg had come from the Rhineland, “that double culture where 
Germany and France are reconnected by the spirit of reconciliation.”31  
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It is not that Rhenish Catholics simply outnumbered their southern or Austrian counterparts 
in these journals: the reception of German Catholics was divided along strictly partisan lines in 
France. A 1934 article in La Vie Intellectuelle made this especially explicit, arguing that the Rhineland 
had the more authentic Christian federalist tradition than Bavaria, which was convulsed by a 
“nationalist fever.”32 Documents de La Vie Intellectuelle also published the results of a 1931 Franco-
German Catholic congress, featuring Alois Dempf and Hermann Platz—two of the most stridently 
Rhenish Catholic voices in Germany.33 This continued into the 1930s: one of Mounier’s favored 
journalistic outlets in the late 1930s was Die Zukunft, a German exile journal run by Catholics from 
the old Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung circle, including Landsberg.34 
Let’s look at the transnational formations of our four paradigmatic intellectuals, keeping in 
mind that it would be nearly impossible to come up with similar figures for the 1920s. We’ll begin 
with the two new entries into our story: Fessard and Landsberg. Gaston Fessard will now become a 
central figure for the rest of the dissertation: born in 1897, he entered the Jesuit order in 1913, only 
to be called up almost immediately for military service. He spent the 1920s studying philosophy and 
law, and discovering the works of Hegel—which he happened across on a stroll through Munich—
which were at the time essentially ignored in a France still dominated by Léon Brunschvicg’s neo-
Kantianism. After finishing up his preparation as a Jesuit with a year abroad in Münster in 1930, 
where he studied with Peter Wust and encountered Scheler’s phenomenology, he moved to Paris. As 
editor of Études, he would become a significant figure in Parisian intellectual life for the next thirty 
years, particularly in the 1940s, when he would become the Catholic face of the Resistance and a, 
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perhaps the, major Catholic anti-Communist voice in the central debates about tripartisme in 1946-7 
(for which see Part III).  
Paul-Ludwig Landsberg came out of Gurian’s circle in the Rhineland. Also Jewish, he was 
born in Bonn in 1901 to a respected academic family. After flirting with Communism in his youth, 
he fell into Catholic circles, largely through the influence of Scheler, in the early 1920s.35 Gurian and 
Landsberg spent the 1920s in the Catholic youth movements together, hiking across the Rhenish 
countryside in sandals and reading Schmitt’s works in the forest.36 He maintained his position in 
Bonn until 1933, publishing very little (according to John Oesterreicher, he was undergoing a crisis 
of faith at the time37). When Hitler came to power, Landsberg immediately went into exile—he first 
followed his Rhenish friends to Switzerland, before making his way to Spain, where he would teach 
until the ravages of the Spanish Civil War forced him to Paris in 1936. From Spain he was in close 
contact with French intellectual life, particularly in the circles around Maritain, Mounier, and Jean 
Wahl (he likely met Maritain when the latter was in Spain in summer 1934 giving the lectures that 
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would become Humanisme Intégral).38 He began writing for Esprit in 1934, from which point he 
became—according to Paul Ricoeur, another Esprit regular during these years—a dominant 
philosophical voice at the journal.39 
Maritain, attuned as ever to the Zeitgeist, began to explore German Catholic life for the first 
time. “It increasingly seems impossible to ignore Catholic Germany, which does exist,” he wrote to 
Massis in 1927. “There is,” he added, “a very powerful Catholic movement among the youth.” 
(recall Gurian’s and Landsberg’s involvement in the youth movements, which had a lower profile in 
Mitteleuropa.)40 Between 1925 and 1927, Maritain ingratiated himself with a handful of Rhenish 
Catholics, most prominently Gurian, Wust, Eschweiler, Peterson, and Schmitt. With Eschweiler, a 
young admirer and spearhead of the first projects to translate Maritain into German, he attempted to 
turn his Meudon study circle into a model for a German renaissance.41 The favor was returned: as 
Georg Moenius pointed out in a 1928 article in Schönere Zukunft, German Catholics were beginning 
to turn to Maritain en masse (even if Bernhard Jansen, one of Germany’s premier Jesuits, acidly 
judged him a “thomiste extrême”).42 Gurian, who wrote a series of articles about Maritain in the late 
1920s, paved the way by pointing out that Maritain “is not one of those polemical French writers 
[…] who trace all evil back to German or Anglo-Saxon influence.”43  
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In Maritain, Gurian had found his new muse. For various reasons, he had broken with his 
earlier mentors, and in Maritain Gurian found an intellectual lodestar that would guide him until his 
death in 1954. They first met in Paris around 1925, where Gurian was acting as a foreign-affairs 
correspondent for Abendland. He shared an apartment with Herbert Dankworth and Werner Becker, 
both of whom were also active at Platz’s journal, and both of whom were active pro-Europeans like 
Gurian himself (Becker and Gurian published an interview with Lucien Romier, the editor of Le 
Figaro, in this vein44). In a series of articles for Kölnische Volkszeitung, Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung, 
Orplid, and Abendland, he became Maritain’s most important proponent in Germany, and it was 
through Gurian that Maritain met Peterson and Eschweiler.45 In a remarkable series of letters in 
1927, we can watch Gurian moving out of Schmitt’s orbit and into Maritain’s.46  
Gurian and Maritain’s new internationalist sensibility can be seen in their joint reaction to 
Henri Massis’s Défense de l’Occident (1927). In this book, one of Maurras’s most loyal lieutenants 
continues and amplifies the traditional Action Française critique of Germany, arguing that the West 
is once again in danger from the Prussian spirit, which had infiltrated Asia in the form of 
Bolshevism. “All these doctrines have, in fact, this in common, that they postulate at the outset the 
failure of Western culture, and that their aim is to bring about the decline of Latinity and its 
irremediable fall.” Our only recourse is “the law of the rampart”: we must, Massis counseled, 
entrench ourselves in Latinity.47 These ideas, of course, were not at all foreign to Maritain; much of 
                                                
44 Gurian and Becker, “Deutschland und Frankreich im neuen Europa: Ein Gespräch mit Lucien Romier,” Abendland 2, 
6 (March 1927), 169-72. 
45 There first recorded contact is a letter from Gurian to Maritain in December 1925, Maritain Archives, Kolbsheim.  
46 The first public evidence of his rupture with Schmitt is probably Gurian’s critique of “political theology” in Gurian, 
“Lamennais,” Die Schildgenossen 7, 6 (November 1927), 499-517, 503. Gurian to Maritain, 18 September 1927 and 27 
September 1927. Schmitt defended himself in a revelatory letter to Maritain the following year. Schmitt to Maritain, 24 
December 1928. Maritain Archives, Kolbsheim. 




Massis’s work could have been lifted from Maritain’s WWI lecture series discussed in Chapter 1. But 
by 1927, things had changed. The switch, as Massis duly noted, was a rapid one: in the first draft of 
his Une Opinion sur Charles Maurras, which Maritain wrote in 1925 and sent to Massis for comment, 
he discussed “the invasion of Germanic ideas” which Maurras was laudably fighting. “There exists,” 
Maritain wrote, “an inhuman Germanism which will never cease to agitate the world.”48 This was 
removed—not at Massis’s suggestion!—for the 1926 publication. By the end of 1926, Maritain had 
turned on Maurras, who had gone too far by attacking the pope personally in his newspaper, and by 
the beginning of 1927 he had begun his lengthy feud with Massis.  
Both Gurian and Maritain savaged Massis’s work: Gurian publicly, through a review at 
Abendland, and Maritain privately, through a last-ditch effort to goad Massis into drastically revising, 
or even abandoning, the project.  In his review, published in Abendland, Gurian begins by bringing 
Maurras to task for his continued unthinking anti-Germanism. Maurras and his associates, Gurian 
held, were guilty of “the attempt to secularize the Church and pursue political goals under cover of 
espousing the truths of revelation. And the work of Henri Massis […] is such an attempt.”49 Gurian 
argued that Massis was misrepresenting the nature of the Church by tying it to “the West,” which 
meant, essentially, France: Gurian titled his review, “The Ideology of the West as a Mask for French 
Nationalism.” Maritain, for his part, chided Massis that he could not possibly speak of “the Orient” 
or “German philosophy” as though they were stable entities (Massis’s charge of hypocrisy on this 
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point seems well-founded), and that the book would do more than inflame passions around the 
world.50 “Our culture is Greco-Latin,” Maritain wrote to his former friend. “Our religion is not.”51  
Catholic Action in Context 
 
So, in the early 1930s the Franco-German barriers had largely come down amongst civil-
society Catholics: even outside the marginal circles of Christian Democrats, Catholics were reading 
one another and seeking to move beyond the kneejerk xenophobia we saw in the early 1920s. This 
was not happening only in transnational conference, although it was happening there, too: more 
importantly, it was happening in the mass-circulation periodicals that were structuring Catholic 
political culture. In this section, before describing in some detail the main ideas of civil-society 
Catholicism, I will explore the position that civil-society Catholics occupied in the political 
maelstrom of the 1930s. The civil-society Catholics, including those involved with Catholic Action, 
most typically defended political agnosticism—in the sense of avoiding political partisanship—while 
remaining especially worried about the rights of the Church in the face of Bolshevism and Nazism, 
both of whose anti-clerical excesses were being worriedly discussed throughout Catholic Europe. 
Catholics had every reason to fear for the security of their religion in the mid-1930s, 
especially from 1934 onwards. From 1934 onwards, it became clear that Hitler had no intention of 
sticking to the terms of the Concordat; specifically, Hitler targeted Catholic Action, assassinating 
Erich Klausener (the movements German head) during the Night of the Long Knives. Waldemar 
Gurian’s Deutsche Briefe, which had a handful of prominent French subscribers, loudly publicized 
Hitler’s anti-ecclesiastical activities. Robert d’Harcourt and René Pinon, above all, kept the French 
Catholic press buzzing with news about Hitler’s anti-clerical activities. François Perroux contributed 
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Les mythes hitlériens in 1935, while Louis Gillet followed with the widely-read Rayons et ombres 
d’Allemagne (1937). In addition to Gurian, a number of German émigrés contributed in the French 
press.52  
In regards to Bolshevism, Catholic horror was nothing new.53 Pius XI had been in Poland 
during the Polish-Soviet War, so he knew the existential fear of Communism firsthand. Quadragesimo 
Anno (1931) was outspoken in its anti-Communism, while remaining silent about Fascist or 
authoritarian politics. In the 1930s, fear of Communism became more pressing for Western 
Europeans: with the birth of the Popular Front, a second transnationalism was taking shape, which 
seemed equally as dangerous. The Front itself came into existence in 1934, just as news of Hitler’s 
outrages were becoming known. The next year, its candidates began actually winning, just as the 
Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance was signed (three other central moments in Popular 
Front culture—the burial of Henri Barbusse, the commemoration of the death of Jean Jaurès, and 
the international Congress of Writers for the Defense of Culture—were soon to follow). These 
events were taken extremely seriously by Catholics in France and elsewhere: the Archbishop of Paris 
sent a letter to the religious orders instructing them to have their bags packed, and passport ready, in 
case of revolution.54 Sept published three separate issues on the Soviet Union, and a long series of 
articles by Marc Scherer—later to become prominent in the MRP—about the absolute impossibility 
of any collaboration between Catholics and Communists.55 
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 While the international scene looked dire for Catholicism, events within France were also at 
a fever pitch. The Stavisky riots of 1934 were the defining political event of the period, marking the 
final polarization of the country between National Front and Popular Front. In that year, in 
response to government scandal, right-leaning French citizens took to the streets and nearly brought 
down the Third Republic. The origins of the Popular Front can be located in the counter-
demonstrations to these riots: in response to reactionary saber-rattling, socialists and Communists 
put aside their considerable differences and marched the streets under the battle cry, “L’Unite!”56 
“France was living through a moral and mental civil war,” recalled one resident, and “one had to 
choose between fascism and fellow-traveling.”57 In other words, one had to choose between the 
Ligues and the Popular Front. Most Catholics opted for the corporatist, quasi-fascist Ligues, and 
their intellectual representatives will be the subject of the next chapter.  
There was a space in between the two sides, and it was not merely occupied by cringing 
intellectuals longing for a third way. On the contrary, it was occupied by one of the most vital, if 
understudied, movements of the 1930s: Catholic Action. Catholic Action was meant as a 
replacement model for the outdated Catholic parties of the past. The PPI in Italy and the Zentrum 
were gone, the Christian Socials in Austria were folded into the “Fatherland Front,” while France’s 
Christian-Democratic parties (the left-wing Jeune République and the centrist Parti Démocrate Populaire) 
remained just as minor as Christian Democracy in France had always been. Civil-society Catholics, 
too, were skeptical of parties: Maritain is, therefore, critical of Christian confessional parties like the 
Zentrum, let alone nostalgic theocracy or even the fascist corporatism of Dollfuß and Pétain to be 
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described in the next chapter (Maritain was as critical of Dollfuss as he was of Blum58). He was not 
alone: an author in Sept was just as critical of Dollfuss for bringing out the Heimwehr, in particular, 
and for involving the Church in politics at all: “especially in politics,” he chided, “the better can 
reveal itself as the enemy of the good.”59  
Catholic Action was not merely about providing Catholic youths with places to socialize, 
although it was that, too: Pius XI saw this dense network of institutions as the key to the Catholic 
reconquest of the social. Catholic Action was less Ralliement than it was Quas Primas, the 1925 
encyclical proclaiming the reign of Christ on Earth. Indeed, it should understood in the context of 
other, simultaneous attempts to remake social life, most notably from Communist and Fascist 
groups.60 Karl Muth, editor of Hochland, made precisely this point in 1929, championing Catholic 
Action against the “revolutionary movements” of Bolshevism and Fascism.61 Consider Pius’s 
formulation: “the organized participation of the laity in the hierarchical apostolate of the Church, 
transcending party politics, for the establishment of Christ’s reign throughout the world.” This is a 
brief for global domination, while also abjuring the traditional sphere of politics. Christ’s reign was 
to come about through individual and spiritual transformation: consider the “Ten Commandments 
of Catholic Action,” published in a Catholic journal in 1933. While nothing “political” in the 
everyday sense was commanded, a certain set of social obligations was certainly proscribed (moreso 
than in the Commandments’ scriptural predecessor): “You will act with full confidence of your 
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responsibilities” (Commandment 4); “You will learn to remain in your position, especially if it is 
uncomfortable” (Commandment 6).62  
 While Catholic Action had technically been founded by Pius X in 1905, it was under Pius 
XI’s pontificate that it truly took off, primarily in the 1930s (even in Italy).63 In Belgium, the major 
organization was the Association catholique de la jeunesse belge: their 1931 conference had 100,000 
attendees. In Austria, too, as Laura Gellott has shown, Catholic Action was a phenomenon of the 
1930s, and it was far less congenial to the Christian Socials than we might think.64 It was less 
successful in Germany, given the close ties that existed between Catholic civil-society organizations 
and the Zentrum.65It did exist, though, and one of its leaders was the Rhenish jurist, Karl Neundörfer, 
who published multiple essays on the topic in the late 1920s. Throughout his work, which included 
detailed critiques of Church canon law, he emphasized above all that the Church must remain 
absolutely indifferent to political questions, pointing out that “the democratic state form is, in 
certain conditions, the best.”66  
In France, Catholic Action had a long history: L'association catholique de la jeunesse 
française was the main movement, and it had 600,000 members by the late 1930s. The Jeunesse 
ouvrière chrétienne, founded in 1927, has 22,000 members by 1933 and 150,000 by 1943. Its female 
equivalent, the JOCF, founded in 1928, had 50,000 members by 1939. In June 1936, 50,000 
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Catholics appeared in a Paris soccer stadium to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the ACJF. 
French Catholic Action participated very much in the apolitical Catholicism outlined here: in 
response to the Stavisky riots, for instance, the ACJF made it clear that they could take a stance, and 
they advised their members to steer clear of explicit politicizing.67 
Catholic Action operated in tandem with the new political sensibilities I’m charting in this 
chapter. Maritain, for instance, mattered here: Martin Conway, one of few people who has studied 
Catholic Action in any serious detail, has declared him the “quasi-official philosopher” of Catholic 
Action.68  J.T. Delos, a social Catholic active in the Semaines Sociales, praised Catholic Action in La 
Vie Intellectuelle in 1935. Its goal, he declared, was to “ensure that the temporal social order is 
Christian and sanctified for the souls who dwell in it.” This might sound “political,” but it is not, 
especially not in the context of the 1930s, when Communism and Nazism loomed. In a section on 
the totalitarian state, Delos claimed, “The problem is not at all political, but philosophical and 
sociological.” An anonymous article in the same journal the following year suggested Catholic 
Action as an explicit antidote to Communism. The journals I’m looking at were widely circulated: 
special numbers of Sept, for instance, ran to 100,000 copies. 69 
The civil-society Catholics were, that is, the political-cultural voice of Catholic Action, and 
like them they refused to take a position in the heady events of 1934, uttering what they called a 
“double no.” As Fessard wrote to a friend in the wake of the riots, neither the right nor left could be 
trusted. Even Esprit, which was more open to socialism than most other Catholic organs, remained 
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wary of the “two categorical misunderstandings” that dominated French politics.70 Yves Simon 
summed up this attitude when he referred to politics as a “seductive and necessary hell.”71 Like the 
Catholic hell, Simon suggests, the political is defined by the absence of God. But, also like the 
Catholic hell, the boundaries and contours of politics are divinely ordained: hell is that place ruled by 
God, despite or even because of his absence. 
The best barometer of civil society Catholicism was an anonymous priest who published as 
“Christianus” and served as the editorial voice of La Vie Intellectuelle, the movement’s central organ 
throughout much of the 1930s.72 Christianus believed the riots to be evidence of serious problems in 
the French state, but that the Catholic must not take sides on the issue, as many in the Ligues had 
been doing. “Historical circumstances,” he warned, “have created, in our country, an inextricable 
confusion between religion and politics.”73 He later emphasized this in an editorial called 
“Christianisme d’abord,” whose title was a clear reference to Maurras’s famous slogan, “Politique, 
d’abord.” Some Catholics, Christianus writes, have called for commitment to one side or the other, 
while some have called for complete disengagement. But we must do both: “Neither impurity nor 
desertion, we say: is there not a poignant contradiction at the heart of the Christian? We believe, on 
the contrary, that these are two aspects of the same tendency.”74 The impure sphere of politics, he 
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suggests, can be leavened by the participation of the Christian, whose hands remain, somehow, 
clean.  
 The same position was staked out in Pour le bien commun, the lengthy manifesto that Maritain 
prepared in the wake of the Stavisky riots and which was signed by a prestigious list including 
Etienne Borne, Charles du Bos, Etienne Gilson, Louis Le Fur, and Emmanuel Mounier (Maritain 
mailed a copy to Gurian and asked him to publicize it in Germany75). It is easy to see why the 
manifesto’s studied neutrality was so frustrating to the Catholic right. The main point is that 
Catholics cannot, qua Catholics, make a political commitment in the wake of the February riots: we 
must declare, the manifest announces, a “double no” to fascism and Bolshevism, each of which 
were seeking to violently reshape France in its own image. “We refuse to support either an error or 
its contrary,” but at the same time we cannot remain silent, and must witness to the truths of 
Christianity.76 The Church, the manifesto argued, does have a vision for a future society: the pluralist 
society sketched out in Quadragesimo Anno, Pius XI’s 1931 encyclical. But this cannot be brought 
about through political action, as normally understood, especially in the absence of a viable Christian 
political party.77 While holding out the hope that, at some point, a non-clerical party would be 
formed in the name of the true bien commun, the Catholic can now rely only on “poor means [moyens 
pauvres]”: these means “are of spiritual order and the order of private life.”78  
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The manifesto outlined a complex relationship between religion and politics, arguing for 
neither strict separation nor theological-political unity.  
Religion and politics, while remaining distinct, must be vitally united: not by external 
or institutional alliances, as in the time of throne and altar: it is in us that the kingdom 
of God is to be found, it is in our heart and in our private life.79  
 
Our first duty is to live a Christian and pure life, to serve as a missionary and a witness in the belief 
that, as Péguy had taught, “the revolution will be moral or it will not be at all.” We must go beyond 
Constantine and back to Christ, whose witness was apostolic and not juridical. But at the same time, 
there should be “vital unity” between religion and politics, mediated not by mass parties but by our 
“heart” and our “private life”: activities performed outside the purview of law, in the safe space of 
civil society.  
As in the previous chapters, I want to emphasize that this had very little to do with 
“democracy.” Glaringly absent from the list of signatories to Pour le bien commun were the most 
prominent Christian Democrats: Paul Archambault, Georges Bidault, Francisque Gay, and their 
house theologian, Maurice Blondel (in a letter to a fellow signatory, Maritain revealed that Blondel’s 
refusal to sign was especially crushing80). The important point is that neither the manifesto, nor the 
journals which nurtured its sensibility, came out in favor of the republic: indeed, Christianus was at 
times skeptical of the Third Republic’s legitimacy.81 It is not the case, either, that the manifesto’s 
opposition to the rioters was intended as an implicit support for the republic: in a simultaneous 
controversy with Paul Archambault, a true Christian democrat, Maritain made clear his contempt for 
parliamentary democracy, at least as practiced in France. George Shuster, the editor of Commonweal 
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and a friend of Gurian’s at the time, recalled that the Gurian of the early 1930s “kept on insisting 
that [Josef Wirth] be called upon to establish a dictatorship.”82 
Sept, a prestigious Catholic journal founded the month after the Stavisky riots, was a perfect 
exemplar of this new sensibility. Although it ceaselessly covered political events, it was allergic to the 
political, as such. Its first issue featured an article called, simply, “Pas de politique,” and claimed that 
the very idea of politics made them “queasy” [écoeuré]: “We say: Find above parties and outside of 
politics the point of junction between the true Christian spirit and the French people.”83As in Pour le 
bien commun, theirs was a politics beyond politics. On the cover of the second issue, they celebrate 
their identity this way: “Neither right nor left, independent from politics in order to better serve the 
City.”84 This is a political independence that still seeks to serve the polity, and a retreat from politics 
that is inescapably political. In another navel-gazing article, Sept claimed that its goal was to “create a 
Catholic public opinion” in a way that “transcends political formations.”85 Later, Mauriac wrote in 
Sept that the conflict between duties to God and country was a “pseudo-conflict,” and that, like Joan 
of Arc, if we serve God first, “we are assured of being, at the same time, good servants of France.”86 
It goes without saying that Sept was not pro-democratic. As Étienne Gilson, one of its chief 
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ideologues, bluntly put it, Sept “is not a democratic journal”; he also criticized l’Aube specifically for 
making a concrete, pro-democratic political commitment.87 
So if “democracy” was not the key term in civil-society Catholic discourse, what was it? As 
in the 1920s, Catholics were interested in broader social and economic themes. But while many 
Catholics turned towards corporatism as a full-fledged economic doctrine, the civil-society Catholics 
did not; they were more interested in what Maritain called “pluralism”. They were interested, that is, 
in creating the sort of society in which Catholic Action could flourish—meaning that the state had 
to be weakened and the multivalent identity of the individual wrested away from “citizenship” and 
parcelled out into the multiple communities (gender, religion, class, family, profession) incarnated 
within Catholic Action. Pour le bien commun, in addition to providing a clear and early example of non-
political politics, revives the old idea of the “human person” and combines it with the novelty of 
“anti-totalitarianism.” It was pathbreaking in that it provides one of the first and most prominent 
introduction of these two terms, which would go on to underwrite Catholic political and social 
thought for decades, most prominently in the post-1945 moment.  
The Person and the State in Fessard, Landsberg, and Maritain 
 Personalism and anti-totalitarianism: these, I contend, were the themes that dominated 
Catholic thinking in the 1930s, and would pave the path towards Catholic legitimation of post-1945 
democracies. They were not the province of civil-society Catholics alone: as we’ll see, their 
corporatist opponents were using the same language. By showing how both competing forms of 
transnational Catholicism were speaking the same political language, we will see how the relatively 
homogenous Catholicism of the Cold War was forged. In the rest of this chapter, I will explore 
                                                
87 “Notre position,” Sept 3, 103 (14 February 1936), 4. “Sans doute, L’Aube est un organe d’inspiration chrétienne […] 
mais elle s’est délibérément située sur le terrain temporel; entre les moyens politiques, elle fait un libre choix. C’est 
précisément ce que, quant à nous, nous nous refusons à faire.” The Gilson quote is embedded in this article, referring to 




personalism and anti-totalitarianism as concepts, relating them backwards to the anti-étatiste political 
culture of the 1920s and showing how they spread throughout the Catholic public sphere in the 
1930s. 
We’ll begin with the person. In Part One, we saw that in both France and the Rhineland the 
idea of the “person” had been mobilized in support of federalizing, anti-étatiste politics. After this 
brief 1920s vogue, however, the notion fell out of fashion. There was certainly no such thing as 
“personalism,” a philosophy placing the notion of the person at its very center. Scheler had acquired 
the taint of heresy by this point; with the exception of Dietrich von Hildebrand (see Chapter 5), his 
Catholic students—Heinrich Getzeny, Paul Landsberg, Peter Wust—failed to put the term at the 
center of their reflections in the late 1920s.88 Characteristically, Karl Eschweiler’s lengthy 1928 
appreciation of Scheler in La Vie Intellectuelle did not discuss his theories of the “person.”89 Maritain, 
too, almost entirely ignored the term between 1925 and 1933. The same is true of Landsberg, who 
wrote almost nothing in the interim period, and of Fessard, who did not come to the term at all until 
the mid-30s. Nonetheless, when it burst back onto the scene during the crisis years of 1933-6, the 
term retained the same political connotations it had had in the early 1920s: a principled anti-étatisme 
and critique of sovereignty. “The Christian philosophy of the city,” declared Eugène Duthoit in 
1933, “is the basis of ‘personalism’.”90  
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My contention will be that, although personalism was defined in a variety of philosophical 
languages, this was always in the service of a similar political project. “Personalism” did not 
fundamentally label a philosophical program, because, as we will see, it was defended in 
phenomenological, Thomist, and Hegelian language. Instead, it was a political program from the 
beginning, defended in a variety of philosophical languages. By 1936, Etienne Borne could write that 
“all of us who reflect […] have understood that every reconstruction of a Christian humanism and a 
Christian city must be carried out under the sign of the person.”91 This process of reflection took 
place in the mid-1930s, and in this section I will attempt to trace its contours. 
If the “person” is really all about politics, the question remains: what sort of politics? At its 
most basic level, personalism teaches that the human person and his eternal soul can never be 
exhaustively contained in a political or social order, as a part of him always and necessarily belongs 
to God. This is more than platitudinous Christianity, although it often sounds like it. Christians had, 
of course, been arguing for centuries that salvation could not be found on earth, and that the 
kingdom of God was in heaven. The novelty here is that civil-society Catholics took this notion of 
the Christian subject and reintroduced it into the very sphere of politics they simultaneously 
denounced. The person is not exhausted in the political, but nonetheless Christians must inhabit the 
public sphere in a way that is not political, and even denies the category of sovereignty as such. What 
we see here is the eruption into politics of a moral voice that simultaneously disclaims the political in 
the name of the person. As one civil-society Catholic wrote in 1936, “The obsession with ‘politics’ 
does not, sadly, grant political wisdom.”92 Only through the denial of politics can the Catholic 
become political. 
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  Between 1933 and 1936, personalism burst back onto the scene. Arnaud and Dandieu’s La 
Révolution nécessaire (1933) used it heavily (their earlier books had not done so), and the personalist 
journal Ordre Nouveau was founded that year. After avoiding the terminology for years, Maritain 
discussed personalism in his Du régime temporel et de la liberté (1933), while Duthoit, as we have seen, 
discussed the philosophy in his high-profile opening address at the Semaines Sociales de France in the 
summer of 1933. Mounier, who would grow to become personalism’s most celebrated 
representative, was something of a late-comer: his journal did not seriously define or defend 
“personalism” until 1934, and the epochal special issue on the “Personalist Revolution” appeared in 
December of that year.93 The first book-length account of personalist philosophy appeared in 1934 
(by Denis de Rougemont, a Protestant in the Ordre nouveau circle), while the second, written from a 
Catholic perspective, appeared in 1935; Mounier published his own Manifeste au service du personnalisme 
in 1936.94 It appeared in the Pour le bien commun manifesto of early 1934, and the political editorialist 
at La Vie Intellectuelle began to use personalist vocabulary in the same year; it became commonplace 
in the journal between 1934 and 1936, while Etienne Gilson began using it in its sister journal, Sept, 
in 1934.95 It was a theme of international reflection, too; as Fessard reported, an international 
congress of Catholic intellectuals, held in Strasbourg in 1935, had the “person” as one of its major 
themes.96 The 1934 Semaines Sociales had as its theme, “L’Éducation pour la personne.”97 By 1937, 
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when the same series treated “La personne humaine en peril” as its theme, the concept had truly 
arrived and become the dominant Catholic understanding of the political subject. By 1939, Louis 
Cruvillier could, in a letter to Maritain, refer to the “classic distinction between the ‘individual’ and 
the ‘person’.”98 
 The “person” was almost uniformly introduced as part of a critique of nation-state 
sovereignty. This was true in both Catholic and non-Catholic invocations: in Aron and Dandieu’s La 
Révolution nécessaire—widely read in Catholic circles—they claim that the “emancipation of the 
person” requires “the destruction of the State” and that the true danger facing modern civilization is 
not capitalism, as such, but “super-étatisme.” “The new order,” they conclude, “will be founded on 
a decentralization, as complete as possible.”99 In Duthoit’s invocation of the term at the Semaines 
Sociales the same year, it is also employed against the servile state: “Many people expect everything 
from the state: secure old age, monitored health, education for children, stabilized prices; all of this 
without personal efforts, without sacrifices.” This “economic étatisme” flies in the face of Catholic 
political theory which, as expressed in Quadragesimo Anno and elsewhere, embeds the person in a 
variety of communities, including the church and the family: this anti-étatiste pluralism, familiar 
from Part I, is called “personalism” by Duthoit.100 Mounier’s Manifeste au service du personnalisme was, 
essentially, a book-length screed against the state. “We are,” Mounier laconically declared, “anti-
étatistes.” The state, for instance, should cede educational responsibility to the family, “because the 
State has no regard for personal life as such.” In his discussion of  “the cancer of the State at the 
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very heart of our democracies,” Mounier makes a fateful and characteristic linkage that will be the 
subject of the next section: “just as the river into the sea, democratic étatisme slides into the 
totalitarian state.”101 
The three most prominent and philosophically-interesting writers to develop personalist, 
anti-étatiste themes between 1934 and 1936 were Fessard, Landsberg, and Maritain (Gurian had 
never been philosophically inclined, and drops out of our story for the time being). We can begin 
with Landsberg who, recall, had been writing about Personalismus since the early 1920s as one of 
Scheler’s most brilliant studentsLandsberg had been studiously apolitical in the 1920s. In the 1930s, 
though, he became more interested in problems of state, which had, after all, turned his own life 
upside-down. Although he did not sign any of civil society Catholicism’s manifestoes—only French 
writers signed—he signaled his agreement with, for instance, their position on the Spanish Civil War 
in a letter to Maritain, and he wrote to Gurian praising his recent works on totalitarian and 
Bolshevism which were, as we’ll see in the next section, central documents in this milieu.102 
 His first French essay, “Quelques réflexions sur l’idée chrétienne de la personne,” which 
appeared in Esprit in December 1934, is a typical personalist reflection of the time. The bedrock 
belief of personalism, in Landsberg’s estimation, is that there is “a central difference between each 
human individual and anything else that might, apparently, resemble it.” Our personhood cannot be 
added to the complex of physical, or even psychological, characteristics, as though it were a 
contingent predicate and not the unique entity to which traits are later appended. He mobilizes an 
“existential” understanding of the person as a “totality” [une tout] against the Aristotelian 
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understanding of the soul as a unique added feature that separates man from nature. In terms 
reminiscent of Heidegger, Landsberg claims that this existential fact is often forgotten because we 
quail from the responsibility of personhood: “to be a person, insofar as this is an activity, signifies a 
demand that man seeks to escape.” We want to think ourselves as substances, capable of 
understanding through the static understanding of the sciences. For Landsberg, however, we can 
only be understood “as a process” and a “constant struggle.”103  
 What, then, might a community of such unique entities look like? What are the politics of 
personality? As always in these circles, the answer is necessarily vague as the disavowal of politics is 
the paradoxical founding gesture of personalist politics. Landsberg describes an “empire of persons” 
in which national characteristics would be maintained—the nations “never resembled one another 
so much as during the great war”—while the personhood of each individual would be respected.104 
The only obvious concrete application of personalist politics in the essay is an opposition to Nazism 
and Marxism, both of which deny the absolute difference between man and man by laying the 
nation on the Procrustean beds of race or class: the only feature of the personalist community to 
come that Landsberg specifies is that it “opposes itself to the idea of a uniform collectivity, of an 
elite or popular mass as a product of directed hereditary selection [i.e. eugenics] or transformations 
of social milieu [i.e. class].”105 While he did not devote major essays to Nazism—which was not, 
despite the sympathies of a sporadic few, a major political presence in France—he did write, for La 
Vie Intellectuelle, an essay on Marxism in 1937, critiquing it in precisely these terms.106 
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Landsberg’s phenomenological, proto-existentialist turn of mind clashed philosophically 
with Maritain’s austere Thomism; in the 1934 essay discussed above, Landsberg argued that properly 
Christian philosophy must leave behind the classical ideas of being and, as Scheler had suggested, 
adopt a phenomenological perspective more attuned to becoming [devenir] than to static being.107 
“You know that my heart and my intelligence adhere to the Augustinean and not the medieval [read: 
Thomist] tendency,” he wrote to Maritain in 1936. “The possibility of a synthesis between Greek 
and Christian philosophy seems to me very problematic.”108  
Nonetheless, despite this total incompatibility of philosophical language, the political valences 
of “personalism”—a position beyond politics from which to critique Nazism and Marxism 
simultaneously as collectivist heresies—was shared with Maritain. France’s most famous Thomist, 
too, revived his old notion of the “person,” and its distinction with the individual, in the mid-1930s. 
It appears in his massive Distinguer pour unir (1932), as well as Du régime temporel et de la liberté (1933). 
Maritain’s philosophical account of the person remained essentially unchanged from the account 
given in Chapter One: it remained tied to a Thomist metaphysics of being that was resolutely 
antithetical to Landsberg’s existential focus on “becoming.” Politically speaking, however, Maritain’s 
“person” is tied to the same pluralist, anti-étatiste politics as Landsberg’s: Maritain, too, worries 
about the tendency of contemporary states to be ruled by the “mass,” and about the person-denying 
theories of, above all, Nazism and Communism.  
This is most clearly demonstrated in Humanisme Intégral, one of the landmark works of 1930s 
Catholicism, which was published in 1936 and based on lectures delivered in August 1934. The work 
is most famous, and most controversial, for its unapologetic, if ambivalent, modernism: Maritain 
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believed that the age of the sacrum imperium had decisively passed, and should not be mourned. The 
collapse of Christian unity provided an opportunity for a “new Christendom,” and a Christendom 
more in keeping with the divine plan. Medieval Christianity was always in danger of immanentizing 
God’s kingdom within the corrupt world of history; current conditions allow us to see clearly the 
chasm that does and must separate the world of politics and history from that of divinity and 
redemption (the spirituality of the “heart” and the “private” celebrated earlier). “It is a betrayal of 
both God and man,” Maritain writes, “not to understand that history is in movement towards the 
kingdom of God. […] But it is nonsensical to think that it will arrive within history.”109 This 
uncoupling of theology and politics allows the flourishing of the free person, who can regain his 
proper autonomy: the promise of the modern age, Maritain suggests, is that it understands “the 
dignity and spiritual liberty of the person.”110 
He provides here his first detailed explication of the political consequences of personalism, 
which was the doctrine that could unite a political community in the interests of the bien commun, 
even in the absence of doctrinal agreement.111 Following Quadragesimo Anno, along with a group of 
secular theorists such as Georges Gurvitch, Maritain began to argue for a politics of “pluralism”: in 
an age in which absolute gulf between the spiritual and the historical has become evident, 
theological-political unity becomes both dangerous and heretical. In terms familiar from Chapter 1, 
he argues for a decentering of sovereignty. He begins, significantly, with a discussion of economics 
and the need for a collectivization of property that would take the family, and not the class or 
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nation, as the true owner.112 He moves quickly to “juridical pluralism,” which is the central axis of 
his pluralist-personalist politics. By this, Maritain refers to “an organic heterogeneity in the very 
structure of civil society.”113 The groups and institutions that comprise a healthy civil society, in 
Maritain’s estimation, must be granted as much freedom and legitimacy as possible in the pluralist 
regime. Alexandre Marc believed that Maritain was coming out in favor of his own corporatist ideas, 
but Maritain set him straight in a letter: he defended “an organic representation—not merely 
technical and professional on the one hand and regional on the other, but properly political, I mean 
expressing the political thoughts of those persons who are members of civil society.”114 
While Maritain does come out strongly in favor of “personalist democracy,” this should not 
mislead us into thinking that Maritain had become any sort of Christian Democrat. His strictures 
against parliamentary democracy remained as venomous as they had been in the 1920s, as we’ve 
seen in his contemporary dispute with Archambault in l’Aube. Even in Integral Humanism, he 
criticized parliamentary government, Rousseau-style understandings of democratic sovereignty and 
“the fictitious democracy of the nineteenth century,” and emphasizes that the form of government 
is, for the Catholic, irrelevant.115 Maritain is only able to accept democracy by emptying it of its 
traditional content and replacing it with his theory of the person: true democracy, understood as 
proper respect for the dignity of the human person, can only be Christian, and can only come about 
once we transcend the language of class and accept a society of “organic inequalities.”116 Maritain’s 
revolution towards a new Christendom, therefore, does not take the form of a reformulation of 
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relations of production, or a seizure of power by Christian politicians. Instead, “new political 
formations” are needed that will be “purely profane”—that is, not an arm of the Church, as was the 
case with the Zentrum, the clerico-fascist regimes, or even Catholic Action.117  
 The last version of the Christian person to be considered here is that of Gaston Fessard: as 
we will see, he defended the person in yet a third philosophical language, but nonetheless in support 
of the same political project. Fessard is primarily remembered as an important figure in the Hegel 
revival of the 1930s, and as one of few Catholics who attended Kojève’s legendary seminars.118 But 
he was also a significant personalist: in an important lecture series in 1941, for instance, Fessard and 
Mounier were the two voices of personalism.119 Like Landsberg, he was skeptical of Maritain’s 
Thomist account of being: “Were I satisfied with Thomism and the philosophy of being that I was 
taught,” he wrote to his friend Jean Wahl, “I never would have attempted to penetrate Hegel’s 
Phenomenology.”120 He made light of Maritain in a letter to Lubac, commenting on a controversy 
erupting in Revue Universelle between Maritain and another Thomist: “As I read these articles, I could 
not help myself from laughing while thinking about the diversity of theses that one can support with 
the wonderful principles of this ‘perennial’ philosophy!”121 While not a polemicist or a signer of 
manifestoes, he was widely known in the circle of civil society Catholics, and entirely ignored among 
the corporatist, proto-fascist Catholics to be considered in the next chapter. Pax Nostra, his 1936 
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work on international organization, received extensive coverage in La Vie Intellectuelle and Sept, while 
Fessard himself published occasionally in the other civil society journals, La Vie Catholique and Temps 
présent.122 He also, as we’ll see more fully in the next section, shared the most characteristic political 
position of this group: resolute opposition to the Popular Front. His first uses of the “person” 
coincide with his first political writings, which began to appear in summer 1935. When these articles 
began to appear, Henri de Lubac excitedly wrote to Fessard about his introduction of “the Person,” 
which “can be regarded as a declaration of method, which is a declaration of principle.”123 
  “What is it,” Fessard asked near the beginning of Pax Nostra, “to be a ‘person’?”124 As a 
Hegelian, Fessard rejected attempts—be they phenomenological or Thomist—to posit personhood 
as a transhistorical essence of the human. Instead, the person is founded and structured upon the 
eruption into history of Christ, the God-man who taught us to overcome the antinomies of our 
wretched historical existence through fealty to the cross. Fessard asks us to consider the fact that 
Christ made his appearance among the Jews: precisely those people who demonstrated most clearly 
the polarity of human existence. The Jews were a particular race claiming unique access to a 
universal God. Fessard calls this the “Jewish antinomy.”125 Christ appeared among the Jews in order 
to suture this gap. The God-Man united his two natures—universal God, particular man—in a 
process that can be described not as a synthesis but as a dialectical Aufhebung, a transcendence that 
preserves. He granted dignity to all men, and made them persons, by showing how we can access the 
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divine in our own individual selves. This was possible through the suspension of the law and the 
circumscribed, particularist communities that are structured by legal commands, thus resolving the 
tension at the heart of the Jewish antinomy. Fessard’s central Biblical text, and one to which he 
returned time and time again, was Paul’s injunction to the Galatians: “There is neither Jew nor 
Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.” (Galatians 3:28)  
 But the law remains in force: no Hegelian worth his salt could claim that the community of 
the spirit could sidestep the community of laws in which we live. For Fessard, the law was not 
abrogated by Christ, as certain millenarians had claimed, nor was the law spiritualized by Christ, as 
Hegel himself was wont to argue. Instead, the law and the spirit—the particular and the universal—
remain in productive tension, constituting the unity that Fessard calls the “person.”  
[O]ur notion of the person has a double meaning. On the one hand, the person is 
the subject of law, term and principle of judicial relations, element of a community; in 
this sense our word descends directly from the Latin persona, which, in Roman law, 
signifies precisely the ‘representative in a judicial matter.’ On the other hand, the 
person designates a subject, no longer as a term or principle of relation, but insofar 
as it is itself [a] relation. It is thus the individuality charged with a role.126  
 
So the law remains, but does not monopolize our relation with God, or with one another. As 
Fessard goes on to explain, the human person encompasses both Roman law—commands that bind 
us to our community—and Greek aesthetics of self-creation. 
 Like Landsberg and Maritain, then, Fessard held that the person pointed to a space beyond 
the political community, but also that this access to the divine should leaven the sphere of secular 
politics. This released Fessard, as it did Maritain and Landsberg, from obligation to provide a 
positive social or political program in this work ostensibly dedicated to social and political problems. 
“As neither a diplomat, nor a member of the League of Nations,” Fessard wrote, “I cannot […] 
                                                




propose a concrete solution to any conflict whatsoever.”127 In a letter to a friend about the 
preparation of Pax Nostra, he proudly assumed Julien Benda’s label: “Of course, I don’t engage in 
any politics in this paper and it is, in a way, purely phenomenological! In my view, this is all that an 
intellectual [clerc] can do.”128 
 Pax Nostra was nonetheless a work of political philosophy. For Fessard, our personhood 
beyond law allows us to understand the structure of those laws, to which we remain bound. Fessard 
strikes a delicate balance: for him, the law is an important part of our personhood, and thus the 
Christian believer cannot, as a beautiful soul, abstract himself from the constitution of political 
society. “Modern man,” Fessard reminds us, “is always to some degree a ‘member of the 
sovereign.’”129 So then the problem becomes how to construct a political society that is nonetheless 
respectful of our personhood. Like Landsberg and Maritain, Fessard was invested in a decentering 
of sovereignty, in which the nation-state’s supreme assumption of sovereign power would be 
challenged by the competing claims of man’s natural societies: primarily the family and the church.130 
The root of society is not the contracting individual, as Rousseau or Locke had claimed, but rather 
the family. In a remarkable philosophy of history, Fessard attempts to upend Rousseau’s founding 
myth with one of his own, in which the state is not the institutionalization of the general will beyond 
the particularistic needs of intermediary societies, but rather the capstone of a long, historical 
process of familial organization.131 From this perspective, the state appears as one community out of 
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many to which we belong. When this is forgotten, Fessard warns, our personhood is decimated by 
statolatry and totalitarianism: the political forms of secularism. 
Through an analysis of Thomist, phenomenological, and Hegelian personalism, we see that 
the “person” as a political subject was the name for the inhabitant of the federalized, non-étatiste 
community for which Catholics had been arguing for decades. It was, nonetheless, a new vocabulary 
and for new times. In one of the rare reflections on the novelty of the concept, one Catholic writer 
in 1938 admits as much: “when we speak today of the person, we reach an agreement with negative 
positions. We rise up, for instance, against Marxist or Nazi tyranny.”132 So while there is clear 
resonance between the anti-sovereign, anti-legal arguments of the 1930s and the monarchist or 
socialist federalism of the 1920s, there is a marked change in emphasis. This can only be explained 
by a change in political context: in the 1930s, Rhenish Catholics and some of their French 
counterparts took a dramatic turn away from the utopian political projects of the 1920s—both 
Maurras’s royalism and Wittig’s socialism had, after all, been condemned—and towards the new 
anti-politics of personalism. Whereas liberalism and republicanism had been the threats of the 1920s, 
it was obvious that these trends were in abeyance in the 1930s, and Catholic theorists now 
considered totalitarianism, and the Popular Front as its domestic form and “human face,” to be the 
primary threat to the future of Christian Europe. The anti-modernism—opposition to democracy, 
the ideals of 1789—remained, translated into a new form. For civil-society Catholics, totalitarianism 
was the end-result of a heretical modernity, not a resurgence of dictatorial atavism. 
Totalitarianism 
 
In this section, I will extend the above analysis to show that anti-totalitarianism was the 
precise political form taken by the anti-politics of the person, in both the four personalists named 
                                                




above and a whole host of others. As we will see, personalists were a major force behind the 
introduction of the term: Gurian was, I believe, the first theorist of totalitarianism. He came to the 
theory in 1932, and giving it an influential book-length airing in 1935; this was read by Maritain, who 
began using “totalitarianism” in 1936.133 Fessard, for his part, began using the term in 1935, too, and 
when La Vie Catholique had a special issue on “Catholicisme et totalitarismes” in 1937, it was to 
Fessard that they turned for their lead article.134 That same year, when Sept signaled its absolute 
opposition to collaboration with Communists, Fessard’s name was listed as an authority behind only 
that of Cardinal Verdier and the Pope himself, and Landsberg signaled his opposition to 
totalitarianism in Esprit.135  
The 1930s revival of personalism was closely tied with the birth of totalitarianism theory. 
The notion of the person, as we saw in the previous section, is almost always introduced as part of 
the critique of the state: this made it particularly suited as the companion piece to totalitarianism 
theory, which is at root a critique of extreme étatisme. Once the notion of totalitarianism was born, 
one seldom appeared without the other. The first book specifically about the person, although from 
a Protestant perspective, was Denis de Rougemont, Politique de la Personne (1934): it was also one of 
the earliest works to refer to “l’État totalitaire” in the mature sense. In that same year, J.T. Delos 
condemned “the affirmation of the primacy of the interests of a totalitarian society, national or 
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ethnic, over the rights of the human person.”136 Personalism and totalitarianism both appeared in the 
landmark manifesto, Pour le bien commun (although the totalitarianism theory, which excluded 
Bolshevism, was still immature). The second book about the person was Pierre-Henri Simon’s 
deeply Catholic Destins de la Personne (1935), and it was uncoincidentally one of the first books to 
make full use of totalitarianism theory. Its reviewer in La Vie Intellectuelle defines personalism as a 
philosophy that  
taking the sovereignty of the human person as fundamental, attempts to escape 
from, on the one hand, all modern forms of the collectivist or ‘totalitarian’ spirit, 
destructor of liberty, negation of the eminent dignity of the human person; and on 
the other hand, liberal individualism.137  
 
Examples could easily be multiplied; one obscure Catholic, in an unremarkable screed against 
Communism and the Popular Front, felt no need to explain himself when he warned of “a 
suppression of the human person by the totalitarian state.”138 “The totalitarian State,” wrote another 
in 1938, “demands only the neglect of liberty and the resignation of the Person.”139 This was true for 
British Catholics, too: “Hegel and the modern totalitarians proclaim the State, Class, or Race as a 
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totality,” V.A. Demant warned in 1936. The Christian response is couched in personalist terms: 
“The freedom for which the Church can fight is the freedom of the person to be a person.”140  
 We have already seen, in the introduction to Part II, Carl Schmitt’s introduction of the 
language of the “total” into Catholic argumentation, and it’s no accident that all of the figures I 
discuss in this chapter conceived of their projects explicitly in opposition to that of Schmitt, with 
whom all of them save Fessard had been close in the 1920s.141 Schmitt’s 1931 pebble into the water 
caused ripple effects throughout Catholic intellectual life, which I’ll attempt to track in this section 
before turning to a more substantive analysis of mid-1930s Catholic anti-totalitarianism in the 
writings of Gurian, Maritain, and Fessard. 
 It first found its way into anti-Bolshevik polemic in Waldemar Gurian’s influential 
Bolschewismus, einführung in geschichte und lehre (1931), which appeared in English, French, Italian, and 
Dutch by 1933. But the time was not yet ripe: Gurian’s book was neither translated nor widely-
remarked. It was his next work, Bolschewismus als Weltgefahr (1935), that sent shock waves through 
Catholic intellectual culture across Europe and America. Although written and published in 
Switzerland—and widely reviewed in both America and throughout the German exile press—the 
book was primarily an event in French intellectual history.142 It was read in German by at least three 
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influential Catholic totalitarianism theorists—Robert d’Harcourt, Jacques Maritain, and Yves 
Simon—and many more in French, both through its translation and the précis of the book’s 
argument that Gurian published in La Vie Intellectuelle in January 1936.143 D’Harcourt wrote a 
glowing front-page review in L’Echo de Paris, a Catholic newspaper with a circulation of over one 
hundred thousand, which was in turn excerpted in both Figaro and La Croix, the most prestigious 
newspapers of French conservatism and Catholicism, respectively.144  
As the name implies, Gurian’s book was designed to show that Bolshevism was the primary, 
world-historical danger, and that Nazism was no more than a “brown Bolshevism.” The fact that it 
received an explosive response, when his 1932 volume had been neglected, can be chalked up to 
new political concerns. In the interim years—that is, between 1932 and 1935—totalitarianism had 
become cutting-edge in Catholic circles, as it perfectly met the political needs of civil-society 
Catholicism: an anti-étatiste political vocabulary that would not commit its wielder to any particular 
political form, least of all hated parliamentary liberalism, while also providing a convenient way to 
undercut the pretensions of the Popular Front. 1935 also saw another book-length version of 
Catholic totalitarianism theory: Joseph Vialatoux’s La Cité de Hobbes: Théorie de l’État Totalitaire, the 
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first monograph to have any form of “totalitarian” in the title in French, German, or English. 
Vialatoux was another member of the civil-society Catholicism school: he made his name, like his 
friend Maritain, by opposing Maurras in 1927, and had signed the bellwether manifesto, Pour le bien 
commun.145 Neither Gurian nor Landsberg felt called upon to intervene in French public life, but their 
constant attacks on Communism qua totalitarianism were clearly not designed to grease the path 
towards Communist/Catholic cooperation. Landsberg signaled his agreement with Fessard’s clearly 
anti-Front politics in a 1937 letter, and in an interview the same year he praised Maritain’s equally 
anti-Front politics of Humanisme Intégral.146 
 So even though the theory was available in its mature form as early as 1932, it only took off 
inasmuch as it was utilized in a political, anti-Front context in 1935-6. In Sturzo’s contribution to the 
L’Aube controversy in February 1934, and in Pour le bien commun—both written before the Popular 
Front had emerged as a serious threat—“totalitarian” regimes are discussed, but the Soviet Union is 
explicitly excluded from the term’s umbrella. In spring 1934, Catholics, following Gurian’s lead, 
began to apply the term to the Soviet regime: Henri Daniel-Rops did so in Sept in March 1934, while, 
in April, an editorialist at La Vie Intellectuelle did the same.147 Among Rhenish Germans, too: 
Friedrich Fuchs, who had moved in Gurian’s circles in the 1920s, attacked Schmitt’s “total state” in 
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1933, while Karl Thieme—probably Gurian’s closest collaborator at the time—criticized “Carl 
Schmitt’s totalitarian political philosophy” in 1934.148 
 By early 1935, totalitarianism had become a leading Catholic method for understanding the 
pathology of modernity. Christianus, who as ever provides the clearest insight into the oft-unspoken 
wisdom of civil-society Catholicism, wrote an editorial in February 1935 called, simply, “Totalitaire”: 
this was an important moment for the concept, as La Vie Intellectuelle was the home-base for these 
Catholic intellectuals, and it appeared here, not as a tentative neologism as in the past, but as a front-
page moniker for the demons we face. “Fashionable word, dangerous word,” as Christianus referred 
to it. “What does totalitarianism mean?,” […] [T]he class or the race which wants to ferociously be 
itself, one hundred percent proletarian or Aryan.”149 In the next issue, J.T. Delos wrote at length 
about totalitarianism and defined it in general terms. “The totalitarian state, understood in its exact 
meaning (that is, understood in light of the fundamental conception of man of society from which it 
is derived) is a new phenomenon that concerns the very notion of civilization.”150 By April the 
concept had become so entrenched that a student group could call a meeting with the theme, “The 
Student in the Totalitarian State.”151 In the fall of 1935, Abbé Charles Journet, a close friend of 
Maritain’s, published an article in his widely-read Nova et Vetera entitled “The Church and the 
Totalitarian Communities.”152 This was also, of course, the year in which Gurian’s Bolschewismus als 
Weltgefahr appeared, as well as Vialatoux’s book-length treatment of “l’état totalitaire.” By 1938—by 
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which point, recall, the phrase had appeared only a few times on the left—Bruno de Solages was 
doing nothing new when he explained, “I am using the word ‘totalitarianism’ [totalitarisme] and not 
the word ‘socialism’ as the opposite of the word ‘individualism’ because, in our language, ‘socialism’ 
does not include the socialisms of the ‘right’, or fascisms.”153 
In 1936, the Holy Office of the Vatican—which had, unsurprisingly given the term’s Italian 
provenance, been using the language of “totalitarianism” for some time—determined that, in light of 
new geopolitical realities, Bolshevism was a form of totalitarianism, too.154 In the Holy Office’s 
never-issued document, entitled “Propositions [to be Condemned] on Racism, Nationalism, 
Communism, Totalitarianism”, it is stressed that totalitarian states claim hegemony over “civil 
society” and deny the “innate rights” of “mankind and the family.”155 Although the Church was 
famously reticent to publicly criticize either the Fascist or Nazi regimes, they were doubtless 
included under the “totalitarian” rubric as well.156 The 1931 encyclical Non abbiamo bisogno, in its 
warnings against “statolatry,” for instance, referred just as much to Italian Fascism as to Bolshevism. 
The most clear display of the Church’s “double no” to Bolshevism and Nazism came in 1937, when 
the Vatican released two encyclicals (Divini Redemptoris and Mit brennender Sorge) devoted to the twin 
heresies.   
                                                
153 Bruno de Solages, “Personnes et Société: leurs rapports,” La personne humaine en peril. Semaines Sociales de France, 
XXIXème session (Lyon, 1938), 229-50, here 236. 
154 Besier and Piombo, The Holy See and Hitler’s Germany, 153.  
155 Godman, Hitler and the Vatican, 199. 
156 Gurian, for instance, wrote a furious pamphlet about the inactivity of the German bishops, and the Vatican hierarchy 
warned Gurian to call off the attacks (years later, Otto Knab was wary of publishing this correspondence, fearful that it 
portrayed the Church in a negative light). Gurian [as Stefan Kirchmann], St. Ambrosius und die deutschen Bischöfe (Liga-
Verlag, Luzern, 1934); Heinz Hürten, Waldmar Gurian, 116; Otto Knab to John Oesterreicher, 3 March 1964, John 




 In the work of Maritain and Vialatoux, we are provided a rare opportunity to track the career 
of “totalitarianism” with precision. Vialatoux’s volume is characteristic of the new totalitarian 
discourse. First, in its timing: there was nothing new about Catholic fear of Bolshevism or saber-
rattling nationalism. Indeed, the Semaines Sociales de France had dedicated several sessions in July 
1933 to the menace of Fascism, Bolshevism, and Nazism (without recourse to the vocabulary of 
totalitarianism, whose political utility was not yet apparent). Vialatoux had spoken at that meeting 
about their common materialist root, but he did not use the concept of totalitarianism, either. In his 
1935 volume, though, he would cite these same lectures as diagnoses of totalitarianism, and he used 
the concept in a mature way: that is, as a pathology linking modernity, Nazism, and Bolshevism. He 
had thus come to the vocabulary sometime in 1934 or early 1935. Vialatoux was also characteristic in 
his discussion of the great flaw at the heart of the totalitarian experiment: the denial and 
misrecognition of the human person.157 A similar phenomenon can be tracked in the case of 
Maritain’s essay, “Un nouvel humanisme.” Its first version—a lecture delivered in Spain in 1934—
does not use totalitarianism, and neither does its second version, published in Esprit in October 
1935. In that version, Maritain describes Communism as “above all a religion assured of responding 
to all of the fundamental questions posed by life, and destined to replace all other religions.” In the 
1936 version, this reads exactly the same, except that “destined to replace all other religions” is 
replaced by “manifests an unequaled totalitarian power.”158 It was added sometime between then 
and the summer of 1936, when the final version of the essay appeared in Humanisme Intégral.159 The 
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other addition that was made to the same section was, as we would expect, a critique of the Popular 
Front. Maritain, like many others, came to anti-totalitarianism and anti-frontisme at the same time.160 
 Let’s look more closely at the totalitarian theories of our major figures, focusing on the 
analyses of Bolshevism in the work of Gurian, Maritain, and Fessard: for all of them, Bolshevism 
was the primary danger to Christian civilization, and Nazism only a derivative, however dangerous, 
of the original totalitarian perversion. We will see that, despite their differences, two major theses 
unite the various totalitarian theories at work in civil-society Catholicism: first, that totalitarianism is 
absolutely and formally antithetical to Catholic religion; second, that totalitarianism is the final and 
most catastrophic fruit of modernity itself. 
In Um des Reiches Zukunft, the first major work on the total state, there are two particular 
features of the total state that are worthy of note. First, in its drive to politicize everything, and 
subdue it into a servant of the nationalist mythology, the total state cannot exist alongside the 
Catholic Church, which is a juridical entity with recourse to a source of legitimacy outside of the 
state.161 Here, Gurian parrots his and Maritain’s position in the Action française debates of the late 
1920s. The National Socialists might ally with the Church as an opponent of liberalism, Gurian 
suggests, “but not as a community dignified with its own laws, which are independent from the 
extant political and social order.” In other words, the National Socialists could never accept “the 
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visible church [die sichtbare Kirche]”: the pregnant formulation that Schmitt himself had used to 
defend the Church years earlier.162  
Second, the total state is a consummation of liberalism and disenchantment, reproducing 
their nihilist worldlessness; the trumpeted antiliberalism of the Nazis is a screen for a fundamental 
similarity. During the bourgeois nineteenth century, Gurian argued following Scheler, the 
transcendent order of value had been ignored in favor of a heretical focus on the immanent, and a 
hubristic belief in the self-sufficiency of man. The totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century bring 
this to its frightful apotheosis. “Marxism, and therefore Bolshevism,” he had already written in 1931, 
“does but voice the secret and unavowed philosophy of the bourgeois society.”163 And, in his work 
on nationalism the following year, he claimed that “[t]he new nationalism flees from the optimistic 
immanence of the nineteenth century towards a pessimistic or fateful immanence, whose final 
realities are no longer individuality and reason, but Volk and fate.”164 The immanence, and the 
concomitant belief that humanity’s goals are internal to the economic or political order, remains. 
“Antiliberalism,” Gurian concludes, “proves itself to be the completion of liberalism.”165  
 In Integral Humanism, “totalitarianism” is the name that Maritain gives to the tragedy of 
secular modernity: the fate of a Europe that ignores Christian principles is, Maritain argues 
repeatedly, totalitarianism.166 In Maritain’s account, we can see the same major characteristics of 
totalitarianism that appear in Gurian’s work: its absolute, formal incompatibility with Catholicism, 
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and its rootedness in the modern, emancipatory project. “Atheism is not a necessary consequence of 
the [Marxist] social system,” Maritain writes, “but rather is presupposed as its principle.” Maritain had 
been arguing, at least since 1926, that the Church could not be equated with concrete political 
positions. How, then, can Bolshevism be equated with atheism? As in Gurian, the answer to this 
question is, simply, “totalitarianism”: Bolshevism is more than a political or social system, but a new 
entity that, through its totalitarian claims to dominance, abolishes the possibility of Christian 
spirituality as understood from a personalist perspective. “The profound evils of the ‘new 
civilization’ in Russia,” Maritain writes, “are summarized in Communist totalitarianism itself.” To 
return to a previously cited passage: 
[Communism] is a complete system of doctrine and of life, which claims to unveil 
the meaning of existence, respond to all fundamental questions that life poses, and 
manifest an unequaled totalitarian power. It is a religion. 
 
The totalizing character of Communism leads to violence towards “the human person, whose 
dignity is fundamentally spiritual.” In this way, Maritain squares the circle of Catholic politics: the 
believer should not enlist the Church in support of temporal political arrangements, but the Church 
can nonetheless take a stand against regimes that, through their “the totalitarian requisition of the 
energies of man,” make religion impossible.167 
As in Gurian, totalitarianism was not understood as the rejection of modernity, but as its 
apotheosis: “a product of bourgeois decadence.” Totalitarianism was, for Maritain, the apogee of the 
“tragedy of [anthropocentric] humanism” whose origins are to be found in the Renaissance and the 
Reformation.168 This, too, might seem strange, as Integral Humanism is renowned for its tentative 
acceptance of the secular, modern political settlement. While it is true that it partakes of none of the 
                                                
167 Ibid. 44, 94, 48, 56, 75. 




flamboyant atavism of his earlier works, Maritain’s acceptance of post-Reformation trends is deeply 
hedged. He held out the hope that a “new Christendom” was in the offing that would be more than 
a return to feudalism, but this did not affect his reading of bourgeois modernity. In Maritain’s 
philosophy of history, the secularism of the industrial revolution led to such massive ressentiment 
and inequalities that it birthed Communism, fear of which led to fascism, the other totalitarianism. 
On a more fundamental level, too, “socialist humanism takes over from bourgeois humanism.” For 
the bourgeoisie, God becomes no more than an idea legitimating the immanent power of man; 
socialism merely gives this process a final “reversal” by instantiating immanent power practically, in 
the order of social and economic reality.169 
I will turn, lastly, to Gaston Fessard, who was destined to play a more important role in 
domestic European debates after World War II than either Gurian or Maritain, who found homes 
and audiences in America. While Pax Nostra (1936), discussed above, utilized totalitarianism theory 
and vocabulary, it was not until La main tendue? (1937) that Fessard launched his career as an anti-
totalitarian activist, which he would revive to great effect in 1946, as we will see in Chapter 7. Like 
Maritain’s Humanisme intégral, Fessard’s work was explicitly anti-Front. The title of his 1937 volume 
on Communism referred to the April 1936 radio address in which Maurice Thorez, secretary of the 
PCF, had “extended a hand” to Catholics, arguing in the spirit of the Front Populaire that Catholics 
and Communists could unite in the anti-fascist struggle. Fessard rejected Thorez’s extended hand, 
and his book-length dismissal became one of the most prominent interventions in the public debate 
occasioned by Thorez’s surprising offer.170  
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As with Gurian and Maritain, we can focus on two axes of Fessard’s anti-totalitarianism: his 
belief that Catholic religion is necessarily anti-totalitarian, and that totalitarianism is another name for 
secularism. He takes a somewhat different tack than the other two, as his philosophical grounding is 
not Thomist but Hegelian. His critique of Bolshevism is rooted in Marx’s landmark 1843 essay, “On 
the Jewish Question.”171 In that essay, Marx had criticized the liberal tendency to separate the 
spheres of society and politics, implying that these two halves would be reunited in the Communist 
utopia to come. This “reintegration” was deemed totalitarian by Fessard, who delighted in pointing 
out the absurdity of the French Communist Party’s claims to protect religious freedom. “The 
founder of communism,” Fessard declared, “had already criticized a constitution and declaration of 
the rights of the citizen closely resembling the ones of which the Soviet Union is currently so 
proud.”172  
Like Gurian and Maritain, he goes further and argues that totalitarianism, the name of the 
conjunction of the political and the social, as a consequence of modernization and secularization. 
We have already seen that, for Fessard, the “human person” necessarily escapes the bounds of law, 
and any attempt to fully interpret human existence in politico-legal terms could only be to deny 
Christ’s incarnation and return to the arid legalism of the Hebrews. Dialectical philosophy, as it 
existed in both Marx and Hegel, attempted to abolish the distinctions between the social, the 
political, and the religious that, as Fessard had already argued in Pax Nostra, were fundamental to 
human social life.173 “The opposition of the social and the political is truly essential to Humanity,” 
Fessard warned, “and both Marx and Hegel fail to understand how this opposition […] constitutes a 
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tension essential to human progress.”174 The absolutization of the political (Hegel’s own solution) 
led to fascist étatisme, while the absolutization of the social (Marx’s) led to Bolshevism. Both of 
these are denials of the legitimate divisions of sovereignty which are natural to the human condition 
and overseen by the church: “Against the totalitarian state, which would tend to absorb everything,” 
Fessard had written in Pax Nostra the year before, “[the church] protects the individual and the 
family.”175 Like Maritain, Fessard held that these two totalitarianisms spring from the same roots, 
both metaphysical and historical: it was Bolshevism’s emphasis on the social that had summoned a 
revenge of the neglected political, which was called “fascism.”176  
In this way, Fessard arrived at an anti-totalitarian personalism that, like the theories of his 
fellow Catholics described in this chapter, legitimated a Catholicism within the limits of civil society. 
Although this theory, and its unstated but significant political consequences, would become 
hegemonic on the postwar European scene, it was nonetheless a minority current in the 1930s, even 
within Catholicism. Most Catholics, and most Catholic intellectuals, continued to believe in the 
possibility and viability of a Catholic politics, and they will be the subject of the next chapter. This 
no longer took the form of monarchism, but rather of authoritarian corporatism (of the type seen in 
Dollfuss and Pétain). Surprisingly enough, however, they too became “anti-totalitarian personalists,” 
and it was under these same keywords that the Catholic authoritarians of the 1930s would sail into 
the mainstream of Christian Democracy after 1945.  
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Chapter 5: Anti-Totalitarian Authoritarianism: Dietrich von 
Hildebrand, François Perroux, and Catholic Corporatism 
 
No politicization of Catholicism—instead, a Catholicization of politics. 
--Dietrich von Hildebrand, 19351 
 
The crisis does not, therefore, strike a form, or a type of state, but the modern state itself. 
--François Perroux, 19382 
 
Introduction 
 Perhaps it is not surprising to find civil-society Catholics speaking in terms of “personalism” 
and “anti-totalitarianism”: those seem like negative political ideals, perfectly suited to those who 
simply want to carve out a space within the polity for the Christian mission, from which the “new 
Christendom” could sprout. Surprisingly, though, we find the same concepts at work in the sworn 
enemies of the Catholic Action approach: the corporatists. In this chapter, we will explore the 
transnational political culture of those Catholics, probably in the majority, who genuinely supported 
authoritarian and non-democratic solutions to interwar crisis.  
 “The majority of Catholics are so confident in the ideology of the right,” wrote one 
exasperated contributor to La Vie Intellectuelle in 1936, “that they are unable to distinguish 
conservatism from Catholic doctrine.”3 French Catholics of the mid-1930s were inflamed by 
Colonel de la Rocque and his Parti social français [PSF], which arose during the mid-1930s years of 
crisis and partook of the intellectual culture of corporatism to be explicated in this chapter. This was 
no mere crackpot right-wing party: it was, on the contrary, the largest political party of the period.4 It 
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seemed to have a bright future: Portugal, Spain, and Austria actually took the Catholic corporatist 
plunge. 
Corporatism emerged in the mid-1930s as a full-fledged social theory that should take its 
place alongside Nazism and Communism as the major theories of national and international order 
that were battling it out in 1930s Europe. Consider the explicitly corporatist Parti social français: 
although the largest political party in the Third Republic, it had a nebulous relationship to 
parliament, and should more properly be understood as an attempt to inaugurate a new form of 
corporatist social order. In the colonies de vacance sponsored by Croix de Feu and the PSF, thousands 
of schoolchildren were educated in the corporatist ideal. What they learned, Laura Lee Downs 
summarizes, was to restore “social harmony through the replacement of class conflict by traditional 
social hierarchies, welded together by ties of reciprocal duty, mutual responsibility, and a shared love 
of the French nation.”5 Most Catholics, that is, still believed in such a thing as a properly Catholic 
politics. “There is a political Catholicism,” wrote one of Dollfuss’s supporters, “and every good 
Catholic must decide in its favor.”6 
There is nothing new in this observation, of course. But in this chapter, I will discuss 
“corporatist Catholicism”—the opponent of “civil-society Catholicism”—in such a way that its 
myriad ties with the Cold War Catholicism to come will become apparent. Corporatist politics, we 
will see, were not abolished in the cauldron of World War II, but survived as an ideological 
apparatus into the welfare statism of the early Cold War. Corporatism had, in other words, 
uninetended consequences. Downs has already shown the ways in which PSF activism, despite its 
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avowed anti-feminist ideologies, in fact groomed women for leadership roles and provided space for 
outcomes that diverged from its original intention. While Downs focused on gender opportunities, 
this chapter and those to come will focus on political culture. The illiberal corporatisms of the mid-
1930s, despite its author’s intentions, translated itself into the welfare statism of postwar stability. 
One leading corporatist wrote in 1932 that Catholics that Catholics could support social democracy, 
but never liberal democracy; this position had its defenders among Austrian Catholics, too.7 After 
1945, this social democracy came into being. 
As we will see in Part III, support for fascist regimes did not disqualify these intellectuals 
from post-war influence; indeed, the opposite seems to have been the case. Although Maritain, 
Gurian, and Fessard were important post-war figures, it is significant that the first two spent the 
majority of their time in America and relinquished much of their continental influence (Maritain’s 
post-1945 works were not big sellers in France, for instance). Within France and Germany, these 
corporatist Catholics remained more important: Jean de Fabrègues as editor of La France Catholique, 
André Voisin as editor of La Fédération, Eugen Kogon as editor of Frankfurter Hefte, Emil Franzel as 
editor of Neues Abendland, Eberhard Welty as editor of Die Neue Ordnung, Walter Ferber as editor of 
Föderalistische Hefte. To take another example, Louis Salleron began his career at the Action Française, 
spent the 1930s as a corporatist in Jeune Droite circles, and then became a prominent federalist after 
World War II. This progression is absolutely typical, and far more representative of European 
Catholicism as a whole than the Christian Democrats. Christian corporatism did not die after the 
1930s—it transformed itself for participation in the Cold War and in European federalism, for 
which it had unwittingly prepared itself in the 1930s. 
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 Catholic corporatism was, like its counterpart, a transnational phenomenon: to varying 
degrees, regimes influenced by Catholic social-political thought arose in Spain, Portugal, Austria, 
Hungary, and (Vichy) France. Catholic economists and social theorists in these places were 
influenced by one another and self-consciously formed a single, if acephalous, tradition. Gonzague 
de Reynold, a prominent Swiss Catholic intellectual, had improbably seen the League of Nations as 
the vessel for Catholic revival in the 1920s. He was still internationally-minded in the 1930s, but the 
content of the internationalism had changed radically (it also had nothing in common with the 
parallel movements among civil-society Catholics).  
Reynold participated in the rightward shift of the “European idea” of the 1930s. He wrote in 
furiously anti-Geneva publications of the French Jeune Droite. He was, for instance, present at a 1932 
conference on the topic hosted by the Royal Academy of Italy: he was joined by figures like 
Christopher Dawson and Pierre Gaxotte (the premier historian of the Action Française).8 Most 
importantly, he was brought by the Portuguese state for a visit in 1935, which resulted in a widely-
read volume called, simply, Portugal. And, to look ahead slightly—in the 1940s he would write in La 
Fédération alongside such status-quo figures as Wilhelm Röpke, the neoliberal economist and father 
of the social market economy, and the American ambassador to France.9 Reynold’s book on Salazar 
perfectly encapsulates the new internationalism. It was written by a Swiss, who was brought to 
Portugal by the state to publish a book in Paris—moreover, if Bernard Fäy is to be believed, it 
appeared on the desk of General Franco.10  
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Of course, the role of the Vatican itself should not be forgotten. I will not be dwelling 
overmuch on Pius XI here: on the ground, neither French nor Catholic corporatists were especially 
interested in the Vatican, although all parties were glad to have enthusiastic hierarchical support 
once their movements came to power in 1934 or 1940. While the story differs from country to 
country, and from bishopric to bishopric, it is largely true that the Vatican and the hierarchy were 
warmly supportive of Christian corporatism as it developed in Portugal, Spain, Austria, and France. 
Eugenio Pacelli, then Cardinal Secretary of State, celebrated Dollfuss’s May 1934 constitution, and 
the hierarchy was equally enthusiastic about Salazar’s experiments. Quadragesimo Anno gave 
ammunition to corporatists across Europe: in it. Dollfuß’s stated mission, for instance, was to 
construct a society on the basis of Quadragesimo Anno: Johannes Messner, who played a role in 
Dollfuss’s government and helped organize Hildebrand’s journal, referred to Austria in 1935 as “the 
first nation in the world that felt called to further the realization of the ideas of Quadragesimo Anno.”11 
Quadragesimo Anno is not itself the whole story, though. For one thing, it did not break new 
ground in any real sense: “The publication of Quadragesimo Anno,” William Patch has judged, “had 
little immediate impact on the Christian trade unions throughout Europe, which simply praised the 
Pope for endorsing principles that they had long followed.”12 For another thing, as we’ll see below, 
corporatism as a major facet of Catholic political culture did not really take off until the mid-1930s, a 
few years after the encyclical’s publication. This culture of corporatism will be our object of analyis, 
and we will find it in the dense clusters of periodicals that circulated across Europe. Particularly we 
will be interested here in exchange between French, Austrian, and refugee-German corporatists. 
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Their journals were full of one another’s works, and articles about the fate of international 
corporatism. The French, in particular, discovered a newfound sympathy with their Latin-German 
brothers, menaced by the Nazi onslaught. In 1936, Robert d’Harcourt, Catholic France’s most 
prominent Germanist, explained that “Austria exerts such a great power of attraction on France” 
because they are spiritual brothers against the Teutons of the North.13 Just as Fessard encountered 
Rhenish Catholics in his own visits to Germany, his fellow Jesuit, Pierre Chaillet, spent much of the 
1930s living in Austria, which bore fruit in his post-Anschluss volume, L’Autriche souffrante (1939).   
Let’s begin with the German refugees and the Austrians. While the last chapter focused on 
the Rhenish Germans and their exile in Switzerland, this one will focus on the Central European 
Germans covered in Chapter 2—both those who remained in Austria and those who fled there from 
Bavaria. Our focus here will be on the circle surrounding Dietrich von Hildebrand, whom we met 
briefly in Chapter 2, and his journal, Christliche Ständestaat. His circle and journal have been judged 
“perhaps the central group of Catholic-conservative resistance against Nazism outside of 
Germany—and not only in Austria.”14 He was desperately cosmopolitan—born in Florence to one 
of nineteenth-century Europe’s most famous sculptors—but in the 1920s he made his home 
primarily in Munich, where he wrote for Bavarian periodicals like Münchener Neueste Nachrichten and 
Allgemeine Rundschau. I will focus almost entirely on this journal, both because it was the most 
prominent intellectual organ of Austrian Catholicism in the 1930s, and because it groomed the next 
generation of Catholic intellectual heavyweights: Emil Franzel, Eugen Kogon, and Walter Ferber, all 
of whom were in Hildebrand’s circle in the 1930s, would go on to edit three of the most important 
German-language Catholic periodicals of the postwar period.  
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Our exemplary figures from Chapter 2 participated in this movement, as well. Ernst Karl 
Winter, still wary of the state qua anti-Christ, served as vice-mayor of Vienna, drawing on his 
wartime friendship with Dollfuß (his sharp left turn led to his fall from favor15). Friedrich Wilhelm 
Foerster provides one of the clearest indices of the connections between 1920s Romantic federalism 
and 1930s corporatism. Although actually located in Switzerland, the best historian of 1930s 
Ständestaat Catholicism has argued that Foerster was the “Kristallationsfigur” of the Austrian 
emigration: he had, after all, been a professor at the University of Vienna before WWI. He met with 
Hildebrand in 1933, and was praised in Hildebrand’s journal.16 Moenius himself, one of Foerster’s 
most prominent protégés, was in Austria, too, where he wrote for the same legitimist journal 
(Vaterland) as Hildebrand. Hermann Görgen, one of his students, was set to take the reins of 
Christliche Ständestaat from Hildebrand and Dohrn before the Anschluss hit in 1938.17  
There were thus myriad links between the legitimist, federalist thought of the 1920s and the 
personalist, anti-totalitarian defenders of the clerical Ständestaat. There were substantial similarities in 
personnel between Schönere Zukunft and Christliche Ständestaat, for instance: the two most notable 
instances were probably Alfred Missong and Eugen Kogon. Missong wrote for Allgemeine Rundschau 
in the 1920s, as did Hildebrand, and served on the editorial board of Schönere Zukunft. He also 
contributed—under pseudonyms—a large number of articles to Christliche Ständestaat before enjoying 
renewed prominence after 1945 as one of the founders of the Oesterrische Volkspartei and editor of 
its journal. We could also think of Johannes Messner, who began as an editor of the reactionary Das 
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Neue Reich, which he took over from Eberle in 1925, before moving into Dollfuss’s government and 
assisting in the organization and funding of Christliche Ständestaat: in one of his paeans to Dollfuss, he 
emphasizes the continuity between Dollfuss and the Austrian, Romantic past, notably Vogelsang 
and Lueger.18 
Eugen Kogon will not play a major role in this chapter, although he will re-emerge in Part 
III. He essentially ceased writing during these years and dedicated himself entirely to anti-Nazi 
resistance activities. He had, it is woth noting, initially taken a cautiously pro-Nazi line, joining von 
Papen’s Kreuz und Adler movement.19 He soon, though, changed his mind, and entered the busy 
world of international anti-Nazi activism. He helped to administer the funds provided by Prinz 
Philipp Josias von Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha, which were used to assist German émigrés and publicize 
Nazi crimes.20 Although his initial overtures towards Nazism made Kogon suspect to Hildebrand 
personally, Kogon was sympathetic to the journal’s aims. He congratulated Hildebrand after his 
meeting with Dollfuß, and eventually became one of the journal’s most important financial backers. 
Kogon doubtless played an essential practical role at the journal: one of the journal’s contributors 
referred in his memoirs to “our most important man, the financial provider Dr. K[ogon],” while in 
Kogon’s own memoirs he emphasizes his assistance to Hildebrand.21 
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Austrian corporatists were attuned to the new importance of their system, and they 
consistently praised the corporatism of Mussolini and Salazar.22 They were less keen, however, on 
German exiles in the civil-society tradition. Polemics occasionally erupted between the two groups 
of German refugees, who had cold and somewhat distant relationships with one another. Johannes 
Oesterreicher, in a letter to Thieme, comically criticized Schönere Zukunft: “God willing,” he 
exclaimed, “it won’t be our Zukunft!”23 As an example of this, we might consider the differences 
between two of the major Catholic refugee voices of the 1930s: Waldemar Gurian’s Deutsche Briefe 
and Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Christliche Ständestaat. The former, recall, was Gurian’s anti-totalitarian 
organ, published in Switzerland. The latter, which will be a major source for this chapter, was a pro-
Dollfuß journal, published in Austria and staffed primarily by German refugees.24 Deutsche Briefe was, 
above all, an anti-totalitarian journal squarely in the civil society tradition. Its goal was to publicize 
the persecution of the Church in Nazi Germany, and it avoided positive political theorizing—this 
not due to a lack of imagination, but due to a certain understanding of the role of the Catholic 
intellectual, as we saw in the last chapter. Christliche Ständestaat, while equally anti-Nazi (its major goal, 
and the reason it was funded by Dollfuß, was anti-Anschluss agitation), opposed Hitler in a different 
way. As the name of the journal implies, its anti-totalitarianism was closely linked with a positive 
political program: the Christian Ständestaat, or Christian corporatism.25   
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Nikolaus Dohrn, “Oliveira Salazar,” Christliche Ständestaat 4, 27 (11 June 1937), 642-3. 
23 Oesterreicher to Thieme, 13 March 1939, Nachlaß Thieme, Box 163, Folder 60. 
24 Although not the only group of Catholic refugees active in 1930s Austria, it was the most important, and most 
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The fact that there was very little collaboration between these two stridently anti-Nazi 
journals is surprising, and Rudolf Ebneth has absurdly claimed that it can be chalked up to pride on 
the part of Christliche Ständestaat.26 The real reason is, as I have intimated, the radically different 
intellectual cultures pervading the two journals. “Since I read [Hildebrand’s] wretched book on 
Dollfuß,” Thieme wrote to a friend in 1936, “I’ve wanted nothing to do with this ‘Hyper-Austrian’: 
the ordinary Austrians are troublesome enough for me.”27 The disappointment was mutual: Klaus 
Dohrn, Christliche Ständestaat’s co-editor, had despised one of Gurian’s only contributions.28 Balduin 
Schwarz was thus correct when he wrote to Gurian that the sticking point between the two journals 
was the inveterate support for the federalist, Austrian idea at Hildebrand’s journal, which clashed 
with Gurian’s sensibility.29 
There was, however, significant cooperation with the French corporatists. This can be seen 
through the career of François Perroux, plausibly referred to in an American journal as “the most 
lucid and withal the most comprehensive analyst of European corporativism.”30 A professor of 
political economy in Lyon, a seedbed of social Catholicism, he came to Paris to assume a law 
professorship in 1935. Like other corporatists, he was fed up with party politics and threw himself 
behind various third-way movements; eventually, he would become one of the chief economists and 
policymakers of the Vichy régime. Perroux’s imagination was always international in scope. With 
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fund from the Rockefeller Foundation, he had studied in Vienna, particularly with Joseph 
Schumpeter. He was a reader of Christliche Ständestaat, and drew on it in his own writings on the 
corporate state. Like others at the time, Perroux was particularly impressed by Portugal, and he 
devoted a section of his 1938 book, called “Salazarean State and Totalitarian State,” to 
demonstrating that Salazar’s corporatism, however imperfect, was not totalitarian and remained 
infused by the doctrines and morals of social Catholicism.31 
Although Perroux remained personally aloof from most of their efforts, his closest 
theoretical allies were to be found in the Jeune Droite, and he would soon join them in Pétain’s 
regime.32 They were broadly continuous with the Maurrassean Catholics discussed in Chapter 1. 
Nicolas Kessler, who has expanded the history of the Jeune Droite beyond the temporal confines 
suggested by Loubet del Bayle’s classic account, has attempted to “resituate the history of the Jeune 
Droite in the larger story of the Action française.”33 The main Jeune Droite activist that I will discuss 
in this chapter, Jean de Fabrègues, we have already met in Chapter 1 as a Thomist student of Gilson, 
leader in the Camelots du Roi, and popularizer of Cochin in La Gazette française, a Maurras- and 
Maritain-inspired journal. He remained loyal to Maurras after 1926, and briefly served as his personal 
secretary. Throughout the 1930s, he was involved with a great number of journals, of which he was 
indefatigable as founder and editor: the most significant were Revue française, Réaction pour l’ordre, La 
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Revue du siècle, La revue du Xxème siècle, Combat, and Civilisation. These journals will provide the major 
source base for the discussion of Fabrègues and his circle.34  
Just as the French civil-society Catholics were in dialogue with the Rhenish exile, the French 
corporatist catalogs were in dialogue with the Austrians and Foerster. Figures like Foerster and 
Moenius were invisible in the civil-society publications of Bernadot: as his Dominican publishing 
empire was designed primarily to counter the dominant Maurrasean voice in French Catholic life, 
they restricted themselves to anti-Maurras German Catholics like Landsberg, Gurian, and Platz. The 
Austrian corporatists, however, were a major presence in Jeune Droite journals: when Jean de 
Fabrègues’s Réaction pour l’Ordre decided to include Germans in their “Enquête sur l’Ordre”, they 
bypassed the whole Rhineland tradition and sent requests to Foerster and Moenius; in his response, 
Foerster was sure to praise Maurras’s healthy, Roman nationalism.35 In another of Fabrègues’s 
journals, Foerster was praised, in a hagiographic article, as an “apostle of moderation and of 
Christian morality.”36 There were multiple articles in Jeune Droite journals defending Austria as the 
last holdout of truly Latin culture, defined, as in Massis, by alliance between Roman religion and 
political authority.37 Moenius was the translator of Massis’s own work, and was celebrated in the 
Jeune Droite press for that reason. One further example: when Perroux describes Catholic 
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Germany, he focuses solely on the South. “The Catholic style of life,” he writes, “blossoms in the 
south, particularly in Bavaria.”38 Like other French corporatists, he ignores the civil-society traditions 
of the Rhineland.  
Louis Le Fur, one of interwar France’s most celebrated international lawyers, is an exemplary 
figure of the rapprochement between the two Catholic corporatisms. He owed his job at the 
University of Paris to Action Française agitation on his behalf in 1925 (the university had first 
proposed Georges Scelle, deemed insufficiently conservative by the royalist student Ligues then pre-
eminent in the Latin quarter).39 In the 1930s, he published in both Fabrègues’s Jeune Droite journals 
and in Christliche Ständestaat (one of few French authors to do so).40 He also traveled through Austria 
with Wladimir d’Ormesson in 1936, who wrote about their trip in a series of articles in Le Figaro. 
These articles were celebrations of Austria’s Ständestaat and the nation’s central role in any stable 
European peace; these articles were, in turn, celebrated back in Christliche Ständestaat, particularly 
d’Ormesson’s declaration that Dollfuss was “the true spiritual hero of our time.”41 He then, like so 
many other Maurrasean corporatists, went on to support Vichy; in particular, he was, like Perroux, 
linked with L’Institut d’études corporatives et sociales, which Le Fur had helped found in 1934, and which 
threw itself behind Pétain. 
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Corporatism in Context 
 So there were two competing internationalisms within 1930s Catholicism: on the one hand, 
civil-society Catholics, primarily in France and Switzerland, publishing in Father Bernadot’s 
Dominican journals. On the other hand, corporatist Catholics, primarily in France and Austria, 
publishing in Christliche Ständestaat and in Fabrègues’s constellation of Jeune Droite journals. Conflicts 
occasionally broke out between the two: we have already seen the friction between Gurian’s and 
Hildebrand’s exile-circles. A Jeune Droite journal condemned Mounier’s journal as “unreadable.”42 
More significantly, there were various wars of manifestoes, most notably that over the Abyssinian 
invasion canvassed in the introduction to Part II. We have, in addition, already seen Maritain’s anti-
Dollfuß manifesto. And, to review : the primary battle was not over which politics to support, but 
over political engagement as such. The corporatist Catholics firmly believed in it. “The parliamentary 
state,” Perroux wrote in 1938, “is no longer adapted to the needs of the economy.”43 And here’s 
Gonzague de Reynold, in a 1936 speech delivered in Portugal: “I do not say ‘politique d'abord’. But 
I do say ‘politics at the same time.’”44 The corporatists were clear that this political bent set them at 
odds with the civil-society Catholics. Roger Manaud, who provided the main Jeune Droite response to 
Maritain’s Pour le bien commun, complained that its authors “go so far as to suppress politics, in seeing 
in it no more than a branch of morality.”45 The State, Hildebrand held, was “God’s proxy.”46 
 Corporatism was Catholicism’s entry into the various planned-economy schemes that swept 
across Europe in the 1930s in response to economic depression. The best known of these came 
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from the neo-socialist Henri de Man, who enjoyed a vogue in French Catholic circles.47 Across 
Europe, these figures advocated some kind of planisme as an antidote to the obvious failures of 
capitalism. The Parti social français and the Croix de feu, for all of their staunch traditionalism, were 
caught up in these modern schemes; as Samuel Kalman has shown, there were debates at the heart 
of these institutions between Americanizing modernizers and traditional defenders of the artisan.48 
The Catholics I will discusss here were in the same general milieu as the technocratic planners of X-
Crise and the mystical ideals of Teilhard de Chardin and Alexis Carrel. “Recent contacts,” Jean 
Coutrot wrote, “have shown me that French Catholic thought, after two thousand years of 
evolution, has arrived at the exact same conclusions we engineers have arrived at, reasoning on a 
purely objective basis.”49 I should be clear, though, that I am not fundamentally interested in the 
technocrats at the heights: these have been ably studied by Philip Nord (and Kalman) already. 
Instead, I will be attempting to evaluate the broader political culture of corporatist Catholicism: the 
one that would allow those technocrats to legitimate their power after the war.  
Corporatism was a contested concept in the mid-1930s. Franz von Papen and the circle 
around Zeit und Volk, for instance, were corporatists in the name of National Socialism, while 
Hildebrand and the Christliche Ständestaat circle supported an authoritarian, anti-Nazi corporatism.50 
The battle over corporatism, though, was between authoritarianisms: it almost never countenanced 
liberal democracy, and Nazi corporatism was strangled at birth. 51 Most members of the Jeune 
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Droite, it was reported in 1933, saw an inextricable link between capitalism and democracy, and 
every tentatively democratic article in 1930s Austria was counterbalanced by many more claiming 
that only the monarchy could defend a Christian state.52 As one politician wrote in Hildebrand’s 
journal in December 1934:  
In democracy, where the sovereign people rules, the government is put under the 
people’s control; it cannot lead, the end is chaos. In a dictatorship, the government 
commands a lawless Volk. In the corporative order [ständischen Ordnung], the 
government leads a free Volk.53 
 
A French corporatist in the same year concurred: “Aren’t democracy and étatisme intimately 
linked?”54 For both the writer and most of his corporatist colleagues, the answer was yes. “France is 
a nation that naturally requires a monarchy,” wrote Louis Salleron.55  
 Quadregesimo Anno (1931), the monumental encyclical released on the fortieth anniversary of 
Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum, re-emphasized the Vatican’s commitment to corporatism. As we saw in 
the last chapter, the Church was careful to remain neutral in most political conflicts, and thus 
maintain its zealously-guarded apolitical stance. On the other hand, corporatist Catholics could point 
to the encyclical as proof of papal support. Pius XI lauded the “true Catholic social science” that had 
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arisen. “There resides in Us,” he added, “the right and duty to pronounce with supreme authority 
upon social and economic matters.” And pronounce he did, drawing on the Church’s corporatist 
traditions. He also directly addresssed the State, reiterating that the Church is indifferent to political 
form, but is committed to reducing the “almost infinite tasks and duties” that have been piled upon 
it, in ignorance of its limited, natural role in the conomy.56 
At the level of political culture, corporatism did not coalesce as an international 
phenomenon until the mid-1930s, alongside civil-society Catholicism. As Marcel Prélot suggested in 
February 1935, “among the events that marked 1934, there is one in particular that should be noted 
by the historian of ideas: the renaissance of the term, and the idea, of the ‘corporative.’”57 Although 
he was somewhat over-optimistic about the perspicuity of future intellectual historians, the evidence 
bears him out. What seems to have happened is that, after the Stavisky riots, the failure of 
Maurrass’s Politique, d’abord! strategy became apparent. As Dollfuß came to power and war began in 
Spain, Maurras’s obsession with poetry, Provençal, and the Bourbons came to seem increasingly 
outdated. The new world belonged not to Taine, but to de Man. Jean de Fabrègues, along with 
others, determined that a change in language was necessary. “Neither this country, nor its political 
institutions, nor its social body,” Fabrègues wrote to a friend, “would be remade with only phrases 
and the evocation of a political structure. We must trace, once again, the substance of an organic 
society.” Thus far, of course, he had not moved beyond Maurras. “But,” he continued, “I no longer 
think, if I ever did, that we find ourselves faced with a purely political problem.” This is a 
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monumental declaration, coming from a former secretary of Maurras. Citing the authority of 
Perroux, Fabrègues explained his belief that a new solution must move beyond “politique d’abord” 
and embrace the economy: in other words, we must become corporatist.58  
One way to track this new interest in the economic sphere among the French right is to look 
at Courrier Royal in 1934-5. The journal housed a number of royalists, including Fabrègues, who had 
broken with Maurras and his whole approach: the Comte de Paris was endorsed by the four premier 
figures of the Jeune Droite in a January 1935 manifesto.59 Whereas Maurras’s journals focused on 
questions of sovereignty and metaphysics, as we saw in Chapter 1, the new legitimism was stridently 
corporatist, exercised primarily by proletarianization and the new economic regime to be 
underwritten by the restored Comte de Paris. “The economic and political regimes of a nation,” 
wrote a supporter in 1934, “are interdependent. Corporatism is not realizable in a democracy.”60 
 “A non-Marxist anti-capitalism,” wrote one of Fabrègues’s colleagues, “can be founded on a 
long Christian tradition.”61 This declaration is found in the Jeune Droite’s immediate response to the 
Stavisky riots: a Spring 1934 celebration in Fabrègues Revue du Siècle of La Tour du Pin’s centenary, 
replete with articles updating the master’s insights for a France in crisis. In his opening essay, 
Fabrègues emphasized that the crisis was not, in the first instance, a crisis of democracy, but of 
capitalism.62 The contributors’ solution, likewise, was not traditionalist royalism, but economic 
corporatism: Roman Dmowski, the Polish Maurrassean leader, contributed a long essay on the 
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nature of the crisis, and Pierre Lucius, an early corporatist, wrote about the Italian regime as a model 
corporative state. The centerpiece, finally, was Roger Magniez’s article, “Towards a corporatist 
doctrine.”63  
The corporatist revival was part of the same anti-Front moment as civil-society Catholicism; 
if anything, corporatist Catholics were even more scathing towards Blum and the idea of 
collaboration with socialism than were their civil-society adversaries. The corporatist Jean-François 
Gravier, who would rocket to prominence after World War II as the author of Paris et le désert français 
(1947), began writing for Jeune Droite journals: “Any entente whatsoever between Catholics and 
Marxists,” he wrote in one of them, “is scandalous from the beginning because Marxism is the direct 
antithesis of Christianity.”64 The National Front, the Right’s answer to the Popular Front, enshrined 
corporatism in its 1934 manifesto.65 An editorial in Credo, the journal of the FNC and a central organ 
of 1930s Catholic corporatism, spoke for many when it proclaimed, “The Popular Front is first and 
foremost the Secular Front [Front laïque].”66 The corporatists simply believed that something more 
full-blooded would be necessary to combat the Bolshevik menace: “Communism or corporatism: 
that is the question,” wrote the Catholic corporatist Paul Chanson in 1937.67  
 The major corporatist theorists for the Jeune Droite were Pierre Lucius, François Perroux, 
and Louis Salleron. As Fabrègues pointed out in his review, Perroux’s 1938 work—among the most 
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influential texts of the period (and one to which we will return in more detail in the next section)—
can be read as a translation of Maurrasean political insights into an updated methodological 
language: bringing Maurras’s fear of abstraction and parliament out of the world of politics and 
metaphysics and into the social sciences. Perroux’s disaster-theory of modernity is, essentially, the 
same as Maurras’s: they both believed that France’s golden age had been the pre-absolutist 
monarchy, and that the absolutist monarchy and the revolution were the direct outcome of the 
breakdown of that order. But for Perroux, this catastrophe was fundamentally economic in nature. It 
was not the breakdown of authority as such, but rather the polarization of society into two 
antagonistic classes: workers and capitalists. Like Kogon before him, Perroux complains that the 
cooperative estates of medieval Europe had given way to antagonistic, artificial classes. This has only 
been exacerbated since the late nineteenth century, which has seen the development of monopolies 
and syndicates. Early political economy, Perroux argues, had been predicated on the belief in a large 
number of equal producers; the necessity of fixed capital (factories, etc.) in a mature capitalist 
economy had rendered this assumption invalid.    
 Only a return to the corporation could stave off economic collapse and revolutionary 
violence. Perroux defines the corporation as  
a group of public or semi-public character in which bosses and workers are equally 
represented, and in which the state will decide in case of conflict. It fixes the prices of 
goods and services (incomes) with an authoritarian voice, instead of letting them 
establish themselves through the play of the free market.68  
 
These groups, defined by nature and not through class antagonism, become the true agents of social 
reproduction. For Perroux, the individual matters insofar as he plays his role in a corporation. This 
deserves judicial recognition, and he suggests that the “rights of man and citizen” be replaced by the 
                                                




“rights of the group”: this is “a modernized and enriched form of the declaration of the rights of 
man.”69 
Much of this does not seem new to us, and in Fabrègues’s review he made it clear that 
Perroux was drawing on a longer tradition of Catholic anti-Jacobinism and anti-étatisme more 
broadly. But one word in the previous quotation should give us pause: “modernized.” Perroux is 
illustrative of a general trend in mid-1930s French Catholicism to find new solutions to new 
problems as Maurras’s royalism came to seem outdated. Specifically, Perroux and his corporatist 
colleagues were willing to envision an expanded role for the state in economic life. For Maurras, 
recall, the state was defined primarily by its retreat from economic and social life: the essence of the 
political was in the realm of foreign affairs and law enforcement, and any expansion of the state was 
read as pathology.  
For Perroux, the state apparatus had, in the medieval corporatist order, kept itself abstract 
from the economy. It was responding to the economic state of affairs: the corporations remained 
intact without government oversight (i.e. they had not split into warring classes) and the rise of fixed 
capital had not fomented monopoly capitalism.70 But we are beyond that now: we live in a world of 
heavy industry and class conflict, in which, as seen already in Perroux’s definition of the corporation, 
the state will sometimes have to intervene. The “work community,” which would be the name for 
the new corporations, would be expected to work out conflicts on its own, but everything would be 
overseen by the state. “The work community is, finally, relatively independent from nationalization. 
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It supposes that the accent is not placed on the existence, importance, and extension of the public, 
socialized sector but on the control and regulation of the entire economy.”71 
When Perroux looked around Europe, he felt particularly encouraged by developments in 
Portugal and Austria: he praised, in particular, the corporatist ideas of the Christliche Ständestaat circle, 
of which he was a reader.72 The new right-wing of the 1930s, in response to economic collapse, had, 
Perroux correctly noted, moved en masse towards corporatist solutions as a way to rein in free-market 
excesses without lending blanket authority to the sinister forces of monopoly capitalism. In 1933 
and 1934, Mussolini announced new corporatist initiatives in Italy, causing great excitement in 
continental Catholic journals. Although Salazar had been implementing corporatist ideas for some 
time, they received new prominence in France through the writings of Gonzague de Reynold, J.T. 
Delos, and Perroux himself. In Spain, José Antonio Primo de Rivera and his Falange published their 
corporatist manifesto in January 1935.73  
It was Austria, however, that most piqued Perroux’s interest, and not only because he had 
been trained there. Austria experienced a revival of corporatist theory and practice. In theory, this 
had been going on for some time: in Chapter 2, we examined the corporatist sociology at work in 
Central Europe in the 1920s. This continued apace throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s. We 
might look, for example, at a “Catholic-Social Manifesto” released by a group of Catholic 
sociologists in Vienna in 1932. Capitalism, they plausibly argued, was collapsing, which left only 
corporatism and Communism as viable options. Drawing on Quadrageismo Anno, they claimed that 
corporatism provided a way out of “the double chaos of capitalism and Communo-socialism.” The 
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manifesto has an interesting relation to Catholic Action: they definitely speak its language (“no city, 
no village without Catholic-Social groups!”), but the occasion for the manifesto was a Catholic 
Action congress in 1929 that the sociologists deemed insufficiently radical. No specific stateform is 
necessarily called for by the corporate order.” Two kinds, however, are explicitly not allowed: the 
first is “party-‘democracy’” and the second is dictatorship.”74 Only the ständische Ordnung would do. 
When Dollfuß came to power, they were ready. 
As with Fabrègues, Hildebrand’s journey towards these ideas was a long one: he had been 
essentially apolitical throughout the 1920s, imbibing and teaching Scheler’s personalism in Munich 
without directly applying them to political realities. He was primarily interested in marriage and the 
family: in one of his many writings on the subject, Hildebrand summarized his view of marriage as 
highest, closest, and most profound natural community of love [Liebesgemeinschaft].”75 This 
changed in 1929, when he entered the fray of political theory with an essay about Carl Schmitt’s 
Concept of the Political. Unsurprisingly, Hildebrand held that Schmitt’s reduction of the political to the 
friend/enemy grouping was dangerous and heretical. Like Roger Manaud a few years later, 
Hildebrand argued that politics and ethics are inextricably bound together: the realm of the state and 
of law cannot be abandoned by the Catholic to the forces of secularism. One of Hildebrand’s 
strongest claims against Schmitt, and one familiar to us from chapter 2, is that he had neglected to 
understand power as the province of a set of overlapping, legitimate institutions. “The individual,” 
Hildebrand emphasizes, “is not a citizen in the first instance!” A society is meaningful to the extent 
                                                
74 Katholische-soziales Manifest, ed. Studienrunde katholischer Soziologen (Mainz, 1932), 8-9, 54. Corporatism was 
flourishing in the Rhineland, too, although the events of 1933 ensured that these voices did not participate in 
international debate. See, for instance, Die berufsständische Ordnung, ed. Josef van der Velden (Köln, 1932); Die Essener 
Richtlinien 1933 (Berlin, 1933). 




that it allows the human person to develop towards God, and other communities—notably the 
family—are far more successful at this than the state. 76  
 In the early 1930s, Hildebrand turned towards corporatism. In 1933, soon before his 
emigration, he published an essay called “The Corporative Idea and the Natural Communities.”77 
His ideas naturally led him to support Austria’s experiment, and when he was forced into exile he 
ended up in Vienna. He soon gained an audience with Dollfuß himself, who agreed to fund his 
journal in an effort to counterbalance the influence of Schönere Zukunft, which Dollfuß felt to be too 
gesamtdeutsch in orientation, and not sufficiently dedicated to the Austrian corporatist experiment.78 
Dohrn, Hildebrand’s relative and coeditor, was opposed to the new journal’s name, which he felt 
sounded too fascist: it was Hildebrand who agitated for it (Dohrn, who had served as the Rome 
correspondent for the Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung, had a somewhat different sensibility from 
Hildebrand). 
 The journal can best be read as a translation of Hildebrand’s personalist theories of the family 
into the realm of politics. “The family,” wrote one contributor, “enjoys special protection as the 
germ cell of the state.” The family should not be overcome, as in the Marxist state, or “encapsulated 
by the great society,” as in National Socialism.79 But, as in France, political realities forced 
intellectuals beyond traditionalist defenses of the family and towards more full-blooded political 
theories. Whereas this article, ten years earlier, might have ended with a simple lament that the 
liberal state was incapable of recognizing legitimate paternal authority, the author now goes further 
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and discusses the need for a corporatist organization of the professions. “The state,” wrote the 
secretary of Dollfuss’s political party in Hildebrand’s journal, “is fundamentally a great family, which 
is unified through ethical norms, defined ideals, and a political idea.”80  Hildebrand agreed, writing 
that the purpose of his journal was to defend “the Christian idea of the state” against the neo-
paganism of Bolshevism and Nazism; Hildebrand emphasized throughout the 1930s that the state, 
as one natural community among many, was no less exempt from Christian values than the family, 
corporation, or church.81 “The higher the domain of value,” Hildebrand wrote, “the deeper the 
stratum in the person to which it beckons, and the more it addresses itself not only to the individual, 
but rather to the community [Gemeinschaft].”82  
 He clarified the relation between his personalist theories of the family and his corporatism in 
a 1935 article entitled, simply, “State and Marriage.” He begins by attacking the common belief that, 
in a well-organized society, “the greater and more capacious society incorporates the smaller as an 
element of itself.” Like Guardini ten years earlier, Hildebrand argued that each society—the family, 
the clan, the nation, and so on—should retain its independence, and that none of them could be 
definitely absorbed by the others without violence to human nature. “Marriage,” Hildebrand writes, 
“is certainly the basis and origin of the family, but it is neither identical with the family, nor is it 
completely incorporated into it, as a part into a whole.”83 The same is true, he continues, of marriage 
and the state: marriage does not resolve into the state, and thus the state has no right to interfere 
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with the marriage bond: the marriage and the state are two communities out of many, and the 
political sovereign has no more right to interfere with the family than does each individual family to 
interfere in foreign affairs. The state, Hildebrand concludes, “is a natural community among others, 
and not the highest.”84 It was this naturalness of the state as a community—which, per Catholic 
doctrines of nature, rooted the state in God—that so distinguished corporatist from civil-society 
Catholicism. Neither Gurian, Landsberg, Fessard or Maritain would say, with Johannes Messner, 
that the contemporary challenge was a “struggle for a return to the natural principles of a true 
national community [Volksgemeinschaft].”85  
 The state, no less than the family, should disavow any forms of legitimacy that are not based 
on natural law, most notably democracy. “[T]he state, in the Christian sense, exhibits an 
authoritarian structure,” because political authority is not properly the “will of the majority” in 
Rousseau’s sense, “but rather flows from a partial representation of God.”86 His journal also 
emphasized that this authoritarian state would inhabit a society in which economic decisions would 
be made by neither the free market nor the dictatorial state, but by organized professions who would 
inhabit the public sphere like other natural communities: the “freedom and independence” of the 
family, just like “the social milieu of the professions […] can only be guaranteed by a federal, 
corporative state.”87  
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The Development of a Political Personalism  
Although corporatist Catholicism differed in many ways from its civil-society counterpart, as 
we have just seen, its journals nonetheless developed a similar political vocabulary in the mid-1930s 
that would set them up for their surprising post-1945 career: personalism and anti-totalitarianism, 
the same two keywords we found in civil-society Catholicism, which was in other ways so different. 
We’ll begin, again, with the person. In the previous chapter, we traced a notion of the person that 
was, in a sense, beyond politics: a political subject that was, paradoxically, defined by its abstraction, 
and protection, from the secular realm of politics. The corporatists defended a different, but 
recognizable, approach. “Such are the quarrels of ‘personalism’,” Fabrègues wrote in 1939. 
“Emmanuel Mounier and Louis Salleron, Denis de Rougemont and Thierry Maulnier, Gabriel 
Marcel and François Mauriac are equally attached to this notion of ‘personal destiny.’”88  
We saw in the previous chapter that the person had fallen out of favor in the late 1920s, 
even among Scheler’s pupils and those, like Maritain, who had pioneered its use. The same was true 
among the Catholic right, although corporatists picked it up again a few years before their civil-
society counterparts.89 Fabrègues began to employ the notion in 1930, in the manifesto that opened 
Réaction pour l’ordre, one of the most important journals of the Jeune Droite. The manifesto, written 
by Fabrègues and signed by others who would join him in Vichy’s cultural firmament, employs 
language that is familiar to us from Chapter 1: although Fabrègues had recently split from Maurras, 
the manifesto is very much a product of the Action française. “The human person” is for Fabrègues 
linked with the “immense question of order [, which is] the law of being. […] Social reaction: against 
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individualism, étatisme and class struggle, in favor of the free development of the human person in 
his natural social surroundings [cadres].”90 
 The person for Fabrègues was already in 1930, and would remain for the corporatist 
Catholics, an inescapably political notion: the person is not that which escapes or transcends all 
possible social settings, but rather that which can only be nourished in “natural social surroundings.” 
Indeed, in Gonzague de Reynold’s celebration of Salazar’s Estado Novo, he emphasized that the state 
protects the “human person.”91 Although relations between the Jeune Droite and Ordre Nouveau were 
somewhat tense, Fabrègues and his colleagues nonetheless agreed with Denis de Rougemont’s 1936 
assertion that “true politics can only be the expression of the person himself [la personne même].”92 
In a 1932 letter to Maurras, Fabrègues clarifies: “Simply, for many of our contemporaries, 
profoundly perverted by an individualism that is both political and philosophical, the notion of man 
himself has been lost: that he is a person, that is to say, a political animal.”93 So for Fabrègues, the 
massified individual of a decadent society can only become a person through political means: 
specifically, through the reinsertion of the individual into his “natural social surroundings” (in the 
same letter, he said that his task was to transform the individual into the person). That same year, 
Roger Magniez, one of the most important of Fabrègues’s collaborators, used the notion of the 
person to attack the creeping Americanization in French society, arguing that the American 
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demolition of the family—one of the most important of Fabrègues’s “natural social 
surroundings”—was denuding the person of his personality, leaving nothing behind but mass man.94  
 Fabrègues clarified his understanding of the person in March 1932. Our eternal self—the 
person—can only be attained by leaving behind our contingent individuality and seeking what is 
eternal, what is beyond: “In this way, definitively leaving the present moment, man also departs 
from himself.” Fabrègues is adopting some of the proto-existentialist language that was decidedly 
not part of the Action Française’s traditional personalism—indeed, he sounds more like Landsberg 
here than Cochin (he may have been familiar with Scheler, whom he cites in a later article). But he 
nonetheless turns this personalism towards the political, because it is only through participation in 
the social that man returns to himself, and like Kierkegaard’s knight of faith, finds more than he left. 
“In this way, departing from ourselves, we receive the prize of our sacrifice: these very institutions 
return us to ourselves, completing us by surpassing us.”95 For Fabrègues, the decadent individual 
becomes a person through the mediation of institutions—personal commitment can never be 
enough, because that which transcends us is not eternal, but historical and social: in a word, political. 
We could look, also, at a January 1935 manifesto that Fabrègues released: characteristically, he 
begins with the fact that “man is a person.” This declaration was being made simultaneously by civil-
society Catholics, of course, but whereas they drew the conclusion that the sphere of politics had to 
be scrubbed free of the sacred, Fabrègues continued, instead, that a society of persons must admit of 
an order, and be “composed according to a hierarchy”: “The two societies necessary to man,” he 
wrote echoing Hildebrand, “are the family and the state.”96  
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 Before the rise of Perroux and Louis Salleron in the later 1930s, the favored economist of 
the Catholic right wing was Pierre Lucius, whose works were widely celebrated in the Action 
Française press of the 1930s (he would, like so many of these people, end up supporting Vichy). His 
arguments were continuous with those of Maurras: “The French parliamentary state no longer has 
more than a theoretical existence,” Lucius claimed in 1934, echoing Maurras in his complaint about 
the role of oligarchies and the departure from nature.97 Reliant, like Fabrègues, on the work of 
Cochin98, Lucius employs the person/individual distinction as a critique of the liberal state: 
“Democracy,” he claimed, “is ignorant of persons with their character and their own values, it only 
knows individuals, that is to say interchangeable unities.”99 Lucius was not alone on the French right: 
we could also think of Georges Coquelle-Viance, an important FNC publicist, who defended his 
corporatist society as the only one in which “societies of persons” could flourish. “The worker,” he 
continued, “will no longer be delivered, like merchandise, to the law of supply and demand: he will 
be incorporated.”100  
 François Perroux, in the long run more significant than Lucius, also adopted personalist 
vocabulary to describe his favored corporatist settlement, in the same 1938 volume discussed above. 
As with Fabrègues, Perroux’s person was inescapably politicized and tended towards the existential; 
again like Fabrègues, Perroux adopted some of the existentialist personalism of Mounier and 
Landsberg, while also pointing out that his personalism was far more nation-centric and political 
than theirs.101 Corporatist Austria is praised for its service to the person: Dollfuß’s state, Perroux 
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gushes, “orders its ideas towards a general goal: an organization of social life that permits each 
human person [personne humaine] to realize his earthly and spiritual destiny in collaboration and 
communion with other human persons.”102 “Every person,” Perroux writes, is “a continuous self-
creation, a choice made according to an absolute.”103  
 Both “liberal” and “totalitarian” states, Perroux holds, “misrecognize the human person, in 
both their internal logic and their activity.” Both of them are rooted in individualism, and cannot 
properly embody the social nature of ethical life because they cannot encompass the person as a 
“totality”. “In its essence,” Perroux contends, “the State is anti-liberal.”104 While agreeing with the 
civil-society Catholics that the human person cannot be entirely subsumed within the state, he goes 
further and imagines a much more expansive political role in the constitution of the person. The 
basic point of his section on “The State and the Person” is not that these two inhabit radically 
different realms, but that they must be integrated on a higher plane. The state, for Perroux, “is 
essentially an effort. It is the effort of gathering a society in order to incarnate absolute moral values and 
make them penetrate the corporeal world.”105 The state, like the person, is in process of self-creation 
and, moreover, the state’s goal is to incarnate those same values that are at work in the person. We 
have already seen how, for Perroux, social life should be organized around a declaration of the rights 
of the group, not the rights of man. This, he claims, will allow for the human person, as a “totality,” 
to be folded into society, apart from which ethics are inconceivable.106  
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 Whereas in France, personalism began its serious political mobilization around 1930, the 
notion had to wait until 1934 to make its rise in Austria, as refugees flooded into the tiny nation, 
bringing with them a vocabulary that might be used to prop up Dollfuß against the omnipresent 
threat of Anschluss. It was not a complete novelty in Mitteleuropa, although it never achieved the 
prominence in the 1920s that it had in France. The “person” was very occasionally used in a political 
sense in Allgemeine Rundschau in the early 1920s, presumably on account of Scheler’s sojourn in 
Munich. In at least one instance, this led to amazing prescience: in 1923, Otto Sachse prefigured 
developments of the 1930s by deploying the “person” as a tool against both Bolshevism and 
Nazism, which was enjoying a great deal of support in Munich at the time. Neither of these systems, 
Sachse held, protected “the freedom of the person,” and they both assimilated the person to the 
“mass.” They were, moreover, united in their anti-Catholic materialism. Interestingly, though, Sachse 
does not then agitate for liberal democracy or the Zentrum: he was a correspondent for a monarchist 
journal, after all. “Europe is gradually collapsing into two great camps: West (Rome) and East 
(Moscow),” Sachse warned. “In them two great ideas struggle with one another: Person and mass, 
freedom and despotism, Fascism and Bolshevism.”107 Fascism is the valorized alternative, and in its 
Italian variety; Sachse had already written that Bolshevism and Nazism were essentially the same. 
While Sachse’s early version is interesting, the “person” fell into disrepute in favor of 
Catholic Romantic federalism, more inclined to treat the individual as part of the social organism 
than as an entity capable of transcending it. It came back, with Hildebrand, in 1934. This should not 
be abstracted from the civil-society context of the previous chapter: Hildebrand was in dialogue with 
Maritain, for instance, and he was present at the person-centered 1935 conference mentioned in the 
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previous chapter.108 Again, the “person” was part of the same anti-totalitarian (anti-Front, anti-Nazi, 
anti-Bolshevik) animus that was driving civil-society Catholicism, so this confluence is not 
surprising.  
As among French corporatists, the Austrian version of the person was inextricably social and 
political: “when we approach the problematic of social being,” wrote one contributor to 
Hildebrand’s journal, “even here the person must be our central focus.”109 When Aurel Kolnai, a 
Hungarian student of Scheler’s, sought to critique Othmar Spann and his philo-Nazism in 1934, it 
was his denial of “the fate of the Person” that was criticized.110 Kolnai had, incidentally, attacked 
Spann already, in an article in Abendland in 1929 (which caused Kogon to leap to the defense of his 
teacher). In that article, it was not Spann’s denial of the “individual” [der Einzelne]—not the 
person—that was at issue; even for Scheler’s students, then, the “person” was not on the table as a 
political concept in the late 1920s.111  
Like the Jeune Droite, Hildebrand began to put personalism at the service of Christian 
politics seriously around 1930, in his Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft published in that year. Doubtless 
Hildebrand—a Jew who had left Munich in 1922 out of fear of Hitler—was responding to the social 
collapse he could see all around him, and in this book he set out a personalist vision as to what 
might be done about it. He expanded on his ideas in a 1933 article for the prestigious journal, Der 
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katholische Gedanke, significantly entitled “The Corporative Idea and Natural Communities.” He 
begins by laying out his phenomenological approach to personhood, adopting new Heideggerean 
language to make a familiar Schelerean point about the superiority of the person to his social 
surroundings. The person is an intentional being whose final goals outstrip himself, and finally point 
towards God. The hierarchy of value to which man aspires is not internal to him, or even to the 
world, but is transcendent and unchanging, and thus spared from history and the constantly shifting 
institutions that inhabit it. The person is “ontologically ‘prior’ to his membership, and even ‘prior’ to 
these communities themselves […] For the natural communities—including mankind, nation, state, 
and Stand—are not the ontic basis for the being of the individual, but rather individuals ‘sustain 
[tragen]’ these communities.”112  
Hildebrand quickly turns to the errors of individualism and its attendant social doctrines. 
Both liberalism and Communism are united in this denial of the person’s transcendent value.113 So 
only what Hildebrand calls “corporatism” can return the individual to his natural surroundings and 
develop his personality. More than Fabrègues, he was attuned to the absolute superiority of the 
person to any of the communities in which he finds himself. “The individual [Einzelmensch] is 
incomparably more than a mere member of a natural community. As individual, he is ontologically 
‘prior’ to his membership [Gliedfunktion], and even prior to the particular community itself.” 
Bolshevism and other forms of nationalism (by association, Nazism, which he was soon to flee) are 
alike in their denial of this fact, and in their desire to appropriate the person fully into his social or 
political surroundings. But Hildebrand is clear here that the society is nonetheless relevant to the 
flourishing of the person: societies, he says, are also oriented towards value. As a student of Scheler, 
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he of course held that only persons could phenomenologically access this Wertbereich, but a properly 
organized society—a society oriented by the natural needs of man—is a necessary precursor to the 
apprehension of value.114 
This was not merely a personal interest of Hildebrand’s: personalism was everywhere in mid-
1930s Austria. Ernst Karl Winter used the “person” time and again in his left-leaning Ständestaat 
writings. The May 1934 constitution itself, which was the centerpiece of the whole movement, used 
the language of the Person, too: “The freedom of the person,” begins Article 19, “is guaranteed.” 
And, in Christliche Ständestaat itself, the “person” was not the province of Hildebrand alone. In a 1937 
article called “The Essence of Federalism,” for instance, Walter Münster explicitly links the Person 
explicitly with Romantic, federalist politics. “Knowledge of the Person,” Münster declares, “is the 
coronation of knowledge of being in the true sense. […] Consideration of the nature of the person 
must constitute the starting point of sociology.”115 Quoting from Quadragesimo anno, he describes the 
“concentric, increasing communities” that nourish the person, notably the family. This Catholic 
concern leads us towards “federalism” as a protection of “subpolitical communities.”116  
Anti-Totalitarian Corporatism: 1934-1938 
 As in civil-society Catholicism, corporatist Catholicism adopted the new, and still almost 
exclusively Catholic, language of anti-totalitarianism to buttress their political-theological claims. 
This leads to the paradox of an anti-totalitarian fascism: these Catholics were no more willing than 
their counterparts to countenance the claims of the person-denying “total state.” Although they 
were far more willing to make political prescriptions, and to theorize a close connection between 
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religion and politics, this personalist politics was, as we have seen, employed in the name of a 
chastening of the state. Whereas we tend to think of fascism as a form of étatisme, these Catholics 
instead saw parliamentary and economic liberalism as the true face of étatisme run amok, and fascist 
corporatism as the only way to return the state to its natural frontiers. “The state deprived of its 
legitimate powers,” argued one central Jeune Droite manifesto, “retains the ultimate power of 
oppressing its citizens.”117 The name for that domination, that expansion beyond the bounds of 
nature, was totalitarianism. 
 As in the circles discussed in Chapter 4, corporatist Catholics in both France and Austria 
began to adopt totalitarian language between 1934 and 1936. Again, this should be read in terms of 
politics: the category of the “total state” was available in 1932-3, but used only sporadically. 
Friedrich Muckermann, an Austrian Romantic from the Eberle circle, used the language in an open 
letter to Ernst Jünger in 1932 as a consequence of his notion of “total mobilization,” without 
emphasizing the doctrine’s novelty or seeing it as the name of that which threatens Christianity.118 In 
France, meanwhile, it appears in Jeune Droite publications in an article about Gurian, and a selection 
from Mussolini’s writings, in 1933, but its use does not expand from this local context.119 The 
rudiments of the theory were available before 1934, of course: as we’ve seen above, it was already 
common to link together liberalism and Bolshevism as equally materialistic and person-denying. 
                                                
117 Robert Francis, Thierry-Maulnier, Jean-Pierre Maxence, Demain la France (Paris, 1934), 153. Francis and Maxence were 
outspoken Catholics; Maulnier one of Maurras’s atheist followers.  
118 Friedrich Muckermann, “An Ernst Jünger,” Der Gral 27 (November 1932), 81-6, here 84-5.  
119 Pierre Gan, “Communisme et humanité,” Revue du Siècle 1, 7 (November 1933), 89-94, here 91; Benito Mussolini, 




Within the Jeune Droite, Henri Daniel-Rops, Thierry Maulnier, and Fabrègues himself were arguing 
this way already in the spring of 1933, and we’ve seen Hildebrand doing the same in 1933.120    
 But it was the political events of 1934 that allowed these disparate strands to come together 
and create full-blown totalitarianism theory: by 1937, Denis de Rougemont could plausibly write that 
“everyone knows, or at least senses, the meaning of the totalitarian menace: it is the ‘coordination’ 
[‘mise au pas’] of our lives and of every aspect of our lives, whether spiritual or material, in the 
service of the deified State.”121 It was (and remains) a politically convenient tool: the Austrians could 
use it to link together the Bolshevik and National Socialist menace, while the French could use it to 
critique the Popular Front. It had, then, the same critical import for the corporatists as it did for the 
civil-society Catholics, even though exercised in the name of a diametrically-opposed political 
project. This led, incidentally, to some bizarre alliances: Hildebrand, for instance, celebrated 
Maritain’s personalist work in the pages of his journal, whose foremost purpose was to defend a 
corporatist state that Maritain had, in a 1934 manifesto, judged illegitimate and violent.122 Gurian, 
meanwhile, who had no sympathy for authoritarian corporatism, had his Bolschewismus als Weltgefahr 
celebrated in a long, front-page review of L’Echo de Paris, the FNC’s newspaper, two separate issues 
of Christliche Ständestaat, Vaterland (a Viennese legitimist journal for which Hildebrand wrote), and 
Wiener Politische Blätter (edited by Ernst Karl Winter).123 
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 In France, corporatist Catholics came to the terminology en masse in 1934. Pierre Lucius, 
before the rise of Perroux the premier corporatist economist of this milieu, provides a very early 
totalitarian theory in his 1934 volume, Révolutions du Xxème siècle. As with others, Lucius sees 
totalitarianism as a product of bourgeois liberalism. “The nineteenth century was a century of 
anonymity and therefore of irresponsibility, destructive of the human personality,” Lucius judges. 
“Moreover, democracy ignores persons with their character and their own values, it only knows 
individuals.” 124 Once the person is abolished in the name of the individual, which requires the 
abolition of all the intermediary bodies that Lucius’s corporatism sought to reinstate, the ground had 
been paved for totalitarianism, the menace common to Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Bolshevik 
Russia. In these regimes, “the state is everything for everyone: it is ‘totalitarian.’”125  
 The quotation marks around the term indicate that Lucius saw himself to be applying a 
familiar word in an unfamiliar way; they also appeared in an article for Fabrègues’s Revue du Siècle that 
Lucius published in Spring 1934.126 Over the next year, however, the quotation marks could 
disappear, as Catholics from across the corporatist spectrum adopted the terminology. It appears in 
Demain la France (1934), a manifesto of sorts collectively authored by three major Jeune Droite 
figures and dedicated to the fallen heroes of February 6th: although the French state is in drastic need 
of reform, they argue, “the French should not, at any price, let themselves be seduced […] by the 
barbarian myth of the totalitarian State.”127  In the inaugural November 1934 issue of Fabrègues’s 
successor journal, called Revue du Xxème siècle, Pierre Loyer could refer without quotation marks to 
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“the example of the totalitarian regimes: Russia, Italy, Germany.” (The article was, incidentally, 
devoted to criticizing the Popular Front)128 In December, the royalist Courrier Royale, to which central 
Jeune Droite figures were contributing, warned against the “totalitarian étatisme” that was the 
necessary consequence of the denial of the corporation.129 Two months later, in January 1935, 
“totalitarianism” had truly arrived in the Jeune Droite’s central organ at the time. Jacques de Broze, 
in his “Essay on the Notion of the State,” picks up on all of Lucius’s themes, theorizing a 
personalist, corporatist state as the only antidote to the liberalism-totalitarianism nexus.130 That issue 
contained three other articles discussing “totalitarianism” in a similar way.131 In July 1935, Marcel 
Prelot, in a lecture at the July 1935 Semaines Sociales conference dedicated to the “corporative 
order,” warned against “turning corporative organs into organs of the state: that is totalitarian 
étatisme.”132 A later account of the whole week of courses summarized it this way: “two adjectives, 
designating systems of government, were placed side by side: corporatist and totalitarian.”133 By 
1937, when the corporatist Paul Chanson used it in his anti-Front volume, Communisme ou 
corporatisme?, the usage was well established.134  
 Through a closer look at Jean de Fabrègues and François Perroux, we’ll see that their notion 
of totalitarianism mapped closely onto that of their civil-society ounterparts. Fabrègues began using 
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the theory himself in a March 1935 article in Credo, an organ of the FNC. “Whether they take place 
in Berlin or Moscow,” Fabrègues writes, “the ‘parades’ or ‘mass demonstrations’ have a common 
end: to take the participants to such a degree of sentimental exaltation that they forget their personal 
reasons, where only the suggestion of the milieu remains.” This reformulation of man takes the Nazi 
and Bolshevik state far beyond the confines set for them by nature. “All the ‘totalitarian’ revolutions 
of the twentieth century rapidly became spiritual, and not merely political.”135 Fabrègues was more 
explicit in a 1937 article, called simply “The State and Man,” that he wrote for Combat, a journal he 
co-edited with Thierry Maulnier. “Every week that goes by,” he lamented, “the power and prestige 
of the State increases across the globe.” This is true both in the “totalitarian nations” and “those 
nations, France for example, that presume themselves to be ‘democratic.’” To clarify, he turns to the 
twofold definition of the state proferred by the Société Française de Philosophie: first, organized 
moral society in the service of a collective destiny; second, an institution that delivers services to the 
population. In the totalitarian societies, the first version predominates and demolishes the person in 
the name of the “sacred and all-powerful State.” The France of the Popular Front, in contrast, has 
developed the second definition of the State to the point of absurdity: French citizens see the state 
as a vast storehouse of goods, there for their material benefit. “The State of the Popular Front can 
only be regarded, today, as the means of satisfying the demands formulated last May [i.e. May 1936, 
the date of Blum’s electoral triumph].” Both of these versions of the state are pathological: one 
makes of the state too much, and the other too little. What is required is the Catholic, corporatist 
solution: “today, what is required is a return to the state of its free power.”136 
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 Fabrègues praises François Perroux for his adoption of totalitarianism theory: he “dares to 
say that the first revolutionary French state, that of the Jacobins, was essentially totalitarian.”137 
Perroux had begun using totalitarianism theory in 1935, in the first edition of his book on National 
Socialism.138 It was used only in passing, though, in that book; for the second edition of 1940, it was 
used more liberally. In the interim he had employed it in a 1937 article in La Vie Intellectuelle on the 
corporatist state to come, and more fully in his landmark 1938 volume on corporatism.139 At that 
point, it entered the center of his political thought: in a 1938 article, he referred to “the totalitarian 
tendency inherent in each state.”140 
He was one of few French intellectuals to engage with the work of Carl Schmitt, with whom 
he was acquainted.141 His understanding of the “total state” closely follows Schmitt’s own, as 
explained in the opening section of this chapter; he was one of comparatively few French readers to 
acquire the language directly from the source. Like other corporatist Catholics, Perroux defined 
“totalitarianism” to mean the total imbrication of the economy and the state. But, adopting a 
distinction Schmitt had broached in his earlier articles for Europäische Revue, Perroux discussed “two 
meanings of the totalitarian state” with “general consequences affecting the relationships of the state 
and the economy.” One of these is the liberal state, which, like others, Perroux felt ended in 
totalitarianism. “The liberal State,” however, “is only totalitarian from the quantitative point of 
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view.” The “new State” of Nazi Germany, on the other hand, is qualitatively totalitarian—
totalitarian “in intensity and in energy.”142 
 While Perroux praises this dynamism, like Fabrègues he felt that the National Socialist 
devotion to the State was tremendously overblown, and they both drew on longer traditions of 
Prussia as the home of the Dieu-État that were traced in Part I. Where Fabrègues referred to the 
“sacred” role of the state in Germany, Perroux claims that it has “divinized” the Aryan race.143 It was 
not even the policies of the state that incensed Perroux, but its étatiste form: “I do not reproach 
National Socialism for promoting an unjust and violent state,” Perroux wrote in 1937, “but rather 
for preaching and spreading a false religion of which the State is both Church and God.”144 This 
étatisme, Perroux claimed, renders true corporatism impossible. “We speak of corporatist 
achievements [in Germany],” Perroux wrote in 1935. “But in fact, employers are not integrated into 
the Work Front [Front du Travail]. Corporatist ideology and terminology are spread only as a 
substitute for, and antidote to, Marxist vocabulary. It is no longer a question of employers and 
employees, but of the Führer and Gefolgschaft [loyalty].”145 Like Fabrègues, then, Perroux thought that 
while Nazi totalitarianism might be superior to flaccid democratic étatisme, it was still rooted in the 
heretical denial of natural communities that could only flourish in a corporatist order. Corporatism 
was, for Perroux, the only antidote to totalitarianism: the Nazi state, he wrote, “is not corporatist or 
ständisch but totalitarian in the most oppressive sense of the term.”146  
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 A similar version of totalitarianism theory could be found amongst Austrian corporatists, 
even amongst its leaders: Schuschnnigg himself declared that “the Catholic spirit of our nation […] 
would clash with a totalitarian state ideology.”147 “G.P.U. and Gestapo,” wrote one of its 
contributors, providing perhaps the first lexical totalitarianism theory, “begin with the same 
letters.”148 “Totality,” wrote one of the journal’s contributors in 1935, “is a concept that, today, 
everybody needs.”149 Hildebrand went out of his way to ensure that these needs were met: his 
journal was constantly filled with anti-totalitarian invective against the theories of Schmitt and 
Spann. Recall that the journal’s mission was to support Austro-fascism against Nazism, and their 
sympathy for Italy’s project: the remarkable feature of the journal’s rhetorical stance, like that of the 
Jeune Droite, is that these corporatist fascists chose “totalitarian” as the name of all that they 
opposed—all that put God’s order at risk. Joint opposition to Nazism and Bolshevism was the 
mission of the journal from the beginning: “Christliche Ständestaat,” the journal announced in one of 
its earliest numbers, “designates Austria as the state destined to serve as the Christian bulwark 
against Bolshevism and National Socialism.”150 They came to the term in the winter of 1934-5—that 
is, at about the same time as the French corporatists and the civil-society Catholics discussed in the 
previous chapter. Aurel Kolnai, a Hungarian student of Scheler who we have met before, discussed 
Spann’s “Totalitarismus” in November 1934, for instance. In early 1935, at least two articles 
appeared that were explicitly on the theme of “totality,” while another spate of anti-totalitarian 
articles appeared in the fall of 1935. By that point, the language had become ubiquitous in the 
                                                
147 Gellott, “Defending Catholic Interests in the Christian State: The Role of Catholic Action in Austria, 1933-1938,” 
148 Otto Maria Karpfen, writing in 1936. Quoted on Martin Kugler, Die frühe Diagnose des Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt, 
1995), 146. 
149 Sepp Aigner, “Totalität,” Christliche Ständestaat 2, 11 (17 March 1935), 259-61, here 259. 




journal: even dyed-in-the-wool traditionalists, like the aged nobleman Hans Karl Zessner-
Spitzenberg (who had written for Eberle’s Neue Reich) were wielding the term, and Hildebrand 
himself used it constantly in his articles. In 1937, when the Viennese art historian Leopold Zahn 
sought to characterize the difference between the two Germanies—i.e., between noble, Austrian 
tradition and barbaric Nazism—he organized his thoughts around the theme, “The Totalitarian and 
the Universal German.”151 
“I assume,” Hans Barion wrote to Schmitt in 1934, “that Mr. Niermann has sent you the 
interesting article from Christliche Ständestaat, probably written by Dietrich von Hildebrand, in which 
our suspension [referring to Barion and Eschweiler’s suspension from priestly duties] is explained as 
a strike—against you.”152 This was not out of the ordinary: Hildebrand and his colleagues lost no 
opportunity to lambast Schmitt, whom they, like Gurian and Perroux, considered the most able and 
therefore most dangerous intellectual defender of the National Socialist regime. Their other major 
opponent was Othmar Spann: together, Spann and Schmitt were the theorists of Totalität against 
whom the corporatists judged their own personalist, anti-totalitarian Catholicism.153   
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Aurel Kolnai—the Hungarian student of Husserl and Scheler—launched in 1934 a two-part 
attack on Spann, rehearsing arguments he had made in an earlier article in Abendland. One novelty, 
though, was Kolnai’s adoption of the language of Totalitarismus, which was still extremely rare in its 
noun form; he also emphasizes now that Spann’s theories bring him close to Bolshevism, which he 
considered to be, as Hildebrand had put it a few months earlier, “the brother of Nazism.”154 Spann 
was a lightning rod for Austrian critics of Nazism, as his theories of Totalität seemed to polemicists 
then, as to some scholars now, to prefigure the totalitarian denial of rights: Karl Polanyi, in an 
English-language discussion of Spann in 1935, in fact translated “Ganzheitslehre” as 
“Totalitarianism.”155 “Spann,” Kolnai wrote, “is the philosopher of the total state in the most 
challenging and thoroughly metaphysical sense.”156 Kolnai’s critique of Spann is familiar, and 
essentially unchanged from a similar article he wrote for Abendland in 1929: Spann denies the “the 
fate of the person” by destroying the legitimate sovereignty of the intermediary bodies between man 
and der wahre Staat, etc. Like Fabrègues and others, though, Kolnai also emphasizes that the 
totalizing of the state leads paradoxically to its demolition: “Totalitarianism, in Spann’s work, is that 
which destroys and atomizes the state.”157 
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In Schmitt’s case, too, it was his theory of the total state in particular that incensed the 
journal’s writers. The first major article on Schmitt, written by the sociologist Richard Behrendt, was 
called simply “The Totality of the Political.”158 The journal’s most extended attack of Schmitt 
appeared in a remarkable article, probably written by Franz Blei and infused, as were Gurian’s anti-
Schmitt pieces, with emotion and disappointment: “How,” Blei wondered, “could this Roman 
Rhenish Catholic [note the adjectival order!], who wrote the classic Roman Catholicism and Political 
Form, succumb to the Leviathan-state?”159 Blei gives a somewhat personal account of Schmitt’s 
increasing misanthropy and Protestant tendencies, which led him to hitch his wagon to whatever 
star—first Schleicher, then von Papen—that seemed to share his contempt for the masses. But then 
he found Hitler: “In this way, Schmitt sought and found the man who had the masses, but lacked a 
theory of the state.” This theory was, of course, that of the total state: “As a publicist, Schmitt has 
since 1933 restricted himself to doing everything possible to defend his indefensible theory of the 
total state.”160  
Hildebrand, as the journal’s leading intellectual, provides what we might think of as the 
official version of the journal’s totalitarianism theory. Like others, he was equally opposed to Spann 
and Schmitt as knights of the total: in a sense, his political theory had been predetermined from the 
beginning by his opposition to Schmitt, whose work had occasioned Hildebrand’s first forays into 
the world of political theory. His critique should not, at this point, be surprising: like Kolnai, he saw 
the two heresies yoked together by “anti-personalism,” which turned the “community” into a 
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“mass.” Moreover, like every other Catholic totalitarian theorist, he saw the totalitarian threat as 
endemic to the logic of secular liberalism:  
Modern anti-personalism, as it confronts us in Bolshevism and National Socialism, 
is, as we have already demonstrated time and again, not an overcoming of liberal 
individualism, but rather its last and most radical consequence.161 
 
“This purely instrumental conception of the human person,” Hildebrand explained in July 1934, 
“conforms with the idea of the totalitarian State, that is to say a state […] which must speak the last 
word over all other communities, such as family, marriage and church.”162 In these terms, in both 
France and Austria, the paradox of an anti-totalitarian fascism was forged. In Part III we will see 
how this translated, surprisingly well, into the anti-totalitarian, Cold War federalism that would be 
the pre-eminent political position of conservative Catholics in both France and Germany. 
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Part III: The Church Triumphant, 1938-1950 
 
If neither individualism nor totalitarianism, then what?  
--Abbé Bruno de Solages, 19371 
                                                
1 Bruno de Solages, “Personnes et Société: leurs rapports,” La personne humaine en peril, 229-50, here 242 (reprint of an 




Chapter 6: Catholicism, Neoliberalism, and the Prehistory of the 
Cold War, 1938-44  
 
We must begin with the ruthless insight that whoever does not want collectivism must want the 
market economy. 
--Wilhelm Röpke, 19442 
 
 One sleepless night in 1946, a Catholic economist named Daniel Villey was visited by the 
restless spirit of John Stuart Mill (or, at least, so he reported in his book, Redevenir les hommes libres, 
published that year). Luckily for Villey, Mill’s spirit was a benevolent one, generous with his wisdom 
and insight into France’s postwar difficulties. There were some significant differences between this 
spectral Mill and the historical one: Villey’s Mill had not corresponded with Comte, had not married 
Harriet Taylor, and had not become a socialist in his later days. Instead, “without renouncing 
anything from his first vision of the world, he had met Christ and adopted the Catholic faith.”3 In a 
long disquisition, Mill explains this change of heart by arguing that Catholicism alone is capable of 
defending liberalism, properly understood. The true Catholic, like the true liberal, recognizes the 
utter insufficiency of all human truths. They each see that purely human plans are doomed from the 
start; they each see that all towers follow the blueprint of Babel. This had immediate political 
consequences, Mill explains: “‘Beware,’ [Mill] told me, ‘the invasion of collective ends! […] 
Everyone in his own fashion, and in his own language, affirms the preeminence of collective ends, 
and is prepared to immolate the individual on their altar. On this point as with others,” Mill 
concludes, “not only the Soviet propaganda machine, but that of almost all democratic parties is in 
step with Adolf Hitler.”4  
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This signals a new stage for Catholic social thought: their dreams were no longer haunted 
only be the specters of evil competitors, but by the friendly spirits of liberals. In the face of 
catastrophe, Catholics were learning to look outside their own tradition for allies against the 
totalitarain onslaught. In the years after 1945, Christian Democratic parties, devoted to liberal forms 
of economic governance, would rise to power across the continent, while the Cold War West in 
general dedicated itself to a peculiarly Christian form of social-scientific discourse.  
Many non-Catholics huddled under the capacious umbrella of “Cold War Liberalism” were 
engaged in similar projects. This same sense of secularism’s exhaustions can be found in the work of 
influential theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr, but also in less religiously-motivated writers like Isaiah 
Berlin, Carl Friedrich, George Kennan, Karl Löwith, Jacob Talmon, and Eric Voegelin. They arrived 
at what we might call the “liberalism of anxiety” or the “liberalism of despair”: a realist liberalism 
alive to the imperfectabilities of human nature and the totalitarian dangers lurking at the heart of the 
modern project as announced in 1789.5 Cold War liberals, as Jan Werner-Müller has pointed out, 
tended to subscribe to some form of value pluralism, meaning that they did not believe that any 
single way of life—including a secular one—could be prescribed as best for everyone. The attempts 
to instantiate secular utopia had ended in violence; the best that the political order could do was 
“piecemeal social engineering,” avoiding the hopeless crusades for equality or justice writ large that 
had, they believed, marred preceding decades.  
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Many politicians, both American and European, were equally convinced that the totalitarian 
nightmare of the war had been a result of secular hubris run amok.6 Konrad Adenauer, Robert 
Schuman, and other Christian Democrats used apocalyptic language to describe the nature of the 
burgeoning Cold War.7 In America, too, Cold War rhetoric quickly took on a Christian tone, while 
Britain was experiencing the first inklings of evangelical revival.8 “Both religion and democracy,” 
Truman proclaimed, “are founded on one basic principle, the worth and dignity of the individual 
man and woman.”9 American liberals imagined themselves partaking in a “War of Civilizations,” 
figuring the Soviet Union as the atheistic enemy of civilization. In January 1939, Roosevelt 
announced his aim to seek “an international order in which the spirit of Christ shall rule the hearts 
of men and of nations.”10 Harry Truman was a major figure in this discourse, speaking in 1946 of 
the “fundamental unity of Christianity and democracy”; similar statements were made in Britain, too, 
and became numbingly familiar as the Cold War wore on.11  
All of this is, or should be, very surprising. This chapter will begin to tell the story of the 
Catholic-liberal rapprochement, focusing on the period 1938-1944. We already know that Catholics 
and liberals collaborated in the Cold War, but, in the absence of this prehistory, it becomes easy to 
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chalk this up to historical expedience, as though the Americans were simply able to purchase 
whatever sort of political ideology they chose. The Catholic-liberal alliance, however, went deeper 
than that. Once we move the timeframe back a bit, we reach the unsurprising conclusion that the 
Catholic-liberal alliance was not carried out in the name of “democracy” as a state form. In the 
specific context of late 1940s Europe, Catholics and neoliberals were convinced democrats, but this 
was for contingent reasons: they harbored deep suspicion of parliamentary governments. Once we 
see this, the trajectory of Cold War liberalism and European reconstruction appears in a new light. 
Specifically, we can see that Cold War liberalism, whose origins can largely be found from within the 
Vichy regime itself, was tied to authoritarian politics from the beginning. It is often believed that 
Cold War liberalism began as a stridently anti-Communist and noble dream, before turning towards 
military solutions and dictatorial politics in response to the global crises of the 1950s and 1960s, 
notably the quagmire of Vietnam.12 There is more, though, to the story: Cold War liberalism is tied 
to interwar crisis, and suspicion of democracy, from its origins. 
These works, however, are unsatisfying in some ways: they show that the voting masses were 
swayed by religious rhetoric and symbols, and they show that politicians perceived, or pretended to 
perceive, the Cold War as a spiritual battle. But in what ways does this, fundamentally, matter? 
Religion, these works show, is empirically present, but to what end? Modern states, especially those 
constructed after 1945, exercise power by means of economic organization and planning. State 
bureaucracies matter much more, in the end, than do intellectuals and the symbols they wield. 
This question has never been satisfactorily answered, which allows accounts from political 
scientists and economic historians to completely overlook the religious dimension. Consider, for 
instance, Neil Brenner’s New State Spaces and Barry Eichengreen’s European Economy after 1945. I take 
                                                




these to be two exemplary accounts of post-1945 European reconstruction. They come from quite 
different perspectives: Brenner from neo-Marxist critical geography, Eichengreen from economic 
history. Neither of them are at all interested in the role religion plays here: the fact that they are 
talking about times and places that were governed by Christian Democratic parties, and all of the 
Christian symbolism uncovered by the last generation of historians, is allowed to go completely 
unmentioned—and the reader feels that nothing significant is missing. So, again, in what way does 
religion actually matter?13 
In Part III of the dissertation, I will hazard an answer. Catholicism mattered in two distinct, 
but related ways. First, as a discourse of legitimation. Nearly every consideration of post-1945 European 
politics has marveled at the consensus and stability of those years: there were no longer massive 
groups of voters and soldiers clamoring to tear down the parliamentary order. In the 1930s, at least 
three major transnational movements were scrapping over the wreckage of the old order: 
Communists, Fascists, Catholics. Only Catholicism survived unscathed in Western and Central 
Europe. It mattered enormously that Catholics believed in the legitimacy of the new regimes: it was 
not written in stone that any of these movements would survive and support an Americanized, 
consumerist, democratic Europe. The fact that Catholics did was absolutely necessary to the 
maintenance of the new order. Second, as a strategy of governance—in other words, as a social science. 
In many ways, which will be explored in upcoming chapters, regimes adopted recognizably Catholic 
principles. The vogue for European federalism, the relatively small scale of economic 
nationalization, the protection of the nuclear family as the unit of welfare, and more: these principles 
survived, mutatis mutandis, from the Catholic tradition as it had existed for decades. This is all very 
abstract, of course, and in the rest of the dissertation I will add some flesh to these brittle bones. 
                                                





To understand these phenomena, we will have to look far beyond the world of Catholicism 
itself. Catholicism’s triumph did not come, like Stalin’s, on the battlefield. It was a war of hearts and 
minds, yes, but it was also a war of diplomacy. Catholics selectively presented their own history in 
order to win the goodwill of Americans, and they were willing to collaborate with other social 
theorists (particularly economists) whom they did not deem a threat. In this chapter, we will see how 
they began to forge ties with other social theorists against a common enemy. The magnitude of this 
phenomenon should not be overlooked: the neoliberals were themselves either secular or Protestant, 
and there was scarce precedent for this form of collaboration.  
In this chapter, also, we will also see how the corporatist and civil-society positions began to 
approach one another. To reiterate, these were relatively distinct positions in the 1930s, and these 
differences had largely disappeared by the 1940s. Of course, a major factor here was the 
disappearance of (most) authoritarian Catholic regimes. In a Europe split between occupying armies, 
Salazar-style corporatism seemed hopelessly out of touch. This was not, though, solely a result of 
power politics and geopolitical realities. Again, ideas mattered. The unifying rhetoric of 
“personalism” and “anti-totalitarianism” paved the way towards collaboration. We can see the sides 
moving together in the late 1930s, insofar as both groups were enthralled by the possibilities of 
neoliberal economics. The neoliberals provided, in other words, a path between civil-society and 
corporatist Catholicism. For the civil-society Catholics, it provided a language for them to return to 
politics: a truly political language that was anti-totalitarian without tending towards the heretical 
political theologies of the corporatists. For the corporatists, it provided a ready-made social-scientific 
discourse that bore many similarities to their own theories and had the added benefit that it would 
survive the collapse of their regimes. If politics had split Catholicism into two parts, social science 




This chapter will be broken into three parts. The first will analyze neoliberalism in its own 
right, focusing on their main tendue to the Catholics. The second will turn to the corporatists: post-
Anschluss, they were centered in France, so we will be looking at Vichy France and the growing ties 
between Jeune Droite, corporatist Catholicism and neoliberalism. The third section will turn to the 
civil-society Catholics: they were nourished by the addition of a clutch of Austrians, newly-
convinced, for obvious reasons, that Catholic corporatism was not the panacea they had dreamed 
for. 
Neoliberalism and Christianity: Raymond Aron and Wilhelm Röpke 
Liberalism would not seem like a likely partner. Even though most were rejected, plenty of 
feelers were sent out between Catholics and socialists, Catholics and Communists, and Catholics and 
Fascists in the 1920s and 1930s. But Catholics and Liberals? There was some nineteenth-century 
precedent, but for half a century liberalism had defined itself as the other of Catholicism. 14 
Regardless, liberalism did not seem like a growth industry in the 1930s: its failure seemed obvious, 
and the great liberal parties of the past either lay in ruins or in alliance with a Blum régime that was 
clearly not liberal in any recognizable sense. The failure seemed obvious to liberals, too, so 
“neoliberals” arrived to salvage their tradition, updating it for a new age of “postcapitalist” economic 
management. Neoliberals accepted the critique of the laissez-faire state: they were creatures of their 
time. They theorized a liberalism that would protect the market without falling prey to the 
monopoly-capitalism and obvious market-failures of past laissez-faire models—a liberalism in which 
the state would play a role, but a small one. In the world of the 1930s and 1940s, Catholics were 
their only allies: no other social theory, or electoral force, believed in private property and the limited 
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state. As we will see in this section, neoliberals aggressively courted Catholic opinion, and the 
embrace was returned.  
The founding moment of neoliberalism was the Colloque Walter Lippmann, a conference 
convened by Louis Rougier in Paris in 1938 to discuss the work of the American journalist. It 
brought together Raymond Aron, Wilhelm Röpke, and others who were in the process of 
retheorizing liberalism, both political and economic, for illiberal times. Although there were some 
links between the neoliberalism of 1938-44 and that of today—Villey was Milton Friedman’s 
immediate predecessor as president of the Mont Pèlerin Society, for instance—the differences 
outweigh the similarities.  
Neoliberals differed from classical liberals in two major ways. First, the state: neoliberals  
were harshly critical of the much-ballyhooed “night watchman” state. To stick with that metaphor, 
they wanted to bring the state out of the night and into the full light of day, directing traffic and 
making its sovereign presence felt throughout society. Like Catholics, they felt that the economistic 
approach of their forebears, and their belief that a free market would naturally and necessarily lead 
to just outcomes, was naïve. Louis Rougier—who as organizer of the Colloque Walter Lippmann in 
1938 served as a sort of ringleader—declared that  
the liberal regime is not solely the result of a spontaneous natural order as several 
authors of the eighteenth century with their Codes of Nature declared. It is also the 
result of a juridical order that presupposes the legal intervention of the state. 
Economic life occurs within a legal order, one that fixes the regime of property[.]15 
 
In both France and Germany, neoliberals were especially incensed by the formation of trusts and 
monopolies, which the free market and the Manchester state had been helpless to prevent; only once 
the state had come out of the shadows, and dedicate itself to rigorously and fairly setting up the 
preconditions for a healthy market, could a liberal society free from monopolization become a 
                                                




possibility. “If […] we organize the economy of the social body according to the rules of the market 
economy,” declared Rüstow at the 1938 Colloque, “there remain new and heightened need for 
integration to be satisfied.”16 
 In addition, and even more importantly, neoliberals were convinced that the free society 
could not be “value-free”: although the free market, protected by a strong state, remained the 
linchpin of their social vision, they did not think this to be possible without a strong sense of shared 
values and commitments. This is often forgotten about neoliberals, insofar as we tend to 
indiscriminately lump them with unrepentant neoclassical economists. Friedrich von Hayek, to take 
an extreme example, described the necessity of shared values in his Road to Serfdom, and he was far 
from alone. Alfred Müller-Armack, one of the most important German neoliberals, was intensely 
interested in social Catholicism, and had received his doctorate at the University of Cologne (which 
was teeming, as we saw in Chapter 3, with social Catholics). Walter Eucken, perhaps the progenitor 
of German neoliberalism, had already declared in 1932 that modern life could “only be given a 
comprehensive meaning again by religion, by the belief in God.”17 When the German neoliberals 
created their house organ in 1950, they called it Ordo: an explicit reference to the Thomist precursors 
they saw to their own project.  
Louis Rougier’s long career is indicative of this transformation. His major work of the 1920s 
—La scolastique et le thomisme (1925)—was an intervention into the neo-Thomist revival, discussed in 
Chapter 1, from the idealist perspective of Brunschvicg and Alain. It was flagrantly anti-religious, 
condemning Thomism as the half-baked answer to a wrongly-put question. Rougier condemns, 
typically, Aristotle’s realist enterprise along with Thomas’s attempts to salvage it. Whereas Maritain 
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had celebrated the cool, scientific rationality of Aquinas’s work, Rougier dismissed it as “[d]runk on 
the divine,” substituting “mystical delirium” for “passive observation.” English deism, Rougier held, 
constituted one step on the long road from medieval ignorance to secular rationality. 18 By 1938, 
Rougier had begun to alter his reading of Christianity: deism, with its “belief in a natural and 
essential order of human societies,” was decried as the “theological origin of the liberal mystique” 
(referring here to the non-constructive, laissez faire liberalism of the past).19 He was still skeptical of 
Catholic corporatism, but now he argued from a different perspective. He no longer discussed the 
enslavement of the mind, but rather the free operation of the price mechanism; in this regard, the 
corporatism of the social encyclicals was no better than, but also no worse than, the laissez-faire 
liberalism it set out to replace. They both, Rougier held, led directly to totalitarianism.20 By 1949, in 
the work’s second edition, his reading of Catholicism and, particularly, Thomism had improved yet 
again: he added a new appendix, dedicated to the proposition that the liberal economy, properly 
understood, “is in perfect agreement with what the Church calls, conforming to Thomist 
terminology, the economy of the common good.” In this appendix, Rougier performs a detailed reading of 
Rerum Novarum and other encyclicals to show that only Manchester-style liberalism had been 
condemned by the church. His own “constructive liberalism,” on the contrary, was perfectly 
orthodox, and could find in the Church a proud ally. “Whoever condemns socialism as intrinsically 
evil,” Rougier wrote in reference to the Church, “implicitly condemns economic planning 
[planisme].”21  
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 To simplify matters, I will focus on Raymond Aron and Wilhelm Röpke, both of whom 
attended the foundational 1938 Colloque Lippmann. They were also, probably, the two most 
prominent liberal intellectuals in wartime and postwar Europe, and they both engaged in significant 
dialogue with Catholic interlocutors, especially after the war. Aron needs no introduction to the 
contemporary reader: he was doubtless one of the most important Cold War intellectuals. Röpke, 
although unjustly forgotten today, was a major moral compass in postwar Germany and, through his 
influence on Erhard, one of the architects of the social market economy. In this short section on 
their ideas, I will emphasize, first, their rejection of the putative hyper-rationalism of earlier 
liberalism; second, their theories of totalitarianism and democracy; and third, their attitude towards 
religion. 
 Raymond Aron did not follow his mentors into support for the Blum government, nor did 
he believe, with them, in the a priori virtues of democratic governance. “I will not fall, again, into the 
illusions of liberalism or scientism,” he pointedly announced in 1937, as “there are no eternal or 
providential laws which could impose the permanence of a social regime.”22 This declaration was 
made at the opening of a long essay condemning the interventionist economic policies of Léon 
Blum’s Popular Front administration, hinting at the inability of parliamentarism itself to solve 
France’s political and economic woes. Two years later, he delivered an address at the Société 
française de philosophie, itself the chief forum of Third Republic radicalism, on “Democratic states 
and totalitarian states.” Here he argues that, by linking democracy too closely to parliamentarism as a 
legal form, Frenchmen have forgotten its true essence. “I think it would be necessary,” he argued, to 
distinguish “in the idea of democracy between that which is secondary and that which is essential. 
                                                




The idea of popular sovereignty is not an essential idea.”23 Popular sovereignty, he points out, could 
easily lead to despotism: what is required, instead, is legality, and the presence of a public-spirited 
political elite, along with a public that could abandon pacifist decadence and adopt the martial 
virtues necessary to defend liberty in a time of war. Democracy is not a form of government, but a 
regime with “a minimum of respect for persons.” It is, in fact, a form of conservatism.24  
 Once the war began, Aron followed de Gaulle to London, where he edited La France Libre; 
although he did not support Pétain, his support for the revolutionary, democratic tradition remained 
tepid. In 1944, he published an important essay on “The Future of Secular Religions.” Aron argued 
here, as many would in the early years of the Cold War, that totalitarianism was a form of secularized 
Christianity, attempting to incarnate the kingdom of God here on earth, as the utopia of a class or 
race. In French circles, as we saw in Chapter 1, this argument had normally been made in support of 
the counter-revolution, especially in the circle of Charles Maurras and his Catholic supporters. 
Jacques Maritain and Waldemar Gurian, in addition, had made this exact argument about 
totalitarianism in the 1930s. It is striking that Aron’s most prominent muse in this piece was not de 
Gaulle or even Halévy, but Georges Bernanos—a reactionary Catholic novelist, associated for years 
with Maurras—who is quoted three times on the dangers of totalitarianism.25 
 The central claim of the essay is not at all that laïcité should rise up and confront the 
theocratic menace (as previous French radicals from Gambetta onwards had believed), but rather 
that overweening rationalism was itself at fault, at least for Marxist totalitarianism. Socialists believed 
that, through planning, total victory could be claimed over the forces of nature. “In this sense, 
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socialism is, essentially, an anti-religion.” But this anti-religion is bound up with its own doctrines 
and dogmas and utopian visions: “from another point of view, socialism is religion exactly insofar as 
it is anti-religion.”26 The problem of Marxist totalitarianism is not irrationalism: it is not, say, an 
eruption of the ancient Russian menace. The problem with Marxism is that it is “hyper-rationalist”: 
too convinced of the powers of human reason (it is difficult to imagine Brunschvicg or Alain writing 
these words). Totalitarianism, Aron writes, provides a “demonic commentary” on Nietzsche’s 
declaration of the death of God.27 The essay implies, but does not state, that liberalism has nothing 
to fear from a non-secular religion: the danger of the secular religions is that they attempt to 
incarnate the kingdom of God on earth, implying that those who keep God in his heaven are no 
danger to the state. Aron was explicit about this in a 1947 address to German students defending a 
chastened form of liberalism: “What are the philosophical bases of this elementary liberalism? I can 
perceive two: Christian faith on the one hand, and the birth of a virile humanism, which I am 
tempted to call a pessimist humanism, on the other.”28 This pessimist and virile humanism (note the 
language of masculinity and realism that was so central to Cold War liberalism), he’d argued in his 
1944 essay, was only possible after a rejection of older humanist principles.  “Without a doubt, in the 
twentieth century,” Aron lamented, “we no longer believe, as we did in the last, in parliamentary 
constitutions, economic liberalism, or national sovereignty.” These dreams have all collapsed and 
revealed the totalitarian despotism lurking behind the humanist façade. Instead, we must chasten our 
hopes and learn from our fears, retreating from Nietzschean cynicism to a skeptical, anti-ideological 
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politics, attuned to the specific needs of the twentieth century. Particularly, the state must intervene 
in the economy, but without becoming totalitarian.29  
 So with Aron we find an anti-totalitarian liberalism that is skeptical of parliamentary 
democracy, untrammeled reason, and the free market: the same features that animated the 
neoliberalism of Wilhelm Röpke. Röpke was no more smitten than Aron with the tradition of 
nineteenth-century liberalism. His social theory was, as Paul Nolte has argued, infused with “a 
romanticizing transfiguration of the past and a fundamental criticism of modernity.”30 World War II, 
Röpke was convinced, should lead to a rejection of “the liberalism of the past, which has become 
untenable.”31 It was not only empirically untenable, but logically so: Röpke, like Aron, thought that 
previous forms of liberalism had rested on bankrupt cosmologies of natural order.32 He called for a 
“Renaissance of liberalism” which would, in light of the century’s new challenges, give up the 
bankrupt laissez-faire approach in favor of a “liberal interventionism,” in which the state would 
intervene not to control markets but to protect the preconditions of free competition.  
Like Aron, Röpke was an early critic of totalitarianism; indeed, he began using the term 
“total state” as early as 1931, in an article attacking the Tat-Kreis of revolutionary conservatives.33 He 
also saw the rationalism and mass-democracy of the nineteenth century, and the decline in elites, as 
behind the rise of totalitarianism. “Nothing spells greater danger to our entire social system,” he 
wrote in 1933, “than the ‘revolt of the masses’ emancipating themselves from the leadership of an 
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intellectual élite.”34 Civitas Humana (1944), Röpke’s wartime opus, featured a chapter called “Errors 
of Rationalism,” in which Röpke explains that the deification of reason is a heresy at the heart of 
both laissez-faire liberalism and totalitarianism.35 Collectivism, he declared, is “the deadly danger of 
our entire Western [abendländischen] society.”36 So, again like Aron, his liberalism was a kind of 
conservatism. He even suggested dropping the term “liberalism” altogether in favor of 
“Westernism.”37 Liberalism, for Röpke as for Aron, is much more than an economic theory: it is, 
instead, “a social philosophy to which we owe all the few somewhat brighter periods of world 
history, from antiquity to our age, from the Stoa to Spinoa and Goethe.”38 It is not marked, 
primarily, by free markets, but by the protection of rights and the rule of law.  
It is also, crucially, a fundamentally religious phenomenon: Christianity, Röpke argued as 
early as 1933, was an important moment in the genealogy of the idea of “humanity,” essential to his 
expansively-defined liberalism.39 In Civitas Humana (1944), he went even further, tying the rise of 
totalitarianism to a longer story of Protestantism and secularization; he approvingly cites, for 
instance, Maritain’s work on Rousseau.40 “Religious beliefs,” Röpke explained, “are naturally an 
anchor of freedom.” To back up this claim, peculiar for a liberal, he tells a story, following Gaetano 
Mosca, about the “unique position of Christian civilization.” The Christian West is different from, 
for instance, the Islamic East in that we never developed a confusion between theology and politics. 
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Only when they are kept apart can the legal protection of the individual be assured (Villey’s Mill had 
spun a similar tale for him). Christianity is thus an essential part of the West’s liberal heritage; 
without the Church, Röpke claims, Europe would be no more than “an Asian peninsula.”41 The 
argument is not only that Christianity kept the flame of civilization alive through the Dark Ages, but, 
even more, that Christian, and specifically Catholic, notions of theology and politics continue to be 
instructive. Although some Catholics have grievously misinterpreted Quadragesimo Anno as a brief for 
authoritarian corporatism, Röpke argues that it is, instead, “clearly and completely” aligned with 
Röpke’s own neoliberal project.42 Louis Rougier, recall, would make the same argument a few years 
later. It was not only neoliberals who were convinced of Catholicism’s liberal, humanist essence. 
Catholics themselves, and sometimes the last ones we would expect, greeted them with open arms. 
Corporatist Catholicism: Neoliberalism, Federalism, and Vichy 
 Neoliberalism, as described above, would become central to post-1945 reconstruction. 
Neoliberal theory and social science came to power by way of Christian Democracy: Christian 
Democrats could provide the votes and the institutional heft to turn neoliberal theory into welfare-
capitalist reality. This became glaringly clear in the 1940s and 1950s: as we’ll see in upcoming 
chapters, Catholics and neoliberals hosted conferences together and collaborated at the heights of 
political and economic management. But it is also clear from the late 1930s, as I’ll show in this 
section. To reiterate: this is important because it shows that the Catholic-liberal synthesis was not a 
matter of political convenience, or a dictate of American occupation policy (although it was, to some 
extent, both of these things, too). Cold War liberalism did not have to wait for Vietnam to turn 
towards the authoritarian. It was indifferent to democracy, qua political form, from its origins. 
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In this section, I will consider the circle around Jean de Fabrègues and François Perroux. 
They were, recall, leading publicists of corporatist Catholicism, arguing that Catholicism provided 
the proper economic theory that could save France from the twin menaces of liberalism and 
Communism. They both viewed the National Revolution as a breath of fresh air, and had essentially 
been calling for it for years; likewise, they both assumed important roles under Pétain. Perroux, for 
his part, served on a commission to draft Vichy’s constitution, helped to found the Vichy-friendly 
group, Economie et Humanisme, founded the Renaître group, charged with forging the National 
Revolution’s ideology, and participated in a dizzying area of other activities, some financed by Vichy, 
to defend the corporatist revolution.43 Fabrègues was an important contributor to Idées, Vichy’s most 
important cultural journal. It was edited by René Vincent, one of Fabrègues’s comrades-in-arms 
from the Jeune Droite’s glory days in the 1930s; Fabrègues himself went on to found Demain in 1942, a 
Catholic newspaper funded by Vichy’s Ministry of Information. Most of the economic and cultural 
thought contained in the wartime works of Perroux, Fabrègues and others is already familiar to us 
from our account of the late 1930s—they maintained their emphasis on personalism and anti-
totalitarianism, for instance, and Perroux’s La Communauté (1942) is essentially indistinguishable from 
the already-discussed Capitalisme et communauté de travail (1938). I won’t, therefore, dwell on it at great 
length.44 
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Instead, I’ll focus on the ties between these French corporatists and the neoliberals 
described in the previous section. In his article opening up Idées—arguing that the defeat of France 
was a veiled opportunity to recover France’s eternal glory by recalling France to its “feudal and 
federalist” mission—Jean de Fabrègues ends with a reference to Raymond Aron. Fabrègues cites 
and agrees with a passage from one of Aron’s prewar essays in which he had criticized the rationalist 
revolutionary tradition.45 Although this hint of an affinity between Catholic corporatism and 
neoliberalism was tentative— Fabrègues still refers to Aron as a “slightly suspect witness”—it had a 
short history and a long future. The central locus of this surprising rapprochement in the late 1930s was 
the Librairie de Médicis, a publishing house founded in 1937 at the instigation of law professors and 
incipient neoliberals like Louis Baudin and Louis Rougier.46 The Librairie was ground zero of French 
neoliberalism in the late 1930s and beyond. Its primary task was the publication of works critical of 
the Soviet Union and collectivist planning generally—notably the first French translations of 
Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and Lionel Robbins.  
In the context of the time, this meant that the publishing house positioned itself squarely 
against the Blum government and its policy of collaboration with Thorez’s PCF. This was, of course, 
the same motivation driving the corporatist Catholics described in Chapter 5. Perhaps for this 
reason, feelers between the two movements were sent out early and often. François Perroux, who 
published many works with the Librairie, was at the center of this collaboration. He wrote the 
preface, for instance, to Mises’s Le socialisme in 1938, and had known Mises since at least 1934, when 
he traveled to Vienna to take part in the economist’s seminars. 
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The association between the greatest Catholic corporatist—highly sympathetic, recall, to the 
experiments of Dollfuss and Salazar—and the voice of French neoliberalism was not unique. The 
Librairie published only one journal at the time: this journal was Civilisation, edited by none other 
than Jean de Fabrègues. The journal was, in fact, the central organ of the Catholic Jeune Droite in 
1938 and 1939, as historians have recognized (without noting the empirical or ideological 
connections brewing between Catholicism and neoliberalism, which is the journal’s true novelty).47 
“Whereas liberalism has, for many years, been the doctrine that dare not speak its name,” wrote Louis 
Salleron in its pages in 1939, “we have seen, in the last few months, the restoration of the term.”48 
Civilisation and its cadre of Catholic corporatists were among the most enthusiastic advocates of this 
restauration. 
This was not simply a marriage of convenience, but a more fundamental alignment of aims: a 
desire to oppose the Popular Front, and free the economy from the constraints of collectivist 
planning, while simultaneously keeping the state strong enough to maintain stability and avoid the 
chaos of purely laissez-faire liberalism. Observers at the time noted it, too: a 1938 issue of Politique 
étrangère, for instance, provided a joint review of three works of neoliberalism (Hayek, Rougier, 
Lippmann) along with a work of Bouvier-Ajam (a corporatist student of Perroux’s), noting the 
strong and surprising resemblance between the movements.49 Gaetan Pirou wrote, in the same year, 
that innovations in corporatism and liberalism had the result that “the doctrines do not seem so 
distant from one another as they were in the nineteenth century.”50 “The reconstruction of France,” 
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observed one Jeune Droite corporatist, “requires the destruction of Communism.”51 The neoliberals 
couldn’t have put it better themselves. Likewise, and surprisingly, neoliberals were sometimes quite 
sympathetic to the Vichy regime. This is most clear in the case of Louis Rougier himself, who 
remains most famous for his high-profile diplomatic service to the Vichy regime.52 
Louis Baudin, discussed above, was an instigating force behind the founding of the Librairie 
de Médicis, and also published his early works there; he can thus serve as a barometer for the 
publishing house’s general political stance. His L’Utopie Sovietique (1937), one of the first publications 
of the Libraire de Médicis, was an attack on the Soviet experiment and on the Popular Front for 
spreading propaganda While previous liberals had trained their sights on clericalism, Baudin turned 
his on collectivism. The problem with the USSR was that it was étatiste and did not allow for the 
efficiency of the markets. Baudin noted worrying analogues at home: “In France, the Russian 
influence manifests itself primarily in an insufferable obsession with planning [planomanie]: all the 
clients at Café Commerce have their own reform program, which is simply absurd.” This took on a 
moral component, familiar from more famous works of both neoliberalism and Catholicism: the 
Popular Front is importing “Asiatic conceptions […] concretized in the mass. The politics of the 
mass,” Baudin continues, “is contrary to the Latin ideal which consists in the elevation of the human 
personality, in the constitution of an elite which attracts the mass to itself and not at all in a lowering 
of the elite to the level of the mass[.]”53 Note the resonance here with earlier texts from Aron and 
Röpke: a new linkage of liberalism with the classical, Latin past, and a distrust of the masses in the 
name of elites. 
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Baudin went on, like a surprising number of French neoliberals, to support the Vichy 
experiment. For all of its flaws, he wagered, it was at least better than the Popular Front and its 
attendant Bolshevism, and laissez-faire liberalism was so bankrupt that its return was not even 
desirable. Baudin’s own hedged support had been prefigured in his collaboration with Fabrègues’s 
Civilisation, which was, probably more than any other journal, a breeding-ground for future 
Pétainistes.54 He published there twice: first, a reprint of his preface to a work by Lionel Robbins, 
the British neoliberal, which had appeared in translation with the Librairie de Médicis in 1938; 
second, an essay called “The Legend of Liberalism” in a special 1939 issue devoted to new trends in 
liberal thought. In each, he parroted the neoliberal party line, such as it was: a twin rejection of the 
laissez-faire liberalism of the past, and of collectivism. In the Robbins preface, Baudin links their 
newly-fashioned liberalism to the “classical doctrine of Adam Smith,” in an attempt to dislodge it 
from the fanatical liberalism of 1789 which, he argued, led straight to collectivism.55 “The Legend of 
Liberalism” makes the same points, explicitly arguing that there is nothing anti-Catholic about 
neoliberalism. The laissez-faire liberalism of the past, Rougier contends, was certainly anti-religious 
in that it counseled base, individualistic egoism as the source of all-important “personal interest.” 
Interest, though, “has nothing to do with egoism; it is familial, amical, national[.]”56  
The invocation of the family was clearly designed to perk the ears of the journal’s primarily 
Catholic audience. He goes on to draw other connections between neoliberalism and Catholicism: a 
liberal society, for instance, allows the individual to choose between good and evil, without forcing 
the person to pass this fundamental spiritual decision on to a bankrupt bureaucracy. “In the second 
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place,” he adds, “authority remains, and in this way individualism distinguishes itself from 
anarchism.” He references here the neoliberal emphasis on the state as the ordering principle of the 
market, which sets up a firm framework of legality and property without engaging in collectivist 
planning. “When liberalism is understood in this way, the Church is in agreement with it: it admits 
the necessary character of social inequalities and opposes étatisme.” Liberalism, in other words, 
allows for the full development of the “personalité.”57  
Baudin, that is, participated in the neoliberal vogue for Christianity that we see in the works 
of Aron and Röpke. More interesting, though, is the movement from the other direction, hinted at 
by the fact that Baudin was invited to publish in Civilisation at all, or that the journal appeared under 
the auspices of the Librairie de Médicis. This can be traced in the work of Maurice Bouvier-Ajam 
and his teacher, François Perroux. Bouvier-Ajam, one of whose corporatist works featured a preface 
by Baudin, was a Catholic who had supported the right-wing Ligues in February 1934. With many in 
his generation, he turned to corporatism at this time, and he went on to take over the Pétainiste, 
government-supported Institut d’Etudes Corporatives et Sociales (I.E.C.S.) under Vichy.58 It had 
been founded in 1934 and revived, according to Bouvier-Ajam, by Pétain himself, who went on to 
funnel vast sums to the organization. A note prepared by Pétain’s cabinet claimed that “there is 
currently no propaganda more urgent than that in favor of the Charte du Travail and the 
Corporation.”59 Implicitly, this note suggests that there was no propagandist more significant than 
Bouvier-Ajam. 
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While Bouvier-Ajam’s corporatism remained some distance away from Baudin’s 
neoliberalism, the novel fact remains that they were operating in the same institutional-conceptual 
space, and that they recognized one another as brothers-in-arms. Bouvier-Ajam envisioned a 
somewhat more activist state than Rougier or Baudin, believing with Perroux that the state would 
have to occasionally intervene in the market instead of simply guaranteeing it. They were, however, 
both arguing that limited forms of state activism would forestall the onset of Bolshevist collectivism, 
and neither of them were especially concerned about the clerical/anti-clerical axis that had so 
divided earlier generations of French intellectuals. In a time of war and shortage, Baudin suggests in 
his preface to Bouvier-Ajam’s central work of the period, ideally neoliberal liberal economics might 
not work, and the corporation might be a healthy replacement. Baudin, like other neoliberals, 
remained concerned to protect the market price mechanism, and was therefore critical of 
“corporative markets” which merely “mask étatiste control.” Bouvier-Ajam’s solution, which Baudin 
accepts with “gratitude,” is the creation of a corporation of shareholders, which will provide 
consumers a voice in a modern economy without recourse to the state; the state itself, in this system, 
will merely “fulfill those functions enumerated by the classical economists.” In this way, prices will 
“free themselves” and reach “equilibrium.” Most important of all, though, is that it rests on 
“collaboration between the classes, it is an agent of internal peace.”60 
Bouvier-Ajam returned the favor: “it is necessary,” he announces, “to renounce the 
liberalism of the physiocrats and their disciples and propose a constructive liberalism,” referencing 
Lippmann and Hayek by name and, through his invocation of Rougier’s vocabulary, the whole 
constellation of figures around the Colloque Walter Lippmann. This requires an interventionist state to 
protect the preconditions of the market (private property, etc.) and, quoting now from Lippmann, 
                                                




ensure that man is considered as “an autonomous person [une personne autonome].”61 Bouvier-
Ajam is especially keen on neoliberal critique of socialism, and worried about “the totalitarian 
intentions of Communism.”62 Alongside paeans to Catholic luminaries like Perroux and La Tour du 
Pin, we find Bouvier-Ajam citing the pantheon of neoliberal luminaries—Baudin, Rougier, 
Lippmann, Röpke, Hayek, Mises and Robbins—on their critique of socialism and the neoliberal 
belief in the necessity of a strong state. The rapprochment was not yet complete, however: Bouvier-
Ajam is gently critical of neoliberalism, just as Baudin was gently critical of corporatism: 
corporatism, according to Bouvier-Ajam, is attuned with human nature, and provides the positive 
account of human existence and flourishing that is absent from even the most “constructive” of 
liberalisms.”63 The road to future collaboration, though, had been opened. 
 François Perroux, who served on a panoply of Vichy’s cultural institutions, evinced a similar 
attitude towards neoliberalism. Although he was, as a friend and supporter of Mises, generally 
sympathetic to the neoliberal project, he thought that their vision remained too negative. One of his 
projects was Economie et Humanisme, a Catholic social-science organization that sought to bring 
Catholic social teachings together with the most modern social-scientific inquiry. Despite this 
putative modernism, the group—of which Perroux was vice-president—remained closely tied to 
older, Action française-style critiques of secular modernity. Manchester-style liberalism comes in for 
attack in the group’s manifesto, just as it did in the work of neoliberals. Étatiste socialism, for its 
part, is “hardly better” than the liberalism it was meant to replace; it, too, leaves the fundamental 
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problem—the “chronic pathology” of secular modernity—untouched. “Neoliberalism,” though, is 
better than either of these, but still not enough. Only corporatism provided a full response.64  
 Corporatism, though, was on its way out, and Catholic intellectuals after 1944 would turn 
towards neoliberalism in a more full-blooded way, as we’ll see in the next two chapters. Corporatism 
in the 1930s had seemed like a living possibility, as Castelnau’s FNC and the other far-right Ligues 
loomed large and were outspokenly in favor of corporatist economic arrangements. After 1944, 
though, the traditional right wing was completely delegitimized. Or even before: Fabrègues, along 
with much of the French population, began to turn against Pétain in 1943 and 1944. From 1944 
onwards, there was no obvious star to which the French corporatists could hitch themselves, at least 
on the domestic scene. Catholic corporatists did not follow Maurras into sullen silence or Cassandra-
style hysteria. Instead, beginning already in 1943, they began to prepare the new doctrine under 
whose aegis they would sail to new prominence after 1944: federalism. 
 Catholic corporatists became enchanted with federalism around 1944, and it was the new 
discourse of federalism that would pave the way towards a full Catholic-liberal synthesis after the 
war (as we’ll see, neoliberals like Aron and Röpke were equally enchanted by the promise of 
federalist politics). The new forum for their intellectual energies was the circle around La Fédération, 
founded in 1944 but rooted squarely in the personnel and ideology of the National Revolution. The 
connections between La Fédération and the Catholic right of the 1930s are legion: at the very least, we 
could point to Robert Aron, Jean Daujat, Fabrègues, Claude Gignoux, Perroux, C.F. Ramuz, Louis 
Salleron, and Thierry-Maulnier.  
La Fédération, founded as a Vichy journal, served as an incubator of Cold War liberalism in 
general: it brought the defunct ideas of Catholic corporatism into the mainstream. The Catholic 
                                                




reactionaries named above rubbed shoulders with the leading lights of neoliberalism—Raymond 
Aron and Wilhelm Röpke published there—alongside mainstream political actors, notably the 
American ambassador to France. Two of the central ideologues of La Fédération were Max Richard, 
the editor of the journal, and André Voisin, the movement’s secretary-general. Their trajectories 
match those of Perroux and Fabrègues; they, too, show how Catholic reaction morphed into Cold 
War liberalism. Richard and Voisin they were both involved with the Action française in the 1930s. As 
the decade wore on, they both aligned themselves with, and wrote for the journals of, Jean de 
Fabrègues and the Catholic Jeune Droite. After 1940, they both welcomed the Vichy revolution and 
were involved with Bouvier-Ajam’s I.E.C.S., but, like others, they became skeptical of the Pétain 
regime around 1943 and engaged in low-risk resistance activities (this would allow Fabrègues to later 
whitewash his own record65). At that time, they created the Centre technique d’organisation 
professionnelle, devoted to the Christianization of the labor force; this organization, in turn, was the 
basis for La Fédération, founded directly after the liberation.66 It went on to become one of the most 
important Catholic journals in postwar France, and led directly to the foundation of the Union 
Européenne des Fédéralistes, the largest European federalist organization of the later 1940s. As we will 
see in the next two chapters, this mass-based organization was one of the central conduits through 
which Catholic masses came to accept the legitimacy of the post-1945 settlement. The discourse of 
federalism, which fit neatly into accepted canons of both Catholic and neoliberal social science, 
allowed for Europe’s social and economic modernization under the cover of an atavistic social-
economic ideology. Before turning to this phenomenon, we will complete this chapter by exploring 
                                                
65 See, for a particularly flagrant example, Jean de Fabrègues to Stanislas Fumet, 29 November 1949, Fonds Fumet, 
Bibliothèque National Française, NAF28071, Boîte 27. 
66 This information comes from Romain Pasquier, “L’invention de la régionalisation ‘à la française’ (1950-1964)”, Jounée 




the activities of the Catholic intelligentsia in exile, showing how they, too, embraced the new 
doctrine of neoliberalism.  
Democracy in the Deeper Sense: Civil-Society Catholics in America and in the 
Resistance  
 
While French corporatists were supporting Vichy and laying the groundwork for postwar 
federalism, many civil-society Catholics either joined the Resistance or rode out the war in America 
(many of the most prominent French resisters came from Catholic Action67). In our consideration of 
civil-society Catholicism in Chapter 4, we focused on four individuals: Jacques Maritain, Waldemar 
Gurian, Gaston Fessard, and Paul Landsberg. During the war, two of them—Maritain and Gurian—
sought refuge in America, where they championed the anti-totalitarian cause from afar, and began to 
undo the traditional Catholic animus towards the United States.68  Fessard and Landsberg entered 
the Resistance: Landsberg perished in Oranienburg, while Fessard became perhaps the most famous 
Catholic intellectual resister in France. Significantly, Maritain and Gurian were joined in America by 
refugees from the Austrian Ständestaat: Dietrich von Hildebrand, most famously, but also Aurel 
Kolnai (the personalist critic of Spann), Balduin Schwarz, and Carl Oskar von Soden, an old hand 
from the Allgemeine Rundschau and Bayerische Volkspartei circles of 1920s Bavaria. In this section, I 
will consider the ideological development of these figures during the war. In this section, I will trace 
their wartime histories, showing the common threads linking their wartime ideas with the civil-
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society Catholicism of the 1930s, and also showing how civil-socity Catholics, too, were turning 
towards Cold War Liberalism as early as the late 30s.  
One of the attendees at Raymond Aron’s 1939 lecture, on the need for a revitalized 
democracy that would protect the person without getting hung up on popular sovereignty, was 
Jacques Maritain. Gaston Fessard, too, was interested in Aron’s works. They had met in the Kojève 
seminars they both attended, and in a 1938 letter Fessard expressed both a wish to review Aron’s 
works in Etudes, and a worry that he agreed so heartily with Aron that he might be unable to write 
without bias.69 After the war, Aron and Fessard remained close friends. Daniel Villey, whose vision 
opened this chapter, got his start a La Vie Intellectuelle, the central organ of civil-society Catholicism, 
in the later 1930s.  
In some cases, this approach of civil-society Catholicism towards liberalism was apparent 
earlier. In the absence of a credible alternative—the Ligues and the Popular Front were both 
outlawed by totalitarianism theory—liberalism came to seem attractive. Here’s Fessard, in 1937: 
Predictably, because the bourgeois State considers the individual as an atom, as an 
absolute, and because it allows the individual to regulate his own life […], the 
Church can bear to be ignored by it. This ignorance […] is not a negation of its 
existence. But in the modern totalitarian state, which presumes to put all individual 
activities at the service of the community, and does not concede liberty apart from 
this service, this is no longer the case.70 
 
And here is Gurian in 1932, referring to the relativist nihilism he saw at the heart of totalitarianism:  
This relativization succeeds, indeed, with the explicit recognition of Christianity as a 
public power, but it is nonetheless more dangerous to the Catholic than a 
relativization rooted in liberal humanitarianism, which treats the Church as a 
worldview among others.71 
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Although comments like these remained marginal, and were overshadowed by their larger belief that 
bourgeois liberalism was at the very heart of totalitarianism, they do point towards the eventual 
political location of civil-society Catholics after 1945. In 1944, Maritain hoped that “the France of 
tomorrow would be Christian and liberal,” and in a wartime article about totalitarianism Gurian 
approvingly quoted, of all people, Elie Halévy.72 
Even Christliche Ständestaat, the house organ of Dollfuss’s Christian-corporatist regime 
discussed in Chapter 5, found itself supporting the new liberal-Catholic synthesis in the later 1930s. 
One of Röpke’s Swiss newspaper articles about the totalitarian menace was actually printed in 
Hildebrand’s journal in early 1937.73 “Yesterday, Christian conservatism struggled, above all, against 
liberalism and individualism,” Klaus Dohrn wrote the same year. “Today collectivism, in either its 
brown or red shade, has become the primary concern.” Like Röpke, Dohrn stresses that many 
liberal ideals, perverted by the strict rationality of the Enlightenment, “are truly a Christian 
inheritance.”74 
Civil-society Catholics became, in many cases, prominent in the French resistance. Pétain’s 
attempt to inaugurate conservative Christian ideals within a temporal political framework stunk to 
many civil-society Catholics of medievalist heresy. Fessard became one of the most prominent 
Resistance journalists during the war, and certainly the most famous Catholic one: his France, prends 
garde de perdre ton âme (1941), the first pamphlet to appear in the clandestine Témoignage chrétien series, 
was one of the most widely-read resistance tracts in France (Maritain praised Témoignage chrétien in his 
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wartime radio addresses, for instance75). In the pamphlet, he called for resistance to Nazism, 
pointing out yet again its essential similarities with Communism. Landsberg, despite his friends’ 
attempts to help him emigrate, insisted on remaining behind. As he wrote at the end of 1939, 
It is disagreeable to be dominated by a tyrannical state. But, as they say, there is 
always an opportunity to get along with the tyrants, and total war is doubtless more 
immediately, obviously, and perhaps radically dangerous for the happiness of the 
reasoning individual. These false individualists say: a living dog is worth more than a 
dead lion.76 
 
Landsberg practiced what he preached: after being rounded up with other Jews in 1940, he escaped 
and joined the Resistance under a false name. He was then arrested by the Gestapo in 1943 and 
died, as a lion, in Oranienburg in 1944.77  
Meanwhile, in America, Maritain, Gurian, Hildebrand, and others were inhabiting the 
American intellectual landscape in a novel way. Just as the corporatists on the continent were 
turning towards neoliberalism, Catholic refugees were turning towards incipient forms of Cold War 
Liberalism. In other words, they too were forced to look outside their own world, often for the first 
time. Maritain once gave an interview in a Popular-Front journal, which caused an outrage—
Catholics were very much sequestered in their own public sphere in 1930s Europe. In America, 
things were different: one early indication was a “Program of Symposium on Political and Social 
Philosophy,” held at Notre Dame on 4 and 5 November 1938. The symposium brought together a 
healthy number of these same intellectuals: “[Etienne] Gilson, you, me, [Goetz] Briefs, Gurian, this 
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meeting is certainly amusing,” as Simon wrote to Maritain at the time.78 But—and here is the 
novelty—it also included a number of non-Catholics, most prominently Carl Joachim Friedrich and 
Mortimer Adler. This might not seem like much, but in fact this sort of cross-faith cooperation was 
remarkable, and had not been at all the norm in Europe (aside from the contemporary neoliberal 
Catholicism in France).79  
Gurian received a post at Notre Dame in 1937, thanks to Maritain’s machinations. He was 
deeply unhappy there, as his brand of Catholicism jarred with the university’s traditionalism. This 
was evidenced most spectacularly in a 1938 controversy with Arnold Lunn about Gurian’s 
unfashionable sympathy with Maritain regarding the Spanish Civil War (Gurian, Lunn seethed, was 
widely renowned on campus for his “very hostile attitude to Franco”).80 Nonetheless, he escaped 
Notre Dame’s reactionary faculty by founding Review of Politics in 1939, which was one of the most 
important incubators of totalitarianism theory and Cold War liberalism (for both Catholics and non-
Catholics). It provided an early platform for Carl Friedrich, Hannah Arendt, and Eric Voegelin, 
among others, and it was through his role at the Review that Gurian became, as one scholar deemed 
him, “the leading Catholic in the scholarly and scientific emigration.”81 Gurian and his review should 
really be considered as part of the circle at the University of Chicago that included his close friends 
Robert Hutchins, Jacques Maritain, Mortimer Adler, and Hans Morgenthau. Jerome Kerwin and 
Morgenthau attempted to get him hired at Chicago, while his archives are replete with letters 
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informing Gurian that the Review suffers from being linked too closely to a Catholic university.82 As 
was reported in the Notre Dame Scholastic, the journal had more readers at Chicago than at Notre 
Dame anyhow.83  
Maritain had been involved with America, and especially the University of Chicago circle, 
where he was particularly close with John Nef and Mortimer Adler, throughout the 1930s. “It is with 
great emotion that I think about the next trip to Chicago,” Maritain wrote to Nef in 1938. “I have a 
profound sentiment of the great things that happen there, and to work under the leadership of 
President Hutchins and his friends will be a great joy for me.”84 “I love America,” he gushed to 
Adler in 1940, “and I think that, along with France, it is the only country in which I could live.”85 He 
thought that his nation should share his newfound admiration: in 1945 he wrote that France must be 
“turned towards the Atlantic and the New World.”86 His affection was returned: in 1943, he had a 
lavish 60th birthday celebration at the Waldorf, attended by around 300 eminent figures. “Mr. 
Maritain understands America,” Dorothy Thompson declared, “because he understands the 
American dream.”87  
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Maritain, who had been visiting America throughout the 1930s and had many friends there, 
was stranded in New York when war broke out. Tapping into his enormous pool of energy, he 
worked indefatigably in the exile community, writing an enormous amount for American 
publication, including a pamphlet for the Office of War Information that was parachuted into 
France. He rocketed to prestige in both America and France as the voice of eternal, Catholic France. 
Two officials with the United States propaganda service, in their proposal to use Maritain’s writings, 
referred to him as the “foremost living French philosopher,” adding that “he occupies a unique 
position. He is essentially above politics.”88 As always, Maritain jealously guarded his own 
independence: the Chicago and New York offices of France Forever, the American branch of Free 
France, both listed Maritain as a member in their publicity materials. But, as he furiously wrote in a 
letter of 1942, this was an error and he sought desperately to have his name removed.89  
 Dietrich von Hildebrand’s circuitous path through exile led him, finally, to America at the 
end of 1940, where he assumed a post at Fordham thanks to Maritain’s help. 90 Although not nearly 
as prominent in America as Maritain or Gurian—owing, perhaps, to his less certain command of the 
English language—he dedicated himself just as fully to the American project. Once Italy left the 
League of Nations in 1937, his journal had declared that the only hope for Christian, Western values 
lay in America.91 Once in America, he did not have to alter his ideas overmuch to translate them into 
the new political context, or even stop praising Dollfuss. “Every Catholic should understand,” he 
announced in a radio address, “that Nazism is primarily an anti-Christian movement, that it is the 
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most anti-Christian Revolution the world ever witnessed.”92 He published little during this period, 
owing at least in part to the destruction of an anti-totalitarian volume called The Hour of Judgment in 
May 1940 (following the French invasion of Paris).93 
 This is not the place for a full account of Catholic resistance activities in America or in 
France; that subject deserves a book of its own. Here I would like simply to point out three major 
continuities with the 1930s: personalism, anti-totalitarianism, and an indifference to democracy qua 
political form. In addition to their own works, I will refer to the clearest expression of the incipient 
Cold War Catholicism in wartime America: Devant la crise mondiale, a 1942 manifesto signed by 
Gurian, Hildebrand, and Maritain, along with about 40 other prominent Catholic exiles (published in 
Commonweal as, simply, “Manifesto on the War”). Maritain did not write the original draft, but he did 
revise it substantially, and he was the point of contact for the diverse group of participants. The 
manifesto went through multiple drafts, with signatories coming and going as the months dragged 
on (one referred to the “idiot manifesto” that Maritain had been forced to salvage94). Hildebrand, for 
his part, was in charge of gathering Austrian signatories.95 The end result was a compromise among 
warring tendencies within the emigré community, and very few of its signatories, least of all Gurian, 
were completely pleased with it.96 It does, for all that, perfectly express the three basic features of 
civil-society Catholicism, and its Atlantic successor. 
                                                
92 Undated radio address, clearly from sometime between 1941 and 1945. In the same address, he obliquely compares 
Dollfuss with Christ. Nachlaß Hildebrand, Mappe XII.7.  
93 Alice von Hildebrand, Soul of a Lion, 302. 
94 Yves Simon to Maritain, 6 November 1941, Box 18, Folder 3, Maritain Archives, Jacques Maritain Center, Notre 
Dame. 
95 Dietrich von Hildebrand to Jacques Maritain, 1 May 1942, Box 18, Folder 3, Maritain Achives, Notre Dame. 




First, personalism: for all three of these figures, the “person,” with all of its implicit politics, 
remained at the center of their moral-political imagination. In his articles (including several in 
Gurian’s Review), books, and radio addresses, Maritain consistently recommended the “human 
person” as the subject of a healthy society, and the name of that for which we fight. For instance, in 
a 1943 radio broadcast he tasks both socialists and anticlerical rationalists with valuing “economic 
technique and the machinery of the State before the consideration of the human person.”97 Gurian, 
in addition to publishing a bevy of personalist articles in his own journal, wrote a popularization of 
Maritain’s thought for another one: “The salvation of the person,” he writes, “lies beyond the 
temporal good of society, though a rightly ordered society is not in opposition to the end of the 
person, but a way of attaining it.”98 Hildebrand, for his part, recapitulated his personalism in a radio 
address, and told his Fordham students in 1941 that the great sin of modernity, as exemplified most 
clearly in Nazism, was “a disrespect of the intrinsic value of the spiritual person.”99 The 1942 
manifesto, the central document of Catholic discourse during the war, continually discussed “the 
rights of the human person.”100 
 Second, anti-totalitarianism: as is fitting for the whole discourse’s originators, Catholics 
remained at the forefront of totalitarianism theory during the war (it had, of course, begun to spread, 
primarily into liberal circles). Even Villey’s summoned J.S. Mill warned against the danger of 
“totalitarianism.”101 In “The End of Machiavellianism,” Maritain claimed that any politics that failed 
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to subordinate politics to ethics would fall prey to “totalitarian rule and totalitarian spirit,” which had 
lurked within the modern project since the despised Florentine himself.102 Hildebrand, too, retained 
his earlier usage of the term as the name of the antipersonalism threatening Christian civilization: "In 
the present moment,” he wrote in 1942, “we are called as Catholics firstly: to understand clearly 
what totalitarianism means.”103 The manifesto that they both signed was, above all, an anti-
totalitarian cri de coeur: the first section is entitled, “Totalitarianism and Its Threat to Civilization,” 
and the first sentence reads, “Totalitarianism, apart from certain externals, holds nothing in common 
with the régimes based on authority which Christian peoples have known in the past.”104 
Gurian remained the most prominent champion of totalitarian theory—which was, recall, 
still a nascent phenomenon at this point. He delivered an address in 1939 to the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association on the congenial theme of “The Totalitarian State,” and wrote a report for 
the American Historical Association in 1942 about “The Rise of Totalitarianism in Europe.”105 Even 
more importantly, his Review of Politics became a sort of home-base for American totalitarianism 
theory. Two important totalitarian theorists—Hannah Arendt and Erich Voegelin—were, per their 
correspondence, influenced by Gurian’s work of the 1930s, while both of them were provided an 
important early platform in the Review of Politics. Moreover, the most prominent totalitarianism 
theorist in the early Cold War—Carl Friedrich—first aired his theory in Gurian’s journal.106  
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The most interesting thing about these Catholics in America, though, is that they retain their 
ambivalence about democracy, even while participating in crusading democratic rhetoric. This is 
possible through a revised understanding of democracy, one prefigured in Maritain’s tendentious 
account of the democracy to come in Integral Humanism (see above, Chapter 4). The 1942 manifesto 
presents an especially clear account of this move. Is this war, the manifesto asks, a war to save 
democracy? 
If by the word democracy you mean the political and social life of a community of free men, 
the answer must be in the affirmative. Not so, however, if you mean thereby some 
particular system or some particular political forms, as they were known, for instance, to 
some European countries under pre-war conditions.107  
 
Later, the manifesto more clearly links its concerns with longer traditions of social Catholic 
teachings: the form of government is irrelevant, but the location of sovereignty is not. The State 
must protect “[t]he freedom of groups and associations of a rank inferior to the State”—i.e. those 
groups that are a member of “civil community.”108 
This is the tack that Catholics would take during and after the war: a defense of democracy 
predicated on a redefinition. Interestingly, and as in Pour le bien commun, the manifesto was shunned 
by dyed-in-the-wool Christian Democrats like Luigi Sturzo. His letter to Maritain defending his 
abstention—doubtless as painful for Maritain as Blondel’s similar refusal to sign Pour le bien commun 
eight years earlier—is worth quoting at length: 
For me, a leader of Christian democracy […], it would be extremely difficult to 
accept the definitions and limitations proposed in the document. I had opposed 
individualist democracy, but if it were necessary to choose between that and any 
authoritarian regime, I would be for the former[.] […] There is, moreover, an anti-
parliamentarian reservation that seems equivocal:  no modern democratic system 
would be possible without a legislative parliament.109 
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This same language is familiar from the 1930s, most famously in Maritain’s Integral Humanism. The 
Maritain of 1936, recall, had been able to defend a “personalist democracy” only by denuding the 
word of its commonly-accepted valence—democracy as a form of governance—and replacing it 
with one more suitable for the Catholic. Democracy, in its new guise, was that form of government 
that protects “persons”: a “community of free men,” whatever “particular political form” they saw 
fit to use. John Nef, Maritain’s close friend at the University of Chicago, and one of the founders of 
the Committee on Social Thought, prefigured this wartime phenomenon when he wrote to Maritain 
in 1936, 
There are already signs of a growing consciousness in France and the United States 
that both Communism and Fascism are false roads, and that the cause of 
Democracy—in the deeper sense—is a good cause even though the older liberalism, 
which the atheists try to identify with Democracy, has failed us.110 
 
 Maritain remained the most distinguished force behind this Leonine redefinition, but 
Hildebrand, Gurian, and others spoke in the same way. In Hildebrand’s consideration of “What is at 
Stake” in the war, he clarifies that the war is not a defense of the American life, nor is it, precisely, a 
war of democrats against non-democrats. He defines the true nature of the war in two ways, one of 
which is unsurprising: first, he defines it as a war of anti-personalism against personalism. Although 
written now in English, and for a new reason, his conception of Antipersonalismus as the sin of 
Nazism and Bolshevism dates from the mid-1930s, as we saw in Chapter 5. But he adds a new 
definition, surprising for a recovering Ständestaat propagandist and explicable only in terms of his 
new context: the war pits totalitarianism against true democracy, “that is to say the observation of 
                                                




the God-given limits of the competency of the state and the inalterable rights of the individual and 
other communities (family, church, marriage).”111  
Gurian was influential primarily as editor of his widely read Review, where, in addition to 
Maritain himself, he published many sympathetic voices. “The modern defense of democracy and 
liberalism,” wrote one of his contributors, in the Maritain/Truman vein, “is a defense of the great 
intellectual achievements of the past. Our ideology is a phase of that cultural continuity which is 
represented in both the ideals of the Church and of the rights of man.”112 In his own writings, 
Gurian came to defend democracy only fitfully, and it was doubtless the war itself that hardened his 
beliefs. In the 1939 lecture on “The Totalitarian State,” referred to above, Gurian is clear that there 
are more forms of governance on earth than “totalitarianism” and “modern democracies”: “the 
assumption that the totalitarian state is the alternative of modern democracy is erroneous.”113 In fact, 
as Gurian had been arguing for years, these two were continuous with one another. “Common 
Good,” he glossed elsewhere, “should be the aim of all regimes and societies. The emphasis on 
Freedom is not central for each good regime.”114 
 As the war began, however, he began to argue that, in present conditions and despite the 
Church’s continued indifference towards political regimes, modern democracy was, in fact, the only 
viable alternative to totalitarianism and thus deserved Catholic support. In a 1940 article in his Review 
of Politics, Gurian issues a clarion call for democracy: the first such brief, for any political form, that 
he had ever written. The same Gurian who had once argued (off the record, of course) for Wirth to 
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establish a dictatorship in Weimar now claimed that non-liberal, non-democratic movements were 
bound to be swallowed up by the totalitarian menace. Traditional authoritarianism—Gurian refers to 
the traditional conservativisms of Germany and Italy, but Pétain and Dollfuss lurk between the 
lines—is a dead project: “The totalitarian movements are superior to all anti-liberal and anti-
democratic moderate and conservative groups, because they have a conscious relation to the 
masses.”115 In effect, he reverses his claim of the previous year that the totalitarianism/democracy 
division was over-simplifying. The month after the fall of France, Gurian’s world of nuanced grays 
crystallized into one of black and white. But his acceptance of democracy remains hedged by an 
account of the spiritual revival it would require: “Not just a democratic legalism but an 
intensification of the belief in liberty, in individual rights, and in the diversity of social groups, will 
pronounce the last word on the future of democracy.”116 Like other Catholics, Gurian here evinces a 
desire to refigure democracy as something other than legal form: after all, Catholics were still bound 
by the Leonine injunction to remain neutral in those matters. Democracy is not a matter of law, but 
of rights and “diversity of social groups” (i.e. protection of family and other subsidiary non-state 
groups).  
The most prestigious thinker in this regard was Jacques Maritain, praised by Gurian in 1943 
as “the most prominent spokesman of those Catholics who looked for a new democracy under 
Christian inspiration.”117 The Office of War Information thought so, too: Maritain was 
commissioned to write a pamphlet on “Christianity and Democracy,” which was parachuted into 
France. This “new democracy” was, rhetoric aside, indistinguishable from the “personalist 
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democracy” of Integral Humanism (1936). “We are looking on,” Maritain declares, “at the liquidation 
of the modern world—of that world which was led by Machiavelli’s pessimism to regard unjust 
force as the essence of politics.”118 Like Gurian, he emphasized a new lack of trust in traditional 
conservatism, which he referred to as a “moderate Machiavellianism”: devoted in some sense to the 
bien commun, but prepared to use unjust means to reach it (only Richelieu and Bismarck are 
mentioned by name, but Pétain is surely meant, too). The secular nineteenth century, though, had 
prepared the “absolute Machiavellianism” of the totalitarians, devoted to nothing but the boundless 
pursuit of power. Traditional conservatives were “overcome and thrown away.”119 
Just as he had argued in Antimoderne (1921) and Integral Humanism (1936), Maritain argued 
that the modern project—which he linked, in 1944 as in 1921, with Rousseau and the 
anthropocentric ideals of 1789—was coming to a crashing end, and that only a renewed Christian 
humanism could salvage Western civilization. As he had done for some time, Maritain was clear that 
the modern project had brought with it certain gains, notably that “civil society” has achieved its 
“autonomy.”120 But these gains are overwhelmed by tragic loss, and Maritain remains skeptical of 
modern European liberalism: “The tragedy of the modern democracies,” he writes, “is that they 
have not yet succeeded in realizing democracy.”121 This is because they have not understood the 
proper nature of democracy. Democrats continue to believe, Maritain writes, that democracy is a 
matter of law and constitutional form. Like Gurian, Hildebrand, and the signatories to the manifesto 
(and unlike Sturzo), Maritain argued otherwise: democracy is a philosophy, a state of mind, and a 
commitment to the rights of the person. “Thus a monarchic regime,” Maritain concludes with a 
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flourish, “can be democratic.”122 Like Gurian and Hildebrand, and all totalitarian theorists of the 
1930s, Maritain continues to condemn nineteenth-century liberalism, which “paved the way for 
totalitarianism.”123 
Maritain’s writings on democracy were matched, almost word for word, by the pope himself, 
in his epochal Christmas message of 1944. For all of the celebration this message has occasioned, it 
is worth returning to it to see how deeply conservative its message truly is. This is one of the only 
places that Pius XII evinced any particular regard for democracy, and even here it is deeply hedged. 
Pius begins his discussion, characteristically, with Leo’s command for political agnosticism, before 
turning, like Maritain, to a deeply hedged notion of democracy. Democracy is not about political 
form, Pius instructs: “democracy, taken in the broad sense, admits of various forms, and can be 
realized in monarchies as well as in republics.” Democracy is not about political form at all, much 
less is it about state control of the economy: on the contrary, it is about the life of “the people” 
expressing itself organically through an elite group of representatives. Pius as ever emphasizes that 
the state should remain weak—unless, that is, we are talking about “Absolute Monarchy,” which he 
explicitly leaves out of the discussion.124  
Like others, Pius XII was studiously silent on issues of economic justice, and did not 
mention the traditional anti-capitalism of Catholic social theory. The rapprochment with America and 
democracy required a reinterpretation of capitalism, matching the new forms of capitalism theorized 
by the neoliberal Catholics across the ocean. The 1942 manifesto, Devant la crise mondiale, included a 
section entitled, simply, “Capitalism is not the issue at stake in this war.” The main purpose of the 
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section is to disprove the Marxist assertion that the war is no more than a cipher for plutocratic 
interests. The manifesto denies this: the war is, after all, about totalitarianism and the freedom of the 
person. The war’s aims and true nature are not economic, but political and spiritual. And although 
unrestrained capitalism is, indeed, evil and anti-Christian, it has also “greatly contributed to the 
development of the material elements of civilization” and, unlike totalitarian Bolshevism, allowed 
the individual to assert his “independence.” “The errors, failings, contradictions of Christian 
principles, springing from capitalism,” therefore, “are themselves certainly less radical and less ‘total’ 
than those of totalitarian doctrines and régimes.”125 
Although one would be hard-pressed to find manifestly pro-capitalistic arguments in the 
writings of Gurian or Maritain, their generally pro-American stance led them to, at the very least, 
cease explicitly attacking capitalism, as they had both done in the interwar period. Gurian shied away 
from economic issues, but his interest in politics and civilizational crisis led him to consistently 
critique the Marxist account of National Socialism as a deformation of capitalism. Instead, both 
Marxism and Nazism were end-results of secularization, political nihilism, and, more proximately, 
the destabilization of WWI; capitalism was no more than a side-effect, for Gurian and, as he 
emphasized in a discussion of Schumpeter, Marxism is more a “pseudo-theological, anti-religious” 
system than an economic one.126 Maritain, for his part, was more explicit: in his essay on 
Machiavellianism, he emphasized that politics, as a branch of ethics, partakes of the logic of 
prudence. For Maritain, as an Aristotelian-Thomist, this distinguishes the messy world of ethics 
from that of divine, metaphysical truth: ethics must, even while not succumbing to the dictates of 
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the world, at least take it into account and act without ignoring context. Maritain turns this into a 
justification for social inequalities, which must be defended, even if unjust, because of the evils 
inherent in any egalitarian politics. Political realism requires “the recognition of the fait accompli […] 
which permits the retention of long ago ill-gotten gains, because new human ties and vital 
relationships have infused them with new-born rights, [and which] are in reality ethically 
grounded.”127 
So here we have a typology of Atlantic Catholicism as it developed during the war: 
personalism, anti-totalitarianism, and a hedged support of democracy, capitalism, and America as 
alternatives to the twin totalitarianisms battling over a ruined Europe. Here, finally, is Cold War 
Catholicism. This is the fruit of a longer development, traced in the previous two parts of the 
dissertation. According to this Catholic tradition, the heresy of modernity is not primarily economic, 
but political. The crisis is not one of capitalism, but of sovereignty, and its most poisonous fruit not 
the monopolistic trust but the sovereign nation-state. “And this is no longer a war of ideology,” 
Maritain announced in a lecture at the New School in 1940. “We are very tired—too tired—of grand 
words, even the best of them.” Christianity and democracy, the two keywords of Maritain’s postwar 
career, have been shuttled out of the realm of ideology into that of “very simple things, very 
concrete and very elementary, about which there is no possibility of compromise.”128 And whether 
or not we think this is the operation of ideology par excellence, these grand words would, a few years 
later and with Maritain’s help, come to legitimate the Cold War and the enthusiastic participation of 
Atlantic Catholicism.  
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Chapter 7: “God Exists, Therefore You May Not Be a Communist”: 
The Rise and Fall of Left-Catholicism, 1944-50 
 
In the concentration camps, and in the backrooms of the inner emigration, oaths were sworn. 
--Walter Dirks, 19501 
 
Every action, in the middle of the twentieth century, presupposes and involves the adoption of an 
attitude with regard to the Soviet enterprise. 
--Raymond Aron, 19552 
 
Ich bleibe, der ich bin. 




 World War II radically changed the fields in which Catholics were operating: Europe in 1944 
was no longer the Europe of 1934, as old quarrels had subsided and American troops held sway 
across a destroyed continent. The various reactionary solutions that had proven so attractive to 
generations of Catholics were, suddenly, off the table. Over the next few years, a new and stable 
postwar consensus would shake itself out, preparing Europe for decades of prosperity and peace. 
This stability did not, however, spring fully-armed from the thigh of war. Europe in the late 1940s 
was a place of competing armies and competing ideas: of the three transnational political cultures 
that had arisen in the 1930s, only one of them—Fascism—was truly defeated. The Socialist and 
Catholic Internationals lived on, and were noisily rebuilding their parties and their periodicals. The 
American and Soviet forces remained in Europe en masse, while Europe’s citizens worked to solve 
the mountains of problems—refugee crises, war orphans, industrial destruction, anti-collaborationist 
violence, and more—that had been left in the war’s wake. While the stable, Cold War Europe that 
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emerged in the 1950s seems now like a fait accompli, it was anything but. In the next two chapters, we 
will see how Catholics interacted with Socialists and Americans, playing an important role in the 
construction of Cold War Europe.  
There were two competing visions of Europe in the late 1940s: we might call them 
Resistance Europe and Atlantic Europe. Millions of Europeans were inflamed by the possibilities of 
the new order that might arise out of the war’s ashes. The war, many thought, might serve as a new 
Europe’s baptism by fire—a Europe of economic justice that would, through a revitalized and 
inclusive socialism, forestall the twin crises of capitalist collapse and authoritarian politics that had 
doomed Europe in the previous post-war period. The Resistance, which had kept alive Europe’s 
ancient flame, would provide both the ideas and the personnel for a Resistance Europe. This 
Europe, though, failed to appear, ravaged as it was by the geopolitical imperatives of an emergent 
Cold War order—an order in which Communists could not take part, rupturing the already shaky 
wartime alliances that were to forge Resistance Europe. By 1949 or so, the outlines of a different 
Europe had taken shape: a Europe divided into two, in which Western Europe turned away, both 
politically and ideologically, from the Stalinism of the East and towards Washington’s lucrative 
embrace. The novel alliances forged in the war and its aftermath crumbled as a series of basically 
conservative parties came to power across Western Europe, committed more to stabilization and 
cautious reform than to triumphant nationalizations and radical uprooting of the bourgeois order. 
“The ancient hopes which flowered and opened out in 1945,” John Berger writes, “had been 
betrayed.”4  
 The two chapters in part III will be dedicated to Catholic participation in the imagination 
and political reality of both Resistance and Atlantic Europe. It will be argued that, due to the history 
                                                




of Catholic thought traced in previous chapters, Catholics were far more interested in and 
ideologically prepared for the liberal, democratic Europe of the Cold War than they were for 
Resistance Europe. The last chapter showed Catholics edging closer to neoliberals and to 
Americans, well before the end of World War II: these moves would bear fruit in the late 1940s, as 
Catholic-liberal synthesis would truly blossom, as the socialists were frozen out. The narrative of 
part III looks like this: a brief efflorescence of Catholic left-ism between 1944 and 1947, succumbing 
to an enormous reassertion of Catholic liberalism, in an Atlantic key, between 1947 and 1950. 
Throughout what follows, it is important to keep in mind that the Catholic Church, and 
Catholic political culture more broadly, mattered during these years, more than it would before or 
after.5 This is obvious in places like Germany, Austria, Italy, and Belgium, where Christian 
Democratic parties came to power. Even in France, the Catholic participation in the Fourth 
Republic would have been unthinkable in the Third. While the French Christian Democratic Party 
itself dwindled in significance, it remains the case that 4 of the first 12 prime ministers were 
Catholics, while Catholics retained a stranglehold on the Foreign Ministry during the Republic’s first 
decade in existence. In the most pregnant symbolic event of the Liberation—the August 1944 
victory parade in Paris—it was two Catholics, de Gaulle and Bidault, who led the march down 
Champs-Élysées.  
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The Church explored new areas of soft power in the postwar years (including France’s first 
televised mass, in 19486). “The temporal power of Pope Pius XII,” Roger Garaudy wrote in 1949, 
“is so great that it is—in a certain measure—comparable to that of Pope Innocent III. […] The 
forms of this temporal power have obviously evolved.”7 In particular, the Church exercised power 
through its alliances with the Americans, which will be explored in the next chapter, and through its 
control over historical memory. This is a huge topic, heretofore largely ignored in the literature: 
there is space here only to note that, through a bevy of publications and papal pronouncements, the 
Church tried, quite successfully, to create an image of itself as the one major institution that had 
been stridently opposed to both Nazism and Communism throughout the war.8 The Pope occupied 
a newly-central place in diplomacy and in public discourse, as his post-1944 pronouncements 
positioned him as an iconic figure, familiar from the prewar past, generally supportive of democracy 
and clear of obvious collaborationism: a set of attributes in short supply in Western Europe at the 
time. 
This chapter will focus on the rise and fall of the Catholic left, chronicling the participation 
of Catholics in the political culture of Resistance Europe, as well as their participation in its collapse 
(from the perspective of the longue durée covered in the dissertation, the latter phenomenon is more 
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significant, and will receive greater coverage). In 1946, a journalist at Fränkische Presse declared that 
the coming rapprochement between socialists and Catholics represented the biggest change in Catholic 
doctrine since the founding of the Church.9 Given the anti-clerical history of the continental left, the 
very existence of such a phenomenon as left-Catholicism casts familiar markers of “left” and “right” 
into question: I will define “left Catholicism” as a form of Catholic religiosity that seeks both the 
nationalization of key industries and collaboration with specifically Marxist socialism. These were the 
factors that truly distinguished left-Catholicism from other forms.  
This terrain has, of course, been charted before, and in far more detail than I can offer here: 
monographs might be or have been written on Catholic trade unions, Catholic newspapers, the 
formation of Christian Democratic parties, and more. What is missing, though, and what I seek to 
contribute, is an understanding of left-Catholicism as a transnational political culture. We have 
studies of left-Catholic political parties, and left-Catholic phenomena like the miniscule “worker-
priest” program or the far larger Mouvement populaire des Familles.10 We have histories of the church 
hierarchy in these years, and of the Vatican’s diplomacy. But what is lacking, for this period as for 
the interwar period, is a history of Catholicism as a transnational political culture: as a vocabulary for 
understanding politics that developed in a transnational way, primarily in the periodical press. This 
chapter will attempt to provide one. While for the sake of brevity and continuity I’ll be focusing on 
France and Germany, it should not be forgotten that the story is Europe-wide: this narrative might 
be expanded to include, for instance, the Union Démocratique Belge or the Movimento dei Cattolici 
Comunisti. 
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Walter Dirks, Emmanuel Mounier, and the Rise of Left-Catholicism 
  
Walter Dirks and Emmanuel Mounier were the figureheads of left-Catholicism in the late 
1940s, and this section will consider them and their journals together (strangely, this has never been 
done, despite the fact that they were in contact and followed such similar trajectories). They were 
both full of hope in the immediate postwar period, filling their sails with the optimism of the 
Resistance. The Church itself was cautiously at one with them: Cardinal Suhard released a statement 
in 1944 declaring that the Church “denounces the proletariat as a wound  … and as the proletariat 
seems to be a direct product of the liberal capitalist regime, how could the Church not desire that 
this regime be structurally transformed?”11 They were the most influential left-Catholic organs of the 
late 1940s: Frankfurter Hefte, with the blessing of the occupying authorities, was one of the publishing 
success stories of the period, with circulation of up to 75,000 copies.12 Esprit, although it was not the 
runaway publishing success of its Rhenish counterpart, was nonetheless highly successful in these 
years, emerging as a major left-wing voice in a crowded leftist scene.  
They were each helmed by figures already known in the Catholic public sphere: Emmanuel 
Mounier, as we saw in Chapter 4, was one of the most infamous Catholic writers of the 1930s. 
Although he famously described himself as “neither right nor left,” there is no doubt that he was 
closer to the left than to the right in the 1930s.13 Walter Dirks had established his leftist chops with 
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less ambiguity: as we saw in Chapter 2, he began his career in the left-Catholic circle of Friedrich 
Dessauer, and he was well-known through his editorial work at Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung. In the 
early 1930s, he was one of few Germans, and even fewer Catholics, to engage seriously with the 
work of Lukács and the young Marx.14 
In France, left-Catholics were largely aligned with tripartisme, the political expression of the 
fevered resistancialisme that was sweeping the nation’s political culture.15 Tripartisme refers to the three-
party coalition that governed France from 1944 to 1947, consisting of the French Communist Party 
[PCF], the socialists [SFIO], and the Christian Democratic Mouvement républicain populaire [MRP]. 
Catholic-Communist collaboration had, as we saw in Part II, been attempted before: in 1937, 
Maurice Thorez had “extended a hand” to the Catholics, only to be completely rebuffed. This time, 
however, the hand was tentatively accepted, as Catholics and Communists both tended the flame of 
Resistance. Georges Bidault, who had been a marginal Christian Democrat in the 1930s, emerged as 
chairman of the vaunted, Communist-friendly Conseil National de la Résistance [CNR] and a major 
figure in the MRP. Catholic voters, meanwhile, flocked to the MRP, which enjoyed astonishing 
electoral successes in 1945 and 1946. And while the party has been seen as one of a number of 
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“bourgeois” parties duking it out in the mind-bogglingly complex politics of the French Fourth 
Republic, it was also, at least at its origins, a party that was seriously trying to forge a socialist France, 
in the name of the Resistance.16  
While I’ll be focusing on political culture, it should not be forgotten that this experiment had 
significant impact on the ground. Inspired largely by the pathbreaking volume, France, pays de mission? 
(1943), French Catholics became obsessed with reaching and converting the working classes. As in 
Germany, left-Catholicism was leavened by the Catholic trade unions: a third of the MRP’s national 
leadership came from the Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens [CFTC].17 The Mouvement 
populaire des familles, a mass Catholic Action movement, found itself allied with socialist and 
Communist trade unions by 1947.18 Although the embryonic worker-priest movement has received 
more attention, the MPF was a far more significant phenomenon, reworking the Catholic Action 
legacy of the JOC for a new era and expandings its reach to adulthood. Jeunesse de l’Église, a 
Dominican movement with roots in the 1930s, rose to prominence in the postwar period and began 
dabbling in Marxism while evangelizing in the banlieue.19 
The MRP was, and understood itself to represent, a break with Catholic tradition. Its first 
manifesto declared, time and again, “We want a revolution.” “We must not allow the genesis of the 
Movement,” the party’s executive committee announced in 1946, “to be explained solely by ’50 
years of Social Catholicism’. Without the resistance, there would be no MRP.”20 The MRP was 
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stocked with members of de Gaulle’s cabinet: in addition to Bidault, voters could look to François 
de Menthon, Robert Prigent, or Pierre-Henri Teitgen. Although the party did not shy away from its 
Catholic faith, and fought tooth-and-nail for traditional Catholic issues in educational policy and 
elsewhere, the MRP’s political-social program was miles from mainstream political Catholicism as it 
had existed in the 1930s. The party was bound to the groundbreaking program of the CNR, thereby 
linking it to left-Catholicism as I’ve defined it: the whole project of the CNR assumed collaboration 
between Catholics and Marxists, while the CNR program called for wide-ranging nationalization of 
key industries. The desired revolution, the MRP manifesto continued, “requires on the social level 
[…] a new reorganisation of private property.”21 “Only the state,” declared one official document of 
the governing coalition, “is able to act according to a general plan and compel the collieries to 
participate in the reconstruction of French industry.”22 This was signed by Catholic ministers, in 
addition to the expected socialists and Communists. 
While Mounier and his journal became skeptical of Christian Democracy and the MRP, it 
was nonetheless, as Michel Winock has emphasized in his political history of the journal, a central 
journal of the spirit of resistance-style tripartisme.23 The central connection between the new Esprit 
and the resistance was Jean-Marie Domenach, a prodigious 23-year-old editor at Esprit and veteran 
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of the Resistance. With Domenach at the lead, Esprit argued strenuously for economic 
nationalizations and for collaboration with Communism, a stance they would maintain even after 
tripartisme fell apart in 1947-8. “We are beginning to recognize,” Mounier wrote in 1946, “that the 
necessity of economic planning [direction de l’économie] is not merely an invention of doctrinaires 
or partisans, but a profound requirement of modern economic structures.”24 Controversially, this 
pushed Mounier and his journal close to André Mandouze and his Union of Christian Progressivists: 
a group of Catholics with firm roots in the Resistance, dedicated to collaboration with Communists. 
In Esprit, Mounier wrote strongly in favor of Soviet policies, defending the show trials in a notorious 
1948 editorial, for instance. Jean Lacroix had declared there in 1944 that “better than others, 
Communism saw the problem and approached its solution.”25 At this stage, they gave up on the 
MRP and held out hopes for a revived revolutionary Catholicism. 
The other connection between the Resistance and the new Catholic left was Témoignage 
Chrétien (which celebrated and publicized Mounier’s work at Esprit26). This had been a series of 
Catholic resistance tracts during the war; Gaston Fessard had written its opening number and had 
been closely involved with the group throughout the war. From 1944 onwards, the movement was 
reimagined as a newspaper of the same name. Although it never supported Communism as such, it 
did hold out the hope that collaboration with non-Christians in the name of a renewed France was 
possible, and even necessary. “We will know how to unite all of those who want to establish the 
rights of the human person,” declared André Mandouze, the paper’s editor in chief, in one of the 
                                                
24 [unsigned, presumably Mounier], “Libertés et dirigisme,” Esprit 124 (July 1946), 128-9, here 128. Esprit commissioned 
Georges Gurvitch to write about nationalizations as well: Gurvitch, “La représentation ouvrière et le problème des 
nationalisations”, Esprit 14, 1 (January 1946), 107-12. 
25 Jean Lacroix, “Dépassement du Communisme,” Esprit 105 (December 1944), 56-64, here 59. 





paper’s earliest issues.27 In multiple essays throughout 1945-6, the paper allied itself with tripartisme 
and its nationalization policies.28 The following year, in a special issue on “The Communists and 
Us,” Jean Baboulène, a member of the editorial staff, put forth what he called a “catechism” of this 
relationship in an article titled, significantly, “La main tendue” (unlike in 1937, the title implies, the 
Catholics are extending a hand this time). The first article of the catechism: “We are Christians.” The 
second: “We consider capitalism to be incompatible with our respect for man.” The third: “We 
observe that the Communist party alone is capable of leading the struggle for the destruction of 
capitalism to the end.”29 
Those journals rooted in Father Bernadot’s publishing empire, which were the nucleus of 
the civil-society Catholicism charted in Chapter 4, briefly evinced a form of left-Catholicism, too. In 
1937, the hierarchy had pulled support from Sept, and it was relaunched as a lay periodical called 
Temps présent; under this name, it reappeared as a left-ist newspaper in 1944. Edited by Stanislas 
Fumet, a veteran from the 30s, it had a circulation of around 45,000.30 An early article, entitled 
simply “The Church and the French Revolution of the Twentieth Century” and written in the 
journal’s editorial voice, gives a flavor of its position: a new revolution is afoot, the author proclaims, 
and this time the Church is on its side.31 “The problem,” explained Jean Lacroix in its pages in 
January 1945, “is not, and must not be, to make France more more Communist or more Christian, 
etc.; it is […] to reconstruct a living nation in which Communists, Christians, and diverse spiritual 
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families can flourish.”32 That same year, the journal published an interview with Maurice Thorez, the 
head of the PCF. The opening matter emphasized Thorez’s politeness, and the interview was clearly 
meant to make Communism seem less frightening to the journals’ Catholic readership (especially in 
tandem with the articles praising the USSR that also occasionally appeared).33 La Vie Intellectuelle 
appeared again, too; while it was more faithful to its civil-society leanings—going so far as to remove 
the social-political editorial from the journal’s otherwise familiar format—it, too, shared in the left-
Catholic effloresence.  “The people of my country,” Christianus enthused in the journal’s first 
postwar article, “have rediscovered their original grandeur,” and we must together seek a “true 
revolution.”34  
This position required a revision of totalitarianism theory, of course: the post-Nazi future 
could not possibly involve Communists if Communists and Nazis were to be equated. Pierre 
Emmanuel, in a 1946 editorial in Temps Présent entitled “The Interrupted Dialogue,” attacked 
totalitarianism theory head on. “Many Christians,” he lament, “reproach Communism for being 
totalitarian.” This is absurd, as Communism is merely trying to spur social evolution, not to divide 
humanity into warring races.35 Even La Vie Intellectuelle, which had been at the forefront of 
totalitarian theorization in the mid-1930s, got in on the act: “The Soviet phenomenon is great, and 
requires respect,” an anonymous editorialist wrote in 1946. “It is naïve to put it on the same plane as 
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the Wagnerian décor of Hitlerism.”36 Joseph Rovan, a Catholic convert writing in Esprit in 1947, 
took this argument to its extreme, arguing that we should not be wary of totalitarianism, which he 
understood as a synonym of “centralization,” at all: “if it is, according to our hopes, wishes, and 
actions, possible and necessary to refuse fascism, it cannot be a question of refusing every 
‘totalitarianism’ […] unless we want to refuse history, unless we want to refuse the world.”37  
The political subject of left-Catholic utopia was not the nation-state, but Europe: 
“Resistance Europe” was not conceived of as a collection of separately socialist states, but as a 
revitalized and federalized continent. We might think of Spinelli’s Movimento Federalista Europeo, 
founded in 1943 and doctrinally based on the “Ventotene Manifesto,” written by Spinelli and 
circulated underground from 1941 onwards. In France, European federalism in the heady days of 
Liberation enjoyed the support of prominent resisters like Camus. The 1942 manifesto of Libérer et 
Fédérer, a resistance group centered in Toulouse, was published in Combat, Libération (Sud), and Le 
Populaire.38 To give another example: La Fédération, the Vichy-based organization whose origins were 
discussed in the previous chapter, collaborated with socialists like Claude-Marcel Hytte, an ex-
Communist who had been involved in the Resistance Mouvement national révolutionnaire.39 The major 
institutional collaboration was the Comité français pour la fédération européenne, planned by resistance 
movements in 1944. Camus presided, while Catholics from l’Aube and Témoignage chrétien attended 
(the majority was socialist).40  
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Most of these movements were dedicated to Europe-wide federation, in which the East 
would be included.41 Like many others, left-Catholics believed in a revitalized Europe that would 
save itself without falling prey to either the Americans or the Bolsheviks. Pierre-Henri Simon, an old 
hand from the early days of Esprit, wrote an article called “Is Europe possible?” in Temps Présent in 
1947, arguing that Europe could survive only by threading the needle between captialism and 
communism, operating as a third force between the two behemoths.42 The next year, when this form 
of European vision was quickly becoming outdated, Témoignage chrétien published a clarion call 
entitled “France and the Two Monsters”—a plea to save Europe from the excesses of both 
capitalism and Communism. They included a mock-identity card for France, listing the nation’s 
profession as “expert in ministerial crisis”, and its nationality this way: “would like to be neither 
American, nor Russian.”43 La Vie Intellectuelle followed suit; there, Maurice Schumann, an important 
member of the MRP, declared that a revitalized Europe must undergo an “intermediary revolution” 
between Bolshevism and American capitalism.44 The Union of European Federalists, the largest 
federalist organization in Europe (and one founded by French Catholics), released a position paper 
in 1947 announcing the goal of “a unified Europe in a unified world.” They were clear that Europe 
could ally with neither America nor Russia: the fomer was neo-imperial, while the second was 
totalitarian. One of its positions: “Refusal of a Europe delivered to the hegemony of any power 
whatsoever, but also a refusal of all anti-Communist crusades, whatever the pretexts.”45 
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German Catholics, too, were enamored with the dream of a federalist, socialist-friendly, 
Resistance Europe. In fact, the early Christian Democratic Party was headed in this direction. The 
complex founding of the CDU/CSU cannot be adequately charted here, predicated as it was upon 
the various policies of the four occupying authorities and the fitful coalescence of regional parties. 
For our purposes, it is essential to note that, as in France, there were many left-Catholics in the 
1944-7 period who saw the party as the basis for economic transformation and collaboration with 
socialists and Communists. German Catholic workers, enthusiastic supporters of the CDU from 
1945 onwards, gave up their separate Christian trade unions and entered the SPD-leaning, but 
reliably anti-Communist, German Labor Federation [DGB] (a phenomenon which even Pius XII 
supported “as long as the extraordinary conditions of this age persist,” as he wrote in an open letter 
to the German hierarchy).46 As Noel Cary charts in his pioneering history of this period, the trade 
unionists at the heart of early CDU party formation desired a “Grand Coalition of Christian 
Democrats and Social Democrats.47 Both the Frankfurter Leitsätze and the Kölner Leitsätze, two of the 
earliest programatic documents of the fledgling CDU, emphasized major land reform and the 
nationalization of coal, energy, and banking.48 The highpoint of this form of CDU activism was the 
1947 “Ahlen Program,” which called for a robust program of economic nationalization. Karl 
Arnold, CDU kingpin and Minister-President of North-Rhine Westphalia, was promising that the 
CDU, aligned with the SPD, would go even further. Arnold’s nemesis within the party, though, was 
the caucus chairman, Konrad Adenauer. He believed that the CDU’s future lay, not in the coalition 
                                                
46 William Patch, “The Legend of Compulsory Unification: The Catholic Clergy and the Revival of Trade Unionism in 
West Germany after the Second World War,” Journal of Modern History 79, 4 (December 2007), 848-80. Pius XII quoted 
on 849. 
47 Cary, The Path to Christian Democracy, 180, 185. 
48 Andreas Lienkamp, “Socialism out of Christian Responsibility: The German Experiment of Left Catholicism (1945-




of SPD and CDU that could be seen in Arnold’s Düsseldorf, but in the coalition of the liberal FDP 
and CDU that was being charted in nearby Frankfurt.49  
As Andreas Lienkamp has shown, the Frankfurter Hefte circle, and specifically Dirks himself, 
was a major force pushing the fledgling CDU leftward in the years before Adenauer and Erhard 
consolidated their control.50 At its head were its co-founders and editors: Walter Dirks and Eugen 
Kogon. The presence of Kogon at the helm of a left-Catholic organ might seem surprising, given his 
history as an Austrian royalist and one-time supporter of National Socialism. The two had been 
briefly acquainted in the early 1930s, but they had not been comrades-in-arms: in one of the few 
surviving letters from this period, Kogon complains about Dirks’s imprecise uses of the word 
“fascism” and emphasizes how very much he disagreed with Dirks’s Marxist-inflected writings.51 
After 1945, though, the differences between them had somehow vanished: even the most left-
leaning of the early CDU activists praised Kogon as a paragon of socialist intelligence.52 The 
specifics of Kogon’s trajectory will be dealt with in the next chapter: he became far more of a Cold 
War intellectual than Dirks ever did, and his true contribution is to Atlantic Catholicism, not its 
Resistance forebear. As we’ll see below, the Hefte’s liberal critics pointed to Dirks, and not Kogon, as 
their bête noir.  
In the beginning, the Hefte had the Zeitgeist on its side. “The CDU in its initial phases,” Dirks 
later recalled, “was a ‘left’ movement […] [T]he conservatives were silent, as there was nothing to 
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conserve amidst the rubble and the wreckage.”53 Dirks was a close ally of Peter Pfeiffer, who was 
engaged in a campaign, via a never-ending series of Rundschreiben, to push the CDU to the left. They 
had each been quite hopeful about the party in the early days; the early programmatic statements of 
the CDU had been far more socialist than the party would eventually become. Although he refrained 
from much party-political agitation in the pages of his journal, Dirks’s correspondence is replete 
with enthusiasim: in February 1946, for instance, he wrote to Pfeiffer in excitement over the CDU’s 
recent electoral victories, even while admitting that “its inner character is not yet entirely stable.”54  
As with Esprit in France, Dirks and his journal were not acting alone. Ende und Anfang 
provided another left-Catholic vision for Europe’s future, and it received support from both Dirks 
and Mounier. It was more opposed to the CDU than was the Hefte, and it wore its socialist stripes 
more proudly, publishing Theo Pirker and others from the left. It had a circulation of around 15,000 
in the late 1940s, and was quite clear about its philo-Communism: “Communism,” a 1947 editorial 
announced, “remains acceptable to the Christian conscience.”55 There was also Werkhefte, another 
Frankfurt-based journal, founded in 1947 and directly inspired by Dirks.56 These were the major left-
Catholic organs, but even those that would become more centrist were originally in line with the 
Christian Socialist vision: the newly-founded Süddeutsche Zeitung, along with Die Besinnung, for 
instance, published early articles in this vein.57  
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In a 1946 essay for Frankfurter Hefte called “Left and Right,” Dirks made his case. There was 
no doubt that the CDU/CSU, a party of the rural and urban middle-class, would occupy the right-
wing of Germany’s revamped political spectrum: Dirks was not so naïve as to think that Bavarian 
peasants would suddenly welcome revolution and seek to resurrect the spirit of Eisner. The 
question, though, was the nature of that spectrum itself: “left” and “right,” Dirks explained, were 
always relative. It used to be that “democracy” and “republic” were left-wing phenomena, but they 
now occupied the ideological center around which Germany’s parties oriented themselves. His hope 
was that socialism would add its name to the roster of centrist political positions and “shed its ‘left’ 
character, just as democracy and the republic already have.” Dirks believed Germany to be poised at 
the “the Rubicon that divides the bourgeois world from the socialism.” Once the crossing was 
made, as Dirks was confident it would be, the question facing the CDU/CSU was this: would it be a 
party of the “normal right,” meaning that it accepted the basic tenets of socialism, or would it 
become a truly reactionary party, seeking to restore a dead past? The party must, Dirks paradoxically 
instructed, “must decide in favor of the left in order to occupy a space on the right.”58 
In the next issue of the Hefte—which was, recall, a sensation at the time—Dirks completed 
his argument with an essay on “The Word ‘Socialism’”: the word that should now define Germany’s 
political center and, more pointedly, a word that should replace the much-vaunted Solidarismus and 
berufsständischen Ordnung at the heart of Catholic social and political thought. Dirks defines socialism 
as a “system of cooperation [Genossenschaftlichen],” which must be distinguished from a merely 
“social politics” that does not attack the heart of the capitalist system. The problem with previous 
forms of Catholic social thought was that they were necessarily backwards-looking: they were based 
upon a Europe that had definitely gone. “The meaning and goal of socialism,” Dirks instructs, “is 
                                                




the freedom and dignity of the person under the conditions of an industrial economy based on the division of 
labor [arbeitsteiligen Großwirtschaft].” This definition allows him to divide the political field into four 
options: there are those who simply “say no” to “the world of industry, the world of cities and mass 
men”: they “aspire to go backwards” and “suspend themselves fundamentally in the world of the 
spirit.” They may safely reject socialism, at the price of irrelevance. But he who utters a “‘Yes’ [to the 
world of industry] […] may choose between three solutions: he must decide between capitalist 
anarchy, fascist dictatorship, and the attempt to bring this reality of men into order, namely towards 
operation and justice: and this we call socialism.” Socialism is thus distinguished from the bucolic 
pastures of Solidarismus, and from the twin menaces of capitalism and fascism. Thus far, almost 
everyone would agree with Dirks; he is consciously attempting to cast his net as widely as possible.59  
But it was not that easy, and as Dirks drew in his net, it became clear that “the word 
‘socialism’” had specific referents that doubtless made many of his readers uncomfortable: 
specifically, those two policy positions that I’ve isolated as the central components of left-
Catholicism: collaboration with Marxism and support of economic nationalization. Dirks’s article 
was, of course, supportive of a certain form of socialism, but that word was being abused so often 
that he clarified the need, specifically, to collaborate with Marxists. Although the atheism of 
Bolshevism was of course to be rejected, its historical preconditions must be understood: the 
proletariat “found it difficult to understand themselves as children of God and as persons because 
they were not encountered as children of God or as persons, but rather in the pitiless mechanism of 
the labor market.” Only by creating a more human economy could workers be won back for Christ. 
Dirks continues: “There is yet another reason, for which the Germans as passionate partymembers 
and Christians as satisfied believers have little sense: the political reason.” “Socialism” has the 
                                                





potential to unite a coalition—“and indeed the right coalition”—that could lead Germany to a better 
future. Among its virtues: it fulfills to the ‘left’ the function of telling the Communists the conditions 
of their cooperation: this condition is socialism, whose essence excludes all totalitarianism.” Here 
Dirks was in agreement with Kogon, his coeditor, in his belief that there was a kernel of 
Communism that could be saved from the pathology of totalitarianism: as Kogon wrote a few 
months later, Communists “are accused, after the collapse of fascism, that nothing essential 
differentiates them: dictatorship and totalitarianism, here and there. That is not at all correct.”60 In 
geopolitical terms, too, Germany’s precarious position in the mid-1940s would be endangered by 
lockstep anti-Communism: “The German Nation,” Kogon explained in May 1946, “has nothing, 
absolutely nothing, to gain from a serious conflict between the Allies.”61  
Second, socialists must accept a planned economy: it is this “plan” that distinguishes 
socialists from capitalists (while the fact that the planning is “in the hands of those that live in and 
by it” distinguishes them from fascists).  “In the center of the meaning of our historical moment 
from which we proceed stands the imagination of the ‘planned economy [Gemein-Plan-Wirtschaft]’; 
we call it ‘socialist’ from grounds of verbal probity, because it contains an essential qualification 
common to all socialisms: the socialization of central means of production.”62 Dirks here gave voice 
to the cluster of Catholics his journal represented: “Christians in our time,” declared a typical 1946 
editorial, “are called to work towards the realization of the nearly century-old slonging of the 
worker’s movement for a dignified economic order.” The editorial went on to call for the 
nationalization of heavy industry and banking, as part of a general Planwirtschaft (ironically, and 
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tellingly, the author of this article would go on to serve as the ambassador to the United States under 
Chancellor Ludwig Erhard in the 1960s: hardly a champion of the planned economy!).63 
Dirks and his team were, like their French counterparts, inflamed by the dreams of a new 
European future (as in France, too, this was an axis of cooperation: Kurt Schumacher declared 
himself in favor of a “United States of Europe” in May 194664). In the journal’s very first article, an 
anonymous editorial, probably written by Kogon, on the Nuremberg trials, this emphasis was 
foreshadowed: “In Nuremberg (and certainly not there alone), the foundations for a world-state 
were laid.”65 In the same opening issue, Dirks declared “the end of the sovereign national state.”66 
There were also, as there had been in German Catholic periodicals for decades, lengthy articles 
deconstructing the very concept of state sovereignty: Clemens Münster, one of Dirks’s closest 
collaborators, contributed an early one called, simply, “The Dismantling of National Sovereignty.” 
At this point, Münster did not imagine Western Europe allying with America against the East: he 
saw Germany’s role as a “a mediation between East and West.”67 Kogon, in a 1947 article, declared 
that “the fate of the world” depends on “whether [Moscow and Washington] conflict with one 
another, or come to an agreement.”68 In a 1948 speech at an international congress, he clarified that 
Europe would be the scene of this rapprochement: “Our principal task,” he announced, “consists in 
laying at least the foundations of economic and social relations in Western Europe, without breaking 
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with the East and always keeping all of Europe in our vision.” He called for “a third force” that 
could navigate “between Charybdus and Scylla.”69 
The interest in a revived Europe was buoyed by a continuation, and a significant expansion, 
of the transnational Catholic public sphere whose outlines were beginning to emerge in the 1930s. 
Mounier and Dirks worked together on several international conferences dedicated to forging a 
lasting, international Catholic leftism. “We found ourselves in the same boat,” Kogon later wrote of 
Mounier’s visit to the Frankfurter Hefte headquarters in 1946, “surrounded by the same dangers and 
gloom, with the same beliefs and hopes in our hearts, in agreement about our positions and our 
goals. […] We shook hands, as comrades.”70 In 1947, Esprit had a special issue marking the 
hundredth anniversary of the Communist Manifesto. Mounier wrote to Dirks asking for a contribution, 
emphasizing that the article “should neither be published under the auspices of a Marxist party, nor 
inspired by anti-Marxist prejudice.” In Dirks’s reply, and in the eventual article, he agreed: the essay 
“would be an attempt to relax the reciprocal misunderstandings” between Christians and Marxists, 
“an attempt to spur dialogue between the positions.”71 The following year, Mounier wrote again to 
invite Dirks to an Esprit conference, emphasizing that collaboration between Esprit and Frankfurter 
Hefte should increase and play an important role in the Europe à venir.72 When Aloys Leber wanted 
to write an article for Frankfurter Hefte critiquing Esprit’s philo-Communism, which was always 
stronger than in its Rhenish counterpart, Dirks blocked it. “I hold this political engagement to be 
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one of the most essential and important elements of the Esprit movement and one of our most 
important tasks.”73 
Dirks and Mounier were staples of the multiple attempts at Franco-German Catholic 
rapprochement in the postwar years: they were each keenly interested in the affairs of their recent 
enemies, one writer going so far as to claim that Mounier “gave the impression, when he occupied 
himself with German affairs, that he lived only for them.”74 They were the two most famous figures 
to attend the Deutsch-französische Schriftsteller Tagung, held in Lahr in August 1947. They were joined by 
an honor roll of left-Catholics from both nations, representing the Frankfurter Hefte circle in 
Germany and the Témoignage chrétien and Esprit circles in France. In Mounier’s opening address, he 
had proclaimed the need for a renewed Christian socialism as the antidote to an ailing Europe: a 
solution enthusiastically adopted, albeit with some reservations about method, by the hopeful 
congress.75 A newspaper account claimed that the proceedings were dominated by dreams of a 
European “third force” that would mediate between, and learn from, both the USA and the USSR.76 
The successor to the hopeful Lahr conference, held in October 1948 in Royaumont, evinced 
a rapidly-changing Catholic political culture.77 The personnel was quite different: the leftists, 
including Mounier, Béguin, and Dirks, were joined by a clutch of liberals, notably F.A. Kramer, the 
editor of the liberal Rheinischer Merkur who would, a few months later, launch a broadside against the 
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totalitarian leanings of the Dirks-Kreis. There were also joined by conservatives like Jean de 
Fabrègues, familiar to us from his para-fascist corporatism of the 1930s and his prominent support 
of Pétain. Dirks provocatively used the occastion to sound a warning that church’s social 
conservatism was reasserting itself and betraying the hopes of the Resistance.78 Dirks’s closest 
collaborator, Eugen Kogon, was missing, and his keynote address was read by someone else.  
Jean du Rivau, the conference’s primary organizer, was horrified at Kogon’s absence; he was, 
after all, enjoying massive fame at the time and it was a blow to the conference’s legitimacy. Rivau 
claimed, in a groveling letter written a few months before the event, that the absence “would be a 
catastrophe.” After giving some prosaic arguments—programs had already been printed, people 
were coming from as far as England to hear Kogon speak, and so on—Rivau revealed the symbolic 
trauma that would be wrought by Kogon’s absence. Kogon had decided to travel to America instead 
of Royaumont. “In France,” Rivau implored, “we will be astonished and […] offended if we have 
the impression that you prefer America.”79  
This was not merely a contingency of a busy man’s schedule; indeed, Dirks too would be 
invited to America by OMGUS the next year, but would claim to be too busy.80 Kogon’s decision to 
go to America instead of Royaumont was emblematic of a paradigm shift that swept European 
Catholic intellectual life in the late 1940s: a shift that we can see as the reassertion of the anti-
totalitarian personalism of the 1930s, and its reinterpretation as Cold War doctrine. As the Cold War 
heated up in 1947-8, the left-Catholic experiment collapsed across Europe and the more dominant 
anti-Bolshevik, anti-totalitarian, anti-étatiste politics whose development we’ve traced surged back 
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into a dominant position in the Catholic sphere. “Events,” our old friend Christianus wrote 
laconically in the summer of 1947, “are accelerating.”81  
Gaston Fessard, Totalitarianism Theory, and the Collapse of Left-Catholicism 
By 1948, the dewy eyes of the immediate postwar years had given way to the cold realism 
required by geopolitics. In a September 1947 letter to the former chancellor, Joseph Wirth, Dirks 
despaired that “things happen every day that make me want to tear at my hair.”82 In response to 
Pfeiffer’s anguished suggestion that they leave the party altogether, Dirks replied that the whole issue 
was “so delicate and complicated that I am reluctant to discuss the matter in correspondence.”83 He 
was, at the time, writing letters to the socialist mayor of Frankfurt, attempting to organize 
“Zusammenarbeit” and apologizing profusely for the anti-socialist stance of local CDU officials. 
84The editor of Etudes voiced a newly majority opnion when he chided in 1949 that Catholics should 
have “better things to do than working towards the advent of a totalitarian, atheist collectivism.”85 In 
retrospect, the left-Catholic experiment seems to have been predestined for failure. As Martin 
Conway has pointed out, it remained primarily an urban, male, and elite phenomenon, never fully 
making a home in the rural or female constituencies critical to the success of Christian Democratic 
parties.86 And the success that it had, Robert Paxton suggests, had more to do with the reassertion of 
traditional Catholic anti-capitalism than with a revolution in political consciousness.87 At the level of 
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political culture, the acceptance of Marxism and economic nationalization—the two linchpins of 
left-Catholicism—flew in the face of every major trend in Catholic social thought as it had been 
percolating in the interwar period. But in the late 1940s, as the Cold War ramped up and the free-
market-friendly U.S.A. began organizing a Western Europe in its own image, traditional Catholic 
political culture reasserted itself. “The European Resistance — I repeat: as a powerful and inflential 
political factor of determinate meaning — has become a historical memory,” declared Eugen Kogon 
in 1949. “A mighty epic, subject-matter for poets and historians.”88 
This was not merely a matter of political culture, of course: these transitions were taking 
place against the backdrop of political changes, both international and domestic. Internationally, the 
Cold War was coming into being. By 1947, the division of Germany seemed final and the Truman 
Doctrine had been announced, while in 1948 the Prague coup and the Marshall Plan solidified the 
sense that Europe would, despite the wishes of the left-Catholics, divide into two. This had domestic 
repercussions, as well. In France, tripartisme collapsed and the customary political instability of the 
Third Republic reasserted itself in the Fourth. Although France’s politics were tumultuous—far 
moreso than Germany’s—it was at least clear that the dream of a new France, constructed out of the 
ruins of war and in the name of equality, was not in the cards; specifically, the near-complete 
electoral collapse of the MRP assured that a strident left-Catholic voice would be absent in French 
politics. So while one of the three parties of tripartisme was siphoning votes to de Gaulle’s RPF, 
another one—the PCF—gave up on the United Front altogether, after determining that the SFIO 
and MRP were mere shills for American imperialism. Internationally, the idea that Communism 
might be turned in a Catholic-friendly direction became untenable: the most publicized evidence of 
this was the József Mindszenty affair, in which the Hungarian cardinal was imprisoned, tortured, and 
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endured a show trial at the hands of the Communist regime. In this atmosphere a propaganda poster 
appeared on the walls of Paris, perfectly summing up the political exigencies of the moment 
(perhaps as only a parody can do): “God exists,” the poster proclaimed. “Therefore, you may not be 
a Communist.”89 
In Germany, left-Catholic politics were dealt a blow at the same time. The 
Arnold/Dirks/Pfeiffer gambit to move the CDU leftwards manifestly failed, as Adenauer and 
Erhard cemented their control and began to theorize and construct a liberal Catholicism in line with 
the neoliberal insights charted in the previous chapter (Erhard was a friend and disciple of Röpke 
and Rüstow).90 Even Jakob Kaiser, in September 1947, was criticizing the “totalitarian bent” of 
Schumacher’s socialists.91 That same year, the hierarchy began seriously discussing an end to the 
unified labor movement in Germany and the refoundation of Christian labor unions, as relations 
between Adenauer’s newly-liberal CDU and the unified trade union movement itself [the DGB] had 
soured.92  
 Although the Church remained officially neutral in the Cold War, the Church’s actions, most 
prominently its direct interventions in Italian electoral politics, were a spectacular instance of politics 
masquerading as non-politics. The Church made two major interventions in the late 1940s (this aside 
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from its obvious direct political roles, most prominently in Italian electoral politics). The first was a 
July 1946 letter from Pius XII to Charles Flory, the head of the Semaines Sociales. The pope begins 
with boilerplate Catholic remarks on the importance of natural law and the family as the fundaments 
of Christian community, before moving onto the political application: this analysis, he instructs, 
“applies to the particular case that interests you at the moment: the nationalization of industry.” 
Although he does not issue a flat-out condemnation, he counsels extreme caution, suggesting that 
nationalization, far from “attenuating the mechanical character of life and work,” “is in danger of 
increasing it.” This is true “even when [the nationalization] is lawful [licite].” The “concentration of 
industry […] only plays in favor of capital and not of the social economy.” This, in turn, flies in the 
face of the “Christian doctrine of the person” and tends towards “totalitarian pretentions.”93 
According to a contemporary American observer, the letter “substantially toned down the 
enthusiasm of the French Catholics relating the program of nationalization.”94 “Although the 
Popular Republicans [MRP] were at one time almost as keen as the Socialists for nationalization,” 
the New York Times reported a few months after Flory’s letter, “they are now divided on this and 
many other issues.”95 
 The intellectual response to the papal letter laid out the fault-lines for the battle to come. 
Left Catholics—notably Etienne Gilson writing in Le Monde and Jean-Pierre Dubois-Dumée in 
Témoignage Chrétien—attempted to salvage the MRP’s policy, latching onto the Pope’s marginal 
implication that there might be such a thing as a licite nationalization.96 Dubois-Dumée accurately 
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characterized the intellectual nature of the pope’s intervention, without admitting that it was 
destructive to the left-Catholic project he was supporting: “The principal theme of the letter is, one 
more time, the danger of totalitarianism, to which we must oppose a Christian conception of the 
human person.”97 Georges Bidault was more concerned: he wrote to Jacques Maritain, then serving 
as French ambassador to the Vatican, asking for more information on the Vatican’s position. 
Maritain agitated to have a further explication published in Osservatore Romano, which appeared on 27 
September. In his letter to Bidault, Maritain indicates the “official” quality of the new article, which 
perfectly encapsulates the civil-society Catholicism he had done so much to form in the 1930s. Like 
the pope’s letter, the article reproduces by name the personalist anti-totalitarianism that had become 
the Church’s official line, and which served to undermine the policy of nationalizations without 
directly saying so.98 
 While the letter to Flory was essentially ignored in Germany, the Vatican’s next major 
intervention affected Catholic political culture across the continent: in the estimation of one 
Austrian Christian Democrat, it “had the effect, across the world, of a bomb.”99 In July 1949, the 
Holy Office published a decree in La Documentation Catholique forbidding Catholics “from registering 
in the Communist Party or from favoring it in any manner whatsoever.”100 The Church’s opposition 
to Communism was no news, but the formal nature of the decree brought the Vatican suspiciously 
close to playing politics—to explicitly favoring one side over the other in the Cold War. This was 
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noted by Henri-Pierre Desroches, a member of the Economie et Humanisme circle and author of a 
controversial 1949 book about Marxism. “It is fully evident that the movement of the Combattants de 
la paix [a pacifist movement linked with the PCF] is a Soviet trump card in the Cold War,” wrote 
one priest to his superiors in 1949. “But it is no less evident that the ecclesiastical ban on 
participating in such a movement will become an American trump card in the same war.”101 
Walter Dirks was probably correct in his estimation that the decree had been primarily aimed 
at French Catholics, notably Mounier and his circle of philo-Communists; as such, it had especially 
significant and interesting repercussions there.102 A major player in this story is Gaston Fessard. 
Unlike many of his colleagues from the Resistance, he was never comfortable collaborating with 
Communists: he had been, as we’ve seen, an important peddler of totalitarianism theory in the late 
1930s, and had stridently argued that Catholics should turn down Thorez’s outsretched hand. After 
the Liberation, he looked on in horror as his fellow Catholics marched hand-in-hand with 
Communism, misunderstanding the anti-totalitarianism at the heart of Catholicism and the 
Resistance. As such, and in full awareness that the theory undercut the political experiments that his 
friends in the Resistance were supporting, Fessard returned to his totalitarianism thesis as soon as 
possible after the war. He resumed the theme as early as November 1944, three months after the 
Liberation (at an Esprit congress, no less).103  
He was simultaneously composing his own major intervention into postwar politics: a book-
length anti-Communist screed entitled France, prends garde de perdre ta liberté! (the title, riffing on his 
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most famous wartime tract, was an attempt to cash in on Fessard’s Resistance credibility). The main 
purpose of the book, as Fessard told Jean Lacroix in 1945 and as is apparent from the book’s 
contents, was to point out the manifold similarities between Nazism and Communism—a project 
designed to scuttle tripartisme in 1945 as much as it had the Popular Front in 1937.104 As he revealed 
in a 1945 letter to the Témoignage chrétien editorial staff, it was Stanislas Fumet’s dangerously 
Communist-leaning articles in Temps présent that had led Fessard to write the volume, against the 
warnings of Henri de Lubac, a close friend, that it would be employed by the right (which, of course, 
it was).105 Fessard’s colleagues at Témoignage chrétien, under whose auspices Fessard mischievously 
wanted to publish the volume, were equally aghast. André Mandouze, in his capacity as editor-in-
chief, vetoed the book’s publication, specifically objecting to the totalitarian theory animating the 
work.106 Eventually, the book was, of course, published, and it provoked a firestorm of controversy. 
Fessard, perhaps seeking to draw his wayward flock into a public controversy, dedicated the second 
edition to his former Resistance comrades. In a shocked and private rejoinder, Mandouze and ten 
other members of the movement from its clandestine days rejected Fessard and his work.  
From 1941 to 1944, we worked, suffered, and fought side by side with you. That is 
why we separate ourselves with such great sadness. […] We refuse the assimilation of 
Nazism and Communism. We refuse to allow our Communist comrades, with whom 
we struggled as brothers for three years, to be insulted.107 
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But insulted they were, and the book was a major early blow in the reconsolidation of an 
anti-totalitarian, anti-Communist, paraliberal Catholicism in the late 1940s. One priest, 
perhaps overstating the case, was nonetheless onto something when he wrote in 1952 that 
Fessard’s book had “violently ended the period of good relations between Catholics and 
Communists.”108  
Fessard was also, as we might expect, on the warpath against Emmanuel Mounier and Esprit. 
He engaged in a high-profile debate about Communism with Mounier at Cloître St-Séverin in April 
1948. In Fessard’s characteristically hard-charging lecture, he dissected the Mounier circle’s 
misconceptions about Soviet Russia: their belief that it was not intrinsically atheist, that salvation lay 
with the proletariat, and, most importantly, that intrinsic differences between Nazism and 
Communism could be found. As he had done at greater length in his 1946 volume, he portrayed 
Communism and Nazism as both rooted in Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave. Leo XIII and 
Quadrgesimo Anno, Fessard pointed out, had not condemned the structure of capitalism, but only its 
excesses. Bolshevism, as a form of “State capitalism [capitalisme de l’État]” is “certainly more 
capable of multiplying this excess than of healing it.”109  
The forces ranged against him at the time were substantial, both within and without the 
Church. Fessard referenced Merleau-Ponty’s Humanisme et Terreur, if only to dismiss the argument 
that totalitarianism theory was in “bad faith.”110 Merleau-Ponty, along with future Communist giants 
like Louis Althusser and Catholic MRP stalwarts like Etienne Borne, was present at Fessard’s 
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presentation and peppered him with questions, perhaps sensing that the Catholic retrenchment 
Fessard represented could only bode ill for the politics of Resistance Europe. Jean Hyppolite began 
the discussion by latching immediately onto the most troubling political axis of Fessard’s talk: its 
totalitarianism theory.  “M. Hyppolite,” the rapporteur wrote, “expressed his agreement with the basic 
points of Father Fessard’s lecture, with the exception of the parallel he established between race and class.”111 
Hyppolite, along with Mounier and Fessard’s other skeptical listeners, was convinced that 
Bolshevism, despite its flaws, remained a universalizing and emancipatory creed; the proletariat, as 
Hyppolite had pointed out, was supposed to disappear after the revolution and cease its dictatorship, 
while nothing of the sort was true of the Aryan race (Althusser characteristically dismissed the whole 
debate: “this little game,” he sighed, “is of no essential interest”).  
Fessard had the wind at his back. By 1949-50, the much-vaunted Catholic left-wing scene 
had largely vanished. Temps Présent ceased publication in July 1948, but not before abandoning its 
Communist sympathies; in the last few months of its existence, the journal decried the 
“exploitation” of the Resistance by Thorez’s PCF, coming out stridently in favor of de Gaulle and 
the RPF.112 Témoignage chrétien, as we’ll see in the next chaper, had given up its Communist sympathies 
and joined the emerging Atlantic consensus. Esprit, the third voice of Catholic leftism, was now a 
lone voice: in issue after issue, from 1947 onwards, Esprit bemoaned the end of the Resistance 
movement and the re-establishment of what Mounier had earlier called the “established disorder.”113 
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It refused to support the politics of blocs, and even after the birth of NATO, Mounier refused to 
take sides.114  
Instead of following other French Catholics towards the Atlantic Consensus, Mounier and 
Esprit lent controversial support to left-Catholicism’s last gasp: André Mandouze’s Union des chrétiens 
progressistes, a small movement founded in 1947 and dedicated to building bridges between 
Catholicism and the Communist party. The union had been founded in February 1947 by Catholic 
sympathizers of Communism, dedicated to “a movement of opinion and propaganda connected to 
the PCF.”115 Fessard lambasted the movement in Études, with such vehemence that other Jesuits 
cautiously urged him to have more charity. Domenach wrote to say that the journal had been 
unfairly lumped with Mandouze’s group, while Mounier himself leapt to the union’s defense in 
Esprit, in addition to sending a long letter to Études about the issue.116 The Union itself fought back 
in their house journal, Positions, claiming that Fessard’s assault was no more than “an R.P.F. 
operation”; his theology was judged to be “too enmeshed in political, economic and social 
judgments to be truly classified as theology.”117 Whether or not this was true, he was not alone: in 
January 1949, the Italian version of the movement was condemned, while in February Cardinal 
Suhard, archbishop of Paris, criticized the movement, followed a few weeks later by the Bishop of 
Lille. The July 1949 excommunication, important as it was, was only a nail in the coffin.118 “I suffer,” 
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wrote the Dominican at the had of Jeunesse de l’Église, “at the decrepitude of a Christianity that is 
compromised with reaction.”119  
Fessard, who had been conversant with German Catholicism since studying with Peter Wust 
in the late 1920s, sought to extend his newfound influence there, sending all of his anti-Communist 
works to Walter Dirks in an attempt to sway Catholic Germany’s most famous philo-Communist.120 
Dirks and many of his colleagues were as resistant to the anti-Communism of Fessard and the 
Vatican as the French were: one Austrian Catholic-Communist wrote that Catholics had received 
news of the 1949 decree “mit brennender Sorge.”121 Dirks, for his part, was furious about it: he was 
already spending his time in fruitless correspondence with priests upset that Dirks was abandoning 
Christianity in the name of godless socialism.122 He penned a vicious article on the subject, entitled 
simply “The Excommunication of Communists,” which was apparently left unpublished. The decree 
was, for the Catholic believer, “something distressing.” Certainly, orthodox Communism was anti-
Christian, but not all party-members are orthodox Communists. As he had been arguing for decades, 
Marxism has much to teach Catholics. In contemporary politics, the decree was harmful, too; in 
Hesse, for instance, a Communist party member, who happened to be Catholic, was running for 
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office. This is just another instance, Dirks concluded, of Catholics allying with atheist capitalism 
instead of justice.123 
 Dirks had good reason to be concerned: in fact, the powerful Rheinischer Merkur published a 
series of editorials in October claiming that the Frankfurter Hefte should consider itself banned by the 
decree.124 The Merkur was something of a mirror-image to Frankfurter Hefte: they were both Catholic 
periodicals of nationwide significance, centered in the Rhineland and stocked with figures from the 
Frankfurt-Bonn-Cologne circle traced in Chapter3.125 The Merkur, like the Hefte, had a massive 
circulation: in this case, around 300,000. The two publications were probably the only two Catholic 
journals to be widely read across the Western zone of occupation.126 They took, though, different 
paths as the CDU debated its future: the Hefte, as we’ve seen, remained firmly in favor of a socialist 
CDU, while F.A. Kramer and his Merkur were far more in line with the neoliberal synthesis, whose 
origins were traced in the previous chapter and whose political consequences were then becoming 
apparent in the Adenauer/Erhard administration.127 
Given Dirks’s antipathy to the CDU’s liberal turn, a clash between the two journals was 
inevitable, and the papal excommunication of Communist party members and sympathizers 
provided the occasion. Kramer himself published an editorial referring to Dirks as the “intellectual 
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bridge-builder to the East.”128 This was followed by a prominent October editorial by Otto Roegele, 
one of the paper’s editors, simply titled, “On the Frankfurter Hefte.” “ We are separated from Walter 
Dirks by serious political differences of opinion—political in the widest sense of the word.” These 
differences, Roegele continued, “extend deeply into questions of philosophy and worldview.” Dirks 
“overlooks” the fact that all parts of socialist doctrine are bound to one another and constitue a 
false, anti-Christian messianism. The paranoia of the burgeoning Cold War can be felt in Roegele’s 
article: how, he asks, could Dirks agitate for socialism when there were Russian troops on our soil, 
engaging in a battle for the soul of Christendom? “It would be the same as if, before the third 
Crusade, with the West in great danger, someone in European Christendom had developed a 
program of ‘Christian Islamism [Islamismus].” Such a hypothetical person, interesting as he might 
be, would rightly be condemned of heresy, as should the Hefte.129  
The journal nonetheless continued to appear, as did Esprit. But, like Mounier, Dirks turned 
from crusading leader to lonely Cassandra. While journals in the mid-1940s had pushed for a true 
socialism, along with Dirks, these journals, along with the Hefte itself, turned towards the Atlantic 
consensus between 1947 and 1949 (as we’ll see in the next chapter). The clearest analogue to the 
situation in France, though, was Ende und Anfang, which, as we saw above, housed a more vital 
confrontation between Catholicism and Communism than could be found in the Hefte. Like Dirks 
and Mounier, its writers were disappointed with the tack taken by Catholicism between 1945 and 
1948: in an anonymous article on this topic, the journal pounced on the new trends represented by 
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Kramer and his Merkur. After praising the religious vitality and “Christian humanism” of the 
immediate postwar years, the author lamented the fact that all of these ideas—“Abendland, 
personality, dignity of the person, cultural values, freedom” and so on—became “slogans for 
Christian politics” and banners for a right-leaning CDU. The author saw this as a grievous misuse of 
ideas, turning Catholics against Communists instead of fomenting collaboration.130 The American 
occupation, however, felt otherwise, and revoked the journal’s license. Despite an outcry of support, 
from Mounier and Dirks, among others, the journal was outlawed by OMGUS in 1948 and folded in 
early 1949.131   
While Catholics in general were enthused by Atlantic Catholicism’s triumph, those few who 
had hitched themselves authentically to left-Catholicism were shattered, and it is worthwhile to dwell 
on their sad fate before moving onto the forms of Catholicism that would become historically 
central. Jean-Marie Domenach was scathing in his critique of Europe’s new direction.  
Strange alliances are beginning to take shape between capitalists and revolutionaries, 
old Vichy-ites and resisters—unionists and federalists both: they have everything in 
common, they say, the same love of Europe. In reality, the first commonality is a 
hatred of Communism, which is an intellectual hatred of Marxism for some and a 
simple hatred of class for others: for anti-Communism is the only platform which 
permits the reunification of individuals so different and with nearly-opposite ideas.132  
 
Dirks, too, who had been writing about federalism since his time at the Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung, 
was skeptical of Europe’s direction. European unity had to be predicated upon progressive domestic 
politics; otherwise, it was useless, doing no more than taking reactionary domestic politics “to the 
European level.” Not every European unity movement, he came to realize, was a progressive one: 
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casting his eyes back to Metternich, Dirks opined that “for this Europe there is a precursor: the Holy 
Alliance.”133  
 Dirks hurled these accusations in a widely-remarked 1950 essay that, more than any other, 
sums up the collective mood and failings of left-Catholicism. Its tenor is given away by its title: “The 
Restorative Character of the Age.” “We are in the process,” Dirks begins, “of losing our freedom. 
The peoples of Europe have not understood how to use either military failure or victory. They have 
not solved the problem that was set for them: to build a more human world after the ruin of the 
old.” The continent had succumbed to what Dirks called the “spirit of strategy”: a doomed effort to 
rebuild a bourgeois Europe in the hopes that its inner contradictions would not lead to the same 
calamity as its forebear, and in the fear that anything else would lead to Bolshevik revolution. This 
was not happening in either the USA or the USSR, which were boldly grasping their world-historical 
moments: “the field of restoration,” Dirks admitted, “is Western Europe.” There were, of course, 
many causes for this, including the KPD’s bad faith and the meddling politics of the occupying 
powers. But one of the major causes was “the feeble Christians” and their rejection of a progressive 
politics. “The ‘Frankfurter Leitsätze’ and the ‘Ahlen Program’ make for bitter reading today.”134 
Although he made no public comment on the issue, Dirks was surely embittered by a 
scandal that rocked French Catholicism a few months later. In 1950, Etienne Gilson gave a series of 
lectures at the University of Notre Dame on the seemingly innocuous topic of Duns Scotus. In 
private conversations during his visit, Gilson repeated some of the talking points of left-Catholicism, 
as outlined above, while adding some colorful gossip. In Gilson’s estimation, as he had been arguing 
for some time on the editorial pages of Le Monde, France should stay neutral between the USA and 
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the USSR, as each power posed a menace of its own. Gilson did not count on the pugnacity of 
Waldemar Gurian, who was at Notre Dame at the time and was, as ever, prepared for controversy. 
Following Gilson’s visit, Gurian published an open letter to Gilson in the pages of Commonweal, 
accusing him of “spreading the sad gospel of defeatism”: “If, as a consequence of Soviet aggression, 
war breaks out between Moscow and Washington,” he challenged, “there will be no neutrals.”135 By 
spreading clichéd anti-American propaganda, Gilson was undermining the mutual trust of Europe 
and America—the only relationship that could save Europe from Bolshevik domination. Despite 
Gurian’s characteristic impropriety—an outraged Gilson charged that Gurian had never bothered to 
confront him personally before taking a public stand136—the newly-forming Cold War intelligentsia 
celebrated Gurian’s missive accordingly. “Your letter,” gushed Edward Shils, “was magnificent.”137 
 The scandal soon extended far beyond the pages of Commonweal, following Gilson back 
home to France. Gilson was not a negligible figure there: as a professor at the Collège de France 
associated with the MRP, he had been one of the most strident voices of French Christian 
Democracy. He had not gone softly, however, into the dark night of left-Catholicism’s irrelevance. 
He had been an outspoken opponent of NATO, for instance, and had already left the mainstream of 
Catholic opinion. Gurian’s letter appeared in translation in Le Figaro, the conservative and pro-
American Parisian newspaper (Gilson believed that François Mauriac was responsible138). This led to 
a flurry of articles that came to be known in the French press as l’affaire Gilson. One journal 
canvassed leading personalities for their opinion on the matter: Jean Paulhan, director of the Nouvelle 
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Revue Française, believed Gilson to be guilty of treason, while Marcel de Corte, a Belgian philosopher 
and former student of Gilson’s, wrote in terms of stinging disappointment: “Gilson publicly 
abandoned all of those who valued him. Our affection trod upon, crushed, destroyed.”139  
 This affair shows us, in clear relief, a series of important changes that had taken place by 
1951. No prominent Catholics rushed to Gilson’s side, although he did receive support (likely 
unwanted) from the Communist newspaper, Action. Gurian’s letter, Gilson charged in his response 
to Figaro, “forms a part of a defamation campaign undertaken in a a happily restricted milieu, but 
virulent in the U.S.A., against every slightly well-known Catholic who does not take the war against 
Russia to be a sacred duty in the strictly religious sense of the term.” He made a similar point in his 
letter to Le Monde: “The reason for this attack is a political fanaticism nourished by misplaced 
religious sentiments.”140 Gilson wrote these letters from Toronto, where he had taken up a 
professorship. The party he’d represented was in tatters, the newspaper he’d helped to found in the 
late 1930s (Temps Présent) had ceased publication, and his formerly mainstream political views had 
turned him into a radical. France in 1950 was no place for a neutralist Catholic. Atlantic Catholicism 
had by this point largely displaced Gilson’s breed of left-Catholicism. Moreover, as this affair shows, 
Atlantic Catholicism was just as transnational as its predecessor: left-Catholicism would no longer 
dominate Catholicism qua transnational Catholic public sphere. Gilson was not brought down in an 
intra-French affair, but by a German exile writing in an American journal. 
One of Gurian’s charges was that Gilson had “emphatically accused a well-known and highly 
respected French publicist and scholar of being a paid American agent.” As he revealed in a letter to 
the editor at Commonweal, the figure in question was Raymond Aron, whose rapprochment with 
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Gurian’s brand of anti-totalitarian Catholicism was charted in the previous chapter.141 In hindsight, 
though, we know that Gilson was, in a sense, correct about Aron: as a member of the Executive 
Committee of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, Aron was a beneficiary of the C.I.A.’s largesses 
(although this did not become clear for several decades). He was joined by our three major 
protagonists, all of whom worked with the CCF. Gurian published in Der Monat, the CCF’s German 
organ, while Jacques Maritain was present at the CCF’s opening meeting in Berlin and Eugen Kogon 
joined Aron on the CCF’s International Executive Committee. Gilson thought that these figures 
needed to be bought off by the American government. About this, at least, he was wrong: there 
were deep-seated ideological reasons for the turn of our protagonists, along with Catholic political 
culture more broadly, towards Washington and a Cold War consensus. These rationale, and the 
transformation that led to Gilson’s downfall, will be charted in the next and final chapter. 
                                                







Chapter 8: “Occupying Religion”: The Restorative Epoch and the 
Rise of Atlantic Catholicism, 1947-50 
 
The French problem […] is to save a certain ideal of liberty and justice that symbolizes, for the 
masses, the word “democracy,” while creating a political regime that is the very negation of 
democracy. 
--Louis Salleron, 19381 
 
Actually, today the problem is not “Church and state,” but Church and society. 
--John Courtney Murray, 19492 
 
Introduction 
In September 1948, an American priest named Father William McManus submitted a report 
to the Catholic Affairs Section of the Office of Military Government (OMGUS), which had been set 
up to govern the American zones of occupied Germany. As part of the massive de-Nazification and 
democratization efforts of the American military, he had been charged with examining religious 
education textbooks for potentially anti-democratic teachings. In his report, he praised the OMGUS 
relation to the churches, which he thought would be “one of the brightest pages in the history of the 
American occupation of Germany.” He used a pregnant phrase to describe his understanding of the 
American mission: we are tasked, he declared, with “occupying religion.”3 This chapter is an attempt 
to understand the sense in which religion was “occupied” by America—or, more precisely, the ways 
in which American occupation interacted with the existing preoccupations of West European 
Catholicism. This occupation, like the Allied occupation of Germany more generally, was much 
more than a military occupation. Indeed, it comes closer to the secondary meaning of “occupation”: 
engagement, in the sense that one “occupies” oneself with a task. American occupying forces and 
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American funds shaped Western Europe in many ways, but this was done with the cooperation of 
the Europeans themselves. As Geir Lundestad has suggested, the encounter was doubtless imperial, 
but it was an “Empire by Invitation.”4 And as McManus knew, the Catholic Church, as both 
hierarchical institution and wide-ranging political culture, was a privileged site for this peculiar form 
of empire. 
The Vatican itself was keen to invite the American presence, obsessed as it was by 
Bolshevism. In 1947, Truman and Pius XII engaged in a published correspondence. While it was 
platitudinous and not overly political, its paeans to freedom and anti-totalitarianism had clear 
resonances (a companion volume of Pius-Stalin correspondence was not forthcoming).5 On a more 
practical level, the Americans used the Vatican to funnel money to the Christian Democrats in the 
Italian election of 1948, which the Communists were in danger of winning. While Americans might 
be discomfited by religious parties, the political scientist Gabriel Almond wrote, we must support 
these movements as the ones that are closest in spirit to American humanism and American 
geopolitics.6 The Church, he pointed out, had traveled a long way from the authoritarian, illiberal 
Church of the American imagination. 
It had also traveled a long way from the warring clans of the 1930s: Catholicism in the late 
1940s and 1950s displayed a single face and was not rocked by wars of manifestoes, or disputes 
between civil-society and corporatist Catholics. In the crucible of the Cold War, a new Atlantic 
Catholicism was born, under the aegis of the Americans and the burgeoning Cold War. Corporatist 
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Catholics were forced to abandon the dream for an authoritarian, Catholic order—it was simply not 
in the cards, and anyway the weaknesses of that state form were painfully obvious. Civil-society 
Catholics, too, were largely forced to abandon their position of purity. Pius XII, for instance, 
wrestled Catholic Action firmly under clerical control, where it was used, in Italy as elsewhere, for 
largely conservative and political ends.7  
 There were, to repeat, two major ways in which Catholicism mattered at the time. First: it 
functioned as a discourse of legitimation.8 This will be the main focus of this chapter: why, we will 
ask, did Catholics conceive of the new regimes as legitimate, when their democratic predecessors 
had not been? We tend to conceive of legitimacy as something owed to, or produced by, a political 
apparatus. But a consideration of Europe in the middle decades of the twentieth century challenges 
such an assumption. Regimes rapidly rose and fell, and yet Europe landed in exceptional stability. 
Even across the crisis years, there was substantial continuity at the level of economic structures and 
the civil service.9 At the risk of stating the obvious: one fundamental reason that Europe was able, 
finally, to experience several decades of political stability was that most Western Europeans 
conceived of the new regimes as legitimate. This had less to do with the state as such than with the 
social-cultural-intellectual matrix from which the state emerged and in which it operated: in other 
words, political culture.  
 This bleeds into the second major way Catholicism mattered: as an actual strategy of 
governance, bolstered by electoral success and social-scientific management. Remember Part I of the 
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dissertation – we cannot ask why Catholics supported or opposed democracy in the abstract, but 
only how it supported or opposed particular forms of democracy. The democracies of post-1945 
Europe looked radically different from their predecessors in the 1920s. There were multiple reasons 
for this, of course. One of them was that Catholics themselves were often at the helm.  More 
broadly, though, the new political and economic circumstances of post-1945 Western Europe were 
particularly congenial to social Catholicism’s anti-étatiste bias. The Marshall Plan, the United 
Nations, NATO, the lengthy occupation of Germany, the Nuremberg Trials, and the list goes on: 
the state’s monopoly was consistently threatened from above. From within, to take Germany as an 
example, the Constitutional Court was given wide scope to defend against violations of the Basic 
Law (this sort of constitutional, apolitical jurisprudence is familiar to us in America, but had been 
foreign to the German experience).10 West Germany was deeply federal, enacting the de-
Prussification that Catholics from Ketteler onwards had desired: the subnational Länder were granted 
authority over education, cultural affairs, radio, television, law enforcement, environment, and more. 
Many “public” functions were in fact carried out by “parapublic” institutions, which were really joint 
public-private ventures. The Churches were among the best examples of these, as they were granted 
enormous control over the delivery of social welfare in much of Germany; they were joined by a 
dense network of other institutions that made up what the political scientist Peter Katzenstein calls 
the “semisovereign state.”11 As Ketteler would have desired, much support was given to the family, 
as well: there was a Europe-wide resurgence of interest in the family as the proper locus of 
economic, moral, and political life. This had multiple dimensions, including natalist population 
campaigns and the status of the family as the privileged object of postwar welfare operations. All of 
this fed into a general European sense of moral retrenchment into the home, and a reimagination of 
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the state as an agent that could provide housing instead of one that could violently reshape society.12 
For all of these reasons, Carl Schmitt, who was committed to a fundamentally Weberean notion of 
sovereignty, did not believe that the Bonn Republic was a state at all.  
The age of economic monopoly was also over: the post-1945 period was one of 
decartelization and deconcentration on the American model.13 NATO and the UN had their 
economic counterparts: GATT, the European Payments Union, the European Coal and Steel 
Commission, and more. The Constitutional Court had its analogue at the new Bundesbank; both 
were given significant powers and insulated from political pressures in ways their predecessors had 
not been. At the commanding heights of the state itself, organized labor and organized business 
cooperated in the “neocorporatist” manner familiar to us from the 1920s. Barry Eichengreen, in the 
best current economic history of post-1945 Europe, calls this a period of “Coordinated Capitalism,” 
stressing the importance of corporatist institutions that were often rooted in the interwar years.14 If 
anything, neocorporatism was even more advanced in the post-45 period: German labor unions 
organized themselves into one umbrella organization [the DGB], which coordinated industrial 
relations with a complex of employers’ federations (their agreements were given legal standing). But 
this time, there was no longer raucous debate about this outcome, and Catholics did not feel that 
socialists were at the gate, foaming at the mouth to abolish private property and nationalize the 
economy. On the contrary, socialist parties jettisoned their Communist elements and signed onto 
the corporatist consensus.15  
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Moreover: while it is true, as Neil Brenner has demonstrated, that states were interested in 
incorporating their undeveloped regions into the new national space of the economy, it is also true 
that this “economy” was conceived of, across Europe, as a multifaceted phenomenon with complex 
vectors of authority and sovereignty, in which welfare was to be delivered as often by families and 
teachers and pastors as it was by the Leviathan of the state.16 From the perspective of comparative 
political economy, Orfeo Fioreto has recently shown that European capitalism, from the 1950s 
onwards, was organized in a profoundly transnational way and cannot be analyzed in national 
terms.17 The state was to coordinate and manage economic growth, but this always in alliance with 
subsidiary and super-state power brokers. The postwar drives for nationalization, for instance, were 
mostly abandoned for fear of Communism, and the post-war decades were triumphant for 
capitalism and open markets (the European Coal and Steel Commission was only the most visible 
success of the latter, which was a precondition for Marshall Aid). Now that “liberalism and 
capitalism have experienced their great transmutation,” argued a prominent Rhenish-Catholic 
sociologist, Catholics could let down their guard and accept the new order. European economies 
began to enter, that is, the “neomedieval” space that some theorists have detected at the heart of 
modern capitalist organization. And who better than Catholics to lead this march back to the 
medieval?18 
 Catholics leapt at the opportunity, and they were at the commanding heights of post-1945 
social and economic management. This is not a history of civil bureaucracies and policymaking, but 
it is crucial to keep this in mind. To take a few examples: Kees van Kersbergen has shown how 
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Catholic notions of the family infiltrated the new family welfare schemes. Philip Nord has shown 
how ideals of elite management nourished in Catholic Action movements were integral to social-
security policy in Fourth Republic France Our old friend François Perroux, sent as an expert to 
study the Keynesean revolution in Britain, spearheaded the introduction of Keynesean economics 
into France; much of Monnet’s team, meanwhile, came from Catholic Action movements.19  
This is perhaps most obvious in Germany, as a number of scholars have shown.20 Joseph 
Höffner is fascinating here. He was a priest and scholar deeply interested in social-economic 
questions. Before becoming Archbishop of Cologne, he founded the Institute for Christian Social 
Sciences in 1951, in Münster. He was probably the most prominent Catholic social scientist in 
Adenauer’s Germany, as his Institute took over from the Königswinterer Kreis to become the 
clearing-house for Catholic social thought in a political era that was particularly congenial to it. In 
addition to organizing innumerable conferences and publications from his center in Münster, he 
held positions of political significance, most notably as spiritual adviser to the Union of Catholic 
Employers (founded March 1949). He was influential in the formulation of social policy, playing 
official advisory roles on topics as diverse as family, youth, employment, and housing issues, while 
Adenauer himself commissioned an influential report on social security policy from Höffner and 
three other economists.21 
This is a story of unintended consequences, as is probably clear. When Höffner and the like 
agitated for an economy based upon family welfare and private property, they did not think that they 
were ushering in the new Europe of the 1950s, marked as it was by consumer culture, new gender 
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relations, creeping secularization, and more. But create it they largely did.  “The restoration does not 
know what it is doing,” Walter Dirks sighed. “Collectively, it has a convoluted, and often false, 
consciousness, conjoined with a conscience that is usually good, even if misguided.”22 
Social Catholicism, that is, influenced the actual shape of the new European settlement. This 
chapter will be more interested, however, in the political culture of legitimacy, broadly speaking: the 
ways that Catholics outside of the immediate corridors of power understood the new regimes, and 
why they supported them. There were, I hope to show, three major components here: (1) on the 
international front, strong commitment to European federalism and currently-existing federalist 
movements (i.e. more than the traditional nostalgia for a decentralized Christendom); (2) on the 
domestic front, support of anti-totalitarianism and political pluralism (i.e. an emphasis on civil 
society as the bastion of political order, and the corollary that centralized state power is a great 
danger); (3) turn towards America, as both geopolitical force and as model for democratic, religious 
politics. The second of these needs some explanation: I’ll be using “pluralism” to refer to the precise 
political theory at issue, and “anti-totalitarianism” for the shorthand that appeared more commonly 
in political discourse. As Nils Gilman has suggested, pluralism was “constructed as the opposite of 
totalitarianism.”23 I will refer to the three of these together as Atlantic Catholicism.  
To reiterate: the claim here is not that these positions are exhaustive of Catholic political or 
social thought. I might have written about Christian humanism, which enjoyed widespread support, 
or Christian socialism, which proved quite divisive. The claim is that these are the terms in which the 
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newly-forged Catholic consensus was enacted.24 These sections will also bring us up to date on the 
three major protagonists with which the dissertation began: Jacques Maritain, Eugen Kogon, and 
Waldemar Gurian. As we saw in previous chapters, they had begun in completely different circles, 
speaking different theological and political languages. Now, in the late 1940s, they were brought 
together by the new discourse of Atlantic Catholicism. Their paths intersect at only one point: a 
1942 essay by Jacques Maritain, discussed in Chapter 6, on “The End of Machiavellianism.” It was 
published in both Gurian’s Review of Politics and Kogon’s Frankfurter Hefte: it was also, not 
coincidentally, one of the earliest invocations of the Atlantic Catholicism on the horizon. 
These three components extended far beyond Catholicism, of course. The other relevant 
groups—Americans, socialists, and liberals—were also on board, to varying degrees. In a way, what 
I’m tracing here is the Catholic contribution to the “end of ideology” that united non-Communist 
intellectuals across the public sphere of the early Cold War (the phrase was associated with the 
Congress for Cultural Freedom, welcomed by and welcoming to Catholic intellectuals). Daniel Bell 
provides a gloss of Atlantic Catholicism when he defines the end of ideology as entailing “the 
acceptance of a Welfare State; the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy 
and political pluralism.”25 The original thesis, as well as later discussions of it, have focused on 
ideology’s collapse on the left. This is surely an incomplete interpretation: that complex of “post-
ideological” social ideas was converged upon from both the left and the right, even though the 
“deradicalization” of the Right has received little scholarly attention. The analysis that Howard Brick 
applied to leftist intellectuals in America can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to European Catholics: 
Daniel Bell’s turn towards accommodation had little to do with his personal trajectory, and much to 
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do with “a particular expression of a general ideological current shaped by a confluence of historical 
forces reaching a special intensity at this time”: economically, the surprising avoidance of postwar 
economic depression in both America and Europe; politically, the collapse of social democracy and 
the cluster of geopolitical events and crises that were eventually coded as “Cold War.”26 
While the American, socialist, and liberal consensus with Catholics on these values will be 
charted below, I should register here that all three of these groups had given up on their previous 
anti-Catholicism—a basic change in tenor that was a precondition for cooperation. Americans were 
welcoming Catholicism into their civil religion for the first time: Maritain and Gurian felt very much 
at home there, both personally and intellectually—Kogon, for his part, enjoyed his visits. While 
FDR had announced, only a few years earlier, that Catholics were in Protestant America “on 
sufferance,” the early years of the Cold War were easier for American Catholics, as Truman and 
Eisenhower celebrated the rapprochement of Catholicism and American democracy (finally ratifying 
something that Tocqueville thought had happened a century previously). American Catholics were 
enthusiastic Cold Warriors, as well: the best example here is probably Edmund Walsh, a Jesuit who 
lectured at air force bases and the Army War College, while serving on Justice Jackson’s Nuremberg 
staff and a presidential commission on the topic of universal military training.27  
The Americans were not the Catholics’ only partners on the continent: in some countries, 
notably Austria and the Netherlands, Catholics were actually in coalition with socialists, while 
elsewhere they at least were able to keep their disagreements within constitutional bounds. 
Schumacher’s SPD, Mollet’s SFIO, Schärf’s Austrian SPÖ, and the socialist parties of other 
European countries largely abandoned the anti-clericalism that had structured their political 
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argumentation in the interwar period. “It makes no difference,” announced Kurt Schumacher, 
“whether one comes to Social Democracy by way of the methods of Marxist economic analysis […] 
or out of the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount.”28 In France, the presiding spirit of the SFIO, Léon 
Blum, sought to take the tired clerical/anti-clerical issue off the table, while even the strident Guy 
Mollet, by the 1950s, was collaborating with Catholics in the name of anti-Communism instead of 
attacking them in the name of laïcité.29 
As we saw in Chapter 6, liberalism, too, had developed in a far less anti-clerical direction in 
the 1930s and through the war years. The two most prominent liberal intellectuals in Europe 
remained Raymond Aron and Wilhelm Röpke. Aron’s star had risen in the Resistance, and he 
emerged as France’s most prominent liberal intellectual and defender of the RPF. Röpke, as a close 
friend and inspiration of Ludwig Erhard, was one of the intellectual architects of the CDU’s liberal 
policies, while he too rose to public prominence after the war. They were both notable Cold 
Warriors and retained their friendliness towards Christianity. “What are the philosophical bases of 
this elementary liberalism?” Aron asked a roomful of German students in 1948, referring to a 
liberalism that could adequately combat totalitarianism. “I see two of them: on the one hand, the 
Christian faith, and on the other a virile humanism.”30 He renewed his friendship with Gaston 
Fessard, perhaps France’s most celebrated anti-totalitarian Catholic—by 1950, Aron could write to 
Fessard to say that they were engaged in the same task and confronting the same enemies.31 Even 
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within the Catholic public sphere, Aron played an important role: he published in La Vie Intellectuelle, 
Cahiers du Monde Nouveau, and La Fédération—as we’ll see, three of the central journals of postwar 
French Catholicism.  
Röpke, too, maintained his stance as a Christian humanist; in Die deutsche Frage (1945), he 
recapitulated the familiar Catholic belief that the road to Hitler began with Luther, and he 
participates in the beloved Catholic pastime of demonizing Prussia, in particular, as Germany’s “evil 
genius.” A Catholic Germany, he theorizes, would never have succumbed to Hitler, and its only path 
to normalcy is a return to “the spirit of Christian and humanist principles.”32 He too was an 
important presence in the Catholic public sphere: like Aron, he also published in Cahiers du monde 
nouveau and La Fédération, while his work on Germany quickly appeared in translation with the 
Librairie de Médicis (on which see Chapter 6). Within Germany, he was a constant presence in the 
leading Catholic newspaper, Rheinischer Merkur, whose editor was a supporter of Röpke’s views.33  
Catholics returned the liberal embrace. Jean Daujat, a former disciple of Jacques Maritain 
who had been involved with General de Castelnau’s Fédération National Catholique in the late 1930s, 
wrote an article in 1948 about the new crop of liberals. He praised particularly the anti-totalitarian 
liberalism of Hayek, Mises, and Röpke for surpassing their nineteenth century predecessors in their 
efforts against “the total regulation of life: in a word, the totalitarian State.”34 “I am neither 
Communist nor socialist, nor even for the New Deal,” declared Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, an 
influential German Catholic writer, in 1950. Instead, he was “entirely in favor of the capitalist system 
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of free enterprise. Not only because I am against Communism, but more because I am against the 
totalitarian system as practiced by the Russians.”35 The Rheinische Merkur, one of postwar Germany’s 
most important newspapers, was essentially an organ of neoliberal Catholicism.36 “Liberalism,” 
Kramer proudly announced in 1947, “has not completely collapsed into the faceless rationalism of 
formal-democratic thought.”37 He referred specifically to “the powerful Renaissance of this school” 
in the work of Röpke and and Eucken, whom we met in the previous chapter. Röpke himself 
regularly published in the paper, which quickly became one of the lodestars of the CDU’s political-
moral firmament.In 1949, for instance, Joseph Höffner published an essay there called, simply, 
“Scholasticism and the Market Economy.” He tried to show that, despite decades of interpretation 
to the contrary, canonical scholastics were wholly in favor of the market economy—they had, he 
claims, a “decisive objection to planned economies,” by which they meant “total power of 
bureaucracy, dictatorship of the public authorities and the concomitant endangering of human 
freedom.”38 Even Gustav Gundlach was deeply optimistic, declaring that the ideal corporative order 
“is not only compatible with the ‘social market economy’, it is its logical refinement.”39  
The Catholic Public Sphere: An Overview  
 
Before exploring the three facets of postwar Catholicism in detail, I want to show how 
hegemonic they, in fact, were, by providing an overview of the Catholic public sphere in France, 
Germany, and Austria overall. This might seem tedious, but it is necessary given the paucity of work 
on this subject. When we consider the Catholic public sphere as a whole, it is striking how closely it 
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hewed to the facets of Atlantic Catholicism outlined above. After decades of Sturm und Drang, 
Catholicism had settled into something approaching a consensus. 
That said, the Catholic public sphere itself was splintered after World War II. “For years,” 
Jean de Fabrègues complained to Maritain in 1952, “we have been terrorized by the absence in France 
of a center of intellectual Catholic influence.”40 There were a huge number of journals, each with its 
own idiosyncrasies and political bent. With the exception of Esprit, though, none of these journals 
charted an especially unique path. They were important because, as a whole, they created the 
Catholic political culture of legitimacy. Despite their disagreements, they were united behind Atlantic 
Catholicism and the legitimacy it granted to the emerging postwar order (even if certain features of it 
were harshly criticized). Rather than showing this to be true for every journal under discussion, 
which would be as exhausting to read as it was to write, I’ve split the publishing scene into four 
major groups: for both France and Germany/Austria, those journals rooted in the civil-society 
Catholicism of the 1930s (Chapter 4), and those rooted in the corporatism of the same period 
(Chapter 5). Although these distinctions had, in a real sense, ceased to matter, these constellations of 
journals retained differences of emphasis and continuities in personnel with their interwar forebears. 
For each of these four groups, I’ll choose one journal as an exemplar to discuss in more detail.  
The major French civil-society journals of the interwar period had been La Vie Intellectuelle 
and Sept. La Vie Intellectuelle survived and prospered after the war, while the fate of Sept, which was 
renamed Temps Présent, has already been considered in Chapter 7 (it had been resurrected as a left-
wing newspaper, and it collapsed along with the rest of the left-Catholic public sphere). After the 
war, La Vie Intellectuelle was joined on the progressive wing of French Catholicism by Cahiers du 
Monde Nouveau, a relatively highbrow journal put out by Témoignage chrétien, as well as the Témoignage 
chrétien newspaper itself. Each of these was, by 1948, firmly in the Atlantic Catholic camp. In a way, 
                                                




this is not surprising: the major tenet of civil-society Catholicism was that political and religious 
authority could separate, so long as each respected its proper sphere (thus entailing an implicit 
political philosophy). The Fourth Republic saw very little overt anti-clericalism, while it was the 
Communistic opponents who were charged with integrating religion and authority. For these 
reasons, La Vie Intellectuelle could support the Atlantic Consensus almost without question. More 
interestingly, these journals provided a landing-ground for disappointed left-Catholics. To see how 
this happened, let’s look at Témoignage chrétien [TC]. 
In the previous chapter, TC appeared as one of the central loci of Resistance Catholicism: 
indeed, as late as 1947, its authors were pointing to Communism as the only path to a brighter 
future, claiming as a corollary that Europe could not afford to align with America. Over the next 
two years, the paper radically changed. In 1948, articles began to appear about atrocities in the Soviet 
Union, and the Catholics at TC were as appalled as those elsewhere by the Cardinal Mindszenty 
affair.41 The newspaper also adopted the three basic conceptual schemes of Atlantic Catholicism. 
First, federalism: the journal had very little about federalism between 1944 and 1946, but it began to 
appear with greater frequency in 1947, as Atlantic Catholicism was consolidating itself. Alexandre 
Marc and Jean Bareth, a correspondent for La Fédération, penned a series of articles in the winter of 
1946-7 introducing the paper’s readers to federalist theory, while Pierre Locardel, a few months later, 
trumpeted the Marshall Plan as a harbinger of European federalism. By 1949, the paper could 
include an article from leading federalist Hendrik Brugmans on the theme, while the paper’s 
companion journal, Cahiers du Monde Nouveau, defined itself almost exclusively as a federalist organ.42 
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Second, anti-totalitarian pluralism: this represented a shift, as the newspaper had, like other left-
Catholic organs, earlier agitated against totalitarianism theory. In 1945, for instance, an editorial 
declared that Catholics must collaborate with Communists, in pursuit of wide-ranging economic 
nationalization, and that this would not lead to “totalitarianism.43 Within a few years, though, the 
paper’s editors had turned strongly against Communism, arguing for the totalitarian nature of the 
regime in Russia and, through publication of an article by David Rousset in 1949, the Communist 
regime’s similarity to the Nazi one.44 This led the paper to the third, and defining, characteristic of 
Atlantic Catholicism: support of America in the Cold War, and the renunciation of the dream of a 
Third Force Europe. In March 1949, Jean Baboulène, one of TC’s main editors, penned a mea culpa 
entitled “America Has the Ideas and the Ideas that are Working.” In the wake of the Mindszenty 
scandal, the crackdowns in Eastern Europe, the PCF’s change in tactics, and the success of the 
Marshall Plan, it had become clear that Catholics must give up on Communism in the name of 
America.45 In May, the paper published an interview with Maritain, in which the sage of Meudon 
extolled the moral virtues of the American mission. By the time of the Vatican’s anti-Communist 
decree in July, the paper had already abandoned the Communist sympathies that had, in part, 
summoned the decree in the first place: the paper accepted it as a fait accompli, pointing out in its 
coverage that the moral failings of Communism had long been apparent.46  
Témoignage chrétien, with its origins in the Resistance, found itself agreeing with its former 
enemies by 1948: journals stocked with Vichy collaborators became Atlantic Catholics, too. The 
1930s corporatists, despite their tarnished histories under Vichy, quickly reconsolidated their 
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personnel and their ideas in two major journals: La France Catholique and La Fédération. The former 
was the biweekly organ of the Fédération national catholique, the integralist movement founded by 
General Castelnau that had proven so attractive to corporatist Catholic intellectuals in the 1930s (in 
1945, it was rechristened Fédération national d’action catholique [FNAC]). The editor-in-chief was none 
other than Jean de Fabrègues, one of Pétain’s leading intellectual henchmen. The journal’s history 
mirrored that of Catholic political culture more broadly: with an initial circulation of 10,000, it 
initially trailed far behind the left-Catholic Temps Présent (which it resembled in format). But history 
was, finally, on Fabrègues’s side: while the left-Catholic journal sputtered and disappeared, La France 
Catholique exploded in popularity, reaching a circulation of 55,000 within fifteen years.47 The journal’s 
more intellectual sister, with whom it shared essentially all of its writers, was La Fédération, which was 
even more rooted in Vichy. While La France Catholique was a new journal that happened to have 
many collaborationists in its midst, La Fédération was, as an institution, a direct survival from the 
National Revolution (see Chapter 6). And even more than its FNAC cousin, it was the premier 
landing-place for former Catholic corporatists and Vichyites: most prominently, Jean Daujat, Jean de 
Fabrègues, François Gravier, François Perroux, and Louis Salleron. Intriguingly, these two journals 
toed the Atlantic party line even more enthusiastically than did their more progressive counterparts.  
The federalism of La Fédération goes without saying: federalism was its whole mission, 
inscribed in the journal’s title and in nearly every article therein (the exact shape of this federalism 
will be considered below). Second, anti-totalitarian pluralism: in 1945-6, several articles were 
published that not only worried about Nazi-Bolshevik totalitarianism, but sounded the alarm that 
Fourth Republic France was headed down the same path: “France,” wrote a correspondent in spring 
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1946, “is about to become totalitarian.”48 While they occasionally held out the hope that 
collaboration with socialists might be acceptable, Bolshevism qua totalitarianism was always beyond 
the pale.49 Unsurprisingly, this was translated into swift opposition to nationalizations: they came out 
against the nationalization of Renault, for instance, in 1945.50 Lastly, and in a spectacular way, 
support for America. Max Richard, one of the journal’s editors and an old hand from the 1920s 
Action française and the 1930s Jeune Droite, made this clear for the first time in December 1947, in an 
article called simply “Cold War.” Against those who dreamt that European federalism could take the 
form of a “Third Force” between the battling blocs, Richard asserted that the Cold War, which is 
“already hot,” forces us to choose sides, and between the Marshall Plan and Soviet takeover, we 
must choose the former.51 The following year, Jean Lorraine wrote an article about the American 
election of 1948. “America,” Lorraine chided, “is not merely the nation of great banks and 
industries. It is also, and perhaps above all, a nation that believes firmly in its ideals.” We must 
“remember that the great choice of our times is, doubtless, between the spirit of Lincoln and that of 
Lenin.”52 Finally, in a capstone to this phenomenon, the May 1949 issue featured a special section, 
called “America and Europe,” dedicated to Franco-American understanding. The American 
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ambassador to France, Jefferson Caffery, contributed an article, as did Paul Devinat, secretary to the 
Prime Minister.53  
 The German periodical scene was as devoted to Atlantic Catholicism as its French 
counterpart, if not moreso: while French Catholics were somewhat hamstrung by their lack of an 
effective political movement after the collapse of the MRP, Germans could line up behind the 
Atlantic Catholicism of Konrad Adenauer, whose politics fit precisely into the tripartite schema I’ve 
described. As with France, we will begin with an analysis of the surviving civil-society periodicals 
before moving onto the residues of the corporatist scene. 
The German civil-society tradition, nourished in the Weimar Rhineland, had been largely 
decimated by a dozen years of repression, and the fact that it had always been a minority current did 
not aid in its survival. The major journals in which it continued to appear were Frankfurter Hefte, 
Hochland, and Rheinischer Merkur. Each of these journals was stocked with figures from the interwar 
period who had, along with Gurian, argued for the impossibility of a return to a medieval order, and 
the possibility of economic and moral justice in an industrial society. Each of these journals, like its 
civil-society counterparts in France, emerged as members of the Atlantic Consensus. The most 
surprising example here is probably Frankfurter Hefte, which was described in the previous chapter as 
a leading journal of philo-Communist left-Catholicism. 
The closest student of German left-Catholicism, in his consideration of the Hefte between 
1948 and 1950, concludes that “there is absolutely no doubt” that the journal supported the 
“Western orientation of Germany.”54 Despite the controversy with the Merkur described in the 
previous chapter, and despite Dirks’s lamentations over the restorative character of the age, the 
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journal used the vocabulary, and participated in the discourse, that was ratifying that lamentable 
restoration. It did not, that is to say, adopt the position of outrage adopted by Esprit. “We know E. 
Mounier and we understand very well the analogies and common points that bring us together,” 
Kogon told an interviewer in 1947. “But the structure of our reviews is different.”55 
The journal, unlike its French counterpart, was among the most vociferous supporters of European 
federalism, largely thanks to the editorship of Kogon, who, as we will see below, became one of 
Europe’s most prominent federalist intellectuals and leaders. It also shared the language of anti-
totalitarian pluralism, although it was more marked in Kogon and other contributors than in the 
writings of Dirks himself, attuned as he was to the conservative uses to which these concepts could 
be put. As we saw in the last section, Kogon was keen to point out during the efflorescence of left-
Catholicism that it was illegitimate to equate Bolshevism and Fascism as forms of totalitarianism. 
But by 1948, he was freely referring to Communism as inherently totalitarian: in November of that 
year, he published an article, henceforth added to new editions of Der SS-Staat, making this case at 
length.56 He was not alone: in a December 1947 article, Karl Buchheim, after defining Catholic 
political philosophy as dedicated towards freedom, concluded that a “total state cannot bear such a 
freedom; the freedom of the Church is therefore especially abhorrent to it.”57  
Lastly, the turn to America: the journal was always friendly to American influence, at least 
partially because the Americans were in control of their license and precious paper supply. One 
particular OMGUS lieutenant, a friend wrote to Gurian, was “tremendously enthusiastic about the 
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Kogon-Dirks group; he furthers them wherever he can.”58 Kogon himself praised the Marshall Plan, 
in January 1948, as far superior to anything on offer from the Soviets. “In its scope,” Kogon writes, 
“the Marshall Plan draws the conclusions from the failures of the first post-war period [i.e. the post-
1919 years] and points towards Europe’s future.”59 In the opening editorial of the same issue, Kogon 
argued that Europe must cast its lot with the United States. The dreams of Europe as a “third force” 
were over, while the Communists seemed intent on making the same mistakes as they had in 1932: 
total opposition to democratic republics. While the United States was imperfect, it was at least trying 
to create European organizations and develop the continent towards freedom and away from 
totalitarianism.60  
As in France, the corporatist, authoritarian-leaning Catholic intellectuals of the mid-1930s 
retained their prominence into the late 1940s. The central locus of the Catholic corporatist tradition, 
as we saw in Chapter 5, was Austria, and particularly the circle around Dietrich von Hildebrand and 
Christliche Ständestaat. And just as figures from Vichy’s cultural apparatus populated, and even 
dominated, postwar French Catholic intellectual production, figures from the Dollfuss regime held 
important positions in postwar Germany and Austria. The Hildebrand-Kreis, in particular, provided 
the editorial staff for some of postwar Mitteleuropa’s most important Catholic periodicals. The most 
significant of these was Neues Abendland, which I will discuss in detail below. It was edited by Emil 
Franzel, a Bohemian Catholic who had been a member of Hildebrand’s circle in the 1930s and 
seems, interestingly enough, to have been the middleman between Kogon and Hildebrand.61 The 
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role of La Fédération was filled in Germany by Föderalistische Hefte; just as the former was stocked with 
figures from Vichy, the latter was replete with figures from corporatist Austria. It was edited by 
Walter Ferber, who had been, like Franzel, a member of Hildebrand’s circle in 1930s Vienna. He had 
written for both Christliche Ständestaat and Die Neue Zeitung, a newspaper briefly edited by Kogon.62 A 
similar intellectual profile was apparent in Austria itself, Hildebrand’s home turf: Österreichische 
Monatshefte, the house organ of Austria’s ruling and Christian Democratic Austrian People’s Party 
[ÖVP], became an enthusiastic exponent of Cold War Catholicism. The journal was edited by Alfred 
Missong, who had, like Kogon, followed a trajectory from Eberle’s journals to Christliche Ständestaat, 
where he was a frequent contributor.  
Neues Abendland, which the State Department reported as having a circulation of around 
25,000, was the most successful and influential of the newly-founded German Catholic periodicals.63 
Despite the name, there was no institutional link between it and the Rhenish Abendland, discussed in 
Chapter 3; Neues Abendland was headquartered in Bavaria and drew its vocabulary and personnel 
more directly from the corporatist tradition outlined in Chapter 2. This is most apparent in its editor, 
Emil Franzel (who took over the reins from Johann Naumann in 1947 and, as Vanessa Conze has 
rightly judged, oversaw a rightward turn in the journal64). Franzel and his contributors were 
surprisingly brazen in drawing the parallels, especially at a time when few Germans were willing to 
call themselves conservative: in one 1947 editorial, for instance, Franzel actually called for a revived 
“Ständestaat”: the Austrians, he now claimed, had gotten it wrong and not uprooted liberal 
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capitalism violently enough.65 He was joined by Franz Klein and Walter Ferber, both contributors to 
Christliche Ständestaat (the former writing under the pseudonym Robert Ingrim), alongside Hans Rost, 
one of the major figures at Allgemeine Rundschau.66 They also featured figures from the earlier Eberle-
Kreis, such as Hermann Bahr, while Eberle’s postwar works themselves received positive reviews. 
Rooted so squarely in the authoritarian corporatist tradition of Mitteleuropa, it is fascinating to 
see how closely the journal hewed to Atlantic Catholicism. Federalism was one of its major reasons 
for being, both as an institutional and intellectual movement. Especially in the 1950s, the journal was 
the central node of a constellation of federalist organizations like Abendländische Aktion, 
Abendländische Akademie, and the Centre Européen de Documentation et Information 
(organizations which counted CSU/CDU politicians, not merely intellectuals, among their ranks).67 
This should be no surprise: certain forms of federalism had been prominent in these circles for 
decades, as we saw in Chapter 2, but, in the new context of the late 1940s, it took on a new cast 
given the unlikelihood of Habsburg restoration. Its contributors were highly aware of this tradition, 
publishing appreciations of Weimar federalist Catholics like Schmittmann and Foerster. “We old 
federalists,” sighed Hans Pfeiffer in 1946, “who were already fighting for true federalism in the time 
of the Weimar Republic, are gratified to examine today the progress towards a federalist 
construction.”68 The journal praised, for instance, the Union of European Federalists—one of the 
major federalist organizations, headed in Germany by Eugen Kogon and founded in the circle 
around La Fédération—and even quoted Jean Baboulène (from Témoignage chrétien) on the necessity of 
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a new Europe.69 This was linked with the same fear of the nation-state, and particularly of Prussia, 
that had animated earlier generations of federalists. They squarely imagined themselves in that 
tradition, as they had in the 1920s, writing about the “federalist subsidiarity principle” in Bishop von 
Ketteler’s social though and, in highly familiar terms, lauding federalism as  
a hierarchical system of social self-government, founded on the person[, whose] 
object is not only the true state, but the universal social arrangement, formed by the 
subsidiarity principle, which elevates itself from the person, over the family and the 
neighborly […] and professional […] social circles up to the federal [bündische] state 
and the community of states.70 
 
Given the journal’s mitteleuropäische roots, it is no surprise that this federalist commitment was the flip 
side of a thoroughgoing anti-totalitarianism. In the 1947 editorial already quoted, Franzel parroted 
the Hildebrand line by arguing that only the corporative state provided “a path towards the 
overcoming of totalitarianism.”71 Walter Ferber, in a 1946 piece on the “essence of federalism,” 
claimed the same.72 Georg Laforet, in an essay from the same year called “The Limits of State 
Power,” which admirably sums up the journal’s political stance, emphasized five times the “totality” 
of the Nazi state on the first page, wielding the word like a talisman.73  
More surprisingly, though, and contrary to the way that the journal has been portrayed in the 
literature, it was generally pro-American in its outlook. Of course, like all other Catholic journals, it 
maintained the same allergy to materialism, consumerism, and so on, but America in the public 
sphere meant much more than that in the late 1940s. The first move in the slow reorientation of 
conservative Catholics towards America appeared in a 1946 article about the American social thinker 
                                                
69 Anonymous, “Europäischer Föderalismus,” Neues Abendland 2, 3 (June 47), 118. 
70 Anonymous, “Kettelers Staatslehre,” Neues Abendland 1, 5 (July 1946), 27-9, here 27; Walter Ferber, “Paul Jostock,” 
Neues Abendland 1, 7 (Sept 46), 23-6, here 23. 
71 F. [probably Franzel], “Der ‘Ständestaat,’” Neues Abendland 1, 12 (Feb 47), 22-4, here 23. 
72 Walter Ferber, “Das Wesen des Föderalismsus,” Neues Abendland 1, 4 (1946-7), 4-7.  




Henry George, who was presented as a paragon of orthodox, personalist Catholic social teaching.74 
A few months later, a short article appeared about “federalism in the United States,” quoting with 
excitement from an article Harold Dodds, president of Princeton, had written about federalism in 
the New York Times Magazine; the writer went on to add that American federalism had much in 
common with Catholic social teaching.75 Hans Pfeiffer, quoted above on Weimar federalism, agreed: 
“In England and the USA,” Pfeiffer explained, comparing them positively to German traditions, 
“personal freedom and corporative freedom, and self-government of communities and freedom of 
instruction, are self-evident, integrated elements of political life as a whole.”76  
One further German journal, Eberhard Welty’s Die Neue Ordnung, does not fit into this 
schema, representing it does a mix of civil-society and corporatist Catholicism (just as Welty’s 
sociological works of the 1930s had been one of the few to incorporate Maritain and Hildebrand). 
For that reason, though, it might be considered as especially typical: it fell into the orbit of Atlantic 
Catholicism along with the others. In his discussion of the journal, Damian van Melis, one of the 
best scholars of postwar German Catholicism, confesses puzzlement. He claims to see a looming 
contradiction at the heart of Welty’s project, which was both opposed to modernity and capitalism, 
while supporting Adenauer’s American-oriented politics: “politics and ideology,” he concludes, “did 
not come together.”77 I will argue that, in fact, they did come together, in a precise and interesting 
way. Welty’s anti-modernism set him up squarely to become a mouthpiece for Adenauer, and for 
Atlantic Catholicism more broadly. To see how this was so, in greater detail, I will further investigate 
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each of the three pillars of Atlantic Catholicism, taking as our guides the three exemplary figures 
whose careers we’ve been tracing since Part I: Eugen Kogon (federalism), Jacques Maritain (anti-
totalitarian pluralism), and Waldemar Gurian (support for America). 
Atlantic Catholicism (I): Eugen Kogon and European Federalism 
In Daniel Bell’s estimation, one facet of the non-ideological ideology of postwar life was 
“decentralized power”; in European terms, this translated into federalism, which burst onto the scene 
in an amazing way from 1944 onwards. Catholic clearly played a major role here, insofar as the 
founding fathers of European institutions—Adenauer, Gasperi, Schuman—were believing Catholics 
who played up the abendländisch nature of their political activities. As with other aspects of the story, 
the federalism of these Catholic political elites has been described before. And, as elsewhere, that 
story is both important and incomplete: Catholic federalism did not matter merely because of the 
(really quite minor) achievements of European federalism in the late 1940s. From a historian’s point 
of view, Catholic federalism was not about federalism at all: it was about legitimacy. There were few 
concrete successes, and it would be a stretch to say that Catholic forms of federalism affected 
political life overmuch (except insofar as the groundswell to be charted here may have pushed 
politicians to support the ECSC). But what federalism did do was convince Catholics that the liberal 
democratic states of postwar Europe were legitimate: their stated openness to federalism, and their 
submission to the ECSC, NATO, the Marshall Plan, and so on, demonstrated that the states had 
given up on the maniacal drive for totalitarian sovereignty that, as Catholics had been arguing for 
decades, constituted the very essence of the modern project and its intrinsic violence.    
The single most remarkable fact about postwar Catholic intellectual life, I submit, was the 
hegemony of federalism as the optic through which to view the European past, present, and future. 
It was ubiquitous in every Catholic journal I’ve seen: the three most important Catholic 




language, too.78 The past, the argument ran, had been catastrophic because of the overweening and 
godless Machtstaat, the present was shot through with virtuous federalist tendencies, and the future 
presented the intoxicating image of a Europe free from the menace of nation-state sovereignty. 
Much of this rhetoric is familiar to us from past chapters: it sounds much like the Action française 
critique of the centralized French state, for instance, or the various Bavarian and Rhenish critiques 
of Prussian centralism. But now this language had a new valence. It was now employed in the 
service of the legitimacy of the postwar order, which had not been the case in the interwar period. In 
the last chapter, we saw that federalists in the early postwar years, 1944-7, were dedicated to a 
Resistance, Third-Force Europe that would fundamentally restructure the political and economic 
order of Europe as a whole, refusing to choose between the USA and the USSR. By the late 1940s, 
though, there were only two viable options for organizing international relations: European 
federalism, under the wing of the Americans, or a Communist Europe, ruled from Moscow. 
Following the 1947 formation of the Cominform, and the Marshall Plan, Third Force Europe left 
the realm of possibility. Molotov made it perfectly clear that federalism, even in the limited form 
desired by the French government, was unacceptable to the Soviets, so any political federalism was 
necessarily antagonistic to newly-rigid Communist parties.79 Meanwhile, French politicians were 
forced to accede to America’s mandate that Western Germany regain its sovereignty and be 
integrated into a free-trade union: the hope, shared by Morgenthau and French diplomats, that 
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Germany might be pulverized into political fragments was laid to rest by geopolitical necessity.80 The 
fear of state sovereignty that used to determine Catholic opposition to liberal democracy was 
transposed into anti-Communism. “The civilization that claims to impose Communism,” it was 
announced at a major federalist congress in 1950, “is based […] on the exclusive importance of the 
collective and its final expression: the STATE.”81 
Federalism was a particularly congenial conduit for formal royalists to join the Atlantic 
consensus. Joseph Baumgartner, a prominent Bavarian politician and one of the founders of the 
CSU, illustrates the continuities well: in the 1920s, he had been involved with the BVP—the 
conservative, quasi-monarchist wing of the Zentrum—before becoming a Christian democrat and 
crusading federalist after the war. Baumgartner also, incidentally, provides an example of the 
transnational nature of Atlantic Catholicism: in addition to his work at Föderalistische Hefte, he wrote 
for both La Vie Intellectuelle and La Fédération. We could also look at André Voisin, who began his 
career as a minor member of the Action française in the 1930s before entering the history books after 
1945 as one of the founders and early leaders of the Union of European Federalists. Gonzague de 
Reynold, an earlier admirer of Maurras, Mussolini, and (especially) Salazar, admitted in 1953 that “in 
order to be strong, or even to be at all, any European union would need to rely on America.”82 Jean 
de Fabrègues provides another instance of the continuities between 1920s royalism and 1940s 
federalism: in a 1948 article, after describing his traditional idea of Catholicism as the dissolution of 
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sovereignty into multiple centers, he concludes that “[i]t is possible to bestow the name ‘federalism’ 
on this notion of life.”83 Fabrègues is saying here that he can reiterate the same social philosophy he 
has espoused since his time as Charles Maurras’s secretary, but that now it is possible to call it 
“federalism,” and now we do not need a revolution to get it: major organizations, dedicated to the 
legitimacy of the postwar order, were acting in its service. 
Catholics widely believed that the long-desired dissolution of state sovereignty was 
forthcoming in Atlantic Europe. Whereas the interwar period had been dominated by statist 
retrenchment—even the League of Nations was predicated on maintaining state sovereignty—the 
nation-state form seemed to be on its way out after 1945. Catholics celebrated the United Nations, 
the Marshall Plan, the war crimes trials at Nuremberg, the consolidation of NATO and the 
possibilities of a European Army, early moves towards European economic union, and so on. It is 
doubtful whether or not these phenomena justified the enthusiasm felt by Catholics, insofar as the 
period was largely marked, as Alan Milward has argued, by the salvation of the nation-state form as 
the central axis of political life.84 Indeed, it would soon be spread around the world, despite the 
federalist leanings of such Catholic decolonizing figures as Léopold Senghor.85 In the crucial years of 
the late 1940s, though, federalism played a major role in closing the legitimacy deficit faced by 
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democratic governments. “The people,” Adenauer told his cabinet in 1952, “must be given a new 
ideology. It can only be a European one.”86  
  Our guide through the thicket of postwar federalist activism will be Eugen Kogon, who was 
one of the most prominent federalist organizers and intellectuals in Western Europe. His postwar 
career was marked by cooperation, both practical and intellectual, with the Americans; they had, 
after all, liberated him from Buchenwald, and it was in an American jeep that Kogon had rumbled in 
search of Walter Dirks.87 He quickly entered the employ of American military’s Psychological 
Warfare Division, which charged Kogon and other inmates with gathering evidence about 
Buchenwald’s operation. Following the suggestion of General McClure, chief of that division, 
Kogon turned this research into a book, which became a massive, and massively influential, 
indictment and analysis of the National Socialist system of camps entitled Der SS-Staat (published in 
America as The Theory and Practice of Hell).88 Again, the Americans were involved: in 1947, paper was 
allocated for 100,000 copies of Kogon’s book—the only book specifically about recent events to 
receive the honor. The chief of OMGUS’s Publications Control Branch gives an indication of why it 
was so valued: it was an exemplary work to convince the German “that he needs to stop thinking in 
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terms of a narrow nationalism and to start thinking in broadly European or world terms.”89 Kogon 
also, at the invitation of the Rockefeller Foundation, visited America in 1948.90 
Kogon expended the political capital gained from this book, alongside his aforementioned 
editorship of the equally successful Frankfurter Hefte, almost solely in the service of federalism. In the 
late 1940s, while Dirks bemoaned the return of capitalism, Kogon devoted himself above all to 
federalism. He believed, as he had since the 1920s, that the fundamental problem of European 
modernity was a political one (he later said that he spent so much of the Hefte’s money on early 
European movements that he nearly bankrupted it91). In an early 1947 article for Frankfurter Hefte, he 
declared that capitalism and individualism were dead, never to return. “But what is neither dead nor 
drawing its last breath, but rather still lives from the past epoch of individualism […] is nationalism.”92 
It was against this specter that Kogon, along with a bevy of former Catholic royalists, marshaled his 
considerable energies. 
His prominence was such that Adenauer grilled him about possible political ambitions, 
which Kogon waved off. “If I were your age, Herr Kogon,” Adenauer commented to the far-
younger Kogon, “I too would want to be no more than a notary and a breeder of roses.”93 Of 
course, Kogon did much more than that, and an account of his postwar activities provides a rough 
guide through the alphabet soup of late 1940s federalist organizations. In a 1949 letter to Dirks, he 
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referred to his activities during these years as “laying European eggs (what a dreadful image!).”94 
Dreadful it may have been, but it was accurate. We have access to his own words as to which of his 
affiliations he found most important: in a 1952 letter to Adenauer, he claimed to speak for 
federalism “as president of the German Europa-Union, president of the central committee of the 
Union Européenne des Fédéralists and leading member of the European Movement.”95 He here indicates 
his central position in the postwar federalist landscape. Let’s take these in order. The Europa-Union 
was the most important federalist movement within Germany, eventually growing to 20,000 
members. This movement was the German branch of the international UEF, whose Vichy origins 
were traced in the previous chapter: by the late 1940s, the UEF had emerged as one of the two most 
important constellations of federalist activity in Europe. Kogon was elected president of the Europa-
Union in 1949, and president of the UEF in 1950. The last group Kogon mentions was the European 
Movement: the international organization headed by Churchill and Duncan Sandys. He had been 
elected to head the German delegation to this movement in 1949. As all of this implies, federalism 
was, like Kogon himself, a transnational phenomenon. Whereas Catholic international life in 1945-6 
had been devoted to left-Catholicism, by this period federalism was the primary axis of transnational 
Catholic intellectual life. Eugen Kogon still traveled to France, but not in the name of a socialist 
Europe: he now went to strategize with the ex-monarchists of La Fédération.96 
Kogon, therefore, provides a unique way to access what federalism meant in the postwar 
period—to access, that is, why federalism in particular seemed such an insightful and obvious optic 
throughout the Catholic public sphere. In discussing Kogon’s understanding of the term, our basic 
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thesis will be that deep continuities can be discerned between his post-1945 federalism and the 
hatred of the nation-state project that had been Kogon’s stock-in-trade since his time as a royalist 
student of Othmar Spann in 1920s Vienna. To clarify this, I’ll turn to Kogon’s most revealing 
postwar consideration of these issues: a 1946 essay for Frankfurter Hefte called, simply, “Democracy 
and Federalism.” “Modern states,” Kogon begins, “received their shape from individualism. The 
roots of this development can be found in the transition from the Middle Ages to modernity.” At 
this stage, we became obsessed with “the freedom of the individual, to which all power was 
assigned.” This led, unsurprisingly, to the “atomization of society,” the precondition for both liberal 
democracy, with its “fanaticism of individual freedom,” and “collectivism,” the “grandson” of this 
same atomization. “Individualism and collectivism,” he writes, “are bound together in a common 
intuition of mankind.” Despite, or because of, its lionization of individual freedom, the turn to 
modernity leads directly the all-powerful state. Specifically, he pointed out that totalitarianism was a 
direct, if paradoxical, offspring of the modern obsession with the freedom of the individual. To 
emancipate ourselves from slavery to the state, we must reinstate all of those intermediary bodies—
the family, the factory, the school, the church—that were delegitimized in the transition to étatiste 
political modernity. “Federalism,” he writes, “is the organization of power in recognition of the 
rights and duties that grow from natural and objective responsibilities.”97  
None of this is new. Kogon reproduces here the basic theory of the modern state that we 
saw in Part I: royalists in both Germany and France shared this story of modernity’s original sin and 
its political repercussions. But Kogon’s conclusions differ radically from those of his youth, and an 
analysis article’s new features will help to show how Kogon, and with him the majority of the 
                                                





Catholic royalists who had been anti-modern federalists in the 1920s, could agree to the legitimacy 
of the postwar order.  
One major shift was the belief that certain forms of democracy might, in principle, be 
compatible with an overturning of modernity’s “fanaticism of individual freedom.” This belief, 
tendrils of which could be spotted in the royalists of the early 1920s, was widespread and will be 
discussed in the next section. It is enough to note here that, in titling his piece “Democracy and 
Federalism,” Kogon did not envision them as antonyms. Rather, the article, and Kogon’s postwar 
activities in general, were dedicated to finding rapprochement with democracy, a fait accompli of the 
postwar period, and the federalist ideals he had espoused for decades.  
Otherwise, the major notable feature of Kogon’s essay were the new authorities that he 
called upon: “Europe,” the United Nations, and the United States (he had had nothing but bile for 
the League in the 1920s).98 In other words, geopolitical events convinced Kogon that things were 
moving in the right direction—that a revolution was not necessary to unravel what he called the 
“fiction” of nation-state sovereignty. There was no need to call for a fundamental political 
reordering, as events were already tending towards federalism: even though Kogon was nonplussed 
by Adenauer’s liberal tendencies, he still supported Adenauer overall, and seems to have counted 
him a friend. Kogon wrote as a disaffected insider to the system, and not as an outsider railing for its 
overthrow.99 
Kogon was responding to something real in international life: European leaders were 
speaking the language of federalism, and the United Nations seemed like a more serious and worthy 
enterprise than the League of Nations. The Nuremberg trials, at which Kogon served as a witness 
and which featured a Catholic MRP-affiliated lawyer at the head of the French team, convinced 
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Catholics that law need not be confined to the nation-state. Catholics were no longer voices in the 
wilderness: federalist congresses were taking place at which Catholics could join hands with socialists 
and even Americans, decrying the pernicious leviathan of the state. The Marshall Plan, widely 
celebrated in the Catholic press, indicated that the heretical belief in liberal markets was coming to a 
close.100 In Kogon’s perception, firmly rooted in the rhetoric, if not the reality, of postwar political 
culture, nobody was committed any longer to the nation-state. We are, he might have written, all 
federalists now. At a 1949 speech delivered in Berlin, Eugen Kogon made this clear: Kogon 
“deemed it auspicious,” wrote a journalist covering the event, “that political tendencies from the 
conservatives to the liberals, and from Christian Democrats to Socialists, are represented within [the 
European Movement].”101 
Specifically, I want to think about three groups whose federalist inclinations led Catholics to 
embrace a political culture of legitimacy: socialists, liberals, and Americans. In the 1920s, there had 
been essentially no collaboration, at least on an ideological level, between socialists and Catholics: 
while the Zentrum and the SPD may have been the backbones of Weimar’s stability, such as it was, 
this was a marriage of convenience and not of conviction (as evidenced by the ease of the divorce 
between 1930 and 1933). In France, the SFIO participated in the anti-clerical Cartel des Gauches, 
while even this looked positively rosy compared to Catholic-socialist relations in Austria. After the 
war, though, there was much more full-blooded cooperation between the movements. Socialists (i.e. 
members of socialist parties, not merely Christian Democrats of socialist conviction) were regular 
contributors to Catholic periodicals in both France and Germany; moreover, socialists like Paul-
Henri Spaak and Altiero Spinelli were, next to Catholics, the most significant leaders of federalist 
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organizations (the UEF counted numerous socialist organizations, notably Henri Frenay’s Socialisme 
et liberté, among its ranks). In Germany, federalism was one of the major axes that separated the 
CDU and SPD from the KDP, which saw federalism as backwards-looking and opposed it. The 
SPD of the Weimar period had been a defender of the Einheitsstaat—as the agent of economic 
change—but this began to change after 1945, as socialist leaders in exile had been converted to more 
federalist principles.102 Social democrats, declared a postwar statement of SPD principles, “know that 
the unrestricted sovereignty of national states is a thing of the past. […] German social democrats 
want a United States of Europe.”103 In France, too, Léon Blum re-emerged from a concentration 
camp to lead the SFIO in a more federalist-friendly direction (although he emphasized that it should 
not take an anti-Soviet tack); he was an honorary president, for instance, of the same European 
Movement in which Kogon considered himself a “leading member.”104 La Fédération was closely 
allied with the socialist Claude-Marcel Hytte and his journal, La république moderne. In November 
1949, the MRP, the SFIO, and the Radicals decided on a joint resolution hoping that “a genuine 
European political authority may be defined and set up as soon as possible.”105 
Liberals, too, were convinced of the need for federalist solutions: in a remarkable article for 
La Fédération, Jean Daujat, a former Action française royalist Catholic, trumpeted the newfound 
alliance between neoliberalism and federalism. After beginning with the standard statement that 
liberalism and totalitarianism are the two largest enemies of true federalism, Daujat pivots: “It is 
therefore interesting to see the courageous and vigorous combat undertaken, alongside us, by a 
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school calling itself ‘neoliberal’, of which the best representatives are L. von Mises, Hayek, and, 
especially, W. Röpke.” Unlike the liberals of the past, who had a debased and secular understanding 
of man, the neo-liberals recognize that “there can only be an authentic safeguard of liberty and 
diversity along the road of multiple and freely constituted communities, which are themselves 
federalized into hierarchies.”106 
As Daujat suggests, the liberalism of Aron and Röpke was well-attuned to the federalism of 
Catholics: they had given up on the strong ontological claims of early liberals, and retreated into a 
more historicist liberalism, one alive to the importance of Christianity’s heritage while still 
maintaining the traditional liberal fear of étatisme. Both Röpke and Aron were critical of the 
disaggregative effects of capitalist modernity, and sought to undercut it through the revival of 
intermediary communities between man and the state—just as Catholics were doing. This similarity 
in sensibilities underwrote the remarkable extent to which they published in Catholic journals, as 
described earlier. Röpke’s Die deutsche Frage recommends German decentralization—the end of 
the unified-Germany experiment, and the return to a de-Prussified Germany of autonomous 
Länder—as the only way forwards.107 In his book on international order, also published in 1945, 
Röpke theorized that Europeans were living through “the crisis of the nation (especially as organized 
in the Großstaat).” When we think of “the new national or international order,” there is “in both 
places the same solution, which we recommend as the only one: federalism.”108 Raymond Aron, for 
his part, was also an enthusiastic supporter of Western European federalism: the idea of Europe, he 
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claimed, was an “ineluctable historical necessity.”109 In 1950, Aron and Kogon served as the two 
rapporteurs of a European Movement congress on “Germany and Europe.”110   
Like Röpke and Aron, Catholic federalists supported an “Atlantic Europe”: a Western 
European alliance that would be folded into a Western bloc as a bulwark against a Bolshevik Eastern 
bloc (Röpke called for a “Pax Anglo-Saxonica, largely regulated by the United States”111). Recall from 
the last chapter that left-Catholics had feared this solution, but by 1949 it seemed, as Aron would 
say, ineluctable. Early hopes began to seem naïve in 1947, when Eastern European delegates were 
kept from attending the UEF’s first conference. 1948 was the annus mirabilis for this transition to a 
Cold War federalism: the Prague Coup and the Marshall Plan convinced prominent supporters of 
Europe as a “Third Force,” notably Eugen Kogon and Alexandre Marc, that there was no choice 
but to align with America. The Soviets had no interest in European federalism, and, although 
federalists were loathe to say it outright, there was no doubt that European federalism had become, 
by 1950, firmly enlisted into the very bloc politics it had pledged to forestall.112 Kogon resigned his 
post from the Communist-leaning Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes in 1949 for this reason, 
and took part in the founding conference of the Congress for Cultural Freedom in Berlin.113 He 
wrote in Der Monat, the CCF’s German organ, that only a “Europe that is bound with the USA” 
could defeat resurgent nationalism (of which Bolshevism was a variant). The next year (1950), 
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Kogon announced at the UEF’s third conference that Bolshevism could only be staved off under 
American protection and “on the basis of a liberal constitution.”114  
Kogon was no maverick here: the guiding principles of the UEF in 1950 spoke of the 
“Soviet menace,” and praised the Americans for taking up the European cause when the continent’s 
own volition had failed. The American measures (NATO, primarily) were seen as so necessary “that 
it can be paradoxically affirmed that those European states which refuse to band together in order to 
better safeguard their sovereignty will have definitely compromised it.”115 We might look at the 
speech made by Kogon’s predecessor as president of the UEF, Hendrik Brugmans, at the 1948 UEF 
conference, held in Rome (which featured a visit and speech from Pius XII). “The first important 
fact,” Brugmans announced, “is the increasingly clear isolation of Communism and the USSR.” “No 
alliance is possible,” he adds, “between those who […] wish the Marshall Plan to succeed and those 
who are only concerned to ruin the production effort in Europe.”116 This was believed across 
Catholic Europe at the time; recall the pro-American sentiment in La Fédération and Neues 
Abendland—Europe’s two most strident Catholic, federalist journals—described above. To give just 
a few more examples from the Catholic public sphere: In Fabrègues’s La France Catholique, a 
characteristic 1948 article argued that only the Americans could lead the way to a bright, federalist, 
future, while Fabrègues himself argued, plausibly enough, that European federalism had a chance at 
working because Europe was uniting against a common enemy: Communism.117 
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Catholics had every reason to believe that the Americans were on their side and could be 
trusted.118 “Is it true, first of all, that my government is favorable to European federalism?” the 
American ambassador to France asked in La Fédération. “Yes, it is a fact.”119 This was widely 
recognized by Catholics: “The United States,” it was reported in Cahiers du Monde Nouveau in 1951, 
“are in the process of creating European Union, and they have already had some success.”120 
America was a highly enthusiastic supporter of European integration, which was seen as the 
simultaneous solution to the problem of West Germany, West European economic recovery, and 
West European defense. One historian has gone so far as to say that, after 1945, “‘Europe’ existed 
mainly in the minds of American diplomats.” Clearly, this is an overstatement, but a telling one.121 
They were not merely opponents of Bolshevism, but steadfast supporters of European federalist 
organizations, including the UEF. The most important organization here was the American 
Committee on a United Europe [ACUE], founded in 1948 and dedicated to European federalism 
precisely as a means of warding off Communism. Its first chairman was William Donovan, wartime 
head of the OSS, while his protégé, Allen Dulles, served as vice-chairman. They were joined on the 
executive committee by Thomas Braden, one of the founders of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. 
As this roster indicates, the ACUE was a Cold War institution, staffed by leading lights of the 
American intelligence community and with the access to deep coffers that implied. 
 Just as the CIA was funding a whole bevy of European cultural activities, the ACUE was 
the conduit through which American money flowed into European federalist movements. While the 
European Movement seems to have been the largest recipient of ACUE funds, there is no doubt 
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that the UEF—the more Catholic of the two major federalist organizations, and one that Donovan 
himself considered to be to be “the largest and most effective group within the European 
Movement”—also received ACUE funding from 1950 onwards.122 Donovan, Friedrich, and other 
members of the ACUE circle were convinced that, as Donovan wrote in a 1951 letter, “an effective 
and practical unity of Western Europe is the most important development which we can 
encourage.” In the same letter, he went on to give a realistic account of the state of European 
federalism: 
The idea of a free, united and independent Europe rejecting neutralism and regarding 
its relationship with America as one of ‘friendship on equal terms’ has become an 
important force in creating the morale necessary to sustain free Europe’s military and 
economic efforts.123 
 
American support for European federalism extended far beyond the sack of cash reportedly placed 
on Thomas Braden’s desk in its service.124 In March 1947, for instance, William Fulbright presented 
a Congressional resolution declaring America’s support for European federalism, while Truman 
himself was a warm and public supporter of federalism. Paul-Henri Spaak, a major player in 
European federalism, made a tour of the United States and gave a number of speeches about his 
experiences, helping to build awareness of the Americans’ attitude.125 
 To recap: federalism was the major discourse through which Catholics came to accept the 
legitimacy of the postwar order. There were deep continuities, both in terms of ideology and in 
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terms of personnel, between the Cold War federalism of the late 1940s and the royalist federalism of 
the 1920s. The political valence had changed, however: whereas royalist federalism, as we saw in Part 
I, was launched against liberal-democratic states, theorizing that democracy led necessarily to 
étatisme, this was no longer the case after 1945. There were two basic reasons for this: there were 
some changes internal to the Catholic public sphere, and Catholics were not immune to the vogue 
for America and for democracy that swept Western Europe after 1945. But the more important 
change was exogenous: Catholics of the 1920s faced liberal democratic regimes, and an international 
order, that was steadfastly hostile to their own ideas about Europe, and about sovereignty. In the 
late 1940s, this was no longer the case: liberals, socialists, and Americans agreed with Catholics that 
Europe needed to be reorganized on federalist lines, and in a more integral way than had been the 
case with the League. In this case, as in others, the language of the Cold War had deep resonance 
with that of Catholicism. 
Atlantic Catholicism (II): Jacques Maritain and Political Pluralism 
“Decentralized power” was one of the phrases in Bell’s succinct definition of the end of 
ideology: another was “political pluralism.” These might seem to be synonyms, but Bell at least 
didn’t think so, and for our own analytical purposes they can be split. The previous section traced 
the Catholic rapprochement with newly-hegemonic ideas of “decentralized power”: to wit, 
European federalism. This section will focus on “political pluralism” as the name for the domestic 
analogue of federalism. Instead of discussing federalization upwards towards federalist bodies, this 
section will focus on federalization downwards, towards the family, the church, and other 
institutions of civil society. As explained earlier, “pluralism” was the precise term in political 
philosophy, which did not filter down into general discourse with much frequency; “anti-




As with federalism, Catholics had reason to believe that Western European states were 
moving in a pluralist, anti-totalitarian direction: most obviously, Communists had everywhere left 
the government and the remaining governments were tied financially and discursively to the anti-
Communist pluralism streaming from Washington. Although this period is usually remembered as 
one of social welfare étatisme, that is not how it appeared at the time, at least in the late 1940s. 
National life was, instead, depoliticized, as families, churches, and other institutions of local civil 
society re-emerged from the fog of war to structure social life.126 This seeming paradox was most 
apparent in Germany, which was constructing a social market economy (theorized by neoliberal 
humanists like Röpke and put into practice by Catholics like Adenauer and Erhard). As Müller-
Armack described it, the social market economy would deny the state the power to “command” the 
economy, while also putting in place a number of structures (worker’s cooperatives, family 
allowances, and so on) that would parcel sovereignty amongst a series of institutions instead of 
demolishing it in the name of the market.127 
Our key figure here will be Jacques Maritain, who made more explicitly pluralist arguments 
than any other Catholic political philosopher; he also was at pains to make it clear that he was 
arguing from within the bosom of hegemonic Cold War social science. He had, recall, spent the war 
years in America, writing paeans to democracy and to America. After the Liberation, he was 
appointed as ambassador to the Vatican, where he worked to further the anti-Communist policies of 
his Pius XII; we saw him in the last chapter defending the papal letter against the MRP’s policies of 
nationalization. In 1948, he stepped down from his post at the Vatican to return to teaching and 
lecturing at Princeton. Unlike Kogon, he had been skeptical of Resistance Europe from the 
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beginning. The French intelligentsia, he wrote to Yves Simon in 1945, “is passing through a 
perfectly terrible moment. […] The people are good, the intellectuals weak and intoxicated. All the 
old and new poisons are going to their head.”128 As Resistance Europe morphed into its Atlantic 
successor, Maritain became an enormously influential figure, both inside and outside the Catholic 
public sphere. He was involved in drafting the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and he served as a French representative to the second UNESCO conference in 1947. His 
disciples, meanwhile, were active in the MRP and in the committee drafting the Italian Constitution. 
He was widely read in Germany, too: no less a personage than Joseph Eberle wrote that Maritain 
had “one of the best heads in any country.”129  
The reader familiar with Maritain might wonder why he is being presented as a pluralist and 
not as a democrat. Although he is currently most famous as a Catholic theorist of democracy, he was 
not a theorist of “Christian Democracy” in any meaningful sense of the word, as we saw in Chapter 
6.130 Maritain didn’t care about parliamentary democracy qua form of government, and he continued 
to see “liberal democracy” as the antechamber to totalitarianism. Maritain only supported a pluralist 
democracy: pluralism, and not democracy, is thus the proper way to understand Maritain’s postwar 
political theory. This leads to a more general methodological point: this chapter is emphatically not 
an account of how Catholics came to accept an essentialized notion of “democracy.” It is about 
how, at a particular moment, a certain conjunction of forces operating under the aegis of democratic 
states was conceived of as legitimate by the transnational Catholic public sphere. This is not to deny 
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the enormity of what happened: for the first time, Western Europe was united under the rule of 
stable, republican democracies. But we should also not forget, as Charles Maier and Martin Conway 
have pointed out, that stability is the more relevant axis through which to view this period than 
revolution.131 While European nations experienced rapid and total changes in governmental form, a 
basic stability in social-economic structure was maintained. And, as was discussed earlier in this 
chapter, an emphasis on stability should direct our attention away from the state and towards the 
discourses and institutions of civil society that were the true guarantors of stability. 
This was the sort of stability that Maritain theorized in his postwar works in political theory, 
most notably Man and the State: an influential work based on a wide-ranging set of lectures delivered 
in 1949. Drawing on contemporary (and secular) sociology, medieval theology, and classical 
philosophy, Maritain presented a powerful vision of human society, and one that had a family 
resemblance to non-Catholic social theories of the time. Jason Stevens, in a chapter about this 
period’s political culture in America, takes his epigraph from this work.132 The intellectual project 
was not rooted only in Maritain’s Atlantic present, but also in his integralist past. Indeed, it can best 
be seen as attempting, like so much of Catholic political thought at the time, to draw the 
connections between the two—a task that, it turned out, was like fitting a square peg in a square 
hole.  
Just as he had for decades, Maritain set his sights on the state sovereignty. He begins by 
drawing a familiar distinction between “civil society” and the “State.” These are the two spheres into 
which “society” can be divided (in distinction to the “community,” which exists at the level of the 
unconscious, language, mores, etc.). The “body politic,” or “civil society,” is composed of a complex 
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of overlapping institutions devoted to the common good: families, churches, the press, labor unions, 
and so on. The important feature here is that it is acephalous, divided into multiple legitimate 
authorities. “Such,” Maritain concludes, “is the element of pluralism inherent in every truly political 
society.”133 The State is only one of these authorities, and a quite limited one. “[The State] is not a 
man or a body of men,” Maritain writes, but “a set of institutions combined into a topmost 
machine.” By denying the Hobbesean equation of state and man, Maritain gives voice to a traditional 
fear of tyranny; more arresting is his declaration that the state should not be seen as a body of men: 
how else could a constitutional convention or a parliament be conceived? Insofar as these were 
communities dedicated to rational goals, they would be counted as part of the body politic. The state 
itself is “instrumental”: a Weberean diagnosis that Maritain actually celebrates (note the “machine” 
language). It deals in laws of mutual security, but should not be linked with any substantial morality. 
This would represent a category error, subsuming the circumscribed “Society” of the “State” to the 
morality that is more properly founded on “community” of the nation and the complex of legitimate 
authorities that make up civil society. This error, it almost goes without saying, was made in the 
nineteenth century and led to the twin totalitarianisms of the twentieth. Maritain went on to 
deconstruct the concept of “sovereignty” altogether. Drawing on the history of “sovereignty” from 
Bodin to Schmitt, Maritain showed the notion to be predicated on ontological distinction between 
the sovereign and ruled that usurped the privileged ontological status of God himself. “It is my 
contention that political philosophy must get rid of the word, as well as the concept, of 
Sovereignty.” With a nod to Kogon, Maritain concluded that the heretical illusion of state 
sovereignty had led directly to Buchenwald.134  
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The only solution to the modern impasse is “the advent of some new personalist and 
pluralist regime.” Drawing on the Scottish sociologist Robert MacIver’s notion of the “multigroup 
society,” Maritain dreamed that civil society might come to the rescue and obviate the need for the 
bacillus of sovereignty: 
All organic forms of social and economic activity, even the largest and most 
comprehensive ones, would start from the bottom, I mean from the free initiative of 
and mutual tension between the particular groups, working communities, 
cooperative agencies, unions, associations, federated bodies of producers and 
consumers, rising in tiers and institutionally recognized.135 
 
Maritain’s fundamental, animating binary, familiar from both Enlightened thought and Catholic 
sociology, thus divides civil society from the state.136 “[T]he basic political reality is not the State,” 
Maritain concludes, “but the body politic with its multifarious institutions, the multiple communities 
which it involves, and the moral community which grows out of it.”137  
As in the 1920s, Maritain was only the brightest star in a constellation of Catholic publicists 
opposed to the principle of sovereignty. “When the individual European states recognize that 
absolute sovereignty is a fiction,” Kogon announced in a 1949 speech in Berlin, “the path to the 
creation of a United States of Europe will be cleared.”138 The language of pluralism was also a 
mainstay of Catholic political culture at the time: “Pluralism or Ideology of the State” was how one 
1946 article in La Vie Intellectuelle posed the choices facing France (clearly favoring the former).139 In 
his account of the 1946 Semaine Sociale, which brought together three thousand social Catholics and a 
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handful of MRP ministers, Pierre-Henri Simon declared that “pluralism” was the concept that 
unified the disparate group. “[T]his pluralism,” Simon noted, “is entirely different from pure 
liberalism” in that it has “respect for the multiple forms of life” and “unequivocally refuses the 
atomistic conception of a society composed of indifferent parts, whether tending towards 
individualist anarchy […] or totalitarian tyranny.”140 In his review of Man and the State, Aurel 
Kolnai—whom we met in Chapter 5 as a member of Hildebrand’s circle in 1930s Vienna—declared 
that “Maritain’s constant stressing of social pluralism deserves our full attention and approval. It is in 
keeping with the best traditions in Catholic social thought[.]”141 
We can see pluralist theories in many major Catholic thinkers: François Perroux’s trajectory 
is interesting here. We have met Perroux throughout this dissertation: he was the most influential of 
the Catholic corporatist economists, and was one of the leading lights in Pétain’s social-scientific 
apparatus. He and Maritain had thus been on opposite sides of the war, but, as happened with so 
many former Catholic enemies, they were united behind Atlantic Catholicism: Perroux was, like 
Maritain, a European federalist and celebrant of American involvement on the continent.142 He was 
also a pluralist in Maritain’s sense, as he clarified in an article published in La Fédération a few weeks 
before Maritain’s lectures. He begins, in a trope that should by now seem numbingly familiar to 
readers of this dissertation, with the invocation of an ancien régime organized into a “hierarchy of 
communities: territorial (villages), professional (trade organizations), spiritual (parishes).” This had of 
course been destroyed by Jacobinism. Here Perroux would veer from his older solutions: he had 
previously wished to install Catholic ideology at the heart of a corporatist state. But now, this was 
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off the table and he allied himself with non-theocratic Atlantic Catholicism. The evil of Jacobinism, 
Perroux now held, was not the specifics of its ideology, but the fact that it was ideological at all: the 
essence of Jacobinism is “the use of power and organized force in the service of an ideology.” This created “the 
germ of totalitarianism.” Perroux declared, in a formulation almost identical to Maritain’s, that a 
solution required the recognition that “pluralism is inherent to societies of men.”  This, in turn, 
requires supporting the West in the Cold War: Russia proposes “an ideological form” for the world, 
while the Americans are beyond ideology.143  
Similar themes can be tracked in the postwar writings of Franz-Josef Schöningh. As one of 
few Bavarian Catholics to enjoy wide name-recognition, alongside physical survival and a clean anti-
Nazi record, he became quite prominent after 1945, as editor of Hochland and cultural editor of the 
newly-founded Süddeutsche Zeitung. Like other figures discussed in this chapter, he was not a 
partisan— in the judgment of the Americans, Schöningh “favors but does not belong to the 
CSU”144—but he did support the legitimacy of the new Western European regimes and their Cold 
War mission. His political pluralism can best be seen in a widely-discussed essay, titled simply 
“Christian Politics?”, that appeared in Hochland in April 1949. The answer to the title question was a 
qualified No: like Maritain, Schöningh emphasized that we live in a secular age, in which the Church 
can and should not hope to wield political power. Christians should certainly not abstain from 
politics, but they should abstain from the notion that their ideology, or any other, could take the 
reins of state power. Coming close to the minimalist definition Maritain would announce a few 
months later, Schöningh defined the political as “the sum of measures which are directed towards 
the common good in the state and in the communities that build it.” We can, he concluded, 
                                                
143 François Perroux, “Les nations partisanes,” La Fédération 58 (November 1949), 601-14, here 601, 602 (emphasis in 
original), 606, 605, 611.  
144 “Individual sketches of 32 Newspapers in the American Zone.” Dated 17 January 1947. Information Control 




collaborate with socialists (Communists are significantly unnamed) insofar as they too are working 
towards the common good.145 
The most obvious manifestation of pluralism was the ubiquity of totalitarianism theory, 
some instances of which were discussed in the section reviewing the Catholic public sphere. While, 
as Part II of the dissertation demonstrated, totalitarianism theory was originally a Catholic idea, by 
the late 1940s it had exploded across the European and American public sphere.146  
One privileged locus of European pluralism was federalism itself, insofar as both theories were 
based on the overcoming of state sovereignty. Federalism and totalitarianism theory were happy 
bedfellows in the late 1940s, as Antonin Cohen has pointed out.147 Each discourse assumed the same 
historical narrative, one that Catholics had been shoring up for decades: the notion that sovereignty 
was the sinister force lurking behind European catastrophe. The programmatic Principes du fédéralisme 
includes a discussion of left and right totalitarianisms, while Jean Daujat penned a long 1946 article 
called, “Individualism, Totalitarianism, or Federalism” (he would argue, characteristically, that the 
first led necessarily to the second, leaving only federalism as the solution). Denis de Rougemont, 
who was not a Catholic but played an important role in early federalism, announced at a major 1947 
conference in Montreux that “there is totalitarianism, and there is federalism. A menace and a hope. 
This antithesis dominates the century.”148 
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Kogon here presents a particularly interesting case. Recall that totalitarianism theory, as we 
saw in Chapters 4 and 5, arose when it became politically necessary for Catholics to equate Nazism 
and Bolshevism. For a few hopeful years after the liberation, this did not seem necessary, so Kogon 
shied away from using the theory: totalitarianism theory was not included in the first version of Der 
SS-Staat (1946), as Kogon was still committed to a Germany in which Communists, then enjoying 
Europe-wide sympathy as prominent resisters, could collaborate with Christians and socialists. By 
1948, though, this was no longer in the cards: the joint effects of the Prague coup and the Marshall 
Plan had convinced him, along with other federalists, that a federalist Europe could only be an 
Atlantic Europe. In that year, he published “Terror as a System of Power” in Frankfurter Hefte, which 
then appeared in the new edition of Der SS-Staat that appeared in 1949. Here, Kogon talks about the 
“Bolshevik-totalitarian” system and compares it to the Nazi system explored in the book.149 
Of course it was not only in European federalism that totalitarianism theory enjoyed a new 
hegemony after 1945: along with federalism, anti-totalitarian pluralism was one of the axes of 
Catholic rapprochement with the Cold War order. The lectures on which Maritain’s Man and the State 
were based were not delivered at the integralist Institut Catholique, as his World War I lectures had 
been. Although the ideas contained were similar, he was now lecturing in the prestigious Walgreen 
Foundation Lectures at the University of Chicago (alongside Arendt, Schumpeter, Leo Strauss, 
Voegelin, et al.). Indeed, Maritain had found a congenial home in Chicago, which had, under the 
leadership of Robert Hutchins, become a key incubator of Cold War social science, and a central 
conduit between European exiles and America. He had actually been involved with Hutchins & Co. 
(notably Mortimer Adler and John Nef) since the early 1930s. “It is with great emotion that I think 
about my next visit to Chicago,” he had written to Nef in 1938. “I have a profound sentiment of the 
great thing that happen there, and to work there under the leadership of President Hutchins […] will 
                                                




be a great joy for me.”150 Maritain’s friend, Waldemar Gurian, was part of the Chicago circle, too: he 
was also friendly with Hutchins, Adler, Morgenthau, and other Chicago figures. Jerome Kerwin and 
Morgenthau actually attempted to get Gurian hired at Chicago (as was reported in the Notre Dame 
Scholastic, Gurian’s Review of Politics had more readers at Chicago than at Notre Dame).151 
Chicago was one of the central loci of transnational Cold War political thought, but it was 
not alone in its anti-modernism and congeniality to Catholicism. The Cold War version of 
democracy was decidedly not the “totalitarian democracy” of Rousseau, in which the atomized 
crowds, produced by modernity, could steer the state towards violence. It was the more subdued 
democracy of Tocqueville: a democracy that could, through political pluralism, actively forestall the 
atomizing effects of modernization through religion and civil society.152 “The dominant reading of 
power in mid-twentieth-century America,” Dan Rodgers reports, was “interest-group pluralism.”153 
As Edward Purcell has demonstrated, theorists of American democracy, in response to the rise of 
“totalitarianism,” theorized an open-ended democratic experiment, built around interest-group 
pluralism, the politics of consensus, and general ideological inclusiveness (this would reach its 
apogee in the work of Robert Dahl). As a Rockefeller Foundation report would later argue, “the 
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effort to impose unity of belief in matters of religion and ultimate philosophy, far from unifying a 
society, can lead to extraordinary bloodshed and brutality.”154 
Isaiah Berlin’s value pluralism found its analogue in a social theory of pluralism that became 
important to Cold War social science in both Europe and America; both versions of the theory were 
founded in the same suspicion of centralized power. “Liberalism is a system of pluralism,” Edward 
Shils announced. “It is a system of many centers of power, many areas of privacy and a strong 
internal impulse toward the mutual adaptation of the spheres rather than of the dominance or the 
submission of any one to the others.” Raymond Aron refers to “[d]emocratic societies, which I 
prefer to call pluralistic societies.”155 Socialists, too, began to make pluralistic arguments: Ernst 
Fraenkel is the most famous figure in this regard.156 
These social scientists theorized a democracy congenial to the Catholic imagination (Maritain 
came to celebrate Tocqueville in particular), and in fact a form of democracy for which Catholics 
had long been calling. Maritain, who drew liberally on Tocqueville for his political theory, is the 
most obvious example: his Integral Humanism, as we saw in Chapter 4, called for a “personalist” 
democracy. This was not as revolutionary as normally thought: as we have seen elsewhere, various 
Catholic reactionaries had stated in the 1920s, following Leo XIII’s line in Immortale Dei, that the 
form of government was irrelevant. They had simply claimed that democracy, as it existed at the 
time, was incompatible with Catholicism. This changed, however: when democracies understood 
themselves to be pluralist—when their logic could be dislodged from the secular logic of étatisme—
Catholics could believe in and support their legitimacy. 
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Atlantic Catholicism (III): Waldemar Gurian and America 
We return at last to Waldemar Gurian, who has been, in a way, the beating heart of this 
dissertation. A refugee from Soviet Russia to Nazi Germany to Cold War America: if the spirit of 
world history travels from nation to nation, as Hegel theorized, Gurian was one of those doomed to 
be dragged in its wake. But while he had been a harsh critic of Bolshevism and Nazism, and was the 
first to join the two under the rubric of “totalitarianism,” he had no such harsh words for his final 
home. Like many other Catholics, both in America and abroad, Gurian became enamored with 
America, both as a force for good in European politics and as a model of a religious path to 
modernity. His friend, Jacques Maritain, told Georges Bidault that one of the main reasons he 
wanted to give up his post at the Vatican was to return to America and further Franco-American 
friendship; “I love America,” Maritain wrote to Mortimer Adler in 1940, “and I think that it is, aside 
from France, the only country in which I could live.”157 And while Gurian had, in the Weimar 
period, seen capitalism and America as modern pathologies, to be overcome by a religious 
renaissance and a new form of Christendom, by the late 1940s he was one of America’s most 
persistent Catholic champions, and his journal, the Review of Politics, a central locus of Cold War 
social science. 158 He spoke at Hutchins’s University of Chicago on the virtues of the Marshall 
Plan.159 He brought his new love for America back to Europe, speaking at the Amerika-Häuser set up 
by OMGUS and writing in German newspapers, both Catholic and secular, on American foreign 
policy; he also wrote for Der Monat (Germany’s CCF organ) and lectured on Bolshevism in 
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Austria.160 By 1950, writing in Rheinischer Merkur, Gurian could claim that the United States “is not 
too imperialist, on the contrary, it is not imperialist enough.”161 
The place of America in postwar Europe, and the extent to which its history can be 
described as “Americanization,” has occasioned intense debate. Nonetheless, a rough consensus has 
formed that, as Mary Nolan reports, “everywhere in western Europe hegemonic America was the 
model of modernity with which Europeans had to deal.”162 This was true politically, as well: the 
Americans had an obvious role in setting up the new West German state, whereas the Americans 
were, as Irwin Wall has shown, deeply involved in French politics.163 While these debates will be in 
the background of this chapter, I will be more interested in thinking about the image of “America” 
in the Catholic public sphere, and the ways in which appreciation for American culture lubricated 
Catholic acceptance of the political and culture shape of the new Western Europe. Whereas interwar 
Catholics had, with few exceptions, seen America as the mechanical menace to be avoided at all 
costs, postwar Catholics—responding, of course, to the more general enthusiasm for American 
dollars, consumer goods, and films—largely felt otherwise. While there were certainly pockets of 
anti-Americanism, these were marginal. As a whole, the Catholic public sphere came to accept 
America. Or, at least, the image of America that was prevalent at the time: an unstable mixture of 
social reality, American self-presentation, and European projection. Catholics imagined themselves 
to be part of a “West” that expanded to America: Ernst von Hippel, a prominent postwar federalist 
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and jurist, described the “Euro-American cultural circle” in a 1946 article: a conjunction that would 
have been unthinkable earlier (especially in the 1930s, when Hippel had prolifically published under 
the Nazi regime).164 “The attitude of the United States,” Fessard wrote in 1950, “attempting to 
restore their power and that of the West [Occident], seems to me largely reasonable.”165 “As a matter 
of fact,” Maritain announced in a 1952 speech, “the Atlantic is now becoming that which the 
Mediterranean was for thirty centuries—the domestic sea of Western civilization.”166 
The Americans went out of their way to legitimate this interpretation, which was clearly in 
their national interest. This was especially true in Germany, where America had the clearest impact 
on European reconstruction. OMGUS officials, like Americans at home, went out of their way to 
speak the language of Catholicism: “The true reform of the German people will come from within. 
It will be spiritual and moral,” declared a prominent OMGUS official at Berchtesgaden in 1948; he 
went on to refine “the so-called German problem” into “a European problem and a part of the 
moral collapse of civilization.”167 The occupying authorities did all they could to help the church. 
OMGUS, despite the reservations of some of its officials, did all it could to portray a Resistance 
Church, whose universal values of freedom had kept it from succumbing to fascism. “The church 
emerged from the catacombs of physical ruin and spiritual disorder,” reads one internal report, as 
“(1) the only voice that had consistently been raised in opposition to the excesses of Nazism, (2) the 
strongest source of order in the early days of the occupation, and (3) almost the only remaining 
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organization touching a majority of the people.”168 They were responding, perhaps, to Soviet 
provocation: whether true or not, internal documents indicate that OMGUS was under the 
impression that Communists were attempting “to discredit leading church personalities in the eyes 
of the Americans.”169  
The center of the OMGUS effort was the Cultural and Religious Affairs Branch, which 
agitated within OMGUS for the centrality of the Churches to postwar strategy. Marshall Knappen, a 
political scientist from the University of Chicago and former priest, spoke for many in this division 
(of which he was Chief) when he declared Nazism and Christianity to be “theoretically 
incompatible.”170 Their intervention, for instance, ensured that the Churches would not be classed as 
cultural organizations, and thus be spared the indignities of licensing and oversight: this was done, 
explains one of the leaders of the branch, so that “the Churches might carry out their mission as the 
spiritual foundation of the new democracy.”171 They put on exhibitions about the resisting church 
(both Catholic and Protestant), for instance, and released precious paper supplies to collections of 
documents purporting to show that the Church had been, behind the scenes, a stalwart opponent of 
Nazism. Perhaps the extent of OMGUS’s infatuation with the Church can best be seen from the 
viewpoint of a minority: the socialist Arthur Eggleston, chief of the Press Control Branch. “So many 
MG [Military Government] officers are over-awed by holy office,” he lamented. They “allow religion 
to influence their political thinking, [and] are over-inclined to favor the clergy as against any other 
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group of citizens.”172 Eggleston argued that the Church was full of reactionaries and had been a 
happy collaborator with National Socialism: ironically, at least one official in the Cultural and 
Religious Affairs divisions seems to have agreed with him. “History must be re-written,” he 
announced in a 1948 radio address, “so as to emphasize the long and difficult struggle for 
tolerance.”173 
 The Americans were also extremely interested in bringing Europeans to America so that they 
could see their pious democracy firsthand (we have already seen their hosting of Paul-Henri Spaak 
and, through the Rockefeller Foundation, Eugen Kogon).174 In April 1949, Urban Fleege reported, 
there were “40 German Catholic experts who are leaders of various Catholic organizations 
observing religious activities in the United States.”175 These efforts paid off: Cardinal von Preysing 
visited America in February 1947 and, two months later, reported to his flock, “It will be a 
consolation and encouragement for you to learn that our holy church over there is prospering. […] 
The Catholic schools in America have impressed me deeply. It is a wonderful system.”176 Paul 
Bolkovac, who visited for six months, wrote a long travelogue for Stimmen der Zeit, reporting on the 
strength of the Church in small town America.177 This appreciation for America as a civilization was 
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matched by appreciation for its ideas: we have already seen Jean Lorraine’s suggestion, in La 
Fédération, that Europe must choose between the spirit of Lincoln and that of Lenin. Josef 
Hoffmann, in an essay on personalism and democracy, compared the American Revolution 
favorably with its French successor, lauding the “wisdom” of the founding fathers, who knew to 
avoid absolute democracy by setting up a network of institutions between the unruly masses and the 
levers of power. 178 It was especially common to see American federalism as a possible model for 
Europe’s own future.179 
To fully understand the Catholic appreciation for America—to understand a world in which 
a German Catholic exile could write to a bishop that “I am now beginning to feel thoroughly at 
home in American literature”180—we must turn to changes in American social thought. “Anti-
totalitarianism” and “pluralism,” in addition to being theories with their own conceptual trajectories, 
were nourished by a widespread sense that the rationalist, enlightenment project and its attendant 
social engineering had failed (a Partisan Review series called this a “Failure of Nerve”). Although the 
intellectual history of the late 1940s and 1950s is in its infancy, it seems clear that intellectuals across 
America and Western Europe became convinced of the limited capacities of reason to reorder 
society, or even to fully understand it.181 There were, of course, radical versions of this theory afoot: 
Adorno, Horkheimer, Heidegger, Strauss, and others, in a move that has become familiar (Agamben, 
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Bauman …), blamed the European catastrophe on the “modern project,” however understood, as 
such.182 These figures remained, at least for the time being, on the margins: they did, though, 
radicalize a suspicion of Enlightenment that was becoming widespread in the late 1940s. This had 
not happened after World War I to a comparable degree: the jackboots and spiked helmets of the 
Prussians could readily be ascribed to an exhausted and decadent past, to be overcome by an 
enlightened future. Although there were obviously rumblings of discontent, hegemonic political 
discourse had remained celebratory of the modern project. The utopian hopes of the Wilsonian 
moment—more widespread and historically significant than the paeans to decadence and exhaustion 
cropping up in The Dial or Dada—were essentially in line with the Kantian cosmopolitanism of 
nineteenth-century liberalism. The Hun of the post-WWI liberal imaginary was marked by his 
atavism, and not his modernity.183 
Nazism was understood differently: its most important early interpreters saw something 
intrinsically modern in the Nazi project. They drew upon a cluster of post-Weberean developments 
of sociology (Mannheim, Ortega y Gasset, Frankfurt School) that criticized modern societies for its 
“mass” basis, for its tendency to pulverize political groupings in the name of individualism. This 
was, of course, true of Catholics, who had been saying so since at least 1932: one of the central 
features of Catholic totalitarianism theory, recall, was that both Nazism and Communism were 
rooted in the failures of the Enlightenment project. But whereas Gurian in 1932 had been speaking 
to a small circle of co-religionists, Catholics by the late 1940s had a more important platform. Eugen 
Kogon and Max Picard were read, it seems, by everyone. They were now joined by many others 
across the Euro-American public sphere who believed that liberal capitalism’s dislocations and 
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Vermassung were at the root of totalitarianism: Hannah Arendt, Raymond Aron, Carl Friedrich, Karl 
Löwith, Franz Neumann, Eric Voegelin, Alfred Weber, and more converged on some version of this 
thesis.  
This was part of a more widespread suspicion of Enlightenment modernity: Ze’ev Sternhell 
has referred to “The Anti-Enlightenment of the Cold War.”184 While the phrasing is provocative, 
Sternhell refers to the familiar Cold War skepticism of rationality and liberal theories of progress, the 
familiar Cold War invocation of the “dark side” of human and political nature, the twin realisms of 
Niebuhr and Morgenthau, the putatively adult understandings of inevitable conflict and tragedy.185 
This is not “anti-Enlightenment” in the radical sense of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, but suspicion of 
modernity in a softer key: the familiar invocation of family values and robust civil society as 
necessary corrective to social engineering. Certain figures—Burke, Tocqueville—were revived as 
distinguished forebears of this political maturity, while others—Rousseau above all—were pilloried 
as theorists and harbingers of “totalitarian democracy.” In his consideration of American social 
sciences of the 1940s and 1950s, Ira Katznelson demonstrates the widespread nature of the belief 
“that a simple reassertion of liberal modernism had become radically insufficient.”186 Richard 
Crossman, in his preface to one of the central texts of the period’s intellectual history, explains that  
[t]he intellectual attraction of Marxism was that it exploded liberal fallacies—which 
really were fallacies. It taught the bitter truth that progress is not automatic, that 
boom and slump are inherent in capitalism, that social injustice and racial 
discrimination are not cured merely by the passage of time.187 
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The “God that Failed,” of course, was Communism, and no God arose to take its place—not even 
liberalism. The post-ideological, pluralist state had no room for state religion, or for a God at its 
helm. But it was not, for that reason, secular. As Christians had claimed for centuries, and as was 
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